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This thesis examines the role of patients’ preferences in post-diagnostic prostate cancer 
treatment appointments, focusing specifically on patients’ preferences as interactive 
constructions. Patients’ preferences are acknowledged as key to shared decision-making 
while prostate cancer treatment decisions are considered highly preference sensitive. Despite 
recognition of patients’ preferences and a desire for routine shared decision-making, little is 
known about patients’ preferences in situ with empirical observational research scarce. 
Prostate cancer is an ideal site for investigating patients’ preferences because treatment 
options for localised prostate cancer have equivalent effectiveness.  
 
Twenty-one naturally occurring post-diagnostic prostate cancer treatment appointments were 
recorded to collect the empirical materials. A combination of discursive psychology and 
conversation analysis was used to analyse the recordings and explore the role of patients’ 
preferences.  
 
Across the three analytic chapters I focused on the ways that patients constructed preferences 
and the forms patients’ preferences could take and made the following observations. First, 
patients indeed constructed preferences in situ and there was heterogeneity both in the forms 
of preferences and the interactive work comprising their construction. Second, I reported that 
rather than being straightforwardly elicited and integrated into decision-making business, 
preferences met with two distinct patterns of receipt and handling by clinical nurse 
specialists. Third, the production of laughter was revealed to be consequential for decision-
making business by functioning to perform subtle preference work and sanction progress.  
 
This thesis therefore provides support for treating patients’ preferences as interactive 
constructions and extends our understanding of preference construction in treatment decision-
making by demonstrating heterogeneity in the conversational and discursive resources that 
patients mobilise. Observations about the distinct handling of patients’ preferences 
responsive to their interactional consequences also extend conversation analytic work on 
differences between shared decision-making behaviour as modelled and attempts at 
accomplishment in situ.  
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Thesis introduction  
 
 
Why, how and interest and motivation 
 
This research arose out of conversations with my research supervisor Dr. Mike Rennoldson, 
around the difficulties in the clinic of making informed decisions about cancer treatment. 
He’d noticed in his clinical practice working as a psycho-oncologist in a local Urological 
Cancer service that there were several live issues around how men with prostate cancer make 
treatment decisions – particularly regretting treatment choices after the fact. Looking further 
into this, the case of prostate cancer became a particularly interesting case because of the 
issue of treatment equipoise, which had attracted some media attention such as a Radio 4 
discussion. I was already alive to many of the issues around treatment decision making and 
treatment effects in cancer through prior work on a cervical cancer support project. 
 
I came into the project with a strong interest in language and social interaction, so naturally 
this was the lens I brought to bear on the issue, and I started to read more deeply into the 
history of research and practice in treatment decision making. Shared decision-making 
(SDM) was the culmination of a push towards a more involving and equitable practitioner-
patient relationship after longstanding historical acceptance of a paternalistic model. 
Subsequently SDM has become an increasingly commonplace aspect of contemporary 
healthcare research and practice. Indeed, in the United Kingdom SDM is a central pillar of 
the National Health Service’s (NHS) long-term plan and concept of Universal Personalised 
Care (NHS England, 2019). Furthermore, SDM is largely understood to be ethically 
admirable or in some cases an ethical imperative or part of a legal framework (Coulter et al., 
2017). 
 
There remains, however, much work to be done both on SDM and the component parts of the 
decision-making process such as patients’ preferences. The most pressing practical issue, I 
discovered, is that practitioners were seen to attempt only infrequently to involve patients’ 
preferences in decision-making and in some cases attempt no patient involvement (Couët et 
al., 2015). Furthermore, patients’ preferences do not accord with the final treatment received 
but rather the standard medical concerns of the clinician (Scherr et al., 2017).  
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I therefore became interested in focusing on preferences themselves, such as how preferences 
being checked or elicited came to become recognisable preferences. My primary research 
question was therefore: How do patients’ preferences shape treatment discussions in 
decision-making appointments?  
 
For the second component of my research question, I focused on two related but distinct 
moments in the appointments. The first was the ways that the clinical nurse specialists 
(CNSs) responded to patients’ preferences, which would be the crucial pivot on which the 
feasibility of patients’ preferences would hinge. Related to this first moment was the 
consequences that patients’ preferences had for the decision-making business, as revealed in 
three insightful conversation analytic studies (Landmark et al., 2015, 2016, 2017). 
 
Having discussed the inspiration behind my research and the motivation for taking a language 
and social interaction position, I will now briefly summarise the individual thesis chapters.  
 
Overview of chapter structure 
 
My first chapter is part one of a two-part background literature review that contextualises and 
provides the rationale for my original research. Chapter 1 recounts how the first model of 
SDM eventually replaced centuries of paternalistic care before it covers and reviews 
subsequent developments. A particular focus will fall on patients’ preferences and how they 
assumed notable prominence as an essential element of SDM while simultaneously proving 
to be a difficult concept to implement in practice. 
 
In chapter 2 I cover approaches to the study of face-to-face healthcare interactions, outlining 
and reviewing three distinct traditions. First, interaction systems analysis; second, critical 
interaction analysis; and third, language and social interaction research. As I take the 
language and social interaction approach, I subsequently overview the branch of this research 
dedicated to healthcare interactions in detail. After demonstrating the applicability to SDM 
and patients’ preferences, I highlight key gaps in the research literature and then make the 
case for using discursive psychology specifically. 
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In chapter 3 I cover my research design and methodology in addition to providing more 
contextual information about the research site. To begin, I provide relevant information about 
prostate cancer treatment appointments and the role of CNSs. I then report the process of 
attaining ethical approval, discuss related ethical issues, and outline the data collection 
process. The data management strategy is then discussed, per my arrangement to archive 
research data for ten years post-completion. A detailed account of my theoretical and 
analytical framework spanning ethnomethodology to conversation analysis and discursive 
psychology follows before an account of transcription conventions concludes the chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 is the first analytical chapter and focuses on patients constructing preferences in 
situ as linguistic and psychological phenomena. Across the chapter I examine the distinct 
forms that patients’ preferences can take, and the varied strategies patients use to construct 
preferences. I first inspect straightforward construction projects and constructed preferences 
to establish familiarity with the phenomena and argument for constructedness. Furthermore, I 
demonstrate how the construction work of accounting for a firm, or decision-implicative, 
preference came after the formulation of that preference rather than lead up to it. Next, I 
focus on patients using and invoking psychological phenomena such as cognitive processes, 
emotion categories, and mental states as resources for preference construction. Lastly, I 
explore extended multi-turn construction projects wherein patients using previous 
experiences as an explanatory resource for constructing present preferences. Ultimately, my 
analysis reveals that not only did patients construct preferences in situ, but that both 
preferences and preference construction projects were heterogenous. 
 
Chapter 5 begins with the suggestion that preferences alone may be insufficient to influence 
the treatment decision. In turn, I extend the analytic focus from preference construction to the 
receipt and handling of patients’ preferences by the CNSs. I report on two patterns of CNS-
side receipt and handling that were seen throughout the dataset. The first pattern was 
receiving patients’ preferences as straightforward and unproblematic. Closer analysis 
revealed that this pattern was typically associated with preferences that had simple sequential 
and institutional implications, such as requesting the institutionally recommended treatment 
of surgery, which CNSs could therefore sanction with relative ease. By contrast, the second 
pattern of receipt and handling was preferences that proved challenging to the business of the 
appointment. This pattern was observed when the sequential and institutional implications 
were less straightforward such as seeking to avoid an unavoidable side effect or requesting an 
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unconfirmed treatment option. I go on to reveal how CNSs moved to either undermine the 
preference or avoid ascriptions of accountability around preferences that cannot be 
sanctioned.  
 
Chapter 6 remains focused on patients’ preferences but examines more tacit preference 
behaviour. I focus on laughter production in decision-making conversations and the function 
of laughter for both SDM and patients’ preferences specifically. Laughter production was 
seen to be consequential for sequential progress, and therefore also relevant for 
accomplishing decision-making business. First, I report on one function of laughter being to 
straightforwardly sanction sequential progress comparable to standard acknowledgement 
tokens such as mm or uh huh. I contend that laughter approximates a positive preference by 
demonstrating that there is no present problem to what a patient wants from their healthcare. 
The second function of laughter was also relevant for sequential progress but involved longer 
and typically shared laughter sequences. In this section I explore how parties use laughter to 
either manage or avoid potentially delicate moments by creating distance and space to 
exchange laughter. Finally, I examine the pattern of treating seriousness as a flexible 
interactive resource to frame or receive talk as serious, non-serious, or a combination of both. 
A flexible notion of seriousness allowed patients and clinicians alike to soften potentially 
delicate actions either ins service of restoring or preserving sequential progress. Ultimately, 
laughter was seen to be a subtle but effective way to negotiate the state of preferences in situ 
as appointments progressed. 
 
Lastly, chapter 7 concludes the thesis with the first section summarising the rationale for my 
research, the aims of my research, and my analytic findings by chapter. I then discuss 
limitations of the research before going on to detail the contributions that my research makes 
to the varied academic literatures. Recommendations for clinical practice derived from my 
analytic findings and focused on accomplishing SDM and performing meaningful patient 
involvement, follow. The final section posits future directions to take for furthering research 












This opening chapter will provide the first of a two-part literature review and background 
section to introduce, situate, and present the rationale for my original research. The particular 
focus is on my research topic, broadly shared decision-making (hereafter SDM), and more 
specifically patient’s preferences. To begin, the practitioner-patient relationship will be 
introduced, and its development traced from historically paternalistic approaches up to the 
cusp of SDM. Shared decision-making as an approach to the practitioner-patient relationship 
will subsequently follow and the first definitions and models shall be detailed. Next, I cover 
the models and developments that followed this initial work and introduce patients’ 
preferences as a key component of SDM. A discussion of some of the problems with and 
facing SDM and patients’ preferences rounds out this coverage. The penultimate section 
provides information about prostate cancer such as diagnosis, treatment options, and long-
term outcomes to give the clinical context of my research. I conclude this chapter by first 
bringing together prostate cancer and SDM and then summarising the chapter.  
 
1.1 The practitioner-patient relationship: Paternalism and the sick role 
 
Across this chapter I will attempt to provide an overview of the development of the 
practitioner-patient relationship as it eventually moved into SDM. The historical narrative of 
this overview, however, is an Anglo-centric one, and there are two reasons for this approach. 
The first reason is that the historical evidence on practice is scarce and the account reflects 
this limited prominence. Secondly, in attempting to keep to major contributions to the 
development of SDM, I found that a lot of this work occurred in the Anglosphere. The 
research that this introduces, then, is situated in that intellectual and practice context so it is 
highly relevant, even if we must acknowledge that practices in other places are neglected by 
this literature. I also wish to make a note on terminology before proceeding further. When 
discussing research literature, such as in chapters 1, 2, and 7 I use the terms practitioner and 
practitioner-patient relationship to encompass the diversity of healthcare roles represented in 
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the literature reviewed. However, when focusing on my research in chapters 3-6, I use the 
terms clinician and clinician-patient relationship since my data concerns clinical nurse 
specialists. The only exception is the interprofessional model of SDM (Légare et al., 2011) 
which is a model inextricable from its precise terminology choices and for which I used the 
authors’ specific term. 
 
The practitioner-patient relationship is usually an integral part of the provision of care by 
healthcare practitioners to the sick. A healthcare encounter necessarily consists of a 
healthcare practitioner and an individual requiring some form of medical attention or advice. 
Although healthcare encounters predate the Hippocratic Oath, it provides a useful starting 
point from which to trace the traditional approach to practitioner-patient relationships and its 
subsequent development. The Hippocratic Oath put in place a code of practice and provides 
an early example of medical ethics. Beneficence, or the act of providing the best care to the 
best of a practitioner’s ability, is one of the guiding principles of the Hippocratic Oath (Kaba 
& Sooriakumaran, 2007). The related concept of nonmalfeasance, meaning not to cause 
harm, is another guiding principle. Taken together, beneficence and nonmalfeasance stand as 
the starting point of what would become the paternalistic approach to practitioner-patient 
relationships. Taken to the extreme, beneficence and nonmalfeasance preclude divergences 
from practitioners’ views of the best care. Practitioners’ views on the best care may be 
subject to bias and might disregard patients’ suggestions where the practitioner considers an 
option to carry excessive risk.  
 
One of the earliest academic understandings of the paternalistic practitioner-patient 
relationship was found in Talcott Parsons’ book The Social System (1951). Parsons, one of 
the leading voices of sociology, was chairman of the social relations department at Harvard 
and was particularly interested in the structures comprising societies. In addition to being 
published by one of the leading voices of sociology, there was another reason that The Social 
System was significant. That is, Parsons had embedded a historical model of the practitioner-
patient relationship in a contemporary model of society and social systems. In turn, the 
suggestion was that this model of the practitioner-patient relationship was not a historical 
relic but rather both operative and contemporary. Parsons’ model of the practitioner-patient 
relationship, then, reflected the lack of mainstream progress to date in terms of establishing 
an equitable and involving practitioner-patient relationship. Here it is crucial to remark that 
Parsons, being a sociologist more broadly rather than a medical sociologist, was interested 
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less in practitioner-patient interaction specifically and more in the social world and social 
order. In turn, it especially noteworthy that Parsons’ concept of the sick role, which I will 
discuss in the following paragraph, became a widely adopted and long-standing feature of 
medical sociology (Burnham, 2014).  
 
Illness, for Parsons, was therefore part of the social order of the world and held a particular 
role within the workings of the social world and its order. Patients would occupy the sick 
role, an undesirable state of illness where they seek assistance from and henceforth cooperate 
with professional medical expertise to avoid claims of motivated social deviance (Parsons, 
1951). Those occupying the sick role were exempt from their typical responsibilities while 
those that were well had obligations to support the ill (Parsons, 1951). As occupants of the 
sick role were exempt from typical responsibilities, it was considered important that 
occupants appeared unmotivated. Parsons contended that “the sick role involves a relative 
legitimacy” (Parsons, 1951, p. 211, emphasis in original), which was seen in this requirement 
that patients appear unmotivated. Unmotivated meant that the patient was not actively 
engaged in the deviant act of not performing their societal role but rather genuinely unable to 
perform that role (Parsons, 1951). Since the sick role entailed a deviation from social order 
Parsons’ argument rested on assumptions of deviance and legitimacy. Parsons further argued 
that the sick role was acceptable if the illness and subsequent cooperation with professional 
medical expertise were legitimate (Parsons, 1951).  
 
Critics of Parsons’ functionalist concept of the sick role argued that it was effectively a 
normative ideal rather than a record of variable illness behaviour (Segall, 1976; Twaddle, 
1969) Furthermore, that Parsons characterised the sick role as a set of expectations, particular 
rights, and obligations. Parsons, they argued, had constructed an ideal type of individual 
behaviour instead of characterising the behaviour of sick individuals. As Parsons’ project was 
theoretical, it is unsurprising that the sick role was conceptual and theoretical in nature. That 
said, it is a problem that the sick role does not have an empirical basis if it was to be treated 
as representative of interactions between patients and practitioners. Another issue that 
Parsons’ critics took with the sick role was that they considered it problematic for chronic 
illnesses. That is, for people with chronic illnesses, a temporary exemption from duty could 
never be sufficient. Therefore, critics of Parsons’ vision of the sick role suggested his system 
excluded this large and important group of patients (Segall, 1976). While Parsons might not 
have made sufficiently clear that the sick role was not exclusive to acute illness in The Social 
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System (1951), he clarified his position in a talk given over 20 years after its publication 
(Parsons, 1975). Furthermore, some later scholars would also consider the critics’ 
characterisation of chronic illness as an issue as having been a misrepresentation of Parsons’ 
work (Gerhardt, 1987). 
 
That said, Parsons’ notion that people must be unmotivated in occupying the sick role sits 
uncomfortably with later 20th century treatment approaches which require patients to actively 
contribute to decisions, such as those developed for chronic or terminal illnesses. Parsons’ 
sick role concept also found itself replaced over time by a newer focus on health behaviour, 
which suggested that a more active approach to health and illness had assumed greater 
prominence (Burnham, 2014). Although Parsons (1951) may have formalised a model of the 
paternalistic practitioner-patient relationship, this was not his sole aim nor the singular 
intended function of The Social System. Indeed, Parsons’ sick role was simply part of his 
larger theory of social order and social systems, of which illness comprised one component. 
It is therefore necessary to consider subsequent developments in the practitioner-patient 
relationship that focused squarely on this relationship.  
 
1.2 Developing alternatives to the paternalistic relationship 
 
Only five years later psychiatrists Thomas Szasz and Marc Hollender (1956) outlined a more 
diverse characterisation of patients’ roles. Although psychiatrists, Szasz and Hollender wrote 
about healthcare encounters more generally and outlined activity-passivity, guidance-
cooperation, and mutual participation as three basic models of the practitioner-patient 
relationship. These three models were also conceptual and would later be used to illustrate a 
historical overview of the practitioner-patient relationship (Szasz et al., 1958). In the activity-
passivity model, practitioners and patients would provide and receive medical activity 
respectively with no active role for patients. Activity-passivity was considered appropriate 
only when patients’ conditions precluded active roles in the encounters. Patients did have an 
ostensibly active role in guidance-cooperation; however, the expectation of the role was that 
patients simply comply with the practitioner’s direction. A patient would not be expected to 
contribute, but rather follow the practitioner’s directives, the roles therefore being 
asymmetric. In turn, the name guidance-cooperation is partially misleading as patients’ 
cooperation is effectively compliance or obedience rather than working together. Activity-
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passivity and guidance-cooperation were both paternalistic models of the practitioner-patient 
relationship, and therefore only one of the three models proposed was considered to have an 
active role for patients. Szasz and Hollender (1956) characterised activity-passivity as 
prototypical of parent-infant relationships and guidance-cooperation prototypical of parent-
child relationships. Here, the influence of the psychoanalytic ideas on the childhood origins 
of adult social behaviour of Szasz and Hollender’s time was visible in their characterisation.  
 
The third model was mutual participation (Szasz & Hollender, 1956) and this approach was 
distinct from the paternalistic activity-passivity and guidance-cooperation. Mutual 
participation afforded contributory roles both to patient and practitioner. Patient and 
practitioner would establish a partnership and work to help each other towards a solution to 
the patient’s problem. Unlike activity-passivity and guidance-cooperation, mutual 
participation was prototypical of a relationship between two adults. Increasing the focus on 
the patient as a person and active participant was a feature of the psychoanalytic tradition of 
Freud and Breuer (Kaba & Sooriakumara, 2007). Szasz’s view of the psychoanalytic 
contribution to the practitioner-patient relationship was as follows: “Breuer and Freud’s 
historical role lies (among others) in having reintroduced, as it were, the patient into the 
medical arena as an active, cooperative – and indeed collaborative – participant in illness and 
in health” (Szasz, et al., 1958, p. 526). In addition to Breuer and Freud, the contribution of 
then-contemporary American psychiatry was to see patients as partners with rights to self-
determination and to see this characteristic as important for therapeutic relationships (Szasz 
et al., 1958). Whether psychiatric or general medical practice, the authors believed chronic 
illnesses were influential in requiring a practitioner-patient relationship wherein both parties 
collaborate to manage patients’ conditions (Szasz et al., 1958).  
 
The influence of psychoanalysis and focusing on the patient as a person and active participant 
also included the work of Hungarian psychoanalyst Michael Balint (1957). Balint trained in 
psychoanalysis and medicine and could therefore bring both traditions to bear on the 
practitioner-patient relationship. Indeed, it was Balint who first explored the practitioner-
patient relationship in general practice appointments (Lakasing, 2005). Balint extended 
Breuer and Freud’s line of patient-as-active reasoning towards a biopsychosocial notion of 
illness and the healthcare encounter (Kaba & Sooriakumara, 2007). To determine the full 
sense of why a patient sought medical advice, practitioners had to investigate patients’ 
psychological and social contexts. Balint (1957) posited the idea of mutual investment 
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whereby patient and practitioner work to establish trust, confidence, and share relevant 
knowledge about the patient and their biopsychosocial context.  
 
Mutual investment necessitated a series of healthcare encounters and the benefits of this 
would accrue over the series. The issue with mutual investment, and relatedly the model of 
mutual participation, was that it was most applicable to chronic illness or psychoanalysis 
where care ordinarily takes place over such a series of healthcare encounters. Indeed, Szasz 
and Hollender (1956) listed chronic illnesses and psychoanalysis as the domain of clinical 
application for mutual participation. Balint was interested in general practice, however, and 
we might consider the relationship between a family practitioner and their patients an 
example of mutual investment (Lakasing, 2005). Modelling the practitioner-patient 
relationship on chronic illness or psychoanalysis would not provide the kind of universality 
necessary for application across illnesses and experiences. Therefore, practitioner-patient 
relationships required a more generalisable principle around which to organize and advocate.   
 
As should be becoming clear, the developments in the practitioner-patient relationship were 
typically conceptually or historically derived. This conceptual or historical derivation was 
significant because these developments, then, were not typically rooted in empirical 
observations from healthcare encounters. In turn, the practitioner-patient relationship was not 
often being informed by or brought into line with the actual business of real healthcare 
appointments. That said, work on the practitioner-patient relationship was getting away from 
the broad social structures of Parsons’ work and moving further towards medical specificity. 
A separate approach was taken by bioethicist Robert Veatch (1972), who outlined and 
considered four models of the practitioner-patient relationship as part of his wider project to 
establish access to healthcare as a human right. These four models were the engineering 
model, the priestly model, the collegial model, and the contractual model. The last of these, 
the contractual model, was of particular significance to the forms of SDM that were to 
follow.  
 
The engineering model conceptualised the practitioner as an applied figure, presenting the 
facts to a patient and addressing the problem with respect to their choice. The priestly model 
was one where the practitioner was valorised as a figure of repute and expertise. Practitioners 
follow the principles of beneficence and nonmalfeasance but also retain complete 
responsibility for decision-making. The collegial model glosses the practitioner-patient 
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relationship as comprising a couple of colleagues in pursuit of the legitimate shared goal of 
restoring the patient’s health. Therefore, the collegial model was one of equality wherein the 
legitimacy of a shared goal and practitioner-patient confidence and trust were essential to the 
practitioner-patient relationship. In Veatch’s (1972) case, these types were derived from 
hypothetical considerations of practitioners in alternative professions or social roles such as 
engineers or close acquaintances of patients. 
 
The contractual model stipulated that practitioners and patients both have obligations but also 
expected benefits. An assumption of the faithful fulfilment of obligations is implicit but there 
are social sanctions in place to safeguard divergences from this assumption. The view is that 
patients need control over the choices that are significant to their life and only where the 
practitioner cannot in good conscience abide the choice should the contract go unfulfilled or 
broken. Veatch remarks: “In the contractual model, then, there is a real sharing of decision-
making” (Veatch, 1972, p. 7). Patients, therefore, were conceptualised as contractors. 
Crucially this is not a legal contract, and more of a symbolic covenant such as marriage. 
Patients can control the overall decision-making without having to involve themselves in 
every individual aspect of decision-making. Trust and confidence are similarly central to the 
collegial model, but the structure of the contractual model is one of greater security. 
 
The significance of Veatch’s model was that it would signify a notable change in the legal 
framework and understanding of medical ethics in practice as they pertained to informed 
consent. Leading up to and contemporary with Veatch’s (1972) considerations of ethical 
practitioner-patient relationships, shifts were occurring in medical ethics. In particular, the 
notion of informed consent was becoming more important and clearly defined in the USA 
due to a series of notable court cases (Murray, 1990). The shift in perspective towards 
informed consent as a patient’s right and ethical requirement was also responsive to the 
patient advocacy movement. For instance, The Patients Association was founded in 1963 in 
the UK by Helen Hodgson as a patient advocacy group, and later charity. In part, the 
establishment of The Patients Association was driven by issues with the drug Thalidomide 
where patients were tested without giving informed consent and received the wrong treatment 
(The Patients Association, 2020).  
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In the USA, the case of Mr Canterbury versus Dr Spence was a significant milestone for 
informed consent. In brief, Dr Spence was ruled not to have informed Mr Canterbury, nor his 
mother who gave consent, of the risk of paralysis that his surgery, a laminectomy, carried. 
The ruling stipulated that informed consent was something for the patient to give, and that 
practitioners were required to provide sufficient information for patients to be able to choose 
their treatment (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992). Informed consent was subsequently 
characterised as requiring the following dimensions. Patients need to know their diagnosis 
and the diagnostic procedures involved, treatment procedures must be described clearly and 
intelligibly including information about inevitable and collateral risks, all available 
treatments must be outlined, and the expected results and their likelihoods must be discussed 
thoroughly with the patient (Murray, 1990). Going forward, informed consent became a key 
issue among other aspects of patient autonomy and involvement for the advancement of 
patients’ rights in the 1980s (Stiggelbout et al., 2015). The shift in understanding and 
importance of informed consent varied in year across countries but was often similarly 
spurred by a legal ruling.  
 
Nine years later, in the United Kingdom, the Chatterton versus Gerson court ruling was 
significant for establishing that, in practice, a basic notion of valid consent was sufficient for 
a procedure to take place (as cited in Jones et al., 2005). Indeed, informed consent itself 
differed between the US and UK, as the US notion necessitates that practitioners inform 
patients of all relevant information prior to seeking consent, while the UK allows for basic, 
valid consent, to be given and then further informing to occur (Hastings, 2008). I must note, 
however, that the modern definition of valid consent in the National Health Service (NHS) 
stipulates that consent must be both informed and voluntary to qualify as valid consent (NHS 
England, 2019). As such, the work that Veatch (1972) produced had an immediate relevance 
in the US and would proceed to be persistently relevant as the practitioner-patient 
relationship evolved away from paternalism towards patients as partners.  
 
The space for involvement in Veatch’s contractual model (Veatch, 1972) and the shift in 
dynamics of informed consent stimulated increasing interest in patient autonomy and 
involvement. Throughout the 1980s, patients’ rights, as part of a broader consumer rights 
movement, pushed this agenda of improving patients’ involvement in their healthcare 
(Stiggelbout et al., 2015). In 1982, in the USA, the government published a report that would 
both advance the understanding of informed consent and be consequential for its practical 
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accomplishment. The 1982 President’s commission (President's Commission for the Study of 
Ethical Problems in Medicine, Biomedical, & Behavioral Research, 1982) report was a 
document concerning the understanding of informed consent and implications of a 
requirement for informed consent to undergo medical procedures. In turn, the report claimed 
that beyond a legal concept, informed consent was an ethical imperative and core part of the 
SDM process, and that a greater exercise of patient autonomy or sovereignty should 
accompany informed consent (President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine, Biomedical, & Behavioral Research, 1982).  
 
Twenty years after Veatch (1972) outlined four models of the practitioner-patient 
relationship, Emanuel and Emanuel (1992) would also outline four models of the 
relationship. An important distinction between Veatch (1972) and Emanuel and Emanuel’s 
(1992) work was the ethical contexts that produced them. Veatch’s article came out in the 
same year as the Canterbury v. Spence case (1972, as cited in Murray, 1990), which was a 
hugely significant ruling for informed consent, and pre-dated the 1982 President’s 
Commission report by a decade. In turn, Emanuel and Emanuel’s (1992) work was produced 
in the context of a well-established ethical mandate for patient-led informed consent. As with 
Veatch’s work, Emanuel and Emanuel were also working theoretically, although they did 
relate the models to a clinical example of breast cancer to demonstrate the distinctions 
between the models. Therefore, the ethical pursuit of the earlier proposal (Veatch, 1972) was 
being supplemented with a clear eye towards clinical practice and real patients. That said, any 
model endorsed would still require a solid empirical grounding of observable insights from 
decision-making appointments. Acknowledging the impact of patient autonomy on medical 
decision-making, Emanuel and Emanuel called for a reformulation of the practitioner-patient 
relationship. Therefore, they outlined four models of the practitioner-patient relationship with 
the intention of determining the preferred model for accomplishing appropriate medical 
decisions while respecting patient autonomy.  
 
The paternalistic model had similarities to what Veatch (1972) termed the priestly model and 
presented the practitioner as a skilled professional identifying patients’ conditions and most 
suitable treatment. Either patients receive enough information to consent or the practitioner 
acts on their skill to dictate the particulars of treatment. In a paternalistic relationship there is 
an assumption of an objective best and the practitioner can find a patient’s best interest with 
minimal patient contributions. In an example of the strict application of beneficence, 
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practitioners will prioritise patient’s health above their autonomy; indeed, assent is the extent 
of patient autonomy. The informative model was comparable to Veatch’s (1972) engineering 
model and centred around the provision of relevant knowledge. Patients present with a 
problem, practitioners inform them of their condition and treatment options, and the patient 
selects an option to receive. An informative relationship is transactional, and practitioners 
simply provide the information and corresponding treatment. Patient autonomy is greater in 
this model, however, as patients control the treatment decision. 
 
The interpretive model requires practitioners provide the relevant information and treatment 
options. However, the practitioner works with the patient to determine the treatment that 
aligns best with their values (Emanuel and Emanuel, 1992, p. 2221). It is worth remarking 
here that Emanuel and Emanuel use the term values but not preferences, nor preferences and 
values, which is an important terminological point. Furthermore, that values are never clearly 
defined but rather taken-for-granted as “patient’s values are well-defined and known” 
(Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992, p. 2221). As with the informative model, the practitioner’s 
values are not central, and the process is one of reaching the most appropriate treatment 
relative to the patient’s values. The interpretive model emphasises understanding, with a joint 
understanding and patient self-understanding important to the model. Patient autonomy is 
comparable to the informative model barring the leading potential of practitioners’ 
interpretations.  
 
The deliberative model involves practitioners providing patients with information and 
treatment options, plus the values corresponding to these options. Practitioners engage 
patients in a discussion of both the broader health-related values, these meaning values 
affecting or affected by the illness and treatment, and those of the treatment options. The aim 
is to conclude which treatment option would be best relative to the importance of health-
related values as the patient judges them. A practitioner can recommend a particular 
treatment based on their understanding of what the patient wants and their principle of 
providing the best care. However, the deliberative model is not a coercive one and the patient 
remains autonomous. It is a developmental model whereby the practitioner teaches the patient 
and assists them in the decision-making process. Perhaps the key distinction between the 
deliberative and interpretive models, as they are broadly comparable, is that practitioners 
assume that patients’ values are not fully formed in the former while in the latter the patient 
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requires guidance towards “the best health-related values” (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992, p. 
2222).  
 
From Emanuel and Emanuel’s ethical perspective, the paternalistic model is untenable except 
for life-threatening emergencies where taking informed consent might take time necessary to 
treat the patient, and therefore cannot be the preferred model. The informative model attends 
insufficiently to patients’ values or patient-relevant health-related values. It was also 
considered problematic to preclude practitioner recommendations and give complete 
decisional control to a patient, even an informed one. While the interpretive model 
accommodates the possibility that patients might be uncertain about their wants, and 
subsequently change their mind, it might prove challenging in practice. For example, where 
the technical specialisation of practitioners, time constraints, and pressures of illness might 
not engender the ideals of this model. Not attempting to recommend or guide patients to the 
full extent limits practice and might be problematic where there is recourse to advocating, for 
example, behavioural change. Therefore, the interpretive model posits more of an ideal than 
an actual conceptualisation of practitioner-patient relationships in practice. The immediate 
issue with the deliberative model is whether practitioners have the right to promote specific 
health-related values while judging patients’ values. In particular, the possibility that patients’ 
and practitioners’ values conflict. Interpretive and deliberative models also encompass the 
risk of playing out as a paternalistic relationship in practice. Emanuel and Emanuel (1992) 
ultimately favoured the deliberative model, considering it the ideal of the four. It is important 
however to clarify that Emanuel and Emanuel’s work was a theoretical consideration, and 
therefore not modelled on actual decision-making encounters.  
 
1.3 The development, definition, and modelling of shared decision-making  
 
Amidst the development of all these models of practitioner-patient relationships the concept 
of SDM first appeared. Indeed, it was Robert Veatch (1972) who wrote of SDM when 
characterising the contractual model, although he did not propose a model. This, however, 
did not impede the development of SDM as a concept. Rather, alongside concerns about 
patient autonomy and informed consent, SDM became part of the discussion about medical 
ethics. The first definition of SDM came in 1982 when the United States’ President’s 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural 
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Research’s report on making health care decisions was published. The commission’s report 
described SDM the following way: “Simply put, this means that the physician or other 
healthcare professional invites the patient to participate in a dialogue in which the 
professional seeks to help the patient understand the medical situation and available courses 
of action, and the patient conveys his or her concerns and wishes” (President's Commission 
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine, Biomedical, & Behavioral Research, 1982, p. 
38).  
 
Subsequently, the notion of a division of facts and values began to form. Practitioners would 
provide facts through their knowledge of medical information, while patients provide their 
personal values with which to evaluate treatment options (Brock & Wartman, 1990). The 
collaborative process of contributing and working with these facts and values is the one that 
leads practitioners and patients to share decision-making (Brock & Wartman, 1990). Eddy 
(1990) also endorsed the division of facts and values but presented the division as a two-step 
process whereby facts precede values prior to decision-making. Although designating a 
contributory role for patients and practitioners, practitioners were tasked only with dispensing 
information to patients (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992). Therefore, these definitions too closely 
resembled the informative model of practitioner-patient relationships. 
 
There was, then, increasing emphasis on patient autonomy and involvement in the 
practitioner-patient relationship and sharing decisions with patients. Despite this focus, the 
first model of SDM did not appear until 25 years after Veatch’s work (1972) in 1997. Charles 
et al. (1997) noted the developments in treatment decision-making work but also the limited 
clarity about what exactly SDM meant and comprised. Their attempts to provide clarity 
through fundamental characteristics led them to propose the now-classic model of SDM. The 
model (Charles et al., 1997) comprised four key characteristics that the authors consider 
necessary for sharing a treatment decision. First, patient and practitioner both must be 
involved; however, SDM is not an exclusively dyadic process or relationship. Second, 
patients and practitioners both take active roles participating in treatment decision-making. 
Here, practitioners attempt to facilitate patient involvement while patients take responsibility 
for aspects of the decision-making process. For example, patients engage by asking 
questions, presenting preferences, and assessing options. Whereas practitioners elicit 
preferences, provide technical information, and establish treatment preference.  
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Third, information sharing is a requirement of SDM in that patients and practitioners must 
share relevant information with each other. The minimum requirement is that patients have 
sufficient information about treatment options to provide informed consent. Practitioners 
bring technical knowledge and medical expertise while patients bring illness narratives and 
experiential knowledge. Fourth, a patient and practitioner must choose a treatment option that 
they both agree upon. This option is not necessarily the best option as a practitioner might 
view it, but both parties are willing to accept it and share decisional responsibility. Taken 
together, these four characteristics were deemed the necessary criteria for engaging in SDM, 
but they were presented as continuous rather than dichotomous criteria. That is, Charles and 
colleagues (1997) considered the elements of SDM they outlined to fall along a gradation. 
Rather than having a dichotomous view that an element of SDM is met or not, there are 
degrees of meeting each element, and in turn, SDM is also not a dichotomous process.  
 
Acknowledging this, the immediate value of SDM was in offering a compromise between the 
extremes of patient-led or practitioner-dominated approaches to treatment decision-making 
(Charles et al., 1997). A crucial point to make is that Charles et al.’s model of SDM (1997), 
while hugely important, was not necessarily dynamic. Yes, the continuum of SDM was 
noted, but it was not clear in the model that the decision-making approach may change in situ 
and that parties might assume different roles at various points yet still make a shared 
decision. For instance, when a practitioner needs to explain multiple treatment options and 
related effects and outcomes, they might take an informed approach for that requirement 
(Charles et al., 1999). The notion that practitioners and patients might necessarily be 
positioned differently for different requirements was not made explicit in the first model. 
 
In 1999, Charles and colleagues revised their model of SDM into a three-stage process. 
Charles and colleagues (1999) aimed to make the practical application of SDM clearer by 
demonstrating the flexibility and dynamism of the decision-making process. These analytical 
stages were information exchange, deliberation, and deciding on treatment to implement 
(Charles et al., 1999). Information exchange was considered to flow bidirectionally between 
patient and practitioner to accomplish SDM. On one hand practitioners provide technical 
knowledge about treatment options, potential risks and benefits, and the resources available. 
On the other hand, patients provide contextual information about their medical history, fears 
and beliefs, and knowledge of their illness. Patient-side information exchange was considered 
particularly important because practitioners would not otherwise have this information. 
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Although not mandatory, patients and practitioners can exchange role preferences at this 
stage to clarify upcoming involvement, which per the continuous nature of SDM 
characteristics might vary across an appointment or appointments. For instance, a patient 
might follow the practitioner’s lead during information exchange but later claim greater 
decisional responsibility. For bidirectional information exchange, the minimal requirement 
was that practitioners provide all decision-making relevant information and patients respond 
with their knowledge, preferences, and values relative to that information. 
 
Deliberation centres on available treatment options and both parties expressing and 
discussing their preferences for treatment. For SDM, deliberation is interactional, and this is 
to include the patient and practitioner in the stage. Practitioners and patients each have stakes 
in the treatment decision. Namely the health of the patient and the practitioner’s concern for 
the patient’s wellbeing. Patients and practitioners must both be aware of treatment options; 
whether between, for example two active treatment options, or an active treatment versus 
monitoring. To participate in the decision-making process, each party must express their 
treatment preference in addition to exchanging information. Depending on whether patients 
and practitioners exchange treatment preferences at the beginning of the consultation, 
deliberation might involve negotiation. If negotiation ensues, then practitioners may make 
specific recommendations but must remain responsive to patients and why they might not 
want that option.  
 
Patients can remain fixed in their preferences and in such cases, practitioners might consider 
endorsing patients’ preferences as a negotiated agreement. Drawing on the analogy of a tango 
Charles et al. (1997) suggested that it is appropriate for patients and practitioners to lead 
discussions at points where there is alignment with their expertise and experience in SDM. 
Deciding on treatment to implement was the final decision-making stage. To accomplish this 
stage, practitioners must receive a patient’s informed consent prior to endorsing the treatment 
decision. Patients require practitioners to agree to implement their preferred decision before 
endorsing the treatment decision. For SDM, patients and practitioners use the deliberation 
stage of the process to work up to the agreement and endorsement of the treatment decision.  
 
The revised model constituted an evolution in thinking about SDM, as Charles and 
colleagues (1999) characterised SDM as dynamic and flexible, unfolding across a 
bidirectional interactive process between active parties across an interactional relationship. 
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Moreover, the negotiated aspects of SDM were made clear and central to the process; indeed, 
SDM is defined as a process rather than an event. Charles and colleagues (1999) also 
emphasised that treatment decision-making needs to incorporate potential roles for 
individuals outside of the practitioner-patient relationship, to account for the totality of the 
decision-making process. That is, practitioners can operate as part of a multidisciplinary team 
(MDT), not of all of whom might attend decision-making encounters. Patients, moreover, 
may involve their family and possibly friends in their decision-making process. 
 
Despite the work that was going into reshaping the practitioner-patient relationship (Emanuel 
& Emanuel, 1992) and developing SDM (Charles et al., 1997), there were still critics who 
questioned the need of SDM. Around the time of the first model of SDM, a review of the 
evidence for claims offered against SDM from its critics was published (Coulter, 1997). The 
criticisms that were reviewed included the claims that patients did not desire SDM, that risk 
and uncertainty information would stoke anxiety, and that some patients would demand too 
much of their healthcare (Coulter, 1997). To the first claim, the review found survey response 
evidence that close to half of patients wanted more information than they received and that a 
majority of patients wished to be involved in decision-making (Strull et al., 1984). In 
addition, the review also found that patients’ views on their heavy menstrual bleeding were 
not known to general practitioners in 45% of cases (Coulter et al., 1994).  
 
Evidence about the effect of risk and uncertainty information was mixed and ultimately 
inconclusive (Coulter, 1997). That said, a randomised control trial of an education 
intervention focused on patient involvement and facilitating patients’ questions showed 
preliminary support for a relationship between patient involvement and improved health 
outcomes (Kaplan et al., 1989). As for patients’ demands, the literature reviewed suggested 
that patients who were better informed and involved might actually decide against treatment 
where it may not be strictly necessary (Wagner et al., 1995). Similarly, it was observed that 
women with higher education status decided against hysterectomies more often than women 
with a lower education status (Kuh & Stirling, 1995). The review concluded that many of the 
criticisms of SDM might reflect an incomplete understanding of what exactly SDM was and 
what it entailed (Coulter, 1997). Considering the time of the review’s publication, this might 
indeed be the case; and there was much more work on and developments in SDM to follow.  
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Following Charles and colleagues’ revised focus on dynamic and interactional stages, 
subsequent conceptual work in SDM began to consider how to teach practitioners about, and 
how to perform, SDM. Towle and Godolphin (1999) considered a set of eight competencies, 
by which they mean knowledge, skills, and abilities for practitioners, and seven competencies 
for patients to accomplish SDM. Towle and Godolphin were academics working at North 
American universities who were interested in healthcare communication and communication 
skills for SDM and both trained healthcare practitioners. It is important to note that these 
competencies related primarily to communication skills and that patient competencies were 
considered preliminary. Patient competencies were considered preliminary because they had 
the weakest theoretical and empirical support and were derived from interviews with family 
practitioners and patient educators rather than patients. As with Charles and colleagues’ 
revisions (1999), Towle and Godolphin proposed a framework rather than a prescriptive 
checklist. Six core concepts of SDM underpinned the eight competencies. Namely 
partnership, explicit dialogue, an informed patient, an informed practitioner, SDM, and 
completeness (Towle & Godolphin, 1999).  
 
Table 1: Towle and Godolphin’s (1999) SDM Competencies for Practitioners and Patients 
Practitioner competencies Patient competencies  
1. Develop practitioner-patient 
relationship 
1. Define practitioner-patient relationship 
2. Establish patient information 
preferences 
2. Develop partnership with practitioner 
3. Establish patient role preferences 
and uncertainties 
3. Systematise and articulate feelings, 
expectations, beliefs, and health 
problems 
4. Respond to ideas, expectations, and 
concerns patients have 
4. Appropriately and clearly communicate 
relevant information for mutual 
understanding 
5. Identify choices with patient input 
and assess relative to patient 
5. Accessing information 
6. Provide evidence to patient relative 
to their preferences  
6. Evaluating information  
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7. Make a decision in partnership 7. Negotiate decision including possible 
conflict resolution and make action plan 
8. Agree an action plan for follow-up 
 
It is also remarkable that Towle and Godolphin (1999) referred to informed shared decision 
making throughout their article. As such, they were not just writing about a decision that 
patients and practitioners share in, but one that was “informed by best evidence, not only 
about risks and benefits but also patient specific characteristics and values” (Towle & 
Godolphin, 1999, p. 766). The competencies were characterised as akin to communication 
training but specifically communication skills that were more advanced than the medical 
school training of the time. Crucially, the competencies were not sold as a behavioural 
checklist but in line with the suggestion that SDM elements fell along gradations and were 
subsequently likely to receive differing emphasis and attention depending on the encounter 
(Charles et al., 1997; Towle & Godolphin, 1999). Towle and Godolphin’s work (1999) 
provided a useful next step in the evolution of SDM. The most striking development was that 
Towle and Godolphin went beyond the more general language of Charles et al. (1997, 1999) 
and proposed more detailed expectations of particular communication behaviours and 
sequences. In addition, Towle and Godolphin’s (1999) competencies clarified that patients 
and practitioners were expected to undertake more complex subject positions in their 
encounters.  
 
Another competency framework shortly followed (Elwyn et al., 2000), which took a set of 
previously proposed competencies (Towle, 1997) and ran focus groups with general 
practitioners. The use of previously proposed competencies is notable because it suggests an 
attempt at consistency with other developments that might prove useful for attempting to 
achieve consensus on SDM. These focus groups were designed to explore the attitudes of 
general practitioners to SDM and patient involvement in decision-making. Immediately, then, 
there are two considerations; the first of which was that the informant population came from 
a distinct primary care background. Primary care presents different decision-making 
considerations to the more acute secondary care context that had previously been prominent 
in SDM modelling and theorising. Indeed, this issue of population generalisability was one 
that the authors raise as a potential caveat in their conclusion (Elwyn et al., 2000, p. 899). As 
for focus groups, however, researchers from the language and social interaction tradition 
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have raised issues about this method of data collection. Chiefly, that the performative and 
public nature of the focus group, with clear roles as researcher and research participant, could 
influence participants to offer the responses they anticipate the researchers wanted to hear. 
That is, the production of talk that is gotten up for research purposes rather than talk that 
would occur without a researcher’s presence or agenda might not be considered to faithfully 
represent the interaction (Edwards & Stokoe, 2004; Potter & Hepburn, 2005). 
 
The informants endorsed the idea of involving patients in the decision-making process but 
only to the extent that patients stated (Elwyn et al., 2000). In addition, while supportive of 
SDM, the informants suggested that it might be more suitable for certain conditions than 
others. Conditions that presented the possibility of multiple effective treatment options were 
specifically highlighted as good fits for SDM (Elwyn et al., 2000). Notably, informants 
reported that patients’ involvement preferences should be established after the patient knows 
their options and has been provided with the relevant information (Elwyn et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, informants did not consider checking whether patients accepted the decision-
making process to necessarily be a verbal practice, as they reported that practitioners provide 
cues and respond to patients’ signs in situ. Where the competences referred to professional 
equipoise, this means a scenario where there is more than one treatment option available and 
the practitioner displays no clinical preference (Elwyn et al., 2000). It is worth noting that 
informants considered it necessary to explain to patients that the absence of clinical 
preference was not due to a lack of knowledge, to avoid anxiety or inspiring low confidence 
in the practitioner (Elwyn et al., 2000). 
 
Table 2: Elwyn and colleagues’ (2000) SDM competences for practitioner 
Practitioner competences  
1. Involve patient in decision-making process (implicit or explicit)  
2. Explore patients’ expectations, fears, and ideas about the problem and treatment 
options 
3. Present treatment options and highlight where professional equipoise exists 
4. Provide relevant information to patients in their preferred format 
5. Check patients’ understanding of and reactions to information  
6. Check patients’ role preference  
7. Discuss and either make or defer a decision with the patient  
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8. Arrange follow-up with patient whether a decision was made or not  
 
Some of the key differences between the competency frameworks, then, included that Towle 
and Godolphin (1999) proposed competencies for patients while Elwyn and colleagues did 
not (Elwyn et al., 2000). As such, practitioners were ascribed substantial responsibility for 
ensuring a shared decision was made (Elwyn et al., 2000) as opposed to the sharing of 
competencies and responsibility (Towle & Godolphin, 1999). In Elwyn and colleagues’ 
(2000) competences there was also less emphasis on explicitness, as practitioners in the focus 
group suggested that involvement could be done more implicitly by a practitioner. Moreover, 
the recommendation from Elwyn and colleagues’ (2000) informants was that patients ought 
to be told their options before practitioners elicited their role preferences. I wish to note that 
Towle and Godolphin (1999) used the term competencies while Elwyn et al. (2000) used 
competences and I have maintained the original usage across this discussion.  
 
At this point it is worth remarking upon the context within which these early models were 
developed, both in terms of intellectual and cultural climates. In terms of cultural context, it 
is worth recalling that this Anglo-centric history of the practitioner-patient relationship is 
reflected in the development of SDM. Charles, Gafni, and Whelan for instance, were all 
working in Canada at McMaster University in various medical or health-related departments. 
Subsequent developments that I shall discuss also came primarily from the academies of the 
USA, the UK, and Canada. Indeed, Charles and colleagues went on to revise their model of 
SDM in 1999, around the time that further work began to appear. As such, our conception of 
SDM has largely been shaped in the intersection between the academy and medical practice 
in the anglosphere. One consideration worth remarking on is that Charles and colleagues’ 
model (1997, 1999) and most subsequent developments (Towle & Godolphin, 1999; Elwyn 
et al., 2000) were not empirically rooted, but rather conceptual, historical, or theoretical. In 
turn, while providing the first model of SDM was hugely insightful and useful, it comes with 
the caveat that we might consider it idealised.  
 
While substantial work and research had gone into developing a more ethical and less 
paternalistic practitioner-patient relationship, the first model of SDM only arrived three years 
prior to Elwyn and colleagues (Charles et al., 1997). Moreover, Charles and colleagues 
reformulated their model of SDM from more of a checklist (1997) to a framework (1999). As 
such, these models that sprung up around the turn of the millennium were responsive to the 
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earliest conceptions of SDM. This meant that they had relatively few examples of SDM 
research to assess the models and were at risk of falling behind another shift or reformulation. 
That said, in focusing on competencies and frameworks rather than viewing SDM as an 
absolute with a prescriptive checklist (Charles et al., 1997), the developing understanding of 
SDM had a strength that would carry forward well. It must be noted, however, that both 
Towle and Godolphin (1999) and Elwyn et al.’s (2000) models were informed by 
practitioner-centric views. A practitioner-defined or derived model runs the risk of failing to 
account for the party whose preference might reasonably be expected to shape a shared 
decision. Indeed, the conceptions of SDM in Elwyn and colleagues’ (2000) work lacked an 
empirical dimension that might tell us something about how decision-making is actually and 
observably done in the wild of treatment appointments.  
 
1.4 Developing shared decision-making for clinical practice 
 
Shared decision-making had begun to proliferate in the wake of the publication of the now-
classic early models and definitions. A decade after Charles and colleagues’ (1997) model, a 
review (Moumjid et al., 2007) undertook to establish whether the research literature was 
using a clear definition of SDM. It sought also to ascertain whether the articles that defined 
SDM subsequently used these definitions consistently in the rest of the article. The results of 
this review identified several clear definitions by Charles and colleagues (1997, 1999), 
Coulter (1999), and Towle and Godolphin (1999) among others. All these definitions 
exhibited similarities, particularly on information exchange and involving patients and 
practitioners. These clear definitions, however, were cited by only 25 of the 76 articles under 
review. Even where a definition was cited or provided, the term could often remain 
inconsistent throughout a paper or even subsequent papers (Moumjid et al., 2007, p. 543). 
Furthermore, there were several instances where SDM and informed decision-making were 
used interchangeably. There were also 21 articles that referred to SDM without explanation, 
neither defining SDM themselves nor providing an existing definition or citation. In turn, the 
research literature presented a confusing and impoverished picture of SDM, which would 
prove to be problematic for furthering research into SDM. That is, the conceptual confusion 
resulting from a paucity of definitions and subsequent inconsistent use would make 
establishing routine SDM difficult. As a result, Moumjid and colleagues (2007) called for 
both a clear definition of SDM and a typology of relevant decision-making terms.  
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Contemporary with Moumjid and colleagues’ (2007) work, another systematic review aimed 
to identify the number of definitions of SDM; to determine the elements, qualities, and 
citations offered to support these definitions. The review identified 418 articles where 257 
referred to but did not define SDM, which meant that only 161 articles provided a definition 
of SDM. From these definitions, Makoul and Clayman (2006) coded 20 elements and 
qualities that were present in a minimum of 10% of definitions. Of the 20 elements, “patient 
values/preferences” and “options” were the only elements present in over 50% of definitions 
at 67.1% and 50.9% respectively (Makoul & Clayman, 2006, p. 304). While 56 of the articles 
under review failed to cite a model of SDM, it was Charles and colleagues’ (1997) initial 
model, appearing in 21.1% of the articles, that was the most cited choice. Of note also was 
the absence of conceptual definitions with 60% of articles not providing any definition of 
SDM. In sum, the review concluded that there was no mutually agreed-upon definition of 
SDM.  
 
Makoul and Clayman (2006) subsequently proposed an integrative model of SDM. The aim 
being a model with conceptual soundness, usefulness in guiding research, and applicability 
for clinical practice. Although Makoul and Clayman (2006) offered a new development in 
proposing an integrative model, they continued to work conceptually and theoretically in 
their model. That is, once again, the long-running tradition of proposing a model that was 
theoretically deductive rather than inductively generated from empirical observations of real 
decision-making appointments was taken. It is worth remembering subsequently that while 
these elements that Makoul and Clayman (2006) proposed were indeed stable concepts in the 
extant SDM literature they required empirical grounding and support. A model was proposed 
on the back of several essential elements necessary for accomplishing SDM. These essential 
elements derived from the elements, qualities, and citations coded in the review process. To 
accomplish SDM the following essential elements must occur. Patient or practitioner must 
define the problem being presented and subsequently declare the options available to the 
patient. A discussion of available options relative to risks and benefits and patients’ 
preferences and values should then follow. Practitioners and patients should also discuss a 
patient’s ability to adhere to the treatment options. The practitioner should communicate all 
relevant knowledge and, where applicable, their recommendation to aid the option 
discussion. Throughout the decision-making process patient and practitioner should check 
their understandings of the information and perspectives they exchange. Finally, patients and 
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practitioners should make or defer a decision including arranging for appropriate follow up 
(Makoul & Clayman, 2006).  
 
Having an integrative model of SDM is a useful tool for providing an operational approach to 
research and clinical practice. Although not perfect, it also offers a comparatively robust 
referent for attempting SDM in clinical practice on an individual level. It does not answer 
Moumjid and colleagues’ (2007) call for a single agreed-upon definition, however. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile looking at the results of Makoul and Clayman’s (2006) coding for 
the essential elements they identify and subsequently integrate. Namely, patient 
values/preferences as the most included element of SDM, which appeared in 67.1% of the 
articles reviewed. Although options appeared in 50.9% of articles, the presentation of options 
is beholden more to the profile of illnesses and less to patient involvement. One key 
distinction between Makoul and Clayman’s (2006) model and those that came before it was 
that the preceding models generated a combined 31 concepts. Makoul and Clayman’s (2006) 
integrative model reduced this to nine essential elements necessary for SDM and four ideal 
elements that might be additive but nonessential (see p. 305).  
 
A second key distinction is that the integrative model was responsive to a conceptualisation 
of “the degree of sharing on a continuum” and the observation that “patient participation and 
SDM are not isomorphic” (Makoul & Clayman, 2006, p. 307). That is, patients and 
practitioners both contribute to appointments and if one party dominates the encounter then 
this would not be a shared decision. For instance, a decision that was led entirely by the 
patient would feature substantial patient participation but would not be a shared decision. A 
shared decision, then, lies somewhere between the two poles of a patient-led and practitioner-
led continuum for Makoul and Clayman (2006). When we couple this notion of a continuum 
of sharing with the view of SDM elements as falling along gradations (Charles et al., 1997), 
we have a dynamic and collaborative process that extends far beyond a simple success or 
failure. In the section below, I will cover two of the more recent developments and proposals 
of SDM models that intended to respond to the developing conception of a dynamic SDM 
process.  
 
1.5 SDM in the 2010s: Alternative developments and novel models  
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Following the proposal of an integrative model of SDM (Makoul & Clayman, 2006) there 
were fewer alternatives put forward, but three models merit discussion. The first model of the 
three was packaged as an interprofessional model of SDM (Légaré et al., 2011) because it 
was aimed at a multidisciplinary team of professionals rather than a practitioner-patient dyad. 
Légaré and colleagues (2011) contended that a dyadic view of SDM was not representative of 
the wide-ranging contributions made by distinct healthcare professionals. As such, they 
proposed a model of SDM that aimed to account for the range of professionals involved in 
medical decision-making. Furthermore, to acknowledge not just the micro level of decision-
making pitched at the patient but also the meso and macro levels of healthcare systems 
(Légaré et al., 2011). The model, then, operated on the assumption that at least two healthcare 
professionals with distinct roles or institutional specialisms would collaborate with the patient 
to make a shared decision. Notably, professionals could either work simultaneously or appear 
at various points in the patient’s decision-making process. I will list the individual level steps 
that the patient is expected to go through in a table below, and then discuss what Légaré and 
colleagues (2011) mean by the meso and macro level influences of healthcare systems. 
 
Table 3: Légaré and colleagues’ (2011) decision-making steps for patients 
Decision-making steps for patients 
1) Patient presents with a health condition 
1) Patient told a decision is required and that they have more than one option 
(equipoise)  
2) Exchange information 
3) Clarify patients’ preferences and/or values  
4) Consider how feasible each option is  
5) Establish the preferred choice 
      5)  Make the actual choice 
6) Implement the choice made 
      6)  Evaluate health outcomes of the decision-making process 
 
In addition to collaboration and a focus on interdisciplinarity, Légaré and colleagues (2011) 
suggested that shared understanding of decision-making elements and the influence that 
individuals may have over the decision-making process were key to SDM. The meso level, 
then, referred to the various and distinct healthcare professionals that could be involved in the 
decision-making process alongside the patient (Légaré et al., 2011). At the macro level, 
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Légaré and colleagues (2011) grouped together various forces from the broader environment 
of healthcare systems that could prove influential, such as healthcare policy; resources 
available; and the social context of the healthcare system. In addition to the levels, it was said 
that not only do the team of healthcare professionals influence the SDM process by their 
collaborative work with the patient, but the culture and organisational structure of the 
healthcare system also influences the team of professionals by shaping their organisation and 
function (Légaré et al., 2011). 
 
Other models of SDM leave open a space for institutional or organisational factors to 
influence the decision-making process such as options being limited to those a patient is 
suitable to receive (Charles et al., 1999). None of those models, however, have such a clear 
and inextricable role for the meso and macro level influences of healthcare systems of 
patients’ decision-making processes (Légaré et al., 2011). In turn, there was also an 
acknowledgement that an express desire for SDM to occur might be insufficient if the macro 
level factors do not support or help facilitate this goal (Légaré et al., 2011). The 
interprofessional model was derived by collating prominent models, frameworks, and 
theories of SDM alongside systematic reviews of interprofessionalism and extracting key 
concepts. Subsequently, Légaré and colleagues (2011) invited a group of healthcare 
professionals and researchers to a workshop intended to develop the interprofessional model 
of SDM. Invited informants ranged from physicians to psychologists and were asked to work 
in three groups to devise an interprofessional model of SDM based on the key concepts 
provided (Légaré et al., 2011). Informants concluded that an interprofessional model was 
indeed necessary to account for the totality of decision-making as a process in a particular 
institutional context. 
 
Two models were most highly rated, and one was at the level of the individual patient while 
the other concerned the healthcare systems wherein decisions get made (Légaré et al., 2011).  
Informants were then reassigned to two groups to refine the two highly rated models and 
those were subsequently integrated and became the final model I overviewed above. The 
interprofessional model has been suggested as having an impact on the barriers to SDM 
posed by confusion and communication issues between teams of professionals and 
professionals and patients (Légaré et al., 2011). More specifically, communication and 
information exchange between various professionals and the patient was intended to foster 
useful collaboration between professionals and make space for contributions from roles and 
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specialisms that might not otherwise have been made. An important point to note is that 
emphasis was increasingly falling on communication and shared understanding with this 
model. I mention this focus on communication because it will be a feature of the second 
model discussed and the thesis at large. The second model was proposed by an important 
figure in the historical development of SDM, Glyn Elwyn, in 2012 and it conceptualised the 
SDM process as a journey through three distinct stages of talk (Elwyn et al., 2012). 
 
In this model there was a first stage of choice talk, a subsequent option talk phase, and finally 
a decision talk phase (Elwyn et al., 2012). A big part of the rationale offered for this model 
was that it would attribute or increase agency to the patient, and practitioners would support 
the patient in the decision-making process and deliberation. As such, Elwyn and colleagues 
(2012) posited that the two means of attributing agency to patients was by providing them 
with information and supporting their decision-making process. This model was expressly 
designed for clinical practice and proposed as a simple three stage process that would take 
patients from initial to informed preferences (Elwyn et al., 2012). The first stage was choice 
talk and this stage focused on informing patients about their available options while also 
allowing for planning work (Elwyn et al., 2012). After choice talk came option talk and this 
second stage involved providing further information about the options such as harms and 
benefits and distinctions between options. At this point of the decision-making process the 
practitioner might also provide or direct the patient to a decision aid to support their 
deliberation (Elwyn et al., 2012). In the final stage of decision talk the emphasis fell on 
eliciting the patient’s preference and then approaching a preference-based decision, which is 
the end goal.  
 
As a set of important terms, it is worth distinguishing between initial and informed 
preferences, with the former based on patients’ initial reaction and existing knowledge and 
the latter responsive to new information about options (Elwyn et al., 2012). As with the 
interprofessional model (Légaré et al., 2011) there was a clear focus on communication with 
the three stages labelled as stages of talk (Elwyn et al., 2012). There was not a strong 
empirical grounding to the model, however, and this overreliance on deductive theoretical 
reasoning limits confidence in its applicability to decision-making as it occurs empirically. 
Before moving on to discuss some of the problems that SDM and patients’ preferences have 
faced, I will remark on the revised three talk model of SDM (Elwyn et al., 2017) and a 
subsequent model. Five years after the initial model and several suggested revisions and 
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refinements from researchers and practitioners, Elwyn and colleagues (2017) decided to 
formally revise and develop their model. A global group of academics worked with the model 
authors and proposed a second draft model. This second draft model was then circulated to 
patients and patient interest groups as an online summary with the feedback summarised and 
provided to healthcare professionals (Elwyn et al., 2017). 
 
After collecting feedback, Elwyn and colleagues (2017) decided to replace the first stage of 
choice talk with team talk and emphasise that these stages could in fact be fluid and that 
decision-making might be recursive. To clarify the distinction between choice and team talk, 
Elwyn and colleagues (2017) stipulated that team talk would involve the following three 
components. First, ensure patients are aware of existing options; second, support the patient 
in deliberation and decision-making; and third, work with patients to identify and set goals 
relevant to their issue or problem (Elwyn et al., 2017). I mentioned that these three models 
overviewed were similar in terms of having a clear focus on the importance of 
communication, which I believe is necessary for accomplishing a shared decision. Elwyn and 
colleagues (2017) acknowledge a potential tension between their simple three stage process 
and the vast range of communicative work that could be involved in SDM (Elwyn et al., 
2017, p. 6). This acknowledgement of the complexity of communication involved and the 
recursive nature of the stages of talk and decision-making process are insightful and additive 
developments. Moreover, developments that suggested an area of empirical observational 
research into the visible communication work that decision-making entails.  
 
Despite the three talk model being a model that received substantial support, and the 
revisions being met favourably (Elwyn et al., 2017), a recent third model merits discussion. 
Of particular interest, is that this model arose from qualitative research aimed at uncovering 
more information about attempts to implement and achieve routine SDM. Indeed, the 
research that led to the proposal of the model actually recruited practitioners who had 
received SDM skills training in line with the three talk model (Elwyn et al., 2017). Breast 
cancer and pre-dialysis consultations were examined using thematic analysis and this analysis 
revealed a more complex picture of SDM than previously proposed. The team, option, and 
decision talk stages of the three talk model were observed but so too was a previously 
unreported preparation phase (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019). The authors suggested that other 
models might presume a preparation phase, but it was this model that first made it clear. 
Furthermore, while the research did provide support for the three talk model it also observed 
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variability in the way that the steps of that model were performed in practice. Indeed, the 
authors concluded that SDM as performed by practitioners in situ was more complex than 
published models suggested.  
 
Of the notable observations were a striking absence of decision aids and a surprising degree 
of tailoring the decision-making to the individual patient (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019). In 
addition, less risk communication was observed than expected but more emotional and 
practical support was seen. Therefore, the Implement-SDM model (Joseph-Williams et al., 
2019) was a proposal that both emerged from the existing promising work of the three talk 
model (Elwyn et al., 2017) and sought to better ground SDM in practice. It is notable that the 
authors aligned the Implement-SDM model with a broader conception of SDM (Cribb & 
Entwistle, 2011). That is to say, the Implement-SDM model was framed as being interested 
in more than SDM as an isolated process. Rather, the work of preferring to discuss decision-
making, of establishing and developing a fruitful practitioner-patient relationship, and work 
between parties that was considered co-constructive (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019).  
 
In terms of key differences between the Implement-SDM and three talk models, the authors 
observed the preparation phase, a changing presentation of options, and a planning discussion 
in the decision talk phase (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019). The areas where comparability, but 
also new elements, were found included the incorporation of the family members of patients’ 
preferences alongside those of the practitioner, the greater prominence of practical and 
emotional support, and the inclusion of the notion of distributed decision-making (see 
Rapley, 2008; Joseph-Williams et al., 2019). A preparation phase was present in all 
consultations but differed between breast cancer and pre-dialysis. Similarly, options were 
presented in all consultations, but breast cancer patients often had more choice than pre-
dialysis patients. Tailoring options to patients as consultations progressed, including when 
clinical equipoise or equivalent effectiveness between breast cancer treatments was present, 
stood out as noteworthy. The authors, then, argued that option discussions appeared to be 
shaped by, or at least partially responsive to, patients’ expressed preferences.  
 
One of the other aspects that changed over time and spoke to a wide decision-making process 
was the notion that decisions were distributed not just between patients and practitioners but 
also family and significant others. While decision support was typically emotional and 
practical there were cases of decision aids being used albeit primarily as a resource for 
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patients to take away with them (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019). With preference elicitation, 
practitioners were reported to generally attempt an elicitation process congruent with the 
patient’s emerging preference. In a similar fashion, the decision process developed according 
to the particulars of the illness, as it was clear that a decision had stages and need not be 
made immediately in the pre-dialysis consultations. Additionally, practitioners were reported 
to be “developing informed preferences during the SDM process about what might be 
suitable for the patient” (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019, p. 1781). Another aspect that arguably 
goes under-reported in SDM models are factors that could facilitate or contribute to 
accomplishing SDM. In these consultations, the contributory factors identified were 
awareness, being meaningful to patients, patients’ emotions, and an urgent sense of need for 
decision-making. 
 
All three models share an interest in communication and an increasingly wide range of input 
from varied informants. As such, they stand distinct from earlier work that focused on 
general practitioners (Elwyn et al., 2000) or physicians (Towle & Godolphin, 1999) as 
informants. The interprofessional model perhaps represents the totality of decision-making 
most faithfully with its awareness of and role for various healthcare professionals and an 
institutional structure that could constrain or facilitate SDM (Légaré et al., 2011). The fact 
that Légaré and colleagues (2011) built the global and institutional contexts of healthcare 
systems into SDM was a vital contribution that other models had not made nor acknowledged 
for its central importance to the process. By contrast, the three-talk model focused less on the 
healthcare systems environment and instead worked in terms of distinct stages of talk and 
interactive work (Elwyn et al., 2012).  
 
In particular, the revised three talk model focused on the way that a recursive process or set 
of elements for SDM (Charles et al., 1997, 1999) might be shaped by iterative interactive 
work between stages of talk (Elwyn et al., 2017). Moreover, the aim of taking patients from 
initial preferences to informed preferences was instructive and insightful in both setting a 
valuable aim and foregrounding a prominent essential element of SDM (Makoul & Clayman, 
2006). That said, the Implement-SDM model (Joseph-William et al., 2019) took the work of 
the three talk model further than its conceptual, informant-heavy, approach into the realm of 
empirical observation. As such, it immediately stood out from the other models discussed and 
had a novelty that was validated by its additive observations. By demonstrating support for 
the stages of talk proposed by the three talk model but also revealing variability in stages 
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across illnesses, and observing an additional stage, there was clearly more to be accounted for 
(Joseph-Williams et al., 2019).  
 
In terms of clinical practice there was no singularly outstanding model of SDM. The revised 
three-talk model (Elwyn et al., 2017) with a simple and intuitive set of stages of talk and a 
clear role for patients’ preferences, is particularly appealing. That said, the observation of 
variability in stages of talk across conditions and an additional preparation phase (Joseph-
Williams et al., 2019) suggests that there remains more to add to the three talk model. I do 
consider the acknowledgement of the scale of complex communicative work and recursive 
nature of decision-making and decision-making talk to be additive and instructive 
contributions to our modelling and understanding of SDM. In turn, while I find the three talk 
model promising, and will make further reference to it, I would endorse the Implement-SDM 
model as the most exciting and faithful to clinical practice to date. 
 
Although these models represent significant progress, I do hold reservations over how 
mainstream SDM models typically deal with decision-making and, especially, patients’ 
preferences empirically. For instance, the acknowledgement of the centrality of complex 
communicative practices to SDM (Elwyn et al., 2017), and support for the stages of talk in 
the SDM process (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019) are promising developments but remain 
somewhat broad. A clear space exists for the provision of finer-grained detail about this 
communication, especially where it concerns patients’ preferences in decision-making 
conversations. The reasons for this endorsement are two-fold and represent two points and 
positions. First, the Implement-SDM model is closest to clinical practice by virtue of being 
an empirical study of practitioners who had received SDM skills training (Joseph-Williams et 
al., 2019). In addition, this skills training was based on the three-talk model of SDM (Elwyn 
et al., 2012, 2017), which was the most promising conceptual model but still lacked an 
empirical grounding. Implement-SDM, then, is an example of work that begins to bring SDM 
closer to a model that reflects clinical practice and decision-making in practical terms. The 
second reason is that I believe the social interaction approach is rooted in social interaction 
approach that I take can enrich and expand this promising empirical work. Focusing on how 
talk-in-interaction shapes decision-making conversations and accomplishes decision-making 
business can provide a finer-grained complementary empirical observational analysis. In the 
next section, I will first discuss some of the problems that SDM has faced, and then some of 
the problems specific to patients’ preferences. 
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1.6 Problems with SDM and patients’ preferences  
 
With the advent of the early models of SDM, interest soon turned to developing the concept 
for reliable use in clinical practice. As such, this section will discuss some of the challenges 
that SDM research and practice faced. One of the main aims of SDM research became 
standardising a process for routine clinical implementation and assessing it for outcome 
measures and process quality. Standardising and assessing SDM are goals consistent with 
Charles and colleagues’ (1997) aim to clarify what exactly SDM meant. However, Charles 
and colleagues (1997) also acknowledged the potential challenges to standardising SDM and 
thereafter measuring the process. Namely, that elements of SDM were not to be understood 
by a dichotomous view that they were either accomplished or not, but rather as falling along 
gradations of being met (Charles et al., 1997, 1999). Moreover, although elements of SDM 
overlap across frameworks, these elements can receive distinct amounts of time and focus 
depending on the specific encounter (Towle & Godolphin, 1999). 
 
As such, there was not a linear process of SDM, necessarily, but rather a more recursive one 
that could be shaped by interactions between patients and practitioners. Therefore, it is 
difficult to assess in practice whether each feature of SDM was unequivocally present, and to 
account for variation in degrees of patient involvement (Charles et al., 1997). Charles and 
colleagues (1997) concluded that standardised checklists would be inappropriate for SDM 
because SDM can take different routes and patients and practitioners do not have fixed 
preferences. Instead of attempting to standardise the SDM process, and seeking to 
empirically measure an objective state, Charles and colleagues (1997) suggested establishing 
a number of core principles. A purportedly objective shared decision may not be consistently 
perceived as such by patients or practitioners. Given these considerations of gradations of 
SDM elements and a recursive interactively shaped shared decision, it is timely to remark on 
some of the problems that SDM has faced.  
 
1.6.1 Conceptual confusion 
 
Despite the insightful contributions and developments that were made by the more recent 
models overviewed above there have been problems with developing the concept of SDM 
and its practical accomplishment. The first problem relates to conceptual confusion or a lack 
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of consensus around the essential SDM element of patients’ preferences. By the time of the 
integrative model of SDM, patients’ preferences had become an increasingly central aspect of 
SDM (Makoul & Clayman, 2006). Indeed, the revised three talk model considers supporting 
patients in the move from initial to informed preferences to be one of its aims (Elwyn et al., 
2017). The increased focus on patients’ preferences reflected the broader shift from 
paternalistic models of healthcare delivery (e.g., Parsons, 1951; Szasz & Hollender, 1956) to 
approaches centred on informed consent and patient involvement (Veatch, 1972; Emanuel & 
Emanuel, 1992). Although patients’ preferences had become foregrounded in SDM, there 
were still issues with how this element was integrated into models of SDM and brought to 
bear on clinical practice. For one, it was observed that preferences as a term was being used 
interchangeably with such terms as attitudes, beliefs, and values (Elwyn & Miron‐Shatz, 
2010). As such, it was difficult to track the use of the term preferences throughout the 
literature; plus, terms such as beliefs and attitudes have their own technical definitions.  
 
Tracking the use of the term preferences becomes harder still when we consider that authors 
do not routinely define what they mean by preferences when they use the term (Street et al., 
2012). Even when preferences are defined, the term is not then used consistently with the 
definition offered (Street et al., 2012). Perhaps the most substantial conceptual issue, 
however, is that patients’ preferences are argued to be unique constructions responsive to 
patients’ options and accompanying information (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010). Patients, it is 
suggested, do not carry around stable and unchangeable preferences in their heads, but rather 
construct preferences in situ responsive to the context and content of their encounters and the 
decision to be made (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010). By virtue of being constructed, patients’ 
preferences are also considered to lack logical transitivity. That is, preferring option a to 
option b and preferring option b to option c does not presuppose preferring option a to c 
(Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010). The argument that preferences are constructed is not a new 
one, but it is not one that has typically been applied to SDM. Indeed, there is a long-standing 
tradition of psychological and economics research into the construction of preferences (see 
Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006 for an overview).  
 
To provide a brief but instructive example of what a constructed preference means I will 
remark on the preference reversal phenomenon. First outlined by Lichtenstein & Slovic 
(1971, 1973), preference reversals are inconsistencies between two wagers that have 
comparable pay outs. In their study, Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971, 1973) observed that 
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participants more frequently chose the wager with a higher chance of winning a small amount 
of money than one with a lower chance of winning a large amount of money. However, when 
participants were asked to name the lowest price that they would sell these wagers for, a 
higher price was named for the lower chance to win a large amount of money (Lichtenstein & 
Slovic, 1971, 1973). Preferences themselves can therefore appear inconsistent or changeable 
depending on the context they are formulated in. As such, it became apparent that preferences 
were not a fixed phenomenon but rather something that varied with information and situation 
in getting constructed. Indeed, preference reversals were recurrently observed by researchers 
interested in the phenomenon and by the mid 90s Slovic remarked that “people’s preferences 
are often constructed – not merely revealed – in the process of elicitation” (Slovic, 1995, p. 
365). This notion of preferences as responsively constructed and ostensibly inconsistent can 
prove difficult for a standardised approach to SDM or patients’ preferences to account for, 
which will become clearer in the overview of problems measuring SDM in the next section. 
 
1.6.2 Problems measuring and standardising SDM  
 
As previously mentioned, there has been a recurrent suggestion that elements of SDM fall 
across gradations rather than fitting a dichotomous view of success or failure (Charles et al., 
1997; Elwyn et al., 2017). Moreover, that these same SDM elements, and SDM itself, might 
be a recursive process (Towle & Godolphin, 1999). In turn, it is perhaps unsurprising that one 
area where SDM has faced problems is measuring phenomena. The first model of SDM was 
proposed in 1997 and by 2001 there was a systematic review of measurement instruments 
that purported to assess patient involvement in decision-making (Elwyn et al., 2001). In the 
review, the authors concluded that those instruments that met the review criteria were 
insufficient to adequately measure patient involvement. None of the instruments reviewed 
had been designed for the specific purpose of measuring patient involvement and they lost 
this focus by trying to cover too many aspects of the consultations (Elwyn et al., 2001). One 
issue is that the elements these measurement instruments addressed and how they assessed 
SDM also varied between instruments. For instance, SDM measurement instruments were 
seen to have assessed patients’ preferences, decisional conflict, self-efficacy, and perceived 
involvement and satisfaction with decision-making (Simon et al., 2007).  
 
Furthermore, instruments generally measured one of the following: assessments of decision-
making needs, support provision for decision-making, or the process and outcomes of SDM 
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(Simon et al., 2007). As such, the concept of SDM and decision-making elements purported 
to be measured markedly differed between assessments. Although measurement instruments 
typically reported satisfactory reliability, they also had insufficient or no validation data, 
which is problematic for the utility of these measures (Simon et al., 2007). A subsequent 
review observed increasing movement towards dyadic assessments of SDM (Scholl et al., 
2011), which is more consistent with a collaborative practitioner-patient relationship. 
However, measurement instruments continued to attend insufficiently to patients’ observable 
clinical encounter behaviour (Scholl et al., 2011). The lack of focus on patients’ behaviours is 
problematic because it diminishes the possibility of a collaborative dyadic assessment of 
SDM. In turn, it reinforces an approximation of SDM that is driven primarily by 
practitioners, which runs counter to the collaborative participation of SDM (Charles et al., 
1997, 1999). Although reliability continued to be generally acceptable, validation presented a 
persistent issue for SDM measurement research. A 2018 systematic review of 40 
measurement instruments judged an overall lack of evidence for measurement quality partly 
because of poor validation studies (Gärtner et al., 2018).  
 
Another issue with measuring SDM is whether the outcome of the ostensible SDM process 
being measured reflects the experiences of both or either patients or practitioners. For 
instance, in a study of healthcare encounters in Norway, where SDM is a legal requirement, 
investigating patient involvement in decision-making a pair of confusing findings were 
reported. Both the practitioners and patients were able to identify poor communication from 
the practitioner, and the practitioners were aware that they performed poorly on SDM 
(Gulbrandsen et al., 2014). Despite this poor communication and the confused attempts at 
SDM, patients gave positive reports of their appointments including global satisfaction 
scores. As such, it is possible that the measurement instruments captured the effort 
practitioners made to share the decision-making process rather than the quality of the 
decision-making process (Gulbrandsen et al., 2014). To date, then, measurement instruments 
have assessed various approximations of SDM and proximal decision-making elements 
(Simon, 2007) plus the effort put into attempting to share decisions (Gulbrandsen et al., 
2014). It would appear from these measurement attempts that confusion exists about what 
SDM looks like and how it might be successfully assessed.  
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Confusion around the status of decision-making and what exactly SDM looks like is a real 
problem for measurement studies. Qualitative evidence has suggested that patients report 
difficulty identifying whether a decision had been made or were unsure what to consider as a 
decision (Entwistle et al., 2004). Informants also spoke about their experiences relative to 
SDM measurement instruments and some remarked that their appointments could be 
considered as patient-led or collaborative rather than one binary choice. As such, the SDM 
assessments might not faithfully capture what occurred in appointments and it might vary 
considerably from the way that patients interpret the process (Entwistle et al., 2004). This 
overview of the problems that attempts to measure SDM face will now be followed by a 
discussion of the difficulty implementing fuzzy concepts such as SDM and involving 
patients’ preferences.  
 
1.6.3 Difficulty implementing fuzzy concepts 
 
Having discussed the conceptual confusion or perhaps lack of consensus around the term 
preferences in SDM, I will now move on to consider another issue. That is, there are crucial 
differences in perceptions between practitioners, who think they are doing SDM, and 
research findings that reveal SDM does not occur as often as practitioners think. Furthermore, 
this section offers a candidate explanation for these differences that allows both sides to think 
they are right.  
 
It is worth remembering that while models of SDM have begun to foreground the extent and 
importance of complex communicative work for the process (Elwyn et al., 2017; Joseph-
Williams et al., 2019), they are not designating preferences as unique interactive 
constructions (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010). As such, it is possible that practitioners may 
have entered decision-making appointments with an expectation of finding simplistic fixed 
preferences. A review of patient involvement in decision-making revealed that practitioners 
infrequently attempted to involve patients in their treatment decisions (Couët et al., 2015). 
This investigation of patient involvement systematically reviewed studies that used the 
observing patient involvement in decision making instrument (OPTION; Elwyn et al., 2003, 
2005), which was specifically designed to assess the extent and quality of patient 
involvement in decision-making. The OPTION instrument assesses behaviours that range 
from explaining professional equipoise to patients to eliciting patients’ involvement 
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preferences and their expectations and ideas for addressing their problem (Elwyn et al., 
2003). While the original OPTION instrument demonstrated acceptable levels of reliability 
and construct validity (Elwyn et al., 2003, p. 97), the revised instrument reported improved 
reliability, with the score increasing from 0.62 to 0.77 (Elwyn et al., 2005, p. 38).  
 
Putting aside criticisms of measurement, in their own terms, attempts to systematise SDM 
have struggled to change practice. In addition to infrequent attempts to involve patients in 
decision-making, the review also reported instances where practitioners attempted no patient 
involvement behaviours (Couét et al., 2015). Of the patient involvement behaviours 
reviewed, those related to patients’ preferences were consistently the least attempted ones 
(Couét et al., 2015). There was also no association between patients’ stated preferences for 
decision-making role and variations in patient involvement behaviour (Couét et al., 2015), 
which suggests that practitioners were not handling preferences as particularly influential or 
consequential. Despite this review evidence of poor patient preference involvement, there has 
been a suggestion that practitioners do in fact routinely perform SDM. A UK-wide SDM 
initiative that surveyed practitioners reported that practitioners considered there to be 
minimal if any difference between SDM and their current practice (Joseph-Williams et al., 
2017). Indeed, practitioners also reported that they involved patients in their decision-making 
and failed to view SDM as distinct. Notably, practitioners also endorsed decision aids as 
important tools and a factor in accomplishing SDM (Joseph-Williams et al., 2017). This point 
is notable because the instances where practitioners performed patient involvement 
behaviours in the review were those where decision aids were used (Couét et al., 2015). 
 
As such, it is possible that practitioners take a more rigid view of patients’ preferences as the 
fuzziness of construction is difficult for them to implement in their practice. The fuzziness 
also extends to the perception of desire for SDM, as practitioners in the UK SDM initiative 
claimed that patients did not routinely want SDM (Joseph-Williams et al., 2017). When 
patients’ role preferences were reviewed, however, most patients reported wanting to be 
involved in decision-making (63%; Chewning et al., 2012). When a measure under review 
explicitly identified SDM as an option there was greater preference for sharing decisions, 
while only a small number of patients stated a preference for practitioners to decide 
(Chewning et al., 2012). That said, patients’ preferences can vary across aspects of SDM, as 
while some patients might want their practitioner to decide (52%), a large majority may also 
want to be offered options and have their input heard (92%; W. Levinson et al., 2005). The 
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apparent fuzziness of SDM as a recursive and interactively accomplished process plus that of 
patients’ preferences as constructions might, then, be a difficult idea for practitioners to 
meaningfully bring to bear on treatment decisions. Alternatively, it could be the case that the 
fuzziness of preferences and a recursive decision-making process are in tension with the way 
that practitioners have historically gotten preferences or choices on the record.  
 
This overview of problems facing SDM draws the SDM history to a close, for now, as the 
next section will discuss prostate cancer; first, relevant clinical information, and second its 
relation to SDM and patients’ preferences. The reason for this focus on prostate cancer is that 
it provides the healthcare context for my research, as I will be investigating and analysing 
prostate cancer decision-making conversations.  
 
1.7 Prostate cancer diagnosis and treatment  
 
1.7.1 Prostate cancer diagnosis, prevalence, and survival  
 
There are instances where patients’ preferences have importance beyond satisfying the 
conditions for SDM. For instance, illnesses or conditions where there are multiple but 
comparable treatment options have heightened preference sensitivity. Preference sensitive 
decisions can be defined as those where there is no objective best course of action, due to 
reasons such as inconclusive evidence for low benefit to harm ratio (Stiggelbout et al., 2015). 
Prostate cancer is an example of needing to make a highly preference sensitive treatment 
decision because curative treatments for localised prostate cancer are equivalent in their 
effectiveness (Xiong et al., 2014). Instead of deciding entirely on treatment effectiveness, 
decisions are shaped also by what individuals personally consider important. For example, 
trade-offs between side effects or functional and long-term outcomes.  
 
Prostate cancer is the most common cancer diagnosis for men in the UK, with a yearly total 
of 48, 487 new cases between 2015-2017 (Cancer Research UK, 2020). With 11, 855 deaths 
per year between 2016-2018, prostate cancer is the second highest cause of cancer mortality 
for males in the UK (Cancer Research, 2021). Survival rates are typically high with recent 5- 
and 10-year estimates at 86.6% and at 77.6% respectively (Cancer Research UK, 2020). 
Patients are diagnosed with localised prostate cancer when the cancer is contained entirely 
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within the prostate gland. Locally advanced prostate cancer is diagnosed when the cancer has 
spread to tissues surrounding the prostate gland. If the cancer has spread beyond the 
surrounding tissues into lymph nodes, and possibly the bones, then advanced prostate cancer 
is diagnosed (Cancer Research UK, 2016). There are also gradations within diagnoses with 
stages one and two corresponding to localised prostate cancer, stage three to locally 
advanced, and stage four to advanced cancer with these gradations being consequential for 
treatment (Cancer Research UK, 2016). Localised and locally advanced prostate cancer are 
both curable and several treatments exist for each diagnosis. Advanced prostate cancer is not 
curable, although there are non-curative treatment options (Cancer Research UK, 2019).  
 
1.7.2 Prostate cancer treatment options  
 
Prostate cancer can grow slowly and therefore patients might not require active treatment. In 
slow-growing cases, practitioners might recommend monitoring the cancer. Options for 
monitoring are active surveillance or watchful waiting, however, monitoring varies between 
these two approaches. Active surveillance monitors localised prostate cancer with the 
intention of providing curative treatment if the cancer starts or continues to grow (Cancer 
Research UK, 2019). Watchful waiting, by contrast is offered to patients for whom active 
treatment would be inappropriate. For example, patients with locally advanced or advanced 
prostate cancer but no symptoms, or patients with multiple health problems would be offered 
watchful waiting (Cancer Research UK, 2019). Watchful waiting typically involves an annual 
blood test to measure prostate specific androgen levels. Active surveillance, however, 
involves triannual or quarterly blood tests, an annual or biannual digital rectal exam, and after 
one year a prostate biopsy (Prostate Cancer UK, 2019).  
 
Although monitoring can be offered to patients with localised, locally advanced, and 
advanced prostate cancer there are various active treatments. Curative treatment options for 
localised prostate cancer include radical prostatectomy, external beam radiation therapy, and 
brachytherapy. A radical prostatectomy requires removing the entire prostate gland and 
typically tissues from the surrounding area. As radical prostatectomy removes the entire 
prostate gland it removes the entire cancer. External beam radiation therapy is offered 
independently when cancer is localised, but low dosages can be combined with 
brachytherapy where there is a risk of cancer spread. The process involves aiming beams of 
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radiation at the prostate gland, focusing these beams, and repeating the process over a course 
of weeks (Prostate Cancer UK, 2018). Brachytherapy is either low dose rate and permanent 
or high dose rate and temporary. High dose rate brachytherapy is offered across treatment 
grades, while low dose rate is only appropriate for grade group one (Cancer Research UK, 
2016). Both brachytherapy options involve inserting doses of radiation into the prostate albeit 
with differing strengths. Brachytherapy also has the advantage of not targeting tissues 
surrounding the prostate gland (Prostate Cancer UK, 2019). For locally advanced prostate 
cancer, curative treatment options are external beam radiotherapy and hormone therapy, or 
radical prostatectomy followed by external beam radiotherapy (Cancer Research UK, 2016). 
This said, it is important to note that treatment provision can vary between hospitals, as not 
every hospital offers every treatment. 
 
There are two more treatment options available for patients with localised prostate cancer 
with low to moderate risk of spread. Both treatments are surgical procedures and in the UK 
are only offered at specific cancer specialist centres or as part of clinical trials. The first is 
cryotherapy, which uses a set of needles to pass freezing gases into the prostate to destroy 
prostatic tissue (Prostate Cancer UK, 2018). High-intensity focused ultrasound is the second 
procedure, and this involves placing a probe into the rectum that a surgeon moves around to 
direct high intensity ultrasound energy into the prostate (Prostate Cancer UK, 2015/2018). 
Both treatments use extreme temperatures and require either a warming catheter in the case 
of cryotherapy or a cooling balloon for high-intensity focused ultrasound to avoid damaging 
the back passage. Cryotherapy and high-intensity focused ultrasound are both less intrusive 
than robotic assisted laparoscopic prostatectomy and may be had following radiotherapy if 
prostate cancer recurs (Prostate Cancer UK 2015/2018, 2018). The common side effects of 
urinary incontinence and erectile dysfunction do also occur with cryotherapy and high-
intensity focused ultrasound, but the latter carries a reduced likelihood than robotic assisted 
laparoscopic prostatectomy (Prostate Cancer UK, 2015/2018). 
 
Advanced prostate cancer does not have a curative treatment, and options focus instead on 
controlling cancer, such as slowing growth and managing pain. Treatment options include 
external beam radiation therapy, hormone therapy, and chemotherapy. External beam 
radiation therapy aims to ameliorate pain and assist bone repair by shrinking the cancer and 
slowing its growth (Prostate Cancer UK, 2018). The treatment course is shorter and the 
radiation dosage lower in advanced cancer treatment (Prostate Cancer UK, 2016). Hormone 
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therapy intends to slow the growth of or shrink cancer. To shrink or slow the growth of 
cancer, hormone therapy impedes or blocks the body’s production of testosterone. There are 
both continuous and intermittent hormone therapies and these options depend on clinical 
factors (Cancer Research UK, 2019). Chemotherapy is offered for symptom management and 
impedes the growth of cancer. The effects of chemotherapy are reducing the pain that patients 
experience and facilitating patients preserving a greater quality of life (Cancer Research UK, 
2019).  
 
One other possibility for prostate cancer patients is that their disease recurs after curative 
treatment. Typically, the primary indicator of potential recurrence is a sustained increase in 
the prostate specific antigen level, which is a protein released by prostate gland cells. 
Estimates are that 20-30% of prostate cancer patients will experience some form of 
recurrence (Moffitt Cancer Centre, 2018) but it is impossible to accurately predict recurrence. 
Whether monitoring prostate cancer or following curative treatment, patients receive prostate 
specific antigen tests for up to two years to spot any possible rises in prostate specific antigen 
levels. 
 
1.7.3 Prostate cancer treatment outcomes  
 
A network meta-analysis of observational management, prostatectomy, radiotherapy, and 
cryotherapy found no one treatment superior for all-cause mortality (Xiong et al., 2014). In 
addition, no superior treatment was found for cancer-related mortality either. Furthermore, a 
comparison of active surveillance, external beam radiation therapy, and radical prostatectomy 
reported poorer sexual function and urinary incontinence after three years; however, no other 
clinically significant declines in health-related quality of life were observed beyond twelve 
months (Barocas et al., 2017). In turn, “men with localized prostate cancer face a decision 
that is emblematic of a “preference-sensitive” choice”” (Shirk et al., 2017, p. 786). There is a 
view therefore, that treatment for localised prostate cancer should be responsive to patients’ 
individual preferences and not just clinical factors such as age and aggressiveness of tumour 
(Sommers et al., 2007), but this is not always the case. There are instances where a treatment 
option is better suited on clinical factors such as radical prostatectomy or external beam 
radiation therapy for medium and high-risk tumours (Sommers et al., 2007). In these 
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instances, however, there is still room for responsiveness to patients’ preferences in decision-
making unless the presentation is acutely life-threatening. 
 
Long-term follow up of a large active surveillance cohort of patients with prostate cancer 
reported fifteen prostate cancer-specific deaths of 993 patients and 13 cases of developing 
metastases (Klotz et al., 2014). Of a combined 4000 patients across seven long-term studies, 
a 93% all-cause/general survival rate was seen with prostate cancer-specific survival rates at 
99.7% (Klotz et al., 2014). When comparing follow-up for radical prostatectomy and 
observation for early prostate cancer on prostate cancer-specific mortality comparable rates 
were found. For surgery, 27 patients died (7.4%) and for observation 42 died (11.4%; Wilt et 
al., 2017). Observation led more frequently to disease progression, but surgery was 
associated with more frequent urinary and erectile problems (Wilt et al., 2017). Therefore, 
trade-off in this decision might centre on a patients’ preferences for potential disease 
progression treatment and side effects. 
 
Follow up of a randomised control trial comparing monitoring, radiotherapy, or surgery all-
cause and prostate cancer-specific mortality investigated 10-year outcomes. 10-year prostate 
cancer-specific survival was excellent across groups at 98.8% with no significant differences 
(Hamdy et al., 2016). All-cause mortality was consistent with active monitoring at 59, 
surgery at 55, and radiotherapy at 55 deaths respectively. Active surveillance/monitoring was 
associated with greater disease progression rates, and rates of metastases, but 44% of these 
patients did not go on to radical treatment. Ultimately, mortality was typically low across 
treatment groups and therefore consideration should be given to the possible trade-off 
between the effects of radical treatment versus the risk of disease progression and metastases 
for monitoring (Hamdy et al., 2016). The consideration of trade-offs may be the aspect of 
decision-making where the preference-sensitivity of prostate cancer treatment is highest and a 
potential source of decisional conflict pending further research.  
 
A study of long-term physical symptoms post-treatment reported that 90% of patients 
experienced one physical symptom, 75% reported currently experiencing one physical 
symptom, and 29% reported currently experiencing at least three physical symptoms (Gavin 
et al., 2015). Variations among treatments included higher rates of erectile dysfunction for 
radical prostatectomy, urinary incontinence for radiotherapy, and lower rates of both for 
brachytherapy (Gavin et al., 2015). In terms of functional quality of life, radical 
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prostatectomy has been reported to associate with losing libido, erectile dysfunction, and 
psychological distress - in addition to urinary dysfunction (Baker et al., 2016). External beam 
radiation therapy was associated with sexual dysfunction and short-term bowel dysfunction, 
while urinary irritancy was a common issue across treatments (Baker et al., 2016). It is clear 
from these observations on outcomes that making treatment decisions for prostate cancer 
entails various complex considerations.  
 
1.7.4 Prostate cancer and decision-making  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly considering the preference sensitivity of prostate cancer (Zeliadt et 
al., 2006), it is a condition especially relevant for SDM. As with SDM more broadly, there 
are conceptual confusions about and practical problems with patients’ preferences. For one, it 
has been reported that patients’ initial treatment preferences appear not to routinely influence 
or predict the treatment they receive (Scherr et al., 2017). Conversely, urologists’ 
recommendations, being based on clinical factors such as age and Gleason score but not 
incorporating patients’ preferences, did appear to routinely predict the treatment patients 
received (Scherr et al., 2017). The Gleason score is a system for grading prostate cancer in 
terms of how aggressively it is likely to grow and how abnormal the prostate cells look 
(Cancer Research UK, 2019). There is also a lack of clarity as to how the factors purportedly 
supporting SDM and patient involvement function in practice. For example, feeling that 
sufficient time to decide on treatment exists is seen not only to associate positively with SDM 
but also patient-led decision-making (Song et al., 2013). A prospective follow-up of 
treatment decision-making factors for localised prostate cancer identified 41% of patient only 
decisions compared to 45% of shared decisions (Song et al., 2013).  
 
Decisional conflict is a phenomenon of personal uncertainty, particularly where there are 
questions of values, elements of risk, and anticipation of regret (O’Connor, 1995). Decisional 
conflict can relate to decisional regret, particularly with regards uncertainty and risk. 
Decisional regret is one of the main targets of SDM, with one of the aims being that an 
informed patient receives exactly their preferred treatment. As with decisional conflict, 
treatment trade-offs can be potential sources of decisional regret. The importance of 
informing patients adequately about potential sources of regret is that this regret is likely to 
present in the longer-term. Typically, patients report decisional regret post-treatment 
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(Christie et al., 2015) whereas immediate post-decision regret is less common (Gwede et al., 
2005). In addition, it is suggested that decisional regret as a concept should be adequately 
explained to patients, particularly where it relates to factors frequently and strongly related to 
treatment modality (Christie et al., 2015). Patients’ perceptions of negative side effects, then, 
might be informative in considering tailoring treatments to preferences and minimising 
decisional regret.  
 
A systematic review of post-treatment regret identified treatment toxicity factors as most 
frequently associated with regret (Christie et al., 2015). Sexual and urinary dysfunction had 
strong significant associations with regret, and bowel dysfunction a non-significant but not 
infrequent association. Between 70 to 92% of patients reported sexual dysfunction across 
treatment modalities including impotency, losing libido, and losing sexual potency in another 
survey (Lehto et al., 2017). Moreover, three quarters of patients reported at least one 
psychological symptom, including worrying, nervousness, irritability, and concentration 
problems in the same study. Particularly relevant for decisional regret was that treatment 
outcome dissatisfaction was associated with indicators of wellbeing; and that common, 
multiple, and persistent negative effects were associated with active treatment (Lehto et al., 
2017). Prostatectomy was the treatment associated with the highest rate of dissatisfaction 
(42%), a finding reported elsewhere (Christie et al., 2015), while hormone therapy (34%), 
external beam radiotherapy (24%), brachytherapy (22%), and active surveillance (15%) 
followed (Lehto et al., 2017). Notably, conservative disease management was associated less 
with regret (8.2%) than surgery (15%) and radiotherapy (16.6%; Hoffman et al., 2017).  
  
Differences between prospective and retrospective appraisals of prostate cancer treatment 
experiences can also be insightful. For instance, prostate cancer survivors report on average 
two on-going side effects; with 30% reporting that side effects were as expected but 25% 
reporting them being worse than expected (Maguire et al., 2017). Alongside worse than 
expected side effects, higher fear of cancer recurrence was seen to be predictive of 
diminished quality of life (Maguire et al., 2018). Where patients’ expectations are 
disconfirmed their quality of life can suffer, and they may experience distress. As a quarter of 
survivors reported worse experiences of side effects than expectations, this suggests that 
treatment preparation might not always be sufficient to minimise the possibility of decisional 
regret (Maguire et al., 2018). One potential challenge for SDM, then, that might need to be 
turned into a positive of the approach, is how it might be relevant for decisional regret. 
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Ensuring that patients have all the relevant information to make informed decisions is 
obviously important, but might there also be value in seeking to shape treatment decisions as 
fully as possible around their preference? That is, to acknowledge the centrality of patients’ 
preferences (Makoul & Clayman, 2006), as unique constructions (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 
2010), and attempt to work through as many of the aspects and implications of this 
preference that might subsequently be consequential for regret. 
 
Before summarising the chapter, I shall briefly reprise the discussion of models of SDM to 
better situate my research. I will spotlight two recent models and discuss their relevance for 
my research. Of the models discussed throughout the chapter, I believe the Implement-SDM 
model (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019) shows the most promise, and I consider it to have 
extended the otherwise promising three talk model (Elwyn et al., 2017). The three talk model 
showed promise in clearly acknowledging the centrality of complex communicative work to 
accomplishing SDM (Elwyn et al., 2017). Moreover, it mapped the decision-making process 
onto three intuitive stages of talk amenable to clinical implementation. Although there was no 
focus on patients’ preferences as unique interactive constructions, the notion of moving from 
initial to informed preferences across decision-making offered a more dynamic treatment of 
patients’ preferences. Overall, then, the three talk model demonstrated a clear development 
from the earlier models of SDM and stands as the best of the predominantly theoretical 
models.  
 
Not only did the Implement-SDM model provide support for the existence of choice talk, 
option talk, and decision talk, but it reported in situ variability between illnesses, and a 
further stage of talk (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019). As such, the Implement-SDM model 
becomes the primary candidate for best model, as it took the strengths of the three talk model 
and extended them further. In addition, it is difficult to overstate the step forward that the 
empirical evidence offered by the Implement-SDM model represented. Both models are 
closer to the language and social interaction approach I take in this research than previous 
models despite not belonging to that tradition. The aforementioned focus on communicative 
processes and stages of talk in the three talk model (Elwyn et al., 2017) and the focus on 
empirical observation and inductive reasoning in the Implement-SDM model (Joseph-
Williams et al., 2019). I therefore offer a qualified endorsement of the Implement-SDM 
model (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019) on the grounds that it demonstrates the same promise as 
the three talk model and develops this by moving further away from theoretical to empirical.  
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This endorsement is qualified because I believe the Implement-SDM model (Joseph-
Williams et al., 2019) represents the best of the current models. By being grounded in 
empirical evidence this model is a clear improvement in closeness to clinical practice and 
SDM as currently attempted. I consider the next step towards an improved model of SDM to 
be the incorporation of the language and social interaction perspective. The language and 
social interaction perspective would further foreground the centrality of the communicative 
process, in particular the link between what is said and subsequently gets done, plus how 
these distinct stages of talk get organized and navigated by the parties. A trajectory from 
choice talk to decision talk should be analytically tractable and the stages of talk could be 
given more detailed accounts and a characterisation based on actual interactions that 
occurred. Further to these spaces for interaction and expansion, it is also worth investigating 
how prostate cancer treatment appointments unfold compared to this succinct model. I do, 
however, believe that the Implement-SDM model (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019) is amenable 
to a language and social interaction perspective.  
 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has told a story about the development of the practitioner-patient relationship, a 
necessarily selective and Anglo-centric story, that focused on the tradition of a paternalistic 
approach to care giving way to more ethical and dynamic developments. In section 1.1 I 
discussed the paternalistic approach and the sick role (Parsons, 1951) and section 1.2 
overviewed participatory and ethical models of the practitioner-patient relationship (Szasz & 
Hollender, 1956; Veatch, 1972; Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992). For section 1.3 I covered the 
development of the first model of SDM (Charles et al., 1997), its subsequent revision 
(Charles et al., 1999), and competence frameworks for SDM (Towle & Godolphin, 1999; 
Elwyn et al., 2000). Section 1.4 remarked on the set of systematic reviews that prompted the 
proposal of an integrative model of SDM (Makoul & Clayman, 2006; Moumjid et al., 2007) 
plus the increasing prominence of patients’ preferences as an essential SDM element. 
Problems with SDM and patients’ preferences at both the levels of research and practice were 
then reviewed in section 1.5. Recent models of SDM that brought the field closer to attempts 
at clinical implementation were then covered in section 1.6. I introduced prostate cancer, as 
the healthcare topic of my research, in section 1.7 and illustrated its relevance for SDM and 
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patients’ preferences. Now, in section 1.8, I will provide a snapshot of the problems that I 
consider SDM and patients’ preferences to continue to face, state the aims and intentions of 
this thesis, and signpost my second chapter.  
 
As this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, there have been many substantial and insightful 
contributions to SDM since the first model was proposed (Charles et al., 1997). That said, 
SDM research and practice still faces problems, and I will re-state those problems before I do 
the same for patients’ preferences. Theoretically or conceptually, I believe the first problem 
facing SDM research is the way that it defines patients’ preferences and to a lesser extent 
SDM itself. I agree with the claims that patients’ preferences are unique constructions that are 
responsively developed in situ relative to the context of the decision-making encounter 
(Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010). As such, while I welcome promising developments such as an 
acknowledgement of the wide-ranging complexity of communicative practices involved in 
SDM (Elwyn et al., 2017), I think it is an issue that patients’ preferences are not clearly 
designated as interactive constructions but rather stable phenomena amenable to 
straightforward elicitation. This omission of preferences as constructions is part of a broader 
problem with standardisation that SDM has encountered. Although there is an obvious appeal 
to standardisation for both research and especially practice perspectives, the first model of 
SDM came with a caution that standardisation was not an important concern (Charles et al., 
1997).  
 
Rather, focusing on the essential elements of SDM, and establishing these as touchstones for 
making a shared decision with the patient was emphasised (Charles et al., 1997). I argue that 
focusing on notions of standardisation to the neglect of the recursive and continuous nature of 
SDM elements (Charles et al., 1997; Towle & Godolphin, 1999; Elwyn et al., 2017) is 
detrimental to the practical accomplishment of SDM in situ. This neglect of the recursive and 
continuous nature of SDM elements throws the handling of aspects of the decision-making 
process into tension with the forms that they may take in situ. With the recurrent suggestion 
that SDM elements fall along gradations rather than being seen as dichotomous successes or 
failures (Charles et al., 1997; Elwyn et al., 2017), it is unclear how a standardised approach to 
either research or practice would faithfully capture these elements empirically. Furthermore, 
an expectation that, for instance, patients’ preferences are stable phenomena interchangeable 
with opinions can set the wrong tone for an appointment where patients’ preferences are key 
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to decision-making business such as scenarios with professional equipoise (Elwyn et al., 
2000).  
 
I would contend also that other problems facing SDM such as trouble measuring the concept 
and its elements successfully relate to the issue of a poor fit or missing consensus between 
constructed and recursive phenomena on one hand and notions of firm standardised 
behaviour on the other. That is, a clash between a deductive checklist of and an inductive 
response to the behaviour that patients, practitioners, and any third parties exhibit in decision-
making appointments in situ. Indeed, when surveyed as part of a UK-wide SDM initiative, 
practitioners reported that they perceived little difference between their practice and SDM 
(Joseph-Williams et al., 2017). However, practitioners have been reported to infrequently 
involve patients in decision-making and rarely perform involvement behaviours that concern 
patients’ preferences (Couét et al., 2015). Without patient involvement it is unlikely that 
these encounters produced shared decisions; certainly not shared decisions in the spirit of 
making healthcare decisions collaboratively as opposed to checklist box-ticking. Healthcare 
is moving towards a goal of routine SDM (Coulter et al., 2017) but for that to mean anything, 
and reflect the ethical developments that preceded it, SDM needs to occur in a manner that 
includes the patient and responds to their preferences whenever possible.  
 
In turn, there is a similar problem with patients’ preferences, in that these are not treated as 
unique interactive constructions but rather as an opinion or belief (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 
2010). The issue is that a model of SDM that purports to involve patients’ preferences 
centrally and meaningfully fails at least partially in this task if it does not designate patients’ 
preferences as interactive constructions. This problem of designation is obviously at the 
theoretical or conceptual level, but it may colour practitioners’ perspectives on patients’ 
preferences and lead to shallow treatment of what I consider a rich and core element of SDM. 
A similar practical problem is faced by patients’ preferences too, as they are not routinely 
seen to be brought to bear on patients’ treatment decisions (Scherr et al., 2017). Indeed, 
patients’ preferences were reported to fall by the wayside in favour of clinical considerations 
around such factors as patients’ age and Gleason score (Scherr et al., 2017). It is presently 
unclear, then, how exactly patients’ preferences do, or can, influence patients’ treatment 
decisions in situ.  
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This thesis, then, is intended to contribute to the study of SDM by focusing on the essential 
element of patients’ preferences. I concur with the view that elements of SDM are recursive 
and indeed that the decision-making process is recursive and interactively accomplished. As 
such, I aim to provide empirical observational examples of patients’ preferences as 
interactive in situ constructions from post-diagnostic prostate cancer treatment appointments. 
Furthermore, to analyse these preferences for the forms they take and ways that patients 
construct them with a view to addressing these absences in the literature. It is also my aim to 
help illustrate exactly how consequential the fine-grained detail of practitioner-patient 
interaction is for the phenomenon of patients’ preferences as unique interactive constructions. 
In turn, how consequential this interactive communicative work is for the recursive and 
continuous nature of SDM elements. The primary claim of this thesis is that the practitioner-
patient interaction is consequential for SDM and especially patients’ preferences, at the level 
of the actual conversations. I do not assume that a practitioner will either succeed or fail to 
share a decision with their patient. Rather, I argue that patients and practitioners create and 
shape a sense of sharedness in their communicative contributions to treatment appointments. 
My contention is that if patients’ preferences can shape the discussion of treatment options, 
and the ultimate decision that patients make, then this will be in the detail of what patients 
and practitioners say. 
 
Chapter 2 will overview the research literature on patient-practitioner interaction and 
attempts to capture, characterise, and explain the behaviour within from three perspectives. 
To begin, the chapter will cover the development of interaction systems analysis and its 
subsequent uptake in healthcare encounters research. Then, the strand of critical qualitative 
microanalysis will follow before the language and social interaction research concludes the 
overview. Chapter 2 will close with my case for taking the language and social interaction 
approach of discursive psychology to investigate the role of patients’ preferences in prostate 










Chapter 2: A review of approaches to the study of interactions in situ 
 
Chapter Overview  
 
In chapter 1 I focused on the history of the practitioner-patient relationship and told a story 
about the development of SDM. While there was a large amount of material covered, and this 
presented much fascinating material, I found the absence of interaction research especially 
notable. As such, it appeared timely to consider the contribution that interaction research 
might make to the field of SDM. This chapter, then, forms the second part of my literature 
review and focuses on interaction research into healthcare encounters and SDM. The first 
section discusses Robert Bales and his interaction process analysis and its influence on 
subsequent interaction analysis studies of healthcare interactions. Section two moves closer 
to the study of interactions as sites of meaningful conversational work by covering critical 
interaction analysts and their interest in ideology and power. In section three, the language 
and social interaction approaches of conversation analysis and discursive psychology are 
introduced. Subsequently, I consider how these approaches to studying social interactions 
have been applied to the field of healthcare. To conclude the chapter, I make the case for 
adopting the language and social interaction approach of discursive psychology for my 
research and set up the coverage of methods in chapter 3.  
 
2.1 Interaction systems approaches to face-to-face interactions  
 
2.1.1 Interaction process analysis  
 
This first section begins a narrative that tells a story about the development of the study of 
face-to-face interaction. The first stage of this development was interaction process analysis 
(Bales, 1950). I begin with interaction process analysis because it was the first major attempt 
at systematic analysis of face-to-face group interaction. In turn, interaction process analysis 
proved to be hugely influential in stimulating research into face-to-face interaction. Indeed, I 
shall overview the role of interaction process analysis in, and its influence for, healthcare 
interactions later in the chapter.  
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As the 1950s began there was substantial sociological interest in theories of social systems 
and structures as seen in the publication of The Social System (Parsons, 1951). Robert Bales, 
one of Parsons’ PhD students, had a keen interest in small groups and wanted to study face-
to-face interactions in small groups. For Bales, however, small groups appeared more 
disparate and harder to generalise than full scale social systems such as countries (Bales, 
1950). Parsons’ influence became clear when Bales reconsidered small groups as 
“microscopic social systems”, or more specifically “systems of human interaction” (Bales, 
1950a, p. 257) to offset this problem of generalisation. In turn, Bales considered that there 
would not be a problem comparing small face-to-face groups to societies if they were 
compared as systems of interactions. In turn, Bales aimed to develop a systematic method of 
analysis for small group face-to-face interactions that could classify and explain the 
interactions and behaviours within. Subsequently, Bales presented interaction process 
analysis (Bales, 1950b), which began the tradition of interaction systems approaches for 
studying face-to-face interaction. Interaction process analysis is a process analysis system 
rather than, for instance, a content analysis system because it focuses on the process of 
interaction and problems that might impede this process (Bales, 1950). 
 
Bales’ (1950) system for analysing small group face-to-face interactions considered 
interactions to be processes, which could be categorised by functions but also by the 
relevance of interactive behaviour for problem-solving (Bales, 1950). Bales was interested in 
problems because he believed that interactions required equilibrium to progress smoothly and 
accomplish aims or tasks. Before I characterise the types of functional problems that Bales 
considered it necessary to solve or avoid for a smooth interaction, I will discuss the 
categories that interaction process analysis used. There were 12 categories of interactive 
behaviour proposed for interaction process analysis, which were grouped into four areas of 
function (Bales, 1950). There are two Social-Emotional areas of a) positive reactions and b) 
negative reactions plus two Task areas of c) attempted answers and d) questions (Bales, 
1950a, p. 258). Each area included three of the twelve categories for classifying interactive 
behaviour and every category had an inverse category in the opposite area. That is, category 
three in the positive reactions area was agrees while activity nine in negative reactions was 
disagrees (Bales, 1950). Now, being concerned with problem-solving meant that these 
categories for classifying behaviour corresponded to a functional problem for the equilibrium 
and aims of face-to-face interaction (Bales, 1950).  
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There were six functional problems proposed in interaction process analysis and they were as 
follows: Orientation, evaluation, control, decision, tension-management, and integration 
(Bales, 1950). To give an example of the way that problem-solving was conceptualised in 
interaction process analysis, categories four and nine relate to problems of control while 
categories two and 11 concern problems of tension-management (Bales, 1950b, p. 11). 
Categories two and 11 are a) shows tension relief and b) shows tension respectively, and 
interactions could risk being impeded if speakers could not skilfully avoid or solve these 
problems in their interactions. Indeed, to maintain equilibrium throughout the interaction 
process speakers must address the various functional problems as they arrive. An example 
that Bales offered on more than one occasion is of a group meeting to reach a conclusion on a 
single matter (Bales, 1950a, p. 259; Bales, 1950b, p. 11). To reach a conclusion, the group 
must proceed through the functional problems of, for example orientation; evaluation; and 
control (Bales, 1950a, p. 259-260).  
 
In terms of methodology, interaction process analysis was a coding system and focused on 
the verbal units or processes that speakers produced, which ranged from a word to a sentence. 
Interactions could be coded either directly from the ongoing interaction by two observers 
trained to use interaction process analysis or from a transcript from an audio recording of the 
interaction (Bales, 1950). Typically, direct observational coding was performed, but 
transcripts were used to train observers in the skill of using interaction process analysis. 
Notably, while direct coding provided details such as posture, gesture, and intonation it was 
seen to omit as much as 23% of behaviour when compared directly to transcript coding 
(Psathas, 1961). Another approach was to code from the audio recording of an encounter, and 
this was considered to share a drawback with coding from transcripts, which was that the 
expressive features of speech and the postural and gestural behaviour were not coded (Waxler 
& Mishler, 1966). An observer would identify a process or unit of speech and then classify it, 
attribute it to its producer, and designate its target (Bales, 1950, p. 259). It was the observer’s 
judgement, then, to decide on the category classification for units of speech or processes and 
both observers would cross-reference their scores to establish inter-rater reliability (Bales, 
1950). Observers would make attempts, however, to preserve the sequential positioning of 
behaviour for accuracy of representation and facilitating comparisons between coders.  
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Despite Bales’ enthusiasm for interaction process analysis and its importance as an empirical 
method for investigating face-to-face interaction, there were critiques worth considering. One 
of these critiques comes from a proponent of a radically empirical alternative to studying 
interaction, and the other from the interaction systems analysis perspective. Number one 
comes from the language and social interaction approach of conversation analysis. Harvey 
Sacks, one of the founders, remarked in a 1964 lecture that “Bales has the notion that you can 
categorize [human behaviour] as it comes out, so that you sit and watch people as they are 
talking, and write down categories of what they are doing as they’re doing it. That makes it 
into some kind of trick. There’s no reason to suppose that you should be able to see it right 
then and there” (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 28). While not contemporary to the publications of 
Bales’ manual, it is notable that Sacks would take issue with interaction process analysis 13 
years after publication, and perhaps speaks to the extent of influence and uptake of 
interaction process analysis.  
 
Sacks’ contention was that interaction process analysis purported to make sense of 
interactions and their behaviour as they took place, rather than take time to develop a 
systematic understanding over time. Interaction process analysis, Sacks contended, was 
working with a set of categories and actions that could be considered to constrain and force 
interactive behaviours into closely bounded groups. Critique number two came from a 
researcher who would go on to develop a widely used alternative to interaction process 
analysis to study healthcare interactions. This critique of interaction process analysis would 
also come much later than its publication, which again demonstrates the influence and 
acceptance it had among researchers. That said, there was a critique that interaction process 
analysis was a poor fit for more unique or specialist types of face-to-face interaction. Roter 
was critical of interaction process analysis for healthcare interactions specifically, deeming it 
“largely insensitive to the unique communications of the practitioner-patient dyad” (Roter, 
1977, p. 304). Roter’s critique of interaction process analysis and related contribution to the 
field will be discussed in the next section where I consider interaction systems analysis and 
healthcare interactions.  
 
Bales was working from a theory of social systems and social structures and was therefore 
attempting to fit a grand structural theory of society onto small face-to-face groups that 
varied in conduct and contexts. Interaction process analysis was designed to operate on this 
broader level of structural generalisability, and it consequently produced a standardised 
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approach with a limited set of generic categories. While this standardised approach was 
influential and useful for generalising behaviour and comparing social structures, it might 
struggle with interactions that could vary significantly across cases. For instance, we can 
consider healthcare interactions, which imply a recognisable category of interactions that we 
might effectively standardise and generalise across. However, practitioners’ appointments 
could differ between acute visits to an accident and emergency department, a routine health 
check-up, or an appointment to discuss cancer treatment. Naturally, a routine health check-up 
is significantly different from an acute illness visit and would almost certainly entail a 
different kind of interaction marked by both different aims and interactive behaviours. 
Despite the distinct business these interactions cover, they are on the face of it small group 
face-to-face interactions and belong to the category healthcare interactions. In the next 
subsection I will overview some of the work that used interaction process analysis to study 
healthcare interactions, and the modifications that were used.  
 
2.1.2 Applying interaction systems to healthcare interactions  
 
Interaction process analysis (Bales 1950) offered a method to study face-to-face interaction 
and was both highly influential and widely adopted but Bales himself cautioned that it was 
not a specialist measure for analysing the specific aims and behaviours of institutional 
interactions, such as practitioner-patient interactions. This, however, did not stop researchers 
using interaction process analysis to study healthcare encounters. One of the most notable 
cases was a project spanning five years at the Los Angeles Children’s Hospital (Korsch & 
Negrete, 1972). This project took audio recordings of over 800 visits by 800 parents who 
brought their babies to an emergency clinic with an acute but treatable illness. In these 
encounters the parents were considered the patients, as babies cannot conduct their own 
treatment visits. The aim of the project was to investigate practitioners’ communicative style 
and its effect on patients’ evaluations of and satisfaction with encounters. Recordings of 
encounters were coded with a modified version of interaction process analysis (Bales, 1950). 
The existing functions of positive reactions, negative reactions, questions, and attempted 
answers (Bales, 1950) became positive affect, negative affect, neutral statements, and neutral 
questions (Fremon et al., 1971). While the change in functions was to improve goodness-of-
fit between interaction process analysis and healthcare encounters, Bales’ (1950) original 12 
categories were used for the analysis.  
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While I do not consider it necessary to summarise the entirety of the findings from the full 
five years, there are some notable observations to report. To begin, friendliness on the 
practitioner’s part was related to greater patient satisfaction, and the opposite was true for 
perceived unfriendliness (Fremon et al., 1971). Patients reported, however, that the highly 
specialised technical language that practitioners used was problematic, as 149 patients felt 
their baby’s problem had not been clearly explained to them (Korsch & Negrete, 1972). The 
study also found similar issues, as 26% of patients reported failing to voice their primary 
concern due to perceptions of an unsympathetic and disinterested practitioner (Korsch & 
Negrete, 1972). Although 76% of patients ultimately deemed practitioner performance 
satisfactory, perceptions of unfriendliness, disinterest, or unfulfilled expectations were all 
linked to noncompliance or poor compliance with practitioners’ advice and prescriptions 
(Korsch & Negrete, 1972). In terms of suggestions for healthcare practice, then, the project 
clearly demonstrated a relationship between sociable and friendly nonmedical talk and 
reported patient satisfaction. Indeed, the authors suggested that their observations could offer 
a straightforward way to improve both the standard of healthcare communication and patient 
satisfaction (Korsch and Negrete, 1972). 
 
The relative success of the project on practitioner communication and patient satisfaction 
(Korsch & Negrete, 1972) encouraged further use of interaction systems approaches to study 
healthcare interactions, but not everybody used interaction process analysis as it was initially 
formulated (Bales, 1950). For one, Debra Roter was also interested in the relationship 
between practitioner-patient interaction and both patient satisfaction and patient compliance. 
As such, Roter (1977) set out to investigate an intervention designed to increase the number 
of questions patients asked their practitioners, with the hypothesis that this might be 
associated with increased satisfaction and compliance. A three-armed randomised controlled 
trial including intervention, contact control condition, and non-contact control condition was 
run. The experimental group received a ten-minute health education intervention that took 
patients through questions they might have, with the aim that patients ask their practitioners 
these questions. Placebo patients also received a ten-minute health education intervention to 
preserve the interactivity and structure of the experimental condition, but this only provided 
routine information about the emergency room facility (Roter, 1977). As mentioned in 
section 2.1.1 Roter was critical of interaction process analysis, judging it “largely insensitive 
to the unique communications of the practitioner-patient dyad” (Roter, 1977, p. 304).  
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Roter used an uncredited, and as such presumably her own, set of interaction categories that 
were tailored to practitioner-patient dyads. This set of interaction categories would go on to 
be dubbed the Roter interaction analysis system, albeit it was not yet named as such nor 
entailed all the categories of its later form. Patients in the experimental group asked twice as 
many questions as the placebo group patients, which was a difference of statistical 
significance (Roter, 1977). In addition, patients who asked more questions were seen to keep 
more faithfully to their appointments, which suggested active roles for patients might 
influence health outcomes. However, experimental patients exhibited more negative affect 
and lower satisfaction scores, which was coupled with reports of feeling less satisfied with 
appointments (Roter, 1977). In addition to the practitioner-patient findings, Roter also 
reported that “uncomfortable dissonance demands resolution through behaviour change” 
(1977, p. 303), which was congruent with Bales’ focus on problem-solving in small group 
face-to-face interactions (Bales, 1950). As such, it might be argued that Roter was important 
to both the development of theory in interaction systems research and the methods for their 
use. For one, Roter took interaction systems research away from the generic categories of 
interaction process analysis (Bales, 1950) and began to work with specific interactions in a 
specific context. As such, there was no need to try to fit a contextually specific interaction 
into generic categories, and interested researchers had an example for developing their own 
categories.   
 
The Roter interaction analysis system would be developed substantially and, in Roter and 
Larson’s words, become “the most widely used single system of medical interaction 
assessment” (Roter & Larson, 2002, p. 243). At its core, the Roter interaction analysis system 
was fundamentally concerned with detailing and characterising interactive exchanges 
between patients and practitioners and their relationship with, and predictive validity for, 
interaction outcomes (Roter & Larson, 2002). There are 37 mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive categories in the Roter interaction analysis system (Joo et al., 2018), although this 
has sometimes varied, with 41 being reported in a recent Japanese study (Yoshida et al., 
2021). In turn, Roter contends that the Roter interaction analysis system is sensitive to the 
particulars of distinct healthcare interaction (Roter & Larson, 2002). That is, Roter interaction 
analysis system scores were discriminative of the healthcare context of practitioner-patient 
interactions, for example distinguishing between the particulars of interactions with 
oncologists compared to interactions with general practitioners (Ong et al., 1998). 
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Quantitative assessment tools need to have sufficient reliability and validity, and over the 
years the Roter interaction analysis system has found inter-rater agreement of 0.85 in studies 
where Roter was an investigator (Roter & Larson, 2002, p. 245). 
 
Unlike interaction process analysis, which typically coded interactions directly or from audio 
recording transcripts (Bales, 1950), the Roter interaction analysis system typically coded 
from audio or video recordings (Roter & Larson, 2002). As such, there were claims that a 
skilled coder can code a recording in only twice the time of the interaction, but this has been 
challenged by studies using the Roter interaction analysis system in other languages (Ong et 
al., 1998). Since the Roter interaction analysis system emerged from a modification of 
interaction process analysis it is unsurprising that similarities exist such as coding units as 
small as a single word provided that a coder can impute meaning (Roter & Larson, 2001). 
Although the Roter interaction analysis system was first used, in an early form, in 1977 it 
became widespread over the years. As such, the supporting evidence for the system 
accumulated later than alternatives such as interaction process analysis.  
 
Research using the Roter interaction analysis system continues to pursue the line of research 
put forward in Roter’s (1977) influential study of health education interventions. That is, 
subsequent research typically aims towards establishing the predictive validity of the Roter 
interaction analysis system for predicting outcomes based on communicative behaviour in 
practitioner-patient interactions. In addition, focus remains on the practicable benefits of 
health education and communication skills interventions for improving practitioner-patient 
interactions and subsequently patient and practitioner outcomes. Programmatically, the Roter 
interaction analysis system is interested in describing and evaluating practitioner-patient 
interaction to subsequently teach communication skills and improve the quality of 
practitioner-patient communication where predictive relationships to patient and practitioner 
outcomes are demonstrable. Having outlined the influential work of Bales (1950) and the 
subsequent development of interaction systems for healthcare interactions (Korsch & 
Negrete, 1972; Roter, 1977), the next section will evaluate the various interaction systems 
both from within and outside the approach.   
 
2.1.3 Evaluating interaction systems approaches  
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As studies were beginning to show (Korsch & Negrete, 1972; Roter, 1977), interaction 
systems research was making inroads with healthcare interactions. By the early 1980s there 
was sufficient interest for a comparative review of their effectiveness in studying healthcare 
interactions. Interaction process analysis (Bales, 1950) was compared with the Roter 
interaction analysis system (Roter, 1977), and a third approach dubbed the verbal response 
modes (Stiles, 1979). I do not intend to dwell on the verbal response modes nor return to it 
and therefore will only outline it briefly. The verbal response modes focused on units of 
verbal communication and coded utterances into one of eight distinct categories ranging from 
disclosure to reflection (Stiles, 1979). As with interaction process analysis, transcripts were 
used for coding and utterances were coded for their grammatical form and their 
communicative intent; or literal versus pragmatic meaning (Stiles, 1979). Of the three 
approaches applied to the set of interactions the authors concluded that the verbal response 
modes had the least explanatory power for outcomes of interactions (Inui et al., 1982). 
 
It was the Roter interaction analysis system that was observed to perform best, as it had 
higher explanatory power for patient compliance with drugs, patient knowledge, and was tied 
with interaction process analysis for patient satisfaction (Inui et al., 1982). With caution, the 
authors suggested that the Roter interaction analysis system might be the best interaction 
system for studying healthcare interactions because of its explanatory power and relative 
coding speed (Inui et al., 1982). That said, beyond individual performance categories the 
authors concluded that while these methods have value, they do not capture the holistic 
experience and business of practitioner-patient interactions (Inui et al., 1982). Importantly, 
the authors did not dismiss interaction systems and voiced their potential for meaningful 
insight about structural and linguistic features of potential relevance. Rather, they suggested 
that perhaps further descriptive materials or work would be required if the aim was to account 
for and explain healthcare encounters in their totality as interactions (Inui et al., 1982).  
 
Beyond the overall explanatory power of these approaches, it had also been observed that 
when interactions were broken up into segments that the explanatory power of these 
approaches varied (Carter et al., 1982). In addition, the findings were not seen to corroborate 
previous results and the authors noted that historically the use of interaction analysis systems 
had been heterogeneous and unstandardised. To these points the authors added the critiques 
that these approaches focused on frequency and therefore undervalued potentially significant 
but infrequent behaviours and made outliers significant challenges to consistency (Carter et 
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al., 1982). Moreover, the features of verbal communication that give language its 
expressiveness such as delivery and intonation were not accounted for by the systems, which 
stilts the account of the communication. As such, the authors considered that these limitations 
might make interaction analysis systems useful for generating hypotheses but perhaps not for 
accounting for and explaining healthcare interactions holistically (Carter et al., 1982). Since 
the Roter interaction analysis system went on to become the dominant interaction analysis 
system for healthcare interactions, I will evaluate this approach further before moving on to 
discuss an alternative approach to the study of healthcare interactions. 
 
An obvious strength of Roter’s approach was that it got away from the generic categories of 
interaction process analysis to study distinct healthcare contexts such as oncology, end of life, 
and chronic conditions (Roter & Larson, 2002). However, the Roter interaction analysis 
system was considered to face a familiar problem, which was that coding healthcare 
interactions into pre-formulated categories produced data that missed the context of the 
interactions (Charon et al., 1994). Indeed, there is an argument to be made from the language 
and social interaction perspective that the Roter interaction analysis system also misses the 
sequential context of healthcare interactions, which is important for understanding how the 
verbal communicative acts fit together and shows transitions between speakers (Heritage & 
Maynard, 2006). The lack of contextual information might be considered a trade-off for the 
latitude to study different specialisms, but it also hints at a related issue. Namely, that the 
Roter interaction analysis system might not capture all relevant elements of action or 
phenomena in healthcare interactions. For instance, in a study of disclosure and informed 
consent, the authors remarked that the Roter interaction analysis system only accounted for 
the content that the chosen codes can account for (Hlubocky et al., 2018). The results of 
Roter interaction analysis systems research were therefore suggested as likely to be highly 
specific but not particularly sensitive to the totality of the phenomena being coded.  
 
By this point in time, interaction systems research had become well established for the study 
of face-to-face interaction. Subsequent researchers had developed the methods beyond the 
limited set of categories and meanings that Bales initially proposed. We had also begun to see 
the types of interactions studied broaden out to healthcare interactions where it provided 
valued findings about patient satisfaction and compliance (Korsch & Negrete, 1972). 
Moreover, rather than persist with Bales’ (1950) more generic categories, researchers were 
developing their own specific alternatives to attempt better fit with their chosen interactional 
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context and finding success (Roter, 1977). There were limitations, however, and chief among 
these was the use of prespecified categories that constrain the interactive behaviour by 
forcing it into a set of narrow categories with limited meanings (Psathas, 1995, p. 3). In 
addition, there was an argument made that interaction systems approaches struggled with the 
specificity of healthcare interactions, and more broadly prioritised frequency of conduct over 
exploration of less frequent but potentially insightful behaviours (Inui et al., 1982). With this 
evaluation of interaction systems approaches to healthcare interaction complete, the next 
section will cover the markedly different approach taken by critical interaction analysts.   
 
2.2 Critical interaction analysis and the study of healthcare interactions 
 
Another stream of research investigating practitioner-patient interaction also sought to 
address perceived problems with practitioner communication. Critical interaction analysts 
sustained the interest in social systems and structures such as was found in the work of 
Parsons (1951) and Bales (1950), but they set out to explain how these structures and systems 
could shape healthcare interactions. These researchers were interested in such issues as 
structural imbalance of power and degrees of participation that might diminish the patient’s 
role and voice in their healthcare appointments. As such, their approach to researching 
healthcare interactions was distinctly different and not just for its critical agenda. For one, 
researchers eschewed the idea of systematically coding the interactions in favour of increased 
focus on verbal conduct and propositional content. There was no predefined set of categories 
to try and fit the varied range of face-to-face conduct into, but rather considerations of what 
structural or ideological features might be shaping or unfolding in the interaction. Whereas 
traditional interaction systems research could typically be considered to neglect the rich 
contextual information parties bring to healthcare encounters, except for the Roter interaction 
analysis system, critical interaction analysts consider context and interaction inseparable.  
 
2.2.1 The voice of the patient and the biomedical practitioner 
 
A concern that would spark a distinctly critical view of and approach to health and healthcare 
encounters was the medicalisation of society, including the concept of health itself (Illich, 
1975). By medicalisation, these authors meant that the problems which individuals faced 
were increasingly met with therapeutic or pharmaceutical solutions (Illich, 1975; Waitzkin, 
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1984). The argument, here, was that in a similar manner to the sick role foregrounding the 
concepts of unmotivated deviance and societal roles (Parsons, 1951), social control by way of 
an ideology of economic production was produced and reproduced in medicalised health 
(Waitzkin, 1984). Indeed, the case was made that even healthcare encounters were subject to 
the medicalisation of health. That is, that patients’ issues, which might arise from their social, 
structural, or personal situation were side-lined by a problem-solving approach to medical 
care that focused on biomedical solutions to return patients to their societal role (Illich, 1975; 
Waitzkin, 1979, 1984). Although this view did not become the mainstream position in the 
1970s and 80s, it did contribute to a bold and critical movement that would investigate and 
critique healthcare approaches and encounters. This critical streak becomes quite clear when 
we consider that two key figures who I discuss in this section were activists as well as 
academics and practitioners. One of the two was a frequent proponent of Marxist critiques of 
health and healthcare encounters (Waitzkin, 1978, 1981), and ideology and power were 
therefore both fixtures in the critical approach to healthcare and its accompanying 
programme of critical analysis. 
 
One of the clearest demonstrations of this critical analysis, focused on the problematizing 
presence of social structural context, came from Elliot Mishler. Mishler was an academic, 
psychiatrist, and activist at Harvard Medical School. In his influential book The Discourse of 
Medicine (Mishler, 1984) Mishler performed qualitative microanalysis on audio recordings of 
practitioner-patient interactions and subsequently characterised patients’ and practitioners’ 
agendas as distinct and often oppositional. Although patients and practitioners both exist in 
social contexts, only patients drew on and made available their lifeworld agenda of daily 
concerns. Conversely, practitioners stuck to a biomedical agenda that was concerned with 
technical problems of diagnosis and treatment (Mishler, 1984). Practitioner-patient 
interactions were therefore considered to be observably asymmetrical, as patients sought to 
involve their lifeworld concerns while practitioners pursued biomedical agendas towards 
technical problem-solving without meaningfully involving a patient’s lifeworld perspective. I 
am using the term lifeworld here in the sense that Mishler did, which is to mean the lifeworld 
of patients or their lives outside of the lens of the biomedical. The world that patients live and 
function in outside of the appointment with subjective issues not seen through the prism of 
medical outcomes and factors. Mishler wrote of practitioners as “applied bioscientists” 
(Mishler, 1984, p. 11) and compared healthcare interviews to physiology experiments. It was 
not just pursuing conflicting agendas that was problematic however, as Mishler called 
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attention to the structural features of healthcare interviews. Structurally, practitioners 
controlled the power of the interaction through initiating a question, receiving a patient’s 
response, and moving on to another question or topic (Mishler, 1984).  
 
Mishler contended that the voice of the patient, and associated lifeworld concerns, were 
suppressed by the practitioner throughout the practitioner-patient interaction. Furthermore, in 
what were termed unremarkable interviews, Mishler argued that the structuring and control of 
the interaction by the practitioner frequently interrupted the patient and limited their ability to 
influence the interaction (Mishler, 1984). While the work was avowedly critical in nature, it 
was not criticism for the sake of criticism, and The Discourse of Medicine (Mishler, 1984) 
contained suggestions for addressing these perceived problems. Furthermore, these 
suggestions would concern the actual interactions between practitioners and patients. The 
biggest suggestion made was that practitioners negotiate with patients to share the power 
more equally in the interaction. In turn, a key recommendation for reducing the power 
imbalance was to translate the biomedical into terms more amenable to patients’ lifeworld 
perspectives (Mishler, 1984). In addition, suggestions that would become fairly common 
practice such as trying to ask open-ended questions and engaging in active and sustained 
listening were also made.  
 
2.2.2 Ideology, power, and healthcare interactions as social control  
 
Mishler was not alone in his argument that that practitioners both held and withheld the 
power in healthcare interactions. Howard Waitzkin, a physician, and sociologist also working 
in the USA, undertook a review of social sciences literature and concluded that practitioner-
patient information giving was problematic (Waitzkin, 1985). Waitzkin contended that 
practitioners often underestimated patients’ desire for information and therefore gave 
information in a highly controlled manner. Subsequently, two hypotheses were proposed with 
the first being that practitioners might withhold information to preserve interactional power, 
and the second that sociolinguistic class differences could problematise information giving 
(Waitzkin, 1985). That is, Waitzkin (1985) theorised that practitioners could both produce 
and reproduce uncertainty in their patients by withholding the specialist information they had 
privileged access to and therefore remain in control of the interaction. Furthermore, Waitzkin 
(1985) theorised that social class difference, along sociolinguistic lines of language and social 
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structure as relational, would be relevant for information giving. Sociolinguistic patterns of 
communication were observed, namely upper-class practitioners typically gave more 
information, and well-educated/upper-class patients received more information (Waitzkin, 
1985). However, the results of the relationship between withholding information, [need for] 
power, and uncertainty were inconclusive (Waitzkin, 1985).   
 
Waitzkin (1989) continued developing the critical analysis of practitioner-patient 
communication, emphasising the importance of social context and both its macro level 
structures and micro level interactions. This development progressed into the thesis that the 
structure of healthcare encounters, and practitioners’ language therein, focused so fully on 
diagnostic concerns that patients’ social contexts and related problems outside the primary 
concern were side-lined. Practitioners seek to make patients amenable to the social context 
again by adhering to a technical, biomedical handling of patients’ problems; therefore, 
making patients feel sufficiently able to continue or return to their social role. We can see, 
here, that this notion echoes Parsons’ sick role (1951), which is perhaps unsurprising since it 
presented a paternalistic relationship between practitioner and patient. Being avowedly 
critical in their analysis and reading of practitioner-patient interactions, it follows that 
Mishler and Waitzkin would problematise such a structured and seemingly paternalistic 
healthcare encounter.  
 
In the critical approach, healthcare encounters are affected by ideological notions of the 
social context much like how social context is governed by macro level structures. For 
instance, Waitzkin summarised three transcripts of healthcare encounters and observed 
concerns rooted in contexts of ideology. The two male patients reported concerns with 
gainful employment and financial earnings, for example, while the female patient was 
concerned about their ability to perform household work (Waitzkin, 1989, p. 233). Healthcare 
encounters therefore echoed macro level structures of ideological social context with 
Waitzkin (1989) considering both mechanisms for social control. It is worth remarking that 
Waitzkin held a doctorate in sociology, had been a physician, and was an activist who co-
published a book in 1974 called The Exploitation of Illness in Capitalist Society (Waitzkin & 
Waterman, 1974). Waitzkin and Waterman argued that Parson’s (1951) Sick Role, discussed 
in section 1.1, was a mechanism of social control (Waitzkin & Waterman, 1974). As such, it 




2.2.3 Evaluating critical interaction analysis  
 
Waitzkin ultimately aimed for a “critical theory of discourse that could convincingly interpret 
what happens in medical encounters” (Waitzkin, 1991, p. XIV). Judged by the metric of 
establishing a critical interpretive theory, then, Waitzkin could be said to have succeeded. 
Theories of healthcare encounters are useful things to have at a general level, and this is also 
true for SDM and patients’ preferences. However, theories are frameworks and do not serve 
the same function as empirical observation and fine-grained analysis. As such, criticisms of 
the critical interaction analysis programme came from proponents of a radically empirical 
alternative. Language and social interaction researchers, interested in the way that speakers 
would organize interactions and accomplish actions therein, contended that invocations of 
ideology and grand social structures of societal control presented a problem of interpretation. 
These authors argued that critical interaction analysts proposed strong, quite determinist 
causal relationships between macro social structures and the micro-processes of healthcare 
interaction (Heritage and Maynard, 2006). Therefore, they claimed it was difficult to draw 
systematic conclusions or highlight routine generalisable features of practitioner-patient 
interaction (Heritage and Maynard, 2006). In turn, these studies were not necessarily 
considered to hold strong in the face of issues of representativeness, reactivity, reliability, and 
replicability that often pose challenges for qualitative social research (Katz, 1983, Mishler 
1991).  
 
Two particular and related issues with critical interaction analysis, concerning its theoretical 
and ideological commitments, were raised by language and social interaction researchers. 
The first issue was how critical interaction analysts used their data, which were naturalistic 
records of healthcare interactions as they happened. Language and social interaction 
researchers believe that naturalistic healthcare encounter data allows us to study the way that 
healthcare interactions, and their institutional business, are organized and accomplished 
locally and in situ by patients and practitioners (Drew et al., 2001). Much like an interaction 
systems approach, then, critical interaction analysts were also argued to be taking rich 
interactive data and seeking connections to preformulated concerns rather than investigating 
the interactions for their own insights about healthcare encounters. That is to say, the view 
from language and social interaction scholars was that novel insights about accomplishing 
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actions in healthcare interactions or organising a smooth interaction were side-lined as the 
data was fitted to something a priori or theorised (Pilnick & Dingwall, 2011). In the case of 
critical interaction analysis, it was ideological notions of power structures (Waitzkin, 1984) 
and in interaction systems it was prespecified categories of behaviour (Bales, 1950).  
 
The related analytic critique of the critical interaction analysis also concerned the way that 
the data was used, and the role of the critical perspective. Language and social interaction 
researchers posited that the systematic study of the local organisation of healthcare 
interactions would be more instructive than critical considerations of ideology and societal 
power (Schegloff, 1997). Approaching healthcare encounters and practitioner-patient 
interactions so critically raised the possibility that analysts might prioritise seeking for faults 
in practitioners’ conduct (Pilnick & Dingwall, 2011). Chief among these concerns was an 
idea that practitioner-patient interactions might be cast as dominance contests with patients 
silenced by asymmetrically privileged practitioners without exploring the possibility of co-
constructive yet asymmetric interactions (Sharrock, 1979). While caution over the extent that 
criticism should drive research is justifiable, it is not sufficient grounds to dismiss the work 
or approach wholesale. Therefore, it is necessary to reiterate that the critical interaction 
analysis research overviewed was empirical research working with real cases of healthcare 
encounters to perform fine-grained qualitative microanalysis. As such, it would be inaccurate 
to suggest that, for instance, the critical interaction analysis research amounted to mere 
criticism. Additionally, it is worth noting that this critique of openly critical approaches was 
not exclusive to studies of healthcare encounters and was the subject of debate between 
eminent language and social interaction scholars (Schegloff, 1997; Wetherell, 1998; Billig, 
1999). 
 
It is also worth noting that although these critiques and analyses are grouped under the term 
critical interaction analysis, it was not the case that the field at large used interaction analysis 
methods. Indeed, the concerns with ideology and social structures often lend themselves to 
theoretical or conceptual and polemical works such as Limits to Medicine (Illich, 1975). The 
work of Mishler (1984) and Waitzkin (1984) were both clearly uses of interaction analysis 
and both lent into the qualitative microanalysis tradition that will be the subject of the next 
section. When we couple the polemical nature of the focus on ideology and the tradition of 
qualitative microanalysis, then it follows that there were critiques from other interaction 
analysts within this tradition. There was a critique of the critical interaction analysis from 
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within the tradition by one of its main proponents, however, as Waitzkin later remarked that 
there was an unspoken criterion of choosing content that would appear typical but also eye-
catching and attention grabbing (Waitzkin, 1990). As such, there was an admission that this 
analysis might not have been entirely representative of the general tenor of the healthcare 
encounters recorded for the project. In the same paper, the related point that it is difficult to 
interpret the reliability, representativeness, and validity of these critical and qualitative 
microanalytic studies of healthcare interactions was made (Waitzkin, 1990). Therefore, while 
this work stimulated much exciting discussion and did provide both instructive findings and 
an insightful view of the workings of practitioner-patient interactions there was an awareness 
of some important limitations. 
 
2.2.4 Considering an alternative approach to studying healthcare interactions  
 
Interaction systems analysis and critical interaction analysis similarly aimed at addressing 
problems of practitioner-patient interactions. Both approaches produced interesting findings 
relevant to healthcare encounters and practitioner-patient interactions. Naturally, each 
approach also has limitations, which I have discussed previously, but they have enriched our 
understanding of healthcare encounters and interactions especially the dynamics of 
interactions. From the language and social interaction perspective that I use for this research, 
critical interaction analysts made an insightful contribution to the understanding of healthcare 
interactions by virtue of its fine-grained analysis of real healthcare encounters (Mishler, 
1984; Waitzkin, 1984). This is to say little of the conceptual and polemical critique that posed 
difficult questions about practitioners and healthcare encounters. The critical position of this 
research set it apart from many of the alternatives despite it producing findings consistent 
with those in alternative approaches. For example, the broad similarities in Mishler’s (1984) 
distinction between practitioners’ biomedical agendas and patients’ lifeworld agendas and the 
task-focused and socioemotional behaviour conceptual framework that Roter and Hall (1989) 
would propose. Despite the suggestion of a developing body of valid research evidence 
across approaches, there remained a belief among language and social interaction researchers 
that another distinct approach would make an additive contribution.  
 
Among the various critiques, the two approaches were subject to two shared criticisms from 
language and social interaction researchers about how interaction data was used and the role 
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of context in the analysis. Both approaches were argued to make limited use of their data, 
which was typically naturalistic or at least direct recordings of practitioner-patient 
interactions. For interaction analysis systems, the issue was that interactive behaviour had to 
be coded into preformulated categories, whether generic (Bales, 1950) or medical (Roter, 
1977). Therefore, the unique conduct of a healthcare interaction became a decontextualised 
idealisation with no connection between context and conduct (Charon, 1994). In addition, the 
commitment to problem-solving (Bales, 1950) or patient outcomes (Roter, 1977) 
presupposed a focus or perspective that was not consistently borne out in the data (Heritage 
& Maynard, 2006). With critical interaction analysis the data was often used in its naturalistic 
form with analysis of verbatim transcript extracts (Mishler, 1984; Waitzkin, 1989), which 
was roughly in line with language and social interaction research.  
 
That said, the perceived issue was that critical interaction analysts were not focusing on the 
analytically tractable concerns and conduct that parties produced. Rather, the argument was 
that a critical agenda and ideological apparatus was imposed upon and smothered the 
concerns and actions that patients and practitioners made observable in their interactive 
behaviour (Schegloff, 1997; Pilnick & Dingwall, 2011). The sense from language and social 
interaction researchers was that the two approaches were pitching at similar aims with less 
difference than one might otherwise assume. Indeed, Pilnick and Dingwall (2011) suggest 
that critical interaction analysts and interaction systems researchers pursued “complementary 
but analogous” (Pilnick & Dingwall, 2011, p. 1376) programmes of investigating problematic 
practitioner-patient communication. Both programmes were deemed to miss the local 
interactive work that might reveal insight about the organisation and accomplishment of 
healthcare encounters because they focused on preformulated categories or prior stipulations 
(Pilnick & Dingwall, 2011; Heritage & Maynard, 2006). 
 
The role of context in the data was the second issue seized upon by language and social 
interaction researchers. For instance, the argument was made that interaction analysis systems 
missed the context of interactions by forcing the behaviour into prespecified categories 
(Charon et al., 1994). That said, the lack of certain specific contextual information might be 
argued to balance out against the ability to discriminate between healthcare specialities and 
account for their business (Roter & Larson, 2002). By contrast, critical interaction analysts 
were said to invoke macro level contexts of ideology and social control that might not be 
borne out in the fine-grained detail of the talk by language and social interaction researchers 
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(Schegloff, 1997; Heritage & Maynard, 2006). This criticism, however, reflects the specific 
and ultra-empirical character of conversation analysis, and is one that critical analysts would 
certainly refute. Indeed, even within the tradition of language and social interaction research 
there are avowedly critical positions such as critical discursive psychology (Parker, 2002) and 
positions that argue for a synthesis of more critical and radically empirical approaches 
(Wetherell, 1998). As such and considering the insightful contributions that these approaches 
have made to the study of healthcare interactions and encounters, it is evident that there is not 
a singular approach to context that should be endorsed above others.  
 
To date, interaction systems approaches had revealed instructive findings about patient 
satisfaction and compliance (Korsch & Negrete, 1972; Roter, 1977). As for critical 
interaction analysts, they had characterised tensions between the agendas of patients and 
practitioners (Mishler, 1984). However, there was still space for a radically empirical 
approach to the study of healthcare interactions. As such, a tradition of language and social 
interaction researchers went on to pursue another distinctive research agenda of qualitative 
microanalysis. This aim of this agenda was to bracket off issues of ideology, social structural 
theories, and categorical coding to focus on the local interactive work of patients and 
practitioners. This approach would be one that worked with both the specific context that 
interlocutors made relevant for that interaction (Goodwin & Duranti, 1992) and the 
institutional context of a healthcare encounter. Therefore, the research would investigate the 
concerns that patients and practitioners made relevant and the actions they could be observed 
as doing in the verbal exchanges. Since I have reported critiques from within these traditions 
earlier and wish to set up my own discursive psychological approach, this section detailed the 
perceived contribution that a language and social interaction approach might make prior to 
overviewing relevant literature. 
 
2.3 The study of language and social interaction  
 
This alternative approach, focusing on interactions as practical accomplishments of reasoning 
practically, is the language and social interaction approach. There are several approaches to 
language and social interaction research, but the two most relevant for my research are 
discursive psychology and conversation analysis. To provide an overview of the study of 
healthcare interactions this section focuses on conversation analysis, which was established 
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before discursive psychology and has generated more research on healthcare interactions. 
Examples of discursive psychology studies are scarce, and the coverage of discursive 
psychology will primarily be confined to considering the additive value of studying 
healthcare interactions with discursive psychology. The case for using discursive psychology 
over conversation analysis will be made at the conclusion of this literature review where I can 
relate it to the extant conversation analytic literature. A more thorough account of both 
conversation analysis and discursive psychology will follow in chapter 3, where I discuss my 
methodological and analytical framework. I will begin this section proper by briefly 
overviewing conversation analysis in the following few paragraphs.  
 
Conversation analysis is a qualitative approach to the study of human social interaction 
focusing primarily on the use of language for accomplishing social action and producing and 
maintaining social order (Sacks, 1992; Hoey & Kendrick, 2017). The development of 
conversation analysis derived from Harold Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodological thinking, 
which was concerned with how individuals employed common-sense knowledge and 
practical reasoning to both order social life and render it intelligible through situated 
practices. Conversation analysis took the ethnomethodological notion of social order as 
produced locally and in situ by members, by which he meant interlocutors, and aimed to 
demonstrate that social interactions concerned members producing “order at all points” 
(Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 484). Members produce order at all points, so that interactions might 
exhibit this order and therefore be understood as ordered. Members are required to 
accomplish certain conditions in interactions and therefore interactions need to be ordered to 
permit members these accomplishments (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 485). Indeed, authors within 
this tradition argued that a “focus on practical reasoning emphasizes that members are - as a 
condition of their competence - rendering scenes intelligible, reasonable and accountable, that 
their world is a constant doing and achieving” (Turner, 1974, p. 10). As such, the approach 
that would seek to demonstrate order at all points, would have to be one that was constantly 
attuned to the production and reproduction of order in social interactions.  
 
Harvey Sacks, and his colleagues Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson, developed 
conversation analysis from these ethnomethodological origins, and Sacks wished to 
understand “how activities get done methodically and reproducibly” (Schegloff, 1992, p 
XVII). Conversation analysis therefore developed an analysis of members’ situated practices, 
practical reasoning, and inferences from available adequacies for producing and recognising 
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intelligible social action (Goodwin & Heritage, 1990, p. 287). Sacks realised that records of 
talk-in-interaction such as recordings of calls to a suicide prevention centre afforded the study 
of “rules of conversational sequences” (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 3). It was through careful 
investigation of these rules that Sacks began to illustrate methodical and reproducible 
procedures whereby members employed specific practices to produce recognisable action 
(Sidnell, 2013). Sacks came to see that what one member said was responsive to what another 
had said previously, or that an action was responsive to a prior action. For example, 
beginning with hello would occasion another hello, with greetings therefore being actions 
responsive to other greetings (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 4).  
 
Sacks’, and his colleagues Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson’ insight was that talk-in-
interaction was organized by a turn-taking system, wherein “overwhelmingly, one party talks 
at a time” (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974, p. 699). Interlocutors oriented to the turn-
taking system to conduct intelligible interactions that accomplished actions and displayed 
orderliness. The turn-taking system (Sacks et al., 1974) described and characterised a 
systematics that demonstrated Sacks’ claim of interactions not only exhibiting “order at all 
points” (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 484) but an order that members’ constantly accomplish and 
orient to. The turn-taking system functions to allocate turns at talk, coordinating speakers 
towards orderly talk-in-interaction through completed turns at talk and places where speaker 
change can occur (Hoey & Kendrick, 2017). From this, conversation analysis developed its 
line of analysis towards the systematics of organization of social interaction and talk-in-
interaction. Guided by the question of “why that now” (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973, p. 299), 
conversation analysts sought to identify, describe, and characterise the structure of talk-in-
interaction as something orderly and mutually intelligible wherein members would 
demonstrate their understanding of this structure and its practices.  
 
In addition to taking turns at talk, turns are sequentially organized, so that one turn or action 
makes a responsive second turn or action conditionally relevant and noticeable when absent 
(Schegloff, 1968, 2007). To accomplish action, speakers design their turns to project the 
recognisable second action such as requesting information with interrogatively formatted 
turns (Hoey & Kendrick, 2017). Particularly relevant for understanding, is the notion of 
repair, which is when speakers address breakdowns in intersubjectivity, and potential halting 
progressivity. A speaker can self-repair and address their own trouble in the production of 
their turn or another speaker can project difficulty with a turn and make relevant the action of 
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repairing the breakdown (Gardner, 2008, p. 274). Conversation analysis therefore embodies 
an analysis whereby considering prior turns at talk, their projections, and speaker uptake one 
can investigate “the organization of action and… understanding in interaction” (Goodwin & 
Heritage, 1990, p. 288). These preceding paragraphs are a gloss and a thorough treatment of 
conversation analysis, the particulars of its application to institutions, and its relation to the 
chosen methodology of discursive psychology will follow in chapter three. In addition, it is 
useful to restate that discursive psychology receives less focus in this chapter because the 
institutional study of healthcare interactions has largely been dominated by conversation 
analysis. 
 
2.3.1 Language and social interaction studies of healthcare interactions  
 
Conversation analysis continued to develop research into “the organization of action and… 
understanding in interaction” (Goodwin & Heritage, 1990, p. 288). Concurrently, studies of 
social interaction in institutions were developing in observational (practitioner-patient 
communication, Byrne & Long 1976; Strong, 1979) and ethnomethodological (therapy, 
Turner, 1972; Wootton, 1977, and psychiatry; Coulter, 1973) research. By the end of the 
1970s conversation analysis made its first foray into institutional social interaction 
(courtroom; Atkinson & Drew, 1979) and by the 1990s institutions had become a distinct 
component of the conversation analysis research programme (Drew & Heritage, 1992). 
Interests in the production and maintenance of social order, the use of language for 
accomplishing action, and the role of language in mutual understanding remained. This 
interest was supplemented by interest in identifying and characterising how the specific 
business of institutions was accomplished through social interaction and both if and how 
members orient to the institution as the specialised context wherein the interaction occurs and 
for the identities particular to the institutions (Gill & Roberts, 2013). Taken together, the 
main programme of conversation analysis, the interest in applying conversation analysis to 
institutional interaction, and the observational and ethnomethodological research 
investigating healthcare interactions spurred conversation analysts towards studying 
healthcare interaction. 
 
The increase in specificity from institutional interactions to healthcare interactions generated 
a strand of medical conversation analysis (Gill & Roberts, 2013). The broad project of 
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medical conversation analysis is to describe and characterise how practitioner-patient 
interactions are organized to provide a structure of produced orderliness, and how interaction 
sequences therein are organized to render recognisable medical business as intelligible in 
interactions. Robinson (2003) proposed, described, and characterised an overarching 
structure of social action wherein (a), a medical problem is established, (b), practitioners 
gather further information, (c), diagnosis is delivered, and (d), treatment is recommended (p. 
30). Robinson (2003) argued that when presenting new problems, this structure functions to 
organize practitioner-patient interactions through the contingent progression of each 
sequential activity. For example, diagnosis requires sufficient information and is therefore 
contingent on gathering information, which is contingent on establishing patient’s problem 
(Robinson, 2003, p. 47). Relatedly, patient participation and conceptions of asymmetric 
practitioner-patient interactions, is accounted for by “actions, activities, and projects of 
activities, and their constitutive relevancies” (Robinson, 2003, p. 51). Robinson and Heritage 
(2005) investigated problem presentation and observed a normative order to which 
practitioners and patients both oriented. Particularly, patients oriented to current symptoms as 
both necessary for presenting problems and transitioning to gathering information. 
Practitioners also oriented to current symptoms as transition-relevant by moving immediately 
to information gathering from current symptom presentation (Robinson & Heritage, 2005).    
 
There are also actions and practices that members produce, which are consequential for the 
organization and therefore orderliness of practitioner-patient interactions. For example, the 
format of an opening question can occasion a response that henceforth shapes the sequential 
unfolding of the interaction. Heritage and Robinson (2006) distinguish between general-
inquiry and confirmatory opening questions; with general-inquiry questions associated with 
longer and more detailed problem presentations. A study of an intervention to reduce 
patients’ unmet concerns found that using the word “some” rather than “any” when asking 
patients “Do you have some/any other concerns you want to address today?” addressed up to 
75% of patients’ reported unaddressed concerns while “any” did not routinely address 
unaddressed concerns (Heritage et al., 2007). The negative polarity of “any” might impede 
the production of unaddressed problems. (Heritage et al., 2007). Robinson and Heritage 
(2016) studied up-front agenda setting, a communication skill designed to elicit exhaustive 
accounts of patients’ concerns (Brock et al., 2011). Strikingly, Robinson and Heritage (2016) 
demonstrated that patients oriented to this practice as enquiring after new problems rather 
than exhaustive accounts of concerns. It is argued that because up-front agenda setting was 
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produced adjacent to problem elicitation and presentation, the sequential position implicates 
further new problem discussion (Robinson & Heritage, 2016).  
 
At this point it is worth considering how conversation analysis, as a representative of the 
language and social interaction approach, fares compared to the approaches previously 
covered. With interaction analysis systems there was much gleaned about the impact that 
communication styles and aspects of interaction had on patient outcomes, which were very 
useful for appraising practitioner communication (Korsch & Negrete, 1972; Roter, 1977). 
Furthermore, the Roter interaction analysis system became a powerful tool for healthcare 
communication intervention research (Joo et al., 2018), which had clear links to suggestions 
for practical improvements in the delivery of healthcare encounters. By contrast, conversation 
analysis studies tend to infrequently focus on interventions as the fine-grained qualitative 
microanalysis tends to forego the statistical analysis involved in establishing the strength of a 
relationship. Indeed, there would need to be a combination of a language and social 
interaction approach and an experimental or statistical one to accomplish such an aim (de 
Ruiter & Albert, 2017). As has hopefully started to become clear from this brief account of 
conversation analysis, its strengths lie more in the realm of identifying patterns, structures, 
and domains of organization (Schegloff, 2007).  
 
Many of the concerns and foci of critical interaction analysis are outside of conversation 
analysis and discursive psychology’s remit as a result. While language and social interaction 
and critical interaction analysis can share the use of qualitative microanalysis, they put this 
analysis to distinct uses. My focus, for instance, could not easily answer questions about the 
role of social structures or the use of social control through ideological reproduction 
(Waitzkin, 1991). There may be opportunities to discuss the “voice of the patient” (Mishler, 
1984) where it is seen to be borne out in the fine-grained analysis of talk, but it would not 
form a primary research question. In turn, the choice of language and social interaction is a 
decision to use one insightful but specific approach to the study of healthcare interactions. I 
decided that at this stage it was more useful to attempt to identify and characterise patients’ 
preferences as constructions (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010) and the interactive consequences 
of construction empirically before attempting intervention or critical studies.   
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2.4 Language and social interaction studies of decision-making 
 
2.4.1 Elements of decision-making   
 
There has been lots of language and social interaction research into some of the features of 
SDM with the following key aspects: Elements of decision-making, approaches to decision-
making, decision-making practices, and patients’ preferences. Before proceeding with the 
overview, I wish to note that in this section I use the term language and social interaction 
research to refer primarily to conversation analysis and discursive psychology; although it is 
possible to consider other strands of this approach such as critical discourse analysis. I do not 
refer to the Roter interaction analysis system, as this remains an interaction process analysis 
system, nor critical interaction analysis, as this does not have the grounding in 
ethnomethodology and ordinary language philosophy of most language and social interaction 
approaches.  
  
A systematic review of language and social interaction studies of decision-making in 
healthcare encounters derived four decision-making elements and thirteen corresponding 
communication practices (Land et al., 2017). Decision-making elements were broaching 
decision-making, putting forward a course of action, committing or not (to the action put 
forward), and healthcare professionals’ responses to patients’ resistance or withholding of 
commitment (Land et al., 2017). Broadly, broaching practices were decision-relevant such as 
indicating a commitment point, eliciting patients’ perspectives or preferences, or patients’ 
disclosing a preferred treatment. Putting forward a course of action was the commitment 
point and made committing to or avoiding commitment relevant (Land et al., 2017). 
Typically, practitioners proposed one treatment option to reach commitment points. Even 
where only one option is feasible, single options were usually taken as being endorsed by that 
practitioner. Practitioners could also recommend against a treatment or list the options 
available to the patient. Upon reaching the commitment point, patients’ next actions include 
committing, passively resisting by withholding commitment, or actively resisting treatment 
proposals (Land et al., 2017). If patients resist, practitioners can pursue commitment, with or 
without engaging with patients’ stated issues; can modify or propose an alternative course of 
action; or can defer the commitment point to a future appointment. As such, patients can 
exert sufficient influence on the interactions as to prompt the practitioner to propose an 
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alternative, even if it is only the option of declination or an equivalent course of action (Land 
et al., 2017). 
 
The review scanned nine electronic databases and performed citation tracking to collect 5535 
candidate publications, but only 28 publications met the stringent criteria for inclusion after 
screening (Land et al., 2017). As with chapter 1, it is worth acknowledging the Anglo-centric 
nature of the work being reported, as the studies reviewed were from North America, the 
United Kingdom, and Australia. The authors, however, admit that they had to exclude 
relevant quality works from other countries due to the focus on English language data (Land 
et al., 2017). This Anglo-centric perspective perhaps reflects a preponderance of English data 
in conversation analysis and discursive psychology, an issue discussed by some alongside the 
emphasis on classic data (Hoey & Raymond, 2018). Since there were 28 publications in total, 
we might express some caution as to how established we view the elements and the practices 
reported. Moreover, the publications concerned various illnesses or conditions and different 
healthcare settings, so it would not be straightforward to confidently establish the proposed 
framework. There is a distinct advantage, however, when we compare these findings to the 
majority of the SDM models discussed in chapter one, as the publications and their data are 
grounded in empirical observation and fine-grained analysis of real healthcare encounters and 
interactions. This empirical basis is present in the Implement-SDM model (Joseph-Williams 
et al., 2019) but less prominent or prevalent in others.  
 
It is insightful, then, to compare the distinct ways in which elements of decision-making, as 
reported here, and models of SDM, in chapter 1, differ. For instance, the revised three talk 
model (Elwyn et al., 2017) has three stages of talk; team talk, option talk, and decision talk. 
The review findings focus more tightly on the mechanics of decision-making and an 
increasingly granular set of small but significant communicative practices. In turn, the 
authors propose more of a taxonomy that might inform or be adapted into a model of SDM 
and or practice. We see in the three talk model that the communicative practices are broader, 
and the focus is on a succinct model for clinical practice. Arguably, these two distinct 
approaches are getting at differing levels of granularity and therefore adding colour to 
different aspects of our understanding of SDM. The Implement-SDM model (Joseph-
Williams et al., 2019), by contrast, sits between the two, appearing closer to the review 
findings due to its emergence from empirical work. Of course, the focus on the function of 
talk-in-interaction casts a distinct spotlight on the practices of communication in Land and 
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colleagues’ (2017) review. That said, the focus on observations of practice and its appeal to 
both greater complexity of SDM and variability of stages in situ share more in common with 
the review findings than previous models of SDM. 
 
2.4.2 Approaches to decision-making  
 
Another influential factor in decision-making that has been revealed by conversation analytic 
work is the approach that practitioners take to appointments. In a study that looked at 
oncology and diabetes consultations, practitioners were seen to approach decision-making on 
a continuum that spanned from more unilateral to more bilateral (Collins et al., 2005). 
Unilateral decision-making elides patient involvement, avoids patient contributions, and 
eschews patients’ perspectives or discussions. Bilateral approaches, however, are contingent 
on patient involvement and build patients’ perspectives and contributions into decision-
making sequences (Collins, et al., 2005). Sequentially, bilateral decision-making provides 
interactional space and slots for patient responses not found in unilateral approaches. 
Bilateral decision-making is amenable to negotiation and considering both the medical 
necessity of treatment and the patient’s perspective, while unilateral decision-making invokes 
medical necessity, precludes negotiation, and makes acceptance or declination relevant 
(Collins et al., 2005). Furthermore, the authors reported that approaches differed between 
settings, as ear nose and throat cancer consultations featured more unilateral decision-making 
approaches than diabetes consultations. A unilateral approach would be led entirely by the 
practitioner and as such would likely omit doing nothing from treatment recommendations, as 
that option could pose more risk than curative treatment. Despite bilateral approaches 
encouraging patient involvement, patients participated minimally in decision-making across 
the dataset (Collins et al., 2005). 
 
Aspects of Collins and colleagues’ (2005) broad typology of approaches to decision-making 
have been replicated elsewhere. In a study of primary care consultations for upper respiratory 
tract infections in Finnish municipal health centres, the authors primarily observed variations 
of unilateral approaches (Ijas-Kallio et al., 2010). Patients typically responded minimally or 
were occasionally silent around accepting recommendations but neither response impeded 
progressivity. Patients sometimes produced extended responses, such as positive assessments 
or negotiation initiations however, and these were often consequential. For instance, patients’ 
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positive assessments were seen to gloss decision-making sequences as more bilateral by 
virtue of including patients’ perspectives and co-implicating patients in diagnostic reasoning 
(Ijas-Kallio et al., 2010). Initiating a negotiation sequence halted the appointment progress 
and deferred the decision-making point. Patients would, for instance, request further 
information and in turn exert their right to evaluate how acceptable treatment 
recommendations were. Although it was not overwhelmingly prevalent, there were occasions 
where negotiation sequences prompted re-evaluations of treatment recommendations by 
practitioners (Ijas-Kallio et al., 2010). One point worth considering, however, is that the 
unilateral-bilateral typology might look different depending on contextual variation. For 
instance, a study of antenatal screening in Hong Kong not only found that doing nothing was 
a viable option but that the patient might often be seen as a unilateral decision maker (Pilnick 
& Zayts, 2016).  
 
2.4.3 Decision-making practices: Epistemic and deontic authority  
 
Having overviewed the significance of the way that practitioners approach decision-making 
more broadly, language and social interaction research would proceed to remark on the 
decision-making practices that practitioners can draw on. In studying outpatient neurology, 
practitioners were broadly seen to use two formats to recommend treatments; either as an 
explicitly limited single recommendation or listing a menu of available options were seen as 
practitioners’ common formats (Toerien et al., 2011). However, a spectrum of openness 
suggested that option lists can be designed and delivered as functionally comparable to single 
recommendations. This means that practitioners can exclude possible options, make clear that 
that they prefer a particular option, or describe options in a way that undermines them 
(Toerien et al., 2011). Despite scope for designing and delivering option lists as functionally 
comparable to single recommendations, they remain different formats with distinct 
interactional consequences. Of the two formats, recommending makes accepting or declining 
the relevant next action for a patient, while option listing makes the selection of an option by 
the patient relevant (Toerien et al., 2013).  
 
In option listing, practitioners diminish their epistemic authority, or right to knowledge, by 
formulating a claim about available rather than advisable options. Therefore, there is 
interactional space for choice, an interactional slot to put forward one’s preference, relative 
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epistemic equivalence for choosing, and an open-ended decision-making slot (Toerien et al., 
2013). In turn, patients need not perform potentially delicate actions such as rejecting a 
practitioner-preferred option or challenging practitioners’ epistemic authority. Patients, then, 
have interactional space for decision-making participation that treatment recommendations 
constrain (Toerien et al., 2013). Interactional devices that occasion reductions in 
practitioners’ authority whether epistemic or deontic, meaning the right to decide, are 
significant because treatment recommendations in the UK and the US are most frequently 
pronounced to patients (Stivers et al., 2017). Pronouncements stand alone among 
recommendation formats such as suggestions, proposals, offers, and assertions because they 
relinquish neither practitioners’ epistemic nor deontic authority (Stivers et al., 2017). We 
might consider, then, that while offering patients options is an essential element of SDM 
(Makoul & Clayman, 2006) its interactional constitution can be hugely consequential for the 
functions and work it accomplishes. Indeed, the interactive consequences of treatment 
recommendations go beyond the formats that practitioners use to the ways that practitioners 
formulate and lead up to them.  
 
Continuing to consider the possible role of deontic authority in decision-making means 
considering the ways that it might be interwoven with medical advice. For instance,  
findings from oncology consultations report a pattern whereby oncologists move from 
delivering diagnosis to recommending treatment (Fatigante et al., 2016). Whether diagnostic 
tests were ongoing, or results were conclusive, oncologists presented diagnostic information 
and the possible treatment options before advising a treatment option, therefore formulating it 
as logically consequential from the available diagnosis (Fatigante et al., 2016). Patients are 
therefore positioned as recipients of a logically informed recommendation and this constrains 
them by not affording interactional space for co-constructing treatment recommendations 
(Fatigante et al., 2016). We saw in Toerien et al.’s (2013) study how the epistemic 
asymmetry of a recommendation and its acceptance or declination dynamic similarly 
constrained patients. Further work identified how formulations of risk in treatment 
recommendations can shape decision-making (Alby et al., 2017). Oncologists formulated 
treatment recommendations as mandatory when recurrence risk, as stated by the oncologists 
in the interaction, was high, and as optional when recurrence risk was low (Alby et al., 2017).  
 
In these cases, the oncologist would produce an utterance pertaining to recurrence or perhaps 
precautionary treatment (Alby et al., 2017, p. 1428). When a mandatory formulation of a 
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recommendation was used, oncologists gave advice after diagnostic assessment, whereas 
advice preceded diagnostic assessment in optional recommendations (Alby et al., 2017). In 
mandatory cases patients had interactional slots for involvement but were pressured to accept 
or decline in situ whereas optional cases provided no slots for involvement but left patients to 
make choices autonomously (Alby et al., 2017). Therefore, risk formulations in 
recommendations were consequential for patient choice and patient involvement. In addition 
to presenting a treatment option as recommended (Toerien et al., 2011, 2013), a practitioner 
can also formulate this as mandatory and further constrain patients’ involvement (Alby et al., 
2017). At a similarly basic level the move from diagnosis to recommendation made an 
asymmetry of knowledge and authority relevant (Fatigante et al., 2016).  
 
One of the most relevant notions of patient involvement for treatment decisions is resistance. 
Broadly speaking, treatment appointments are oriented to progressivity, with a view to 
acceptance on the way to deciding (Koenig, 2011). If one accepts an orientation to accepting 
a treatment recommendation as being necessary for progression to decision-making, then it is 
possible to consider resistance an agentic action (Koenig, 2011). When a patient resists a 
treatment recommendation, they halt progression towards a decision and open space for their 
own participation in negotiating which options are acceptable (Koenig, 2011, p. 1112). As 
such, we see that a normative expectation of patients accepting recommendations exists, but 
resisting these recommendations is a resource for patients to negotiate the option endorsed 
(Koenig, 2011). Similar action has been observed in paediatric healthcare encounters where 
resistance opens both a space and opportunity for patients or parents to negotiate treatment 
options (Stivers, 2006).  
 
A key feature of language and social interaction findings is that they tend to concern generic 
or reproducible actions, as we can see with resistance in Stivers (2006), and Koenig’s (2011) 
works. The significance of these negotiation sequences in paediatrics, then, is that patients 
and practitioners orient to them as a negotiation of resistance and acceptance respectively 
(Stivers, 2006; Koenig, 2011). This observation of resistance as an agentic action had also 
been observed in oncology and general medicine contexts. Costello and Roberts (2001) 
reported that patients resisted treatment recommendations via interactive actions such as 
silence, delaying responses, and minimal uptake. While resistance prompted negotiation in 
both contexts, treatment recommendations were only reformulated in general medicine 
consultations (Costello & Roberts, 2001). As such, resistance is not normatively tied to 
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reformulation, but resistance is a resource for patients constrained by treatment 
recommendations that may open a negotiation sequence. Another example, then, of the 
complex interactional work involved in what might otherwise appear as an unremarkable 
aspect of the process of negotiation towards a decision.  
 
To take stock of the coverage so far, the language and social interaction literature has built on 
the groundwork laid by the research programmes of interaction analysis systems and critical 
interaction analysis. For one, the systematic review of language and social interaction studies 
that revealed four decision-making elements and thirteen communication practices provided 
empirically grounded alternatives to our more conceptual models of SDM (Land et al., 2017). 
Additionally, we have seen evidence of distinct approaches to decision-making from 
practitioners and the specific interactional opportunities they afford patients in two countries 
(Collins et al., 2005; Ijas-Kalio et al., 2010). Relatedly, the insights about the distinct effect 
of listing options as opposed to recommending a treatment option and the interactional 
constraints and obligations they impose on patients is pertinent to our understanding of SDM 
(Toerien et al., 2011, 2013). That said, how patients frame and construct their preferences, an 
increasingly important part of SDM, is less intensively studied. In turn, the next section will 
overview the small but insightful number of language and social interaction studies that have 
investigated patients’ preferences in situ.  
 
2.5 Patients’ preferences in decision-making appointments   
 
A small number of analysts have investigated how discussions around patients’ preferences 
are involved in the negotiation of treatment decision-making. In particular, the way that the 
respective rights to knowledge and deciding were negotiated around patients’ preferences; 
and the ways that practitioners could paraphrase patients to encourage or challenge 
preferences. The following sub-section first reports on the interplay of epistemic and deontic 
rights relative to decision making and preferred treatment options first and then the ways that 
practitioners can respond to patients’ preferences.  
 
One of the dynamics that is crucial to SDM is the balance between knowledge and 
determination. Indeed, the interplay between epistemic and deontic authority, or alternatively, 
the right to knowledge (Heritage, 2012a, 2012b) and right to determination (Stevanovic, 
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2013) has been reported as interwoven with the production of sharedness in decision-making 
(Landmark, Gulbrandsen, & Svennevig, 2015). Deontic authority and responsibility for the 
decision were ascribed to the party whose epistemic authority was glossed as most relevant. 
In a way, we might consider the negotiation of deontic authority comparable to Collins and 
colleagues’ (2005) continuum of unilateral to bilateral decision-making approaches. At the 
unilateral end, one party has complete deontic or decisional authority, while at the bilateral 
end this authority might be shared where appropriate. 
 
For instance, in a study of Norwegian secondary care appointments the authors reported that 
the patient had deontic authority where preference and experience were seen as most 
relevant, and the practitioner when biomedical knowledge was most relevant (Landmark et 
al., 2015). Deontic and epistemic authority are types of authority that are primarily locally 
constructed in the interaction by speakers, rather than social forces that certain speakers carry 
with them. For instance, while we might presume that the practitioner automatically carries 
epistemic authority in a treatment appointment, the linguistic and discursive resources for 
constructing a claim to epistemic authority are equally available to patients. Deontic authority 
is particularly important for decision-making because it can ultimately relate to the party who 
gets to make the decision. 
  
Patients often oriented to practitioners’ epistemic authority as a way of diminishing their 
claim to deontic authority, citing insufficient or inferior knowledge bases to make such 
decisions. A prior study by Stevanovic (2012) observed that individuals could project 
insufficient access to specialist knowledge to avoid decisional responsibility for a joint 
decision. This was particularly evident when patients were ascribed deontic authority based 
on their previously stated preference, but they in fact oriented to the practitioner’s superior 
biomedical knowledge and by extension right to determine (Landmark et al., 2015). By 
contrast, when the patient had deontic rights to an option that they did not prefer but the 
practitioner did, they provided partial agreement contingent on the practitioner ultimately 
making the decision (Landmark et al., 2015). As such, despite being offered the right to 
decide on treatment options, patients often relinquished this authority and did so by invoking 
and interweaving the respective epistemic and deontic authority of the practitioner. 
  
Deontic authority was also relevant for how practitioners formulated treatment 
recommendations; and whether these were proposed as possibilities or necessities. For 
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necessities practitioners strongly indexed their deontic authority to the decision while this 
was relaxed and turned over to the patient in the case of possibilities (Landmark et al., 2015). 
Notably, also, every presentation of an option in Landmark and colleagues’ data was as either 
possibility or necessity. We can see, then, that deontic authority was mobilised as a decision-
making resource by patient and practitioner alike in service of decision-making. With the 
historical move towards SDM, it is perhaps surprising that patients were observed to forego 
their rights to determination. 
 
Practitioners were observed to elicit patients’ preferences by formulating hypothetical 
preferences and treatment proposals (e.g., “if you think X, we can do Y”; Landmark, Ofstad, 
& Svennevig, 2017). Broadly, practitioners were observed to produce positively, negatively, 
and neutrally formulated hypotheses. These hypothetical formulations were typically 
produced when a treatment recommendation had been made but the patient had not accepted. 
If a practitioner was to formulate a hypothetical stance that went against their preferred 
option, then it was framed negatively. For instance, the practitioner might frame not waiting 
for a development negatively by characterising the patient as impatient in a formulation such 
as the following “but if you are very impatient, then I can’t say to you that you can’t have a 
baby” (Landmark et al., 2017, p. 2084). In turn, the option is available to the patient, but the 
practitioner has presented it negatively and potentially undermined the option. By contrast, 
when practitioners produced a hypothetical stance about their preferred option, they did so in 
positive terms. For example, waiting to check a blood test was framed as a demonstration of 
the patient’s patience, and requiring only “a ↑bit of patience” (Landmark et al., 2017, p. 
2084). Notably, this formulation featured a negative interrogative, which is significant 
because speakers have been shown to treat negative interrogatives such as “can’t you” 
similarly to assertions rather than a traditional questioning interrogative (Heritage, 2002). As 
such, we can see the practitioners actively pursued acceptance of their preferred option in 
positive formulations and engaged in delegitimization with negative formulations in this 
study (Landmark et al., 2017).  
 
Whether positively or negatively framed, practitioners’ hypothetical formulations about 
patients’ preferences were designed for preference elicitation (Landmark et al., 2017). That 
said, both positive and negative formulations pursued acceptance of practitioners’ preferred 
options and constrained patients’ involvement. Indeed, while hypothetical preference stances 
were ostensibly about an important aspect of SDM (Charles et al., 1997, 1999; Elwyn et al., 
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2012, 2017) they posited predetermined options for patients to accept or reject in practice. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, considering the pressure to accept, undermining of alternative 
options, and interactional constraints, patients often produced non-committal responses 
(Landmark et al., 2017). This finding, then, is an instructive example of the disparity between 
a theoretical notion such as preference elicitation and the interactive in situ work that can be 
missed by standardised notions taken at face value. More specifically, Landmark and 
colleagues’ work (2017) demonstrated what the disparity between the theoretical notion and 
the actual interactive work looked like in practice. This is an important clarification because a 
coding scheme would not uncover a disparity between attempting to elicit preferences and the 
lack of positive engagement on behalf of patients. As such, it was the fine-grained analysis of 
practitioners’ interactive work that revealed what that disparity entailed, which opens 
possibilities for addressing it in the future. Having discussed the language and social 
interaction research into patients’ preferences, I will proceed to evaluate the language and 
social interaction research on healthcare interactions in the next section.  
 
2.6 Evaluating language and social interaction research  
 
As with the other approaches overviewed in this chapter, language and social interaction had 
both strengths and limitations. A trait that straddled the lines between strength and limitation 
was language and social interactions’ obvious focus on description and characterisation. 
Whether conversation analysis or discursive psychology, the primary analytic focus was on 
identifying, describing, and characterising the interactive conduct and social actions of 
speakers. As such, this work has significant insight value and can be especially instructive 
when we consider the mechanics of the social interactions that underpin healthcare 
encounters. By the same token, however, the work has less immediate power for 
interventions or judgements on the wide scale effectiveness of an intervention. One might 
think of the language and social interaction approach as a crucial or primary first step in 
addressing problems or proposing solutions for problems with healthcare encounters and 
practitioner-patient interactions.  
 
I say primary because when we study or discuss healthcare encounters, we are dealing with 
something real conducted through real social interactions between real people rather than 
something theoretical or contrived. There are of course exceptions, but typically the business 
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of the healthcare encounter is largely accomplished through verbal and vocal interactions, 
between patients and practitioners. To clarify, I mean that while gestural and embodied 
conduct is relevant for these interactions, the decision-making work is primarily driven by 
words and vocal sounds. It is therefore necessary to produce a body of research that can 
identify the conduct produced and accomplished in healthcare encounters. Furthermore, to 
contribute to the explanation of this conduct by describing the accomplishment in situ by 
reference to fine-grained interactive and discursive work and characterising the structuring 
and organization of that conduct by the speakers. This ultra-empirical focus, then, is a clear 
advantage of the language and social interaction approach, but it does mean that for example, 
experimental studies of effectiveness (Roter, 1977) or comparative coding of predictive 
validity and explanatory power (Inui et al., 1982) would be outside the remit of this approach. 
We might consider, then, that the ultra-empirical focus of language and social interaction 
research narrows the lens to such an extent that other approaches would need to be recruited 
to take further steps towards outcome or intervention research.  
 
A critique especially pertinent to the critical interaction analysis approach is the way that 
conversation analysis especially does not move beyond the fine-grained analysis of 
conversational organization (Schegloff, 2007). With a focus on what is made observable in 
the talk-in-interaction and having distinct proof procedures for analytic claims, conversation 
analysis does not engage in considerations outside of the text. Again, then, we have an 
example of the narrow focus that persists throughout conversation analysis. The narrow 
focus, and the way that conversation analysis positions this focus, has been subject of debate 
even within the language and social interaction approach. Other language and social 
interaction researchers who have used conversation analysis in some capacity remarked that 
while the method provides a fine-grained technical analysis, this does not necessarily mean a 
scholarly analysis (Wetherell, 1998).  
 
For the ultra-empirical analysis, there is a sacrifice of broader theoretical considerations and 
social explanations alongside any discussion of identity and power that cannot be 
overwhelmingly grounded in the data as a concern or production of the speakers (Wetherell, 
1998). Again, the avowedly technical focus allows the research to produce insightful and 
high-quality fine-grained analysis, but the limitations are clear. If we consider the critical 
interaction analysts, then the programme they are engaged in has similarly qualitative 
microanalysis but also the addition of engagement with theoretical and ideological issues. 
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Indeed, if researchers were interested in the questions or problems of power or the broader 
relationship between healthcare encounters and social structures or forces, then it is 
reasonable to assume that they might prefer the more wide-ranging and seemingly holistic 
approach.  
 
Despite the methodological and analytical frameworks of language and social interaction and 
interaction analysis systems research differing substantially, they do share in some 
similarities. For one, both approaches disattend to content in certain respects, as the language 
and social interaction approach focuses on action over content (Billig, 1999) and interaction 
analysis systems works with a set of preformulated categories (Roter, 1977). Furthermore, 
these two approaches are often engaged in similar tasks of evaluating healthcare encounters 
and interactions, but cling to their own perspective rather than establish collaborative 
programmes despite calls from figures in the respective fields (Roter & Frankel, 1992). 
Indeed, one of the critiques of conversation analysis has been the field’s claim to naivety 
(Billig, 1999) that has led it to privilege the disattending to content and subsequently function 
as an exclusionary approach. That said, this concern has dissipated over time as the field has 
become more interdisciplinary and collaborative (Barnes, 2019) and cases have again been 
made to collaborate between language and social interaction researchers and more 
quantitative or experimental approaches (Albert & de Ruiter, 2018).  
 
Of course, the language and social interaction approach remains a distinctive one that yields 
highly particular findings, but ones that are amenable to the broader empirical contributions 
of cognate but alternative approaches. We might say, then, that to fully bring out the value of 
the research there needs to be more collaborative and interdisciplinary work. Without this 
edge towards collaboration the output of language and social interaction might not find its 
place in the bigger picture understanding of healthcare encounters as they pertain to decision-
making. Although it is crucial to emphasise that this issue is bidirectional and other 
approaches must integrate this ultra-empirical fine-grained microanalysis of language and 
social interaction to bolster their claims and contributions to our understanding of healthcare 
encounters and interactions. I note also, that perhaps due to the relative outsider status of 
language and social interaction in the mainstream of healthcare research, there has not tended 
to be as much critique of this position as vice-versa. In turn, much of this evaluation comes 
from either my perspective as author of this overview or figures within the tradition who 
recognise its limitations as a singular approach (e.g., Billig, 1999; Wetherell, 1998). With this 
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consideration of some of the limitations of language and social interaction research, I shall 
move on to outline the gaps I perceive in the SDM and patients’ preferences literature.  
 
2.7 Gaps in the literature and unanswered questions  
 
Despite the sustained interest in SDM from both academic and practice perspectives, there 
has only been so much work on patients’ preferences. Now, this research has often been 
illuminating and contributed to our bigger picture of SDM and patients’ preferences, but it 
has naturally left gaps. I would argue that there are three significant, but related, gaps that 
require addressing to come to an understanding of patients’ preferences that works best for 
SDM. The first gap is what patients’ preferences as constructions (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 
2010) look like empirically as they feature in healthcare encounters. Second is how patients 
go about constructing preferences in an observable manner and what kinds of strategies and 
approaches are used in this process of construction. Finally, there is the question of the 
consequences of patients’ preferences in situ, which is the gap that Landmark and colleagues 
(2017) have begun to address with their work on practitioners’ handling of patients' 
preferences. I will further discuss these gaps below before I provide more detail about 
discursive psychology and reprise the discussion of the gaps with regards to how discursive 
psychology can contribute to addressing them. 
 
When we consider these gaps together, it is likely the case that they result from the low 
number of studies investigating patients’ preferences in a way that focuses on interactivity 
and construction. Outside of Landmark and colleagues’ (2017) work, I could not find 
research that engaged with preferences as primarily verbal constructions empirically. That is 
not to discount the good work that is being done on a theoretical level, such as the focus on 
stages of talk and taking preferences from initial to informed (Elwyn et al., 2017). In 
addition, the Implement-SDM model (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019) began to partially 
address this gap by providing a model of SDM based on empirical analysis of actual 
decision-making encounters. Promising work on patients’ preferences in situ is also taking 
place in intervention development research. For instance, one study reported that the 
inclusion of a preference assessment before the decision-making point was reported to lower 
decisional conflict and may have prompted patients to discuss their preferences more fully 
with their practitioner (Shirk et al., 2017). Although I consider the language and social 
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interaction approach to be most immediately valuable, by virtue of its scope for documenting 
and characterising real interactive behaviour, there remain questions to be answered.  
 
For instance, the work by Landmark and colleagues’ (2017) while hugely insightful for 
understanding the gap between ostensible SDM behaviour, such as preference elicitation and 
checking, and its interactive appearance in situ shows us the ways that practitioners respond 
to preferences. These findings alone are instructive and novel contributions to the way that 
we understand SDM and patients’ preferences, however there is still space for a focus on the 
work that patients put into their preferences and the construction process. Indeed, if we want 
to better understand what a discussion about preferences that might lower decisional conflict 
(Shirk et al., 2017) looks like or see examples of initial or informed preferences (Elwyn et al., 
2017), then we need research that is designed to work with the constructed nature of patients’ 
preferences (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010) and the interactivity involved in construction. Put 
simply, I believe there remains a clear need for research that identifies patients’ preferences 
as unique constructions in situ and characterises the forms that these preferences can take. If 
we are to take patients’ preferences as a prominent essential element of SDM (Makoul & 
Clayman, 2006), then we need to be able to refer to real examples and analysis of patients’ 
preferences as they appear and function in healthcare appointments.  
 
A related second gap in the literature is research on how patients’ preferences come to be 
constructed within a healthcare encounter or treatment discussion. When discussing patients’ 
preferences as constructions in section 1.5, I overviewed the research on preference reversals 
(Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971, 1973), which is a long-standing example of preferences being 
anything but fixed. To return to that discussion, preference reversals are an example of a 
substantial literature with a sustained focus on how preferences get constructed via cognitive 
processes (see Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006 for an overview). Again, this research contributes 
to a larger understanding of the possible explanations for or routes to preference construction 
and findings such as preference reversals are useful despite methodological or theoretical 
differences between approaches. As such, this research is certainly valuable and lends 
another kind of support to the claim that patients’ preferences are constructions that can stand 
alongside language and social interaction research.  
 
I do, however, consider the absence of research documenting and explaining the ways that 
the construction of preferences occurs in verbal interaction to be noteworthy. Having 
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examples, and an understanding, of the ways that patients actively construct their preferences 
in decision-making discussions would be useful for two reasons. First, it is easier to track and 
respond to the verbal construction work than internal processes of cognitive computation, 
which could help with the dynamism of encounters. Second, if practitioners can recognise 
that a patient is in the process of constructing a preference, then they would be well 
positioned to ensure that there is meaningful engagement with and impact of that preference. 
 
The final gap would be the way that patients’ preferences are influential for the patients’ 
decision-making process and treatment decision. In section 1.5.3 I discussed some of the 
problems that patients’ preferences and SDM faced in relation to implementing or utilising 
patients’ preferences. Crucially, patients’ preferences do not exist in isolation and to 
understand the impact of patients’ preferences on decision-making, we need to observe and 
interrogate preferences as they feature in healthcare encounters. Returning to Landmark and 
colleagues’ work (2017) since it is the primary example of this research, we have an example 
of the consequences of patients’ preferences, and it is a striking one. The observation that 
practitioners would steer patients towards institutionally preferred treatment options and 
undermine alternative preferences certainly provides one candidate explanation for the 
limited influence of patients’ preferences on treatment decisions (Landmark et al., 2017). 
Indeed, the disparity between what is ostensibly SDM behaviour, and the in situ interactive 
work is a spur to further work that might reveal similar barriers to patients’ preferences 
influencing treatment decisions. As the suggestion appears to be that patients voicing their 
preferences is insufficient to influence treatment decisions, there is a clear gap for research 
that can demonstrate the interactive consequences of patients’ preferences in treatment 
appointments.  
 
Although I have been discussing conversation analysis here, this is not the only approach that 
has left this gap around patients’ preferences. Indeed, the argument that patients’ preferences 
are constructions was made within the mainstream of SDM by one of its main proponents 
(Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010). Eleven years have passed since the publication of the paper 
making the argument for constructed preferences and there have been contributions from 
various research traditions and approaches, which point towards useful suggestions and 
insights. Taken together, however, they do still leave a gap in the research that remains to be 
filled and this suggests to me that a novel contribution such as a discursive psychological 
study would enrich our developing understanding of patients’ preferences. As this section 
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concludes, I will now transition and make a clearer statement as to why I chose to use 
discursive psychology for my research. 
 
2.8 Why use discursive psychology to study patients’ preferences?  
 
Thus far, my overview of the language and social interaction research has focused on 
conversation analysis and its application to healthcare interactions. As such, there is a 
question to be asked: Why did I not choose to use conversation analysis instead of discursive 
psychology? My answer to this question includes the following reasons. The first reason is 
that discursive psychology as it is practiced by major proponents such as Potter, Edwards, 
and Wiggins is distinct from discursive psychology as it first appeared. Potter and 
Wetherell’s (1987) Discourse and Social Psychology set out a vision of discursive 
psychology that drew on the analytic framework of conversation analysis, but also concepts 
such as interpretive repertoires (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984) and ideological dilemmas (Billig 
et al., 1988) from the sociology of scientific knowledge and rhetorical studies respectively. 
By contrast, contemporary discursive psychology has recently been characterised as: “an 
approach that applies a conversation analytic method and perspective to issues that are 
typically seen as individual, cognitive, and psychological” (Edwards & Potter, 2017, p. 498). 
As such, it did not make sense to suggest stark differences between the analytic frameworks 
of conversation analysis and discursive psychology. Now, having acknowledged the 
similarities between conversation analysis and discursive psychology, the second reason for 
my choice of discursive psychology is the key difference between the two approaches.  
 
Discursive psychology is obviously interested in psychology, but more specifically in the 
ways that psychological concepts and terms feature in talk (Potter, 2005, p. 739), which is 
less clearly a focus in conversation analysis. Indeed, conversation analysis is more interested 
in questions of structure, organization, and the mechanics of conversations as social 
interactions (Schegloff, 2007). My research is interested in SDM, but the focus is on patients’ 
preferences, which in addition to being constructions (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010) are also 
psychological phenomena. Moreover, my research also focuses on the fine-grained analysis 
of talk-in-interaction, and the constructive power of language in accomplishing action that are 
hallmarks of language and social interaction research. When we consider that preferences as 
constructions are responsive to information and options given in situ and develop in 
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appointments (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010), we consider points that are amenable to 
discursive psychology. In turn, it is logical that my research would gravitate to language and 
social interaction approaches, and that I would choose the one with the focus on psychology 
in interactions.  
 
To reprise the gaps in the literature that I outlined earlier, there are reasons to believe that 
discursive psychology can contribute to addressing them. For one, I mentioned that although 
we can now speak of initial and informed preferences (Elwyn et al., 2017) and empirical 
examples of practitioners challenging patients’ preferences (Landmark et al., 2017), we do 
not have a clear picture of patients’ preferences. Indeed, even the definitions of patients’ 
preferences tend to be general and quite vague such as “what patients want from their 
healthcare” (Street et al., 2012, p. 168). We do, however, have a claim that patients’ 
preferences are constructed in situ (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010) and evidence that 
preferences are malleable and interactive (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971, 1973). Therefore, 
using discursive psychology’s focus on both construction as an interactive act and 
psychology as an interactive resource would allow for similarly fine-grained analysis into the 
work of constructing a recognisable preference. Moreover, it would also allow for the 
characterisation of patients’ preferences as constructions alongside the provision of examples 
of both constructed preferences and strategies for constructing them. Both insights would be 
instructive in developing our understanding of patients’ preferences empirically, which is 
crucial to grounding the overwhelmingly theoretical and conceptual understanding of SDM 
that we currently have. In addition, there would be a clear link to the work of Landmark of 
colleagues’ (2015, 2017) for an additive contribution to a small but detailed programme of 
analysis. 
 
One obvious caveat is that discursive psychology cannot answer these questions alone, 
especially in a single piece of research. That said, discursive psychology can contribute to 
this area by extending the examination of the interactive consequences of patients’ 
constructions of preference in situ. Using discursive psychology affords me the opportunity 
to identify patients’ preferences in treatment appointments, as they appear and in the fullness 
of their interactive and decision-making context. This provision of context alongside 
examples of real preferences and analysis of the forms they take would provide a bundle of 
rich information to our understanding of patients’ preferences and SDM. It is not the case, 
then, that a discursive psychological investigation would provide a narrow contribution to 
 103 
knowledge despite it being a narrow and specific approach to the study of language and 
social interaction. Altogether then, I argue that this is a window of opportunity for an 
underutilised approach to language and social interaction that would build on existing 
findings and make specific novel contributions that enrich our understanding of patients’ 
preferences and SDM.  
 
2.9 Chapter summary  
 
This chapter told the evolution of the study of small group face-to-face interactions from 
beginnings in social structures theories through to radically empirical analyses of 
conversational structures. One striking continuity between these stages of evolution is the 
shared attention to fine-grained analysis from distinct traditions. For example, interaction 
systems research drew upon grand sociological theories of social structures but systematically 
recorded and rigorously coded each act in face-to-face interactions (Bales, 1950). Another 
evolution arose from adapting the earlier interaction systems approach to better fit healthcare 
encounters and discriminate between the specific context of medical specialities (Roter, 
1977). As researchers moved into more qualitative investigations of healthcare interactions, 
there were two markedly different approaches that I reviewed. The first was avowedly critical 
and drew on similarly grand social structural theories as the earlier interaction systems 
research to explore how social structures would shape and constrain healthcare encounters 
(Mishler, 1984; Waitzkin, 1985).  
 
By contrast, the second approach was radically empirical and ignored the ideological 
considerations of the critical researchers to focus on how patients and practitioners were 
responsible for structuring and accomplishing their face-to-face encounters (Sacks, 1992). All 
the traditions have their own strengths and limitations and make distinct contributions to the 
broader understanding of healthcare interactions. Indeed, taken together they are developing a 
broad understanding of healthcare encounters that can further our understanding of the way 
that decision-making occurs in treatment appointments. That said, my decision was to pursue 
the radically empirical tradition and to choose one of its approaches that has been less 
commonly applied to the study of healthcare interactions. Therefore, I conclude this chapter 
by reiterating that I shall use discursive psychology to investigate the way that patients’ 
preferences appear as and are a feature of post-diagnostic prostate cancer treatment 
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appointments. Chapter 3 will follow by reporting my methodological choices, my data 






















This chapter will provide more contextual information about the research site and what 
typically happens in prostate cancer treatment appointments. Having overviewed the 
treatment appointment process and its position in the treatment decision-making trajectory, I 
will proceed to cover data collection, sampling, and recruitment. A discussion of ethical 
considerations follows the data collection section before the chapter focuses on the analytic 
framework of the research. Ethnomethodology is covered first, as the theoretical and 
analytical basis for conversation analysis and discursive psychology. Subsequently, 
conversation analysis and discursive psychology both receive sections detailing their 
intellectual foundations and analytic principals. The chapter concludes with an account of the 
analytic procedure used for this thesis.  
 
3.1 Prostate cancer treatment appointments  
 
Prostate cancer is the most diagnosed cancer in men (Cancer Research UK, 2020), and the 
second highest cause of cancer mortality, in the UK (Cancer Research UK, 2020). There is, 
however, a high survival rate, as seen in recent 5- and 10-year rates respectively (86.6% and 
77.6%; Cancer Research UK, 2021). Indeed, providing that the cancer has not spread 
throughout the body, then patients can receive curative treatment. Prostate cancer is 
interesting in this regard because there are a range of treatments such as internal and external 
beam radiotherapy, surgery, and brachytherapy. Of the available options there is no “gold 
standard therapy for prostate cancer” (Zeliadt et al., 2006, p. 1871) and no superior treatment 
for cancer-related mortality (Xiong et al., 2014). In turn, it has been suggested that treatment 
for localised prostate cancer ought to be responsive to patients’ preferences rather than purely 
clinical factors (Sommers et al., 2007). As such, post-diagnostic prostate cancer treatment 
appointments are a strong candidate to explore how SDM takes place. The expectation, then, 
is that treatment discussions in prostate cancer treatment appointments might be rich sites of 
patient preference and by extension SDM work. 
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Prostate cancer treatment appointments typically take place after a diagnostic discussion with 
a clinical or medical urologist. Patients present to general practitioners with symptoms, which 
may not indicate prostate cancer, and the general practitioner will perform initial 
examination. Typically, a general practitioner will either administer a digital rectal 
examination or perform a prostate specific antigen blood test. A digital rectal examination 
involves the general practitioner checking the prostate gland for signs of abnormalities with 
their finger. Prostate specific antigen blood tests can indicate possible prostate cancer if they 
reveal unexpectedly high prostate specific antigen levels. In each case, the general 
practitioner will refer the patient to a urologist. A urologist might then offer a clinical 
diagnosis of prostate cancer and refer the patient for further testing. The further tests for 
patients are typically prostate biopsies such as a transrectal ultrasound, which involves 
threading a needle through the rectum (NHS England, 2018). A transperineal biopsy is the 
other typical biopsy and a needle is guided through the skin behind the scrotum (NHS 
England, 2018). Subsequently, patients might have a magnetic resonance imaging scan or 
computerised tomography scan to establish whether the cancer has spread and to stage the 
cancer. Staging cancer involves factoring the size of the tumour, whether cancer cells have 
spread to the lymph nodes, and whether cancer has spread further into the body (Cancer 
Research UK, 2019).  
 
Ideally all of this takes place prior to an appointment with the patient, but in a system like the 
NHS, scheduling all these tasks means some can be incomplete. This is relevant for our data 
because the treatment discussions did not always take place in ideal conditions with all stages 
complete. A doctor will usually inform the patient of their diagnosis and provide information 
about grading, staging, and whether the cancer is treatable. Subsequently, clinical nurse 
specialists (CNSs) will ask patients about this information and discuss it further with patients. 
It is important to note that treatment appointments do not necessarily entail a treatment 
decision. Due to their proximity to diagnosis, it is possible that the multidisciplinary team has 
not discussed suitability for treatment options. A multidisciplinary team is a collection of 
specialists that typically includes oncologists, CNSs, pathologists, radiologists, and surgeons 
(NHS England, 2018). The multidisciplinary team will discuss the stage and grade of the 
cancer, its size, and whether it has spread alongside the patient’s general health when 
deciding treatment suitability.  
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Patients are then given their Gleason score, which range ranges from six to ten. While 
pathologists calculate Gleason scores, a doctor or specialist nurse will usually tell patients 
their score. Gleason scores are calculated by examining cell samples taken during biopsies 
and adding together the two most common grade cells. Cell samples are graded between 3-5 
depending on how aggressive and likely to grow they appear. Three is the least aggressive 
and the Gleason grades that feature cells graded as 3 are the least aggressive grades (Cancer 
Research UK, 2019). Gleason grades 1-3 are slow to moderate growing cancers, while 4-5 
are quick growing and more aggressive cancers (Cancer Research UK, 2019). Two critical 
pieces of information for decision making are therefore a) how far the cancer has already 
spread, or the cancer’s stage, and b) how fast growing the cancer appears to be, which is the 
Gleason score. 
 
Treatment appointments are the interactions where patients receive their options for treating 
or living with cancer and relevant associated information. In turn, treatment appointments are 
sites of behaviour directly relevant to and consequential for decision-making. Patients have 
the opportunity also to raise any questions or concerns they might have or respond to 
information they may not entirely understand. Most relevant to this research however is that 
these appointments are a place for patients’ preferences to take shape in response to the 
information and options available. In receiving treatment information, asking questions, and 
being offered options there is a time for patients to begin formulating how they wish to 
proceed. The key professional party is the CNS who is the representative of the 
multidisciplinary team and therefore knowledgeable about the multidisciplinary team’s 
decision-making process. Clinical nurse specialists also offer support to patients and occupy 
an interesting position between patients and the institutional machinery for treatment 
decision-making. In the treatment decision making appointments recorded for this research 
participants had typically already met briefly with a consultant urologist to receive news of 
their diagnosis and an initial suggestion of the treatment strategy recommended by the 
multidisciplinary team. Immediately following this they are invited to meet for longer with 
the CNS for an opportunity to ask questions about their diagnosis and to discuss their 
treatment preferences. 
 
It is necessary to explain that the treatment discussions recorded for this research are not the 
final stage of decision-making. Indeed, patients are typically sent home after these 
appointments with written information, such as a pack of booklets and leaflets, and advised 
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that they have time for further consideration. However, if there has been indicative agreement 
to a treatment option, institutional arrangements for this proceed such as the making of 
appointments, booking of operating theatre space and so on. Final consent to treatment is 
formally collected immediately prior to its commencement which could be several weeks 
after the appointment recorded for this research. In turn, while we might expect patients and 
practitioners to both be oriented to the need to eventually decide, we would not expect 
patients to arrive and make an immediate decision. Treatment decision-making as arranged in 
and understood by NHS England, then, is a distributed affair and difficult to capture in 
totality. In my research I collect data on one very important occasion, potentially the most 
important occasion, according to the advice of my patient and public involvement panel.  
 
The CNS role is also a topic that deserves proper explanation to better contextualise the 
research. In the context of NHS England, the CNS has been seen as having a critical role 
overseeing the holistic care of cancer patients since the 2004 National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence guidance on supportive care in cancer. Clinical nurse specialists can have 
evidence-based expertise in domains such as types of cancer, treatment specialisms, and 
patient population groups (National Cancer Action Team, 2010). In addition, CNSs inform 
patients about the specifics of treatment options such as the benefits and risks they entail 
(National Cancer Action Team, 2010). The CNS role, then, is one that is pivotal to patients’ 
supportive care but crucially for this research, also to their decision-making process. Despite 
the general competencies, the precise role of the CNS will differ between both hospitals and 
cancer multidisciplinary teams therein. In our specific context of prostate cancer CNSs play a 
major role, with treatment decision-making appointments up to four times longer, up to an 
hour, than those typically held with a medical doctor. Patients, then, can spend far more time 
with their CNS than their doctor, and would work through many key aspects of their care and 
decision-making. Particularly interesting for the literature, is that the role of CNSs in 
decision-making has not been prominently studied in the language and social interaction 
research.  
 
3.2 Data collection and management 
 
3.2.1 Ethical approval process  
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While the university did not need to grant ethical approval, as this was the role of various 
NHS organisations, they were required to approve the project. Project approval was granted 
on March 23rd, 2018 and preparations were subsequently made for ethical approval. To work 
with an NHS foundation trust, I required ethical approval from the NHS research ethics 
committee, the health research authority, and the health and care research Wales bodies. The 
chosen NHS foundation trust also had to confirm capacity and capability to deliver the 
research. Ethical approval was part of the integrated research application system and this was 
accompanied by the health research authority qualitative protocol development tool. The 
protocol and the integrated research application system form together comprised the research 
proposal reviewed by the research ethics committee, health research authority, and NHS 
foundation trust for the research site.  
 
Prior to submission, the protocol was reviewed by a lecturer in communication and social 
interaction and a consultant clinical psychologist. Both reviewers affirmed the value and 
novelty of the research while contributing insightful revisions. Ethical approval also required 
study documents, all of which were reviewed by the health research authority, research ethics 
committee, and NHS foundation trust research and innovation department. Furthermore, as 
patient and public involvement is central to NHS research, former and current prostate cancer 
patients also gave feedback between April and August of 2018 prior to submitting my project 
to the relevant NHS bodies. Indeed, the patient and public involvement feedback was 
important for ensuring the research was designed with a sensitivity to patients’ concerns and 
impressions and subsequently conducted in an appropriate manner. Patients received a 
project summary and example study documents. All patients endorsed the project and 
provided astute suggestions for refining study documentation, which rooted the study in the 
concerns and experiences of prostate cancer patients. The most influential of the study 
documentation suggestions were emphasising the potential of the research to improve 
delivery of care, providing a clear timeframe for data archiving, and attempting to avoid 
impersonal language.   
 
Three patients advised on the significance of treatment decision-making appointments for 
them and the right way to approach potential participants at such a sensitive moment in their 
lives. For instance, patients agreed that notification in advance, via post, would be required, 
and that a sensitivity to the possibility that patients might be anxious was important. 
Although patient and public involvement and external peer review were not addressed 
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specifically to ethical considerations, these processes both informed an ethical sensitivity and 
stimulated particularly attentive detail to the delicacy of the research design and subsequent 
implementation and conduct. The patient and public involvement informants had concerns 
about de-identification, confidentiality, and anonymity, which I discussed with them face-to-
face and via email; and gathered their suggestions to best attempt to address their concerns. 
Following approval and access, frequent communication between the research site and the 
chief investigator and local principal investigator has maintained up-to-date information and 
ensured prompt responses to requests. Moreover, the chief investigator produced annual 
reports for the two years that the project ran with the cooperation of the NHS foundation 
trust. Per patient and public involvement, all participants also received a write up of the study 
findings that was tailored to the participant group while findings of a practicable, applied 
nature were shared with the NHS foundation trust.  
 
This research has three participant groups, all with dedicated study documents containing 
standardised study information but tailored to their participation, namely prostate cancer 
patients, patients’ companions, and CNSs. Consent forms were also standardised and asked 
for the same permissions. Namely, consent to audio record the appointment, to use 
anonymised data extracts for publications and presentations plus teaching university students 
and medical students and staff, and to securely archive recordings and transcripts for up to 
ten years. Consent forms asked for these permissions on an opt-in basis, so participants could 
consent to the extent that they felt comfortable. All study documents included contact details 
for the local principal investigator 1and the chief investigator while information sheets 
contained information about withdrawing participation from the research. The study 
documents that patients received are available in appendix A, for the information sheet, and 
appendix B for the consent form. Appendix C contains the information sheet for patients’ 
companions while appendix D is the patient companion consent form. Clinician information 
sheets are in appendix E and clinician consent forms are in appendix F. 
 
3.2.2 Overview of ethical issues 
 
 
1 Dr. Mike Rennoldson acted as local principal investigator in addition to his role as Director of Studies while 
Charles Baker acted as chief investigator. 
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The main ethical issues were related to the confidential nature of medical data and records on 
one hand and the sensitivity on the patients’ side of the potentially difficult interactions on 
the other. For one, it was crucial to ensure that identifiable information about patients was 
anonymised and omitted. Furthermore, that confidential information that comprised part of 
patients’ medical files were de-identified and stored securely. This concern was particularly 
pertinent since the intention was to archive consent forms and recordings for up to ten years 
and offer a form of open access, albeit not in the sense of making them widely available. 
Rather, the intention to make the audio recordings, with identifiable information obscured in 
the recordings, available to other researchers with appropriate ethical approval. In turn, I 
arranged for a secure archive system that could store both the recordings and study 
documents separate from each other. Another ethical concern was the potential intrusiveness 
of the research. While it would have been more intrusive to set up cameras, the patient was 
informed that a digital recorder will be present and visible. Beyond the intrusiveness of 
recording devices, however, there was a sense of intrusion into potentially tough emotional 
and otherwise private moments. As such, I was mindful of being alive to the possibility that 
patients, or their companions, could find themselves overwhelmed or upset in the 
appointment. 
  
To help address this issue, I attempted to clearly inform patients about the nature and scope 
of the research including how it would be conducted. I was careful to avoid influencing the 
patients’ appointments and ensure they were not left with lingering doubts or concerns about 
the research and their contributions to the research specifically. A key component of this 
communication was informing patients of the extent of their involvement, precisely what will 
happen to their recordings including storage and all usage. Furthermore, informing them of 
their rights to decline participation and withdraw their permission during and after the 
appointment up to a clearly defined cut-off date. One other important step to addressing these 
issues was conducting the research in a way that minimised the potential for ethical problems. 
For instance, being sensitive to any delicate moments in the recordings and swiftly 
anonymising data while moving them from the digital recorder to the secure storage system. 
 
3.2.3 Consent to sensitive data collection 
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A two-step recruitment process was necessary to conduct the data collection strategy. First, 
CNSs needed recruiting so that they could subsequently recruit prostate cancer patients and 
their companions. The director of studies, as local principal investigator, approached CNSs 
about participation eligibility and interest. It is important to note that the NHS requires the 
director of studies to be named principal investigator and responsible for data collection in 
PhD research. Clinical nurse specialists saw tailored information sheets, consent forms, and 
spoke with the local principal investigator about what participation entailed. Six CNSs 
ultimately consented to participation, and thereafter assumed responsibility for recruiting 
patients and their companions and recording their appointments. Clinical nurse specialists 
were identified as participants, and patient recruitment leads, because they are responsible for 
conducting treatment appointments with newly diagnosed prostate cancer patients. The local 
principal investigator briefed the CNSs on the data collection process and recruitment 
strategy before passing on an encrypted digital recorder and study documents leaving the 
CNSs to conduct recruitment. Clinical nurse specialists were asked also to include a written 
notification of the possibility of being invited to take part in research which would involve 
recording appointments in appointment letters. The director of studies acting as local 
principal investigator provided a link between hospital and university for any questions, 
contributions, or concerns that they might have. 
 
Patient participants were men awaiting prostate cancer treatment appointments at the research 
site. Notification included contact details for the researcher and information about opting out 
of recordings. All patient participants were identified by participating CNSs. Participating 
CNSs approached men attending the hospital for treatment appointments to ask whether they 
were interested in participating. Members of patients’ clinical care team used their 
professional judgement to decide whether it was appropriate to approach about participation, 
paying particular attention to visible distress or discomfort. Interested patients were assured 
participation was voluntary with no expectations of participation and no consequences of 
declination. Patients were provided an information sheet by participating CNSs, who also 
took questions. Patients wishing to participate were then provided a consent form, informed 
of their right to cease participation without explanation, and, although data would be retained, 
to withdraw from the study. Further to explaining the research and participation 
requirements, participant information sheets detailed all prospective uses of data including 
archiving and using anonymised extracts for teaching and publishing. Consent forms 
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requested permissions for all uses so participants could consent to the extent that they were 
comfortable. 
 
As patients’ companions were often part of the interactions to be recorded, they were also 
asked about participation. Patients’ companions were approached concurrent to patients and 
were therefore party to the discussion between CNS and patient. Tailored information sheets 
and consent forms were provided for companions, who also had the opportunity to ask 
questions and raise issues with the CNS. Of course, companions declining participation 
would stop the recording since their data would have been collected without their consent in 
such cases. That said, no companions declined participation and only one patient declined, 
which meant that their appointment was not recorded. Beyond the presence of companions as 
a possible source of support, they can have important roles in decision-making appointment 
business and do form part of the patient-side of these interactions. As such, it was not just 
procedurally appropriate to record companions but intellectually useful in capturing how 
companions help patients navigate treatment appointments.  
 
Prospective patient participants were considered for inclusion if they had recently been 
diagnosed with prostate cancer, were aged eighteen years or older, and were discussing 
treatment at the research site. Patient companions were included if they were accompanying 
the patient for the purpose of attending the treatment appointment. If prospective participants 
lacked capacity to give informed consent to participate, and/or lacked fluency in spoken and 
written English to understand study information, they were excluded. If all parties consented, 
the CNS took the treatment appointment as standard but asked patients to confirm their name 
and date of birth upon beginning the recording. On occasion, the CNS recorded a patient’s 
name and date of birth when it was not asked in the recording. Patients and companions were 
not tasked to do anything for the recordings, nor was there any follow-up obligation. Initial 
recruitment began in November 2018, but the first recordings were taken on January 14th, 
2019. Here it is key to state that CNSs were making recordings in addition to their usual 
institutional tasks, and patients were not approached sequentially, which constrained their 
ability to give time to research recruitment. Recordings were made with three Olympus 
digital recorders; one DS-3500, one DS-5000, and one DS-9500. The digital recorders were 
circulated between the CNSs for making audio recordings.  
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As a cancer consultation would typically be a personal and private experience it follows that 
there existed potential for distress. Therefore, I was mindful of the possibility that patients, 
should they become distressed, may want to stop the recording after giving consent. 
Participants were able to stop the recording, either temporarily or definitively, and to 
withdraw their consent to participate after the recording or later after the appointment. 
Crucially for participants, their CNSs, as the principal source of psychological care during 
their treatment, were well placed to offer support. There were no reports of concern at 
participation to CNSs nor were there any requests to withdraw data or consent after 
participation. 
 
3.2.4 Data management  
 
Treatment appointments are sensitive interactions, particularly in these instances, where 
participants were discussing a prostate cancer diagnosis. In the interactions being recorded, 
patients and companions were informed about the severity of their cancer and the available 
treatment options. A total of 22 recordings were made with an overall sample size of 22 
prostate cancer patients, 6 CNSs, and 20 patient companions. Recordings varied in length 
with the shortest running five minutes and 37 seconds and the longest being one hour 
fourteen minutes and 43 seconds. The individual durations of the recordings are listed in table 
4 below, and the total time of the combined recordings is 09:54:32. I explain how I came to 
choose the extracts used for analysis and their representativeness of the dataset more broadly 
in the subsequent two paragraphs on selecting and coding data. Participant demographics 
were not recorded as this was not deemed criterial to the research, although some but not all 
participants were asked by their specific CNS to give their date of birth during the 
recordings.  
 
Table 4: Recording duration in minutes 
Recording title Recording duration in minutes  
Recording 1 16:28 
Recording 2 10:08 
Recording 3 16:05 
Recording 4 05:37 
Recording 5 26:30 
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Recording 6 42:41 
Recording 7 20:40 
Recording 8 1:14:43 
Recording 9 10:04 
Recording 10 38:55 
Recording 11 36:41 
Recording 12 41:58 
Recording 13 24:34 
Recording 14 18:22 
Recording 15 23:13 
Recording 16 21:16 
Recording 17 25:05 
Recording 18 32:30 
Recording 19 38:10 
Recording 20 20:37 
Recording 21 22:43 
Recording 22  27:32 
 
I coded my data in line with standard practice for discursive psychology, which is to first 
familiarise myself with the recordings and transcripts before making notes on stretches of talk 
(Wiggins, 2016, pp. 118-119). These stretches of talk were revisited in greater detail as I 
focused on spotting candidate actions and phenomena in them. Once I had spotted more than 
one stretch of talk containing an action or phenomenon, I compared them one against 
another. The comparison process led me to identify actions and phenomena that appeared in 
stretches of talk across the dataset. I then extracted and gathered the stretches of talk 
featuring those actions and phenomena into collections that described the patterns they 
demonstrated. After establishing collections of extracts I categorised the actions and 
phenomena into sub-collections that would comprise the analytic foci of my three empirical 
chapters. For instance, my collection for chapter 4 concerned preference construction and 
was comprised of three smaller sub-collections. These sub-collections were Accounting for a 
firm preference; Constructing preferences: Cognitions, emotions, and mental states; and 
Constructing preferences: The invocation of prior experiences. As these collections and sub-
collections were derived from all available recordings, they are representative of the dataset 
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used. The extracts that make up the collections and sub-collections were numbered, labelled, 
and given line numbers in preparation for analysis.  
 
My dataset was diverse, as recordings varied in the decision-making content they contained. 
This variation reflected participants’ distinct positions in the decision-making process rather 
than cherry-picking, which was consequential for the preference work involved. There were 
recordings that featured extensive and distributed preference work, which meant some 
recordings were sampled multiple times. By contrast, other recordings dealt with decisions in 
progress and therefore contained less preference work and fewer preference formulations. 
These decision focused recordings were still sampled, however, to demonstrate the 
heterogeneity and distribution of patients’ preferences. Patients’ preferences were constructed 
in different ways, took distinct forms, and were not always discussed extensively. Indeed, the 
focus on patients’ preferences varied across chapters despite being developed through the 
same rigorous process of coding and collection building. Chapter 4 and the focus on 
preference construction came from identifying the psychological phenomena of patients’ 
preferences and characterising the construction strategies used. With chapter 5, I focused on 
the handling and receipt of patients’ preferences after close inspection of the stretches of talk 
that featured preference construction and preference formulations. Chapter 6 was different 
because I noted a surprising prevalence of laughter and then subsequently came to understand 
the tacit ways that laughter could help manage and construct preferences. I cover these points 
in more detail throughout the thesis, particularly in the opening sections of my three 
empirical chapters and reflect on them in my discussion. 
 
Research data was subject to strict regulations and permissions as part of the ethical 
agreement with the NHS foundation trust. Access to data was restricted to the chief 
investigator and their supervisory team with exceptions granted for auditing and review 
purposes. All recordings being made with an encrypted Olympus digital recorder meant that 
recordings were saved as .ds2 files, which only open in DSSPro transcription software. 
Digital recorders were password-protected, and passwords were only known to the chief 
investigator, local principal investigator, and participating CNSs. Recordings were 
subsequently transferred to the university’s centralised secure storage system and were then 
deleted from the digital recorders. No copies of recordings were stored outside of the 
centralised secure storage system, except for when required for presentations. In the event of 
using data for presentations, the audio recordings would be clipped to match data extracts, 
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stored in a password-protected folder, and securely transported on an encrypted USB flash 
drive. Transcripts would exclude identifying information, with the recordings altered to 
silence these utterances, and the pitch of participants’ voices would be shifted up or down 
semitones for anonymisation.  
 
Recordings, transcripts, and consent forms were numbered rather than named and all were 
stored in separate folders in the centralised secure storage system. All data analysis activity 
took place on a password-protected computer on university grounds or remotely through the 
secure virtual private network Pulse Secure and university host NTUAnywhere. Furthermore, 
except for printing anonymised extracts for data sessions, all analysis was mediated via the 
centralised secure storage system to minimise concerns around confidentiality. In terms of 
physical security, the chief investigator passed the digital recorders to the local principal 
investigator, who securely transferred it to the CNSs. The CNSs then passed the digital 
recorders between themselves for recordings and upon completion stored the digital recorders 
in a locked room. The local principal investigator collected the digital recorders from the 
CNSs, securely transferred it to the chief investigator who transferred recordings to the 
central secure storage system. After deleting recordings, the digital recorders were stored in a 
locked drawer, in a locked room, on university grounds.  
 
While audio recordings were one of the great innovations of conversation analysis, video 
recordings have become increasingly commonplace (Heath et al., 2010). Video recordings 
offer unique insights about embodied conduct (Streeck et al., 2011) and were considered for 
this research. Ultimately the decision was made to take audio recordings. One reason was the 
continued belief that audio recordings offer a faithful or at least “good enough record of what 
happened” (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 622) for analysis. Moreover, discursive psychology and 
conversation analysis both continue to use audio recordings for research, including healthcare 
interactions. For instance, in studies of patient resistance in diagnostic testing (Zhao & Ma, 
2020), the delivery of weight loss interventions by general practitioners (Albury et al., 2018), 
and the appearance of diagnostic categories in psychiatric interviews (Weiste et al., 2018). 
Although audio recordings do not afford considerations of embodied conduct, they do offer a 
naturalistic account of the vocal conduct of the treatment appointments. In turn, it remained 
possible to describe and characterise recognisable preference talk, the construction of patient 
preference, and the organization of treatment appointment discussions. The primary reason 
however was sensitivity to patient and public involvement informants’ concerns about de-
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identification, confidentiality, and anonymity. As the research asked patients to volunteer 
access to, and a record of, a highly sensitive life experience, all efforts were made to assuage 
their concerns, and this was easier with audio recordings.  
 
Beyond sensitivity to patient and public involvement informants’ concerns, there is an 
empirical basis for the concerns that informants raised. There exists a body of research that 
demonstrates voice identification as an ability is fallible and suggests voice identification 
accuracy is diminished compared to visual recognition (McAllister et al., 1993; Stevenage et 
al., 2011). For instance, voice recognition is subject to significant interference compared to 
visual identification (Stevenage et al., 2011), poor detection of speaker change has been 
reported (Fenn et al., 2011), and low success rates for identifying a target voice among 
distractor voices were observed (e.g., Kerstholt et al., 2004, 2006; Öhman et al., 2013a, 
2013b). Given, then, the evidence that voice identification research suggests identification is 
difficult, I was confident in the assurances given to participants about non-identification. 
There are, of course, ways to show visual data in outline that reduce the possibility of 
identification. That said, when coupled with auditory information, the data presents two 
possible sources of identification information. In turn, the singular use of audio recordings 
and single possible source of identification information was considered to better engender 
confidence2.  
 
3.2.5 Open data  
 
One aim of the research was to archive the data collected. The purpose of data archiving was 
multifaceted and begins with the opportunity to study audio recordings of treatment 
appointments without requiring data collection. In this case, the burden of participation on 
patients is diminished and access to healthcare interaction data is made more easily available. 
For the research agenda I am staking out, the intention is that the archival data allows more 
researchers to study SDM and patients’ preferences. Nottingham Trent University confirmed 
they could provide an archive for anonymised recordings and electronic consent forms to be 
securely stored in designated folders with access restricted to the chief investigator and their 
supervisory team. Data archiving was an optional element of participation, and this was 
communicated clearly to prospective participants in study documents. Data archiving was 
 
2 I am grateful to Dr Harriet Smith for providing me with relevant information on voice identification 
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proposed for a period of ten years following study completion, which study documents also 
clearly stated. As research data will be stored in Nottingham Trent University’s centralised 
storage service for active research data for five years following study completion, the 
transition to archiving will be straightforward. During patient and public involvement, 
correspondents were mindful of de-identification, confidentiality, and anonymity issues. 
However, except for mentioning General Data Protection Regulation and advising against 
archiving in perpetuity, correspondents had no objections to data archiving. 
 
A descriptive metadata record for datasets will be created, using the DataCite schema, in 
Nottingham Trent University’s open institutional repository to ensure discoverability. A 
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) will be 'minted' so that the data can be cited in future outputs. 
This is a mediated service and access to the data will be made available upon request, subject 
to agreed conditions of access and terms of data usage. All data will be preserved for a 
minimum of 10 years after the end of the project. As the archive is institutional, it will be 
held by Nottingham Trent University with a request procedure for mediated access. 
Academics requesting access to the data would have to provide their details and credentials 
as well as the reasons for wanting access to the data and how they intended to use it. The 
Nottingham Trent University library research team then contacts me or my supervisor to ask 
for permission to share the data with that academic. In the event I or my director of studies 
leaves Nottingham Trent University, further instructions about how to manage access to this 
data will be provided. Ultimately, however, the library research team would refer the request 
to the Associate Dean for Research and School Research Committee for their permission to 
share that data. This, therefore, minimises the impact of staff turnover and guarantees long-
term access to and custodianship of the data3.  
 
In archiving the data and transcripts, the intention is to be transparent and aspire to the 
highest standard of research. Although Open Science (e.g., The Center for Open Science) is a 
bigger issue in experimental and statistical psychology (Maxwell et al., 2015) this does not 
diminish the need for language and social interaction and qualitative researchers to assist in 
addressing shortcomings in scientific practice. Qualitative researchers encounter an ethical 
issue of participant sensitivity with open data due to the way that the data generated has 
 
3 I am grateful to Jane Bonnell for extensive discussions about the university’s storage and archival systems and 
assistance in setting up access to these systems.  
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stronger real-world implications and experiential content than the artefacts of experimental 
procedures. For instance, sharing accounts of adverse psychological experiences or 
recordings of therapy sessions makes much more potentially sensitive information about a 
person public than a collection of reaction times. Conversation analysis and discursive 
psychology perform well on transparency, and this is because of two related reasons. One 
reason is the subsequent analyses of phenomena that engender corroboration and empirical 
generativity (see Heritage 1984, 1998, 2002). The other reason is the reanalysis of published 
findings that probe critical evaluation and discussion of previously accepted claims (see 
Lynch & Macbeth, 2016; Drew, 2018). Owing to their shared intellectual lineage, and 
overlapping analytic frameworks, discursive psychology shares in these practices. A 2020 
editorial on discursive psychology argues that it “is aligned with the strive for open science in 
that readers can undertake their own examination of the transcripts and their analyses” (Huma 
et al., 2020, p. 324).  
 
3.3 Theoretical and analytical framework  
 
The analytical and theoretical framework informing this research traces its lineage from 
developments in American sociology through to the linguistic reinvigoration of social 
psychology. Now a recognisable approach to the study of psychology and talk-in-interaction; 
discursive psychology has many intellectual forebears. The following section is subsequently 
concerned to introduce the approach of discursive psychology as “a package of topic, 
method, and theory” (Edwards, 2012, p. 427). Moreover, it expands on ethnomethodology 
and conversation analysis as central influences on and components of the theoretical and 
analytical framework of discursive psychology. There are no proprietary methods for 
ethnomethodological analysis, which is the intellectual and analytic basis for conversation 
analysis and discursive psychology, and the thesis will focus on discursive psychological and 
conversation analytic methods. Rather, an ethnomethodological appreciation of the centrality 
of “mundane interpretive processes” (Arminen, 2008, p. 186) to the sense-making work of 
both analysts and interlocutors informs the analytic mentality. It is therefore necessary to 
reprise the brief discussion of the ethnomethodological mentality and outline such notions as 
accountability, indexicality, reflexivity, and the documentary method of interpretation as 
relevant for the thesis. As conversation analysis developed out of ethnomethodology, and 
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discursive psychology out of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis both, there is 
value in discussing all three approaches.   
 
This research is a discursive psychology project but draws extensively on conversation 
analysis as a key part of the analytical framework. In turn, the analytic thrust of this thesis 
can be considered in two parts. A primarily conversation analytic section and a discursive 
psychological analysis. Conversation analysis is used to describe the structures of social 
action that underpin the institutional business of prostate cancer treatment appointments. In 
particular, the ways that talk recognisably about patients’ preferences occurs, and how the 
related phenomenon of option talk unfolds. Furthermore, conversation analysis shows the 
methodical and reproducible ways that intelligible prostate cancer treatment discussions are 
accomplished. The conversation analysis-driven section therefore describes the observable 
structures of social action underpinning the institutional business of prostate cancer treatment 
appointments, with a focus on the business of patients’ preferences. Conversation Analysis is 
used to describe and characterise the normative order of the treatment appointment, and to 
detail the formation and location of talk recognisably about patients’ preferences. Moreover, I 
use conversation analysis to account for the organization of recognisable preferences talk so 
that it constitutes mutually intelligible sequences of preferences-implicative action.  
 
The discursive psychology analysis demonstrates the ways that psychological concepts of 
preference are constructed and how they are implicated in the practices underpinning or 
accomplishing the institutional social actions of treatment appointments. The discursive 
psychology focuses on patients’ constructions of preferences as practical, situated, and 
constructive resources consequential for the institutional business of the treatment 
appointment and social action therein. Moreover, this analysis addresses the ways that 
psychological concepts and states are deployed as discursive practices shaped for the specific 
business of formulating or constructing, accounting for, and making relevant or involving 
patients’ preferences within the institutional context of treatment decision-making and the 
sequential and structural contexts of treatment discussions and decision-making 
conversations. The intention of this cumulative analysis is to display how parties to treatment 
appointments render these interactions “intelligible, reasonable and accountable” (Turner, 
1974). Furthermore, how patients’ preferences as interactive psychological constructions “are 
shaped for the functions they serve, in and for the nexus of social practices in which we use 
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language” (Edwards, 2012, p. 427) particular to the institutional context of prostate cancer 
treatment appointments.  
 
Discursive psychology and conversation analysis both overlap and complement each other by 
drawing on similar intellectual and analytical foundations. As such, discursive psychology 
has been called “an approach that applies a conversation analytic method and perspective to 
issues that are typically seen as individual, cognitive, and psychological” (Edwards and 
Potter, 2017, p. 498). That said, discursive psychology has a clear focus on psychological 
matters, and stance on cognition, that conversation analysis does not share. Conversation 
analysis concerns the fine-grained study of talk-in-interaction and its sequential and structural 
organization as recognisable ordered interactions. While discursive psychology retains an 
interest in the production and organization of talk, it is focused more on the action-orientation 
of talk (te Molder, 2015). The combined analytic foci, then, allow me to build a rich account 
of the interactional business of treatment appointments. In turn, giving me the scope and tools 
for the organization and production of recognisable decision-making talk and the construction 
of patients’ preferences and their subsequent action-orientation. I believe that an 
understanding of ethnomethodology is beneficial for understanding both conversation 
analysis and discursive psychology for two reasons. The first is the intellectual context of 
these approaches, being that they both arose from initial developments in ethnomethodology. 
Second, the terms and concepts of ethnomethodology were largely absorbed by and then 
subsequently reappeared in various forms in conversation analysis and discursive 
psychology. 
 
3.3.1 Key underpinnings of ethnomethodology  
 
The now-classic statement of EM was Harold Garfinkel’s Studies in Ethnomethodology 
(Garfinkel, 1967), which largely collected work conducted earlier. Garfinkel set out to 
demonstrate that although social order was a valid object of inquiry, the intelligibility of 
social actions and their place in the production and sustainment of social order should not be 
taken for granted (Hammersley, 2018). Studies in Ethnomethodology is appropriately named 
to distinguish the particularity of EM. That is, although referring to a sociological approach, 
ethnomethodology is the subject of investigation (Lynch, 2007). Ethnomethodologists study 
the methods and methodic ways with which individuals produce and maintain social order as 
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observable, and therefore reportable, and intelligible (Turner, 1974). Garfinkel demonstrated 
the ways that interlocutors produce social order locally and in situ through their mastery of 
natural language and production of social actions (Garfinkel, 1967). Interlocutors draw upon 
the resources of commonsense knowledge, practical reasoning, and culturally available 
inferences to produce and order their social reality. Therefore, for interlocutors the social 
reality, its order, and indeed “their world is a constant doing and achieving” (Turner, 1974, p. 
10).  
 
As there are no proprietary steps for ethnomethodology, the instructive way to characterise it 
may be through an explication of some key terms and concepts. In turn, I will offer brief 
characterisations of accountability, reflexivity, indexicality, and the documentary method of 
interpretation. Before I begin, it is important to clarify that accountability, indexicality, and 
reflexivity are held to be intrinsic, inherent, and incarnate properties. Now, accountable 
conduct is simply conduct which may be accounted for irrespective of whether one must 
account for that conduct. That is, accountable conduct is not the conduct that individuals are 
held responsible for, but rather conduct that can be understood or can stand as intelligible. 
Indeed, the term accountability refers to the relationship between how conduct can be 
described and its intelligibility as conduct (Peyrot, 1982). As accountability is inherent, it 
follows that one does not make conduct accountable by accounting for it post-hoc, but rather 
an accountable meaning and accountable features either inhere in that conduct or they do not 
(Peyrot, 1982). If not immediately intelligible, then accountability can relate to explicability 
such that conduct is both understandable and expressible (ten Have, 2002). To be 
accountable, then, conduct must have “the potential for being understood” (Peyrot, 1982, p. 
271) rather than be accounted for by the producer or explained to the recipient.   
 
For reflexivity, members’ productions afford or are taken as being constitutive of that which 
they account for. That is, the scene, account, or social world “is in part made up of, the talk” 
(Turner, 1974, p. 10) and can be said to denote how that scene or account stands in relation to 
itself (ten Have, 2002). For Garfinkel, reflexivity may also be considered the incarnate 
property of action and to stand as the relationship between the action, and its methodical 
production, and the process whereby it is made accountable and amenable to interpretation 
(Lynch, 2000). With reflexivity, then, being incarnate entails that “descriptions of the social 
world become, as soon as they have been uttered, constitutive parts of what they have 
described. To describe a situation is to constitute it”” (Coulon, 1995, p. 23). Reflexivity, then, 
 124 
does not refer to a conscious act, such as a term like reflection might suggest, but rather the 
inherent link between conduct under description and its existence out there in the world as 
observable and describable conduct.  
 
Ethnomethodology transformed indexical expressions, the linguistic idea that certain 
expressions are dependent on their context of use for meaning (Bar-Hillel, 1954), into the 
notion that all conduct, including all language, is indexical (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 33). 
Indexicality changed from relationships between expressions and context-specific meanings 
to relationships between all conduct involved in the organization of the conduct being studied 
(Peyrot, 1982). All conduct is inherently indexical, because all conduct is part of the local 
and in situ production of social reality and its ordering (Garfinkel, 1967). Garfinkel stated 
that indexical conduct is “self-organizing with respect to the intelligible character of its own 
appearances” (1967, p. 33). All conduct being indexical requires interlocutors apprehend the 
quiddity (Garfinkel, 1988) or just-thisness of conduct and its uniquely occasioned context-
specific meaning.  
 
One key resource for interlocutors to apprehend the just-thisness of conduct and the practical 
accomplishment of accountable ordered social reality, is the documentary method of 
interpretation (Garfinkel, 1967; Mannheim, 1952, as cited in vom Lehn, 2014). The 
documentary method of interpretation involves identifying a pattern underlying a series of 
appearances, or conduct, where each appearance is also a document of that pattern 
(Garfinkel, 1967). That pattern, however, is identified by reference to the individual 
appearances, which means that the pattern and the appearances stand in relation to each other 
as mutually determinable. As the pattern gives meaning to the appearances, and the pattern is 
meaningful through its relation to the appearances, the documentary method of interpretation 
demonstrates indexicality. This last point is a useful reminder that these ethnomethodological 
terms and concepts are not just inherent but also interrelated. Having reached the end of this 
brief account of key ethnomethodological terms, I will move on to characterise conversation 
analysis as a development from ethnomethodology that would focus squarely on talk-in-
interaction.  
 
3.3.2 Key underpinnings of Conversation Analysis  
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Conversation analysis is a qualitative microanalytical approach to the study of social 
interaction. Conversation analysts investigate talk-in-interaction for its role in the production 
of social action, accomplishment of understanding, and orderly organization of interaction 
and the actions therein (Psathas, 1995). The interest in order comes from the founder Harvey 
Sacks, who built upon Garfinkel’s (1967) interest in order as practical accomplishment and 
Goffman’s (Goffman, 1967, 1983) interest in studying social interaction (Heritage, 2001). 
Sacks proposed that social interactions exhibit “order at all points” (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 
484). Furthermore, that this order was locally produced in situ by interlocutors and normative 
in that interlocutors orient to it and the related norms. Conversation analysts study recordings 
of “naturally organized ordinary activities” (Garfinkel, 1988, p. 106) to investigate 
interlocutors’ local production and orderly organization of social interaction in mundane and 
institutional settings. Perhaps the clearest demonstration of the conversation analytic interest 
in order and organization is A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of Turn Taking for 
Conversation (Sacks et al., 1974).  
 
In this early paper, Sacks Schegloff, and Jefferson put forward the turn-taking system, which 
would prove to be the mechanism with which conversations were ordered and organized for 
intelligible and accountable conduct. The turn-taking system is an illustration of how social 
order is both a produced and a normative order. Order is produced per the expectation that 
“one party talks at a time” (Sacks et al., 1974, p. 699), and is normative in that interlocutors 
orient to this expectation and the possibility of sanctions for eschewing the norm (Sacks et 
al., 1974). The turn-taking system involves two components, turn-constructional units and 
turn-allocational techniques, and rules governing their use (Sacks et al., 1974). Turns at talk 
are built from turn-constructional units ranging from phrases to sentences, which carry 
entitlement to speak. The first interlocutor to speak claims the right to take the present turn. 
Each turn-constructional unit also projects a recognisable point of possible completion that is 
required for speaker change.  
 
Possible completion points occasion transition relevance places where speaker change can 
occur through turn-allocational techniques. The turn-allocational techniques are other 
selection by current speaker, self-selection by other speaker, and self-selection by current 
speaker (Sacks et al., 1974). Allocation techniques are hierarchically organized, with current 
speaker self-selection being the least preferred outcome. Current speaker selecting other 
speaker designates next speaker and privileges the right to the turn. Other speaker self-
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selection is subject to no such designatory privilege (Sacks et al., 1974). The turn-taking 
system exemplifies Sacks’ aim of transforming “our sense of ‘what happened’, from a matter 
of a particular interaction done by particular people, to a matter of interactions as products of 
a machinery.” (1984, p. 26). That is, the turn-taking system is a context-free and generic 
machinery but also context-sensitive and therefore able to underpin orderly social interaction 
methodically and reproducibly (Sacks et al., 1974).  
  
Talk-in-interaction is sequentially organized, in service of order, intelligibility, and action; 
and it is the organization of sequences that comprise this sequential organization so central to 
the conversation analytic enterprise and its empirical generativity (Stivers, 2013). Turn-
taking is one such organizational resource for sequential organization, and it is in the orderly 
production of turns that we observe sequence organization. When inspecting the openings of 
calls to a suicide prevention centre, Sacks noticed that certain utterances occasioned a 
particular utterance in response. From this noticing, Sacks ascertained that the first utterance, 
or first-pair part action, made relevant a second-pair part action (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 3-12). 
The organizational machinery of first-pair parts and second-pair parts is conditional relevance 
(Schegloff, 1968) and its organizational structure is an adjacency pair (Schegloff, 2007, p. 
13). Conditional relevance functions to project a recognisably expectable second-pair part 
upon completion of a first-pair part (Schegloff, 1968). Conditional relevance is the 
relationship between two pair-parts such that if the expected second-pair part is not produced 
it is noticeably absent (Stivers, 2013). For instance, greetings expect return greetings and 
invitations project acceptance or declination (Stivers, 2013). Adjacency pairs demonstrate the 
extent of “order at all points” (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 484) and that the order is produced and 
organized by interlocutors as “a constant doing and achieving” (Turner, 1974, p. 10).  
 
Another form of organization is structural organization, which is a type of sequential 
organization but distinct from sequence organization (Schegloff, 2007). Structural 
organization is concerned with how sequences of talk-in-interaction are organized into the 
larger framework of coherent interaction (Robinson, 2013). To this, it is important to clarify 
that overall structural organization can relate as readily to a single unit of interaction as it can 
a body of units (Schegloff, 2007). Per Schegloff and Sacks (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973), and 
later Schegloff (Schegloff, 2011), a local and an overall organization can exist, and exist in 
such a way that they provide for and shape each other. For instance, the work of structural 
organization depends upon the provision of space for the organization that local organization 
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provides (Schegloff, 2011, p. 378). The local organization, by contrast, is shaped by reference 
to the overall structural organization of coherent interactions, turns-at-talk, and sequences of 
interaction among others (Schegloff, 2011, p. 378). As with sequence organization, such as in 
adjacency pairs and the conditional relevance of second-pair parts, interlocutors orient to 
structural organization as both relevant to and consequential for their interaction (Schegloff, 
1992).  
 
Repair is the organizational domain and related machinery for addressing problems of 
speaking, hearing, and understanding (Schegloff et al., 1977). As with coherent sequences of 
action, shared understanding is central to the production and maintenance of orderly, 
organized social reality as incoherence risks disorder. Interlocutors recognise the necessity of 
shared understanding and display their candidate understandings in talk-in-interaction. When 
interlocutors produce or encounter a trouble source, they address it through the machinery of 
repair (Schegloff et al., 1977). Interlocutors produce a repair initiation that indicates the 
upcoming repair procedure, and subsequently work to achieve a repair solution (Kitzinger, 
2013). Repair can be self-initiated or other-initiated, these differing in implementation and 
interactional import. A preference exists for self-repair over other-initiated (Schegloff et al., 
1977) and self-initiated, often self-implemented in the same turn constructional unit, is the 
most common format (Kitzinger, 2013). Other-initiated repair marks the preceding utterance 
as a trouble source therefore requiring a repair solution and interrupts the ongoing sequence. 
Self-initiated repair requires no such external marking and interruptions are typically 
localised to the turn-in-progress (Kitzinger, 2013).  
 
Talk-in-interaction being vehicular of action, it follows that there is much emphasis in 
conversation analysis on action. We see this emphasis in the two notions of action formation 
and action ascription, sometimes action recognition, (Levinson, 2013). Action formation 
concerns the conversational practices that produce a recognisable action; an action that the 
recipient can demonstrably understand as having been produced by the conversational 
practices of the speaker (Schegloff, 2007, p. 7). The question of action formation is the 
question of what interlocutors’ talk can be recognised as designed to achieve. The means for 
ascertaining the answer are inspection of interlocutors’ treatment of this talk in the 
surrounding, and their uptake in subsequent turns. Action ascription is the corresponding 
notion and entails interlocutors attributing an action to another’s prior turn (Levinson, 2013). 
Turns at talk might propose various actions by virtue of their sequential placement but there 
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are organizational restraints upon actions. For instance, action is constrained both by 
sequence organization, such as adjacency pairs and their projected seconds, and overall 
structural organization such as openings and closings (Levinson, 2013).  
 
Talk-in-interaction being conducted through turns at talk, and talk being vehicular of action 
and shared understanding, requires turns be designed for specific actions. Turn-
constructional-units comprise turns, and linguistic features comprise the resources 
interlocutorss use to design and build turns (Drew, 2013). One aspect of turn design is its 
relation to sequence organization, as interlocutors often design turns to fit contiguously with 
the prior turn (Sacks, 1987). Interlocutors might respond with a change of state token such as 
oh to indicate something newsworthy (Heritage, 1984) or a well-preface to indicate a 
dispreferred response to an utterance (Pomerantz, 1984). As interlocutors ascribe action to 
prior turns (Levinson, 2013) and build understanding through successive pieces of 
documentary evidence (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 78) it is crucial that turns are designed to produce 
accountable actions. Turn design relates to action formation and ascription through the ways 
that turns projecting actions are designed to project actions in particular accountable terms 
(Drew, 2013). For example, Curl (2006) showed how interlocutors formulate offers of 
assistance as do you want or either conditional or declarative grammatical forms. Each 
grammatical form is recognisably an offer of assistance, but the turn is designed for a 
particular sequential position (Curl, 2006).  
 
One final organizational domain is preference organization, and it is crucial to stress that the 
technical concept of preference in conversation analysis is distinct to the vernacular sense of 
preference, and the psychological sense of preference this research investigates. Lerner 
(1996, p. 304), characterises preference organization as methods and practices, observable 
and recognisable, primarily turn-constructional and sequence organizational in nature, that 
inhere in the structures of social actions that inform talk-in-interaction. To consider all 
language indexical (Garfinkel, 1967) necessarily entails that a preference for action may be 
discerned only in the local sequential environment of its production or implication. To 
perform the seen but unnoticed preferred action, one must recognise the design of an action 
(Boyle, 2000). Turn-constructional practices relate to how interlocutors design turns as 
responsive to the inherent preference of an action for a particular response. Pomerantz (1984) 
for instance, demonstrated how disagreement with self-deprecation is constructed in a 
preferred turn shape while agreement is constructed in a dispreferred turn shape. In terms of 
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sequence organization, interlocutors can organize their interaction to elide the possibility of a 
dispreferred action. For example, a pre-sequence, such as a pre-request can occasion the 
response that an invitee is unavailable and therefore need not produce a dispreferred rejection 
responsive to an invitation (Lerner, 1996).  
 
From the beginning of Sacks’ work, conversation analysis developed with the study of audio 
recordings of everyday (Schegloff, 1968) and institutional talk-in-interaction (Sacks, 1992, 
vol. 1, pp. 3-12). This interest was as incidental as the focus on talk-in-interaction itself, 
providing Sacks some possibility of accounting for the methodical and reproducible ways 
that activities were accomplished (Schegloff, 1992, p. XVII). However, both topic and 
resource soon assumed centrality, with Sacks’ early rationale of audio recordings providing 
“a good enough record of what happened” (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 622) providing a 
theoretical tenet around which to organize data collection and analytical strategies. The 
analytical framework of conversation analysis stipulates “naturally occurring, interactional 
phenomena” (Psathas, 1995, p. 45), as it inspects talk-in-interaction as it happens, in routine 
situated contexts, for the interactive ordering and organization of social reality. There is also 
a rich body of conversation analysis research using video recordings to analyse embodied 
conduct as part of the production of action and social order (Heath et al., 2010; Streeck et al., 
2011). Whether audio or video however, recordings afford repeated inspection, detailed 
transcription, and documents of interlocutors’ displayed conduct and understandings.  
 
3.3.3 Key underpinnings of Discursive Psychology 
 
Discursive psychology is an approach to talk-in-interaction and psychology, both for and in 
interaction (Potter, 2005). In particular, discursive psychology is interested in how 
interlocutors put together talk-in-interaction, the role of ostensibly psychological language 
and concepts, and what talk-in-interaction achieves (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Edwards & 
Potter, 1992). Conversation analysis, and ethnomethodology, were both central influences on 
discursive psychology, and in turn, both share this focus on talk-in-interaction and practical 
accomplishment. Distinct to discursive psychology, however, and its unique intellectual focus 
is the study of psychology as interlocutors’ concerns. That is, psychology is understood as a 
practical interactive object and a subject for analysis rather than being purely explanatory 
(Potter, 2005; Potter & Edwards, 2013). Discursive psychology draws on conversation 
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analysis and ethnomethodology in particular, but also on linguistic philosophy and ordinary 
language philosophy such as that of Austin (Austin, 1962), Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 
1953), and Ryle (Ryle, 1949); constructionism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966); the sociology of 
scientific knowledge (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984), albeit diminishingly relative to its earlier 
statements, (Ashmore, 1989); and rhetoric (Billig, 1987). This section will not give a 
historical account of the development of discursive psychology, as this has been done 
expertly elsewhere (e.g., Potter, 2010; Wiggins, 2016). Overviews of ethnomethodology and 
conversation analysis have been included as they feature prominently in discursive 
psychology and are central to the theoretical and analytical framework of this research.  
 
Discursive psychology is a highly particularised approach to psychology, “a package of topic, 
method, and theory” (Edwards, 2012, p. 427). A central interest of discursive psychology is 
constructionism and discursive psychology may be considered a constructionist, particularly 
relativist, enterprise (Edwards et al., 1995). Social constructionism as discursive psychology 
considers it, entails that interlocutors’ social world and social reality therein is constituted by 
their social practices (Wiggins, 2016). Relatedly, constructionism in discursive psychology is 
epistemic rather than ontological (Edwards, 1997), which means it pertains to the 
constructive capacity of talk-in-interaction. Derek Edwards characterises this sense of 
epistemic social construction as concerning “the constructive nature of descriptions, rather 
than the entities that (according to descriptions) exist beyond them” (1997, p. 47-48; 
emphasis in original). This epistemic constructionism leads to the discursive psychology 
principle that talk is both constructed and constructive (Wiggins, 2016, p. 9). Constructed 
herein refers to how interlocutors construct their talk out of various linguistic resources, 
including psychological, linguistic, and categorial materials (Wiggins & Potter, 2008). 
Constructive ties directly into “the constructive nature of descriptions” (Edwards, 1997, p. 
47-48) as interlocutors’ worlds and the concepts, constructs, and notions therein are the 
constitutive product of interlocutors’ talk-in-interaction (Wiggins, 2016).  
 
Action orientation is one central tenet that distinguishes discursive psychology from much 
other work preoccupied with language and its importance. As Derek Edwards wrote 
“language is primarily a medium for the accomplishment of social action” (1991, p. 518; 
emphasis in original). Discursive psychology is not preoccupied with propositional content, 
and diverges from the information transfer, or telementation, view of language (Harris, 
1981). The telementation view of language being that language functions to transparently 
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transfer information between interlocutors (Harris, 1981). For Edwards, any such cognitive, 
informationist, or propositional functions of language is “predicated upon that essential and 
primary social nature” (1991, p. 518). The intellectual lineage of discursive psychology 
follows on more closely from speech act theory (Austin, 1962). Briefly, speaking comprises 
noise, vocabulary, grammar, and meaning that together forms a locutionary act. Performing a 
locutionary act also conveys an action such as asserting or denying, which is an illocutionary 
act. By performing an illocutionary act, one consequentially performs a further 
perlocutionary act such as persuasion (Austin, 1962). In discursive psychology the “focus is 
squarely on language use” (Potter & Hepburn, 2007, p. 166, emphasis in original) or talk-in-
interaction. Talk-in-interaction is taken as the arena for talking psychological concepts, 
notions, and states into being that other approaches may consider talk to reveal 
straightforwardly to analysts.  
 
Discursive psychologists understand that talk is not context-free and, like psychology, 
appreciate the contextual sense in which it is situated. Talk is situated sequentially, in that 
utterances precede and follow other utterances within larger sequences of talk-in-interaction 
(Potter & Edwards, 2001). Furthermore, talk is occasioned by this sequential situation, such 
that interlocutors orient to what an utterance projects as relevant, such as acceptance or 
declination following an offer (Potter & Edwards, 2001; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). The 
second sense of situation is an institutional one, and this pertains to the possibility of the 
institutional setting as providing a particular framework for talk. This situation is similarly 
driven by interlocutors, in that it is about the ways that interlocutors make the institution 
relevant and implicate and accomplish its specific institutional business (Potter, 2005). Third, 
talk is taken as rhetorically situated, which is to say that interlocutors’ talk has a rhetorical 
organization such that particular choices have specific interactional importance per their 
selection. For instance, interlocutors might produce a particular account or remembering to 
defend against claims of stake (Potter, 1996) or to provide a version that stands to counter an 
alternative, such as an assessment (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Pomerantz, 1984).  
 
As in conversation analysis, discursive psychology typically studies recordings of “naturally 
occurring, interactional phenomena” (Psathas, 1995, p. 45) and both audio and video 
recordings are used to generate data. Discursive psychology also uses Jeffersonian 
transcription conventions (Jefferson, 2004). The broad preference is for an untouched record 
of exactly what happened in a non-contrived social interaction. Sources of data other than 
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naturally occurring or naturalistic social interactions are poorly fitted to the theoretical and 
analytical framework of conversation analysis and discursive psychology. There has been 
debate over the stances of terms such as naturalistic or naturally occurring data, and 
interviews as data gathering techniques (cf. Speer, 2002; Lynch, 2002; Griffin, 2007; Potter 
& Hepburn, 2005b), but I choose to use the term naturally occurring data.  
 
Interviews for instance, do not provide the naturally occurring data of interlocutors’ mundane 
talk-in-interaction, being instead a social scientific venture that necessitates investigation as a 
distinct interactional object itself (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). There is no recourse to idealised 
sentences, as perhaps in linguistics, or experimental control of linguistic performance, per 
psycholinguistics, as this is not where one discovers the ordered structure of social reality 
(Garfinkel, 1996). Using other sources of data problematizes the interpretive gap between 
research interest and the claims and discussions staked thereupon (Edwards, 2012). In other 
words, the gap between how patients and practitioners enact the process of SDM and 
preferences and how they talk about them is huge. Conversely, the gap between the 
recordings of patients and practitioners’ enactment of SDM and preferences and the 
enactment of these phenomena in situ is small.  
 
Before summarising the analytic procedure that I used for my analysis, it is necessary to 
formally state my research questions. My overarching research question is the following: 
How do patients’ preferences shape treatment discussions in decision-making appointments? 
This question can be broken down into a set of 5 smaller research questions, however.  
 
1. What form do patients’ preferences take in prostate cancer treatment appointments?  
2. How do patients’ construct preferences in situ as interactive phenomena?  
3. How do clinical nurse specialists respond to patients’ preferences? 
4. How were patients’ preferences consequential for the decision-making business of 
treatment appointments?  
5. How, if at all, was the production of laughter relevant for patients’ preferences and 
decision-making? 
 
I wish to expand on the last of these research questions because it was not one that I 
anticipated asking when I designed the research. Of course, I was not presupposing my 
research questions, but I did imagine that I would be able to investigate patients’ preferences 
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on account of the preference-sensitivity of prostate cancer (Zeliadt, 2006; Shirk et al., 2017). 
The focus on laughter, however, to the extent that it formed one of my three analytic chapters 
was unexpected. During the transcription process I noticed that laughter was surprisingly 
commonplace and that both patients and CNSs would laugh. Indeed, most surprising was the 
observation that CNSs did not appear to treat laughter as proscribed, whether it was 
responsive to the patient or produced to invite laughter. Reciprocal laughter, then, was 
observed alongside patient and CNS-initiated laughter and at a greater frequency than I 
would have expected. As such, my analytic chapter on laughter was the one that most closely 
resembled the practice of “unmotivated looking” (Psathas, 1995, p. 45). By unmotivated 
looking, I mean that laughter emerged as a topic of analytic interest because I recurrently 
noticed the production of laughter, first more generally and subsequently around side or 
treatment effect talk. With a substantial number of cases, I began to wonder whether the 
production of laughter might be relevant for either or both patients’ preferences and SDM.  
 
In discursive psychology, a research question is typically concerned with a topic or form of 
interaction before progressing into the specific foci of the work as the data collection and 
familiarity with the data progresses (Wiggins & Potter, 2008, p. 80). As such, we can see how 
my interest in SDM and interactions between CNSs and prostate cancer patients led me to my 
specific research questions. My research began with a topic and developed iteratively with 
the concept of unmotivated looking (Psathas, 1995, p. 45), as I was led by the recurrent 
phenomena that appeared in the data, which led to the accumulation of collections of 
phenomena. That is, while research questions are informed by the topic of research such as 
patients’ preferences in this case, they take shape in response to emergent findings. Indeed, 
this research began with an interest in SDM and prostate cancer appointments before a proper 
research question developed; and subsequently, smaller research questions arose to better 
account for the topics and analyses the research focused on. It would, of course, have been 
possible to pose a greater number of questions to attempt a comprehensive investigation of 
patients’ preferences. I was aware, however, that this posed a higher risk of the research 
losing focus and therefore being spread thin with few and shallow analyses. In turn, my 
decision was to retain my focus on the construction and subsequent treatment of patients’ 
preferences and the emergent focus on laughter as possibly preference relevant.  
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3.3.4 Summary of analytic procedure 
 
Having outlined the intellectual lineage that discursive psychology traces to its inception, and 
characterised conversation analysis and ethnomethodology as particularly relevant forebears, 
this section describes the analytic procedure underlying the claims advanced in this thesis. To 
begin, I will discuss the process of transcription and related familiarisation with the data. 
Subsequently, I will cover the work of noticing phenomena and building a collection for the 
purpose of analysis. This will be followed by a characterisation of the actual work of the 
analysis and its various foci. Finally, I conclude this section with a note on the analytic 
approaches taken throughout the empirical chapters.  
 
Before analysis could begin, I was required to transcribe the audio recordings to have textual 
aids for my analysis. All transcription was initially performed in the verbatim style common 
to other forms of qualitative social sciences research. After the verbatim transcription I often 
revised transcripts in line with a modified version of Gail Jefferson’s transcription 
conventions (Jefferson, 2004). This modification differs in the granularity of prosodic detail 
and extent of interactional symbols it provides. As such, it works up a more representative 
version of the data but stops short of providing an exhausting representation of all possible 
prosodic details or non-standard renderings of pronunciation.  
 
In cases where data was a candidate for analysis the provision of prosodic and interactional 
detail was necessary to characterise the data as faithfully as possible. Once an extract was 
chosen, I would often attempt a closer take on Jefferson’s conventions (Jefferson, 2004) with 
the caveat that judgements on pronunciation and timing were my own subjective readings. 
My reasoning behind the differing degrees of transcript detail was that the transcripts were 
textual accompaniments and aids to the data proper, which were the series of recordings. As 
such, while I obviously wanted an accurate textual rendering of the data, I would still use the 
data itself to guide my analysis. That all said, Jefferson’s (2004) conventions are a core 
feature of the history and practices of conversation analysis and discursive psychology, and I 
shall provide more detail about them and subsequent developments.  
 
Jefferson’s transcription conventions not only capture what interlocutors have said but also a 
close sense for the way that interlocutors produced their vocal conduct. To accomplish this 
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representation of vocal productions the Jefferson’s conventions utilise a series of symbols 
and a style of notation sometimes referred to as “‘comic book’ orthography” (Jefferson, 1983, 
p. 3). This style is so-called because it renders words in the style that they are spoken rather 
than the traditional orthographic way. In terms of rendering what interlocutors said in the 
manner that they produced it, examples include me rather than my and d’ya rather than do 
you. Beyond pronunciation, the Jeffersonian conventions also include a set of symbols for the 
representation of prosodic and vocal features, which include using degree signs to indicate 
quiet or low volumes ° ° and arrows to signify notable rising or falling intonation ↑ ↓. A copy 
of Jefferson’s transcription conventions is included in the appendix G for reference.  
 
As mentioned previously, I chose not to transcribe every recording in line with full 
Jeffersonian conventions. Not fully transcribing the entirety of the data in complete 
Jefferson’s conventions is not unheard of in discursive psychology (Wiggins, 2016, p. 99) 
and I consider this to have been sufficient and appropriate for my research. As mentioned 
previously, I largely decided to use this lighter take rather than focus on furnishing all audible 
prosodic features. Of course, some extracts demanded more extensive use of the conventions 
because the prosodic features were interwoven with the analytically interesting material. The 
decision to provide more interactional detail when using a certain extract for analysis was 
taken because that stretch of talk was particularly interesting and relevant. When discussing 
her conventions, Jefferson said that the features she transcribed were included simply because 
“it’s there, plus I think it’s interesting” (Jefferson, 2004, p. 15) while Jefferson also 
acknowledged that there were other features that went unrecorded. This interest, then, 
deserved to be represented as faithfully as possible to reflect both the analytic claims being 
made and eye-catching features of the audio data. Of course, the caveat is that my decisions 
were led primarily by importance for analytic claims, which in turn led to more sparing use of 
extensive transcription conventions. 
 
As mentioned, the analytic procedure began by listening to the audio recordings and 
subsequently transcribing them with a simplified version of Jeffersonian transcription 
conventions (Jefferson, 2004). Following transcription, recordings were cross-referenced for 
accuracy and analytic sufficiency. Transcripts were then read for further familiarity with the 
data and in turn, initial noticings of phenomena linked to decision-making and patients’ 
preferences. Analysis was iterative and cumulative, with the final analytic claims advanced 
on the grounds of the entire dataset of recordings. Preliminary analyses were worked up over 
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the course of transcription to both satisfy procedural requirements and begin noticing 
phenomena that might subsequently shape and direct the analysis. Initial noticings were noted 
in the transcripts by adding comments to the word documents, and questions were posed of 
the phenomena noticed. As noticings began to span recordings, word documents were created 
for those phenomena that recurred across the recordings alongside of their place in the 
transcript and interaction. When phenomena were sufficiently recurrent to suggest their 
commonplace status in the dataset, collections were established, and candidate analytical 
sketches were developed. 
 
Once established as collections, and formulated as candidate analytic sketches, I engaged the 
questions that I had posed of the phenomena in the initial noticings. For the conversation 
analysis-informed work, collections of phenomena were analysed for the organization of the 
phenomena, how participants understood it, and how it was accomplished interactively. 
Collections of phenomena were not restricted to discrete actions such as requesting or 
questioning, as the analysis focused also on the local and structural organization of stretches 
of preference-implicative talk. That is, sequences of talk-in-interaction pertaining to patients’ 
preferences were analysed for their coherence as fitted sequences, and relatedly their 
appearance as recognisable sequences of talk about patients’ preferences. For discursive 
psychology, the interactions were analysed for how psychological themes, states, and 
phenomena were used for and within these appointments. Primarily, how preferences were 
constructed as accountable, consequential phenomena and psychological topics and resources 
were drawn upon in the management of constructed preferences.  
 
I developed, refined, and completed all the analyses, albeit with the luxury of taking 
analytical preliminaries to data sessions organized by my supervisors and me. Data sessions, 
and supervisor feedback too, afforded me the opportunity to crowdsource candidate 
explanations for phenomena and receive feedback on my analytic claims in their incipient 
state of development. At this point, it is important to clarify that I did have to decide when it 
was appropriate to use conversation analysis as opposed to discursive psychology and vice-
versa. In practice, given the overlap of the approaches, they were applied simultaneously and 
the analysis that emerges foregrounds one or other approach as appropriate to the issue at 
hand. As such, I have referred to analytic sections and chapters that were primarily 
conversation analytic or discursive psychological focused.  
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3.4 Chapter summary  
 
One of the driving aims of SDM research in recent years has been the translation of a 
conceptual model into practical actionable steps (Elwyn et al., 2012). As I discussed in 
chapter 1, this had some success, but patients’ preferences both as an empirical phenomenon 
and as interactive constructions remain challenging for these proponents. In terms of 
theoretical models, the three talk model is the most promising and its treatment of preferences 
as moving from initial to informed across stages of talk is a thoughtful one. The Implement-
SDM model (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019) has made the most progress towards a model 
faithful to clinical practice by providing empirical evidence for the three talk model (Elwyn 
et al., 2017) and expanding our picture of decision-making appointments. Taking the 
Implement-SDM model (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019) as a plausible candidate for the 
current model under pursuit allows us to see the focus on preferences and the gap between 
conceptual and practical.  
 
The implement-SDM model (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019) largely follows the three talk 
model in dealing with initial preferences during team talk, evolving preferences through 
option talk, and concluding at decision talk and informed preferences (Elwyn et al., 2017). 
Theoretically, this stepwise pathway through the decision-making process with its space for 
preferences as dynamic and evolving phenomena makes sense and sounds both reasonable 
and intuitive. That said, however, it ought to have become clear by now that on one hand the 
cognitive work reported to be involved in preference construction, and on the other the 
conversational and discursive practices of construction make this process far from simple. 
Despite offering a more immediately accessible alternative, the language and social 
interaction approach is unsurprisingly also not simple. As such, there is a clear need to 
expand on the coverage of patients’ preferences in SDM models in a way that better reflects 
the complexities of both getting to informed preferences and making them consequential for 
decision-making. I argue that a combination of conversation analysis and discursive 
psychology is well placed to make this contribution to research.        
 
Having outlined the analytic procedure used in the empirical chapters, the next chapter will 
be the first of three analytic contributions and shall focus on the act of patients constructing 
preferences in situ in their appointments. Subsequent analytic contributions will first concern 
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the receipt of preferences during and following their construction, and second, the role and 




Chapter 4: The interactive production of patients’ preferences as a 
constructed phenomenon in treatment appointments   
 
Chapter overview  
 
Across chapters 1-3 I have argued that patients’ preferences should be understood as a crucial 
component of SDM. Furthermore, that patients’ preferences are not ready off the shelf but are 
unique phenomena that patients interactively construct in situ. As such, it is necessary to 
investigate how patients’ preferences get constructed in the treatment decision-making 
encounters. Discursive psychology can help reveal what a constructed preference can look 
like but also what consequences it has for the decision-making encounter. As discussed in 
chapter 3, I was required to decide when to use discursive psychology and conversation 
analysis simultaneously or distinct to one another. In turn, while this is a discursive 
psychology chapter, the first analytic section is largely conversation analysis inflected. 
Alongside this reveal would be the practices that patients and clinicians draw upon and the 
ways that they are used to attempt preference construction. In this, the first analytic chapter, I 
begin to examine this notion of preferences as constructed and the action of constructing a 
preference in post-diagnostic prostate cancer treatment appointments. A brief reminder of the 
notion of preferences as constructed will restate the context for the chapter and set the scene 
for the analysis proper. The chapter will then focus on the ways that patients’ preferences get 
worked up and constructed rather than simply plucked from the brain at the first instance of 
being asked.  
 
4.1 Patients’ preferences as constructions  
 
To restate the position that patients’ preferences are constructed phenomena requires an 
acknowledgement of the following points. For one, preferences are rarely fully formed and 
ready to go off the shelf. Rather, individuals are made aware of their options, receive relevant 
information, and compare the alternatives (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). Indeed, even when 
preferences are considered elicited, they come to elicitation through a process of construction 
(Tversky & Thaler, 1990). As such, there is a responsive and context-sensitive element to 
preferences. It is difficult, but not impossible, to think that patients would routinely come to 
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appointments with certainty in a preferred treatment option. With a disease such as prostate 
cancer, which has no gold standard treatment (Zeliadt et al., 2006), it might be particularly 
unlikely that one option is staunchly endorsed from the moment of diagnosis. Although, there 
must obviously be exceptions for factors such as fear or previous experiences that can cast 
options as unfavourable, as we will see in the analyses to follow.  
 
Further to these aspects, and particularly pertinent for sensitive treatment decisions like 
prostate cancer (Zeliadt et al., 2006), is the point that patients’ preferences are not logically 
transitive and therefore preferring A to B and B to C does not guarantee preferring A to C 
(Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010). Therefore, we have a phenomenon that we cannot take for 
granted as pre-existing, nor even as fixed throughout the consultation or series of 
consultations. Preferences are then, both the most important single element of SDM and the 
one most tricky to pin down and make consequential for the ultimate decision. The premise 
of this project is that patients’ preferences are constructed (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010). 
Indeed, that context, information exchange, and options available have a role to play in 
preference construction. That said, the notion that patients’ preferences are the result of 
cognitive inner workings that transpire inside their heads is problematic (see Slovic & 
Lichtenstein, 2006; Tversky & Thaler, 1990 for examples of this work). This is problematic 
for analysts and clinicians alike, as neither group has particularly much access to patients’ 
inner cognitive workings.  
 
Taking this approach allows us to “look to see how it is that persons go about producing what 
they do produce” (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 11). That is, to see what a patient’s preference looks 
like in practice rather than general or abstract terms. In addition, a focus on language use or 
talk-in-interaction and the observable conduct of appointments has a practical advantage over 
the more internal or cognitive routes. For one, it avoids the problem of having limited, if any, 
access to the inner workings of a patient’s head. Beyond this, the preferences that patients 
construct throughout the course of the encounter are the ones that will be taken as 
consequential regardless of what details might be purported as distinct from the internal 
preference. Clinicians can do little with a suggestion to focus more attention on what’s inside 
a patient’s head. By contrast, the availability of what is said in these encounters might make 
the proposed approach more amenable to refinements and improvements. One further issue 
that clinicians may face, but could attempt to tackle, is the reflexivity of patient interviewing. 
That is to say, and especially with the standardised treatment of patients’ preferences, 
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clinicians may be likely to assume the normal way to elicit preferences is to ask the patient. 
Perhaps, then, coupling a focus on what interlocutors say specifically in these appointments 
and a suggestion to look beyond straightforward elicitation questions might be instructive. 
 
One of my research questions was how, if at all, patients interactively, and perhaps 
collaboratively, construct their preferences; and this was because an answer is crucial to any 
understanding of patients’ preferences as constructions (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010). In 
turn, we might package it as a key instance of conduct that clinicians ought to look out for to 
improve the inconsistent involvement of patients’ preferences in decision-making. It is 
crucial to note here, however, that while decision-making research can focus on decision-
making as an event, focusing on if a singular shared decision was made, this is not the way 
that NHS England understands decision-making. Rather, within the context of NHS England, 
especially with non-acute illness visits, decision-making is understood as distributed across 
time and appointments. In turn, we do not find a constant stream of preferences being 
constructed and formulated nor an ever-present push towards a firm decision. Rather, we see 
orientations to decisions at different stages and talk that reflects these distinct orientations. 
This point is one that ought to become clear throughout the chapter and will be revisited in 
the discussion.  
 
The first analytic section will explore the process of accounting for a firm preference and 
therefore begin by considering a straightforward example of a patient constructing a 
preference. Section 4.3 will investigate the work of drawing on cognitive, emotional, and 
mental states or phenomena when constructing preferences. In the final analytic section, 
remembering as a discursive act and appeals to prior medical experience will be the focus of 
the analysis. Further to the specific foci of each analytic section, there are two broader 
takeaways from this chapter that are worth foregrounding, and the first is that patients’ 
preferences were indeed observed to be interactive constructions that developed in situ. 
Second, there was substantial variation between preferences both in terms of the form they 
took and the ways that patients constructed them.  
 
4.2 Accounting for a firm preference  
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For the first analytic section I will focus on providing examples and a characterisation of the 
interactive production of patients’ preferences as something they construct. To do this, I 
examine three extracts where the patient expresses an ostensibly firm preferred treatment and 
then accounts for this preference. All these preferences are presented for the fact that they 
become preference construction projects after the formulation of a choice. In turn, the 
preference as a stated option is often clearer, but we can then observe the interactional 
conversational work that makes the choice a unique constructed preference. This, then, offers 
a relatively straightforward example of what a constructed preference can look like and an 
intelligible characterisation of the way that one can be built interactively. I will also note that 
of the 21 appointments, only five featured formulations of firm preferences. By contrast, six 
preferences were judged not to be firm, and in 10 cases the decision was either awaiting 
ratification or had been made by the patients’ main clinician. When I write of firm 
preferences, I do not refer to a discrete class of preferences but rather those preference 
formulations that are hearable as firm such as by ruling out an option or indicating a decision-
in-waiting. 
 
Extract 4.1 (recording 6)
 
COM:                                          [d]o you think we [need 1 
         [to ]sit and think about it= 2 
CNS:     [-ry]                       =oh ABSolutely I mean I don’t wa- 3 
         -nt you to make a decision today I’ve got to be honest I’ve 4 
         got to pop out and get a lo[t of]  5 
PAT:                                [I do]n’t think we’re monitoring  6 
         it that’s (.) that was out the question soon as he mentioned 7 
         that in there as one of the options= 8 
CNS:     ((stammering)) ↑O:k that that’s fine 9 
PAT:     I already knew that straight away  10 
CNS:     ((stammering)) ↑that’s absolutely fine that is your choice I 11 
         mean uh: ((stammering)) I assume the own- only reason why 12 
         name redacted offered that to you is becuz there’s only one  13 
         core= 14 
PAT:     =yea[h] 15 
CNS:         [o]f the disease .hhh however (0.3) you know it’s 16 
         ultimately your choice 17 
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In the extract above, the patient’s companion has asked about the procedural aspects of the 
decision-making process and the CNS both affirms the companion’s projection and goes 
further in saying that they do not wish to rush the couple. Orienting to the topicality of 
making the treatment decision, which involves choosing the preferred option (Charles et al., 
1997; Elwyn et al., 2012), the patient rules out one of the treatment options initially offered 
(line 6). The format is initially soft, as the loose cognitive formulation “I don’t think” is 
used to imply that the option of active monitoring is dispreferred. Far from being the 
definitive article, “I don’t think” is implicative and allows the preference to take shape in 
a form less abrupt than a declarative. The patient goes on to produce an idiomatic formulation 
“that was out of the question” (line 7) that moves forward significantly from the 
subtler formulation offered in the turn prior. Indeed, the use of an idiomatic or figurative 
phrase can signal that the speaker is producing something that has a generality and sense of 
cultural familiarity that makes the phrase difficult to challenge (Drew & Holt, 1988). In the 
same turn the patient upgrades their stance with an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 
1986) “soon as he mentioned that in there” (lines 7-8).  
 
This combination of idiom and extreme case formulation has the effect of glossing the 
production as difficult to challenge due to its generality (Drew & Holt, 1988), sense of 
finality and therefore having the last word (Drew & Holt, 1998), and the implication that the 
option of active monitoring is unacceptable (Pomerantz, 1986; Whitehead, 2015). We can see 
evidence of the strength of formulation in the CNS’s uptake, which is a stammer that 
produces no utterance followed by a concession of acceptance. This first extract is interesting 
because there is an initial indication of waiting that soon transfers into a firm preference 
against one option. We see in this first extract that while there may be an indication that 
decision-making is considered distant, a firm preference can be constructed. Furthermore, the 
preference is for avoiding something rather than favouring a treatment option, which is not 
uncommon as four of the five following extracts also present preferences this way. In this 
extract, we also see examples of distinct aspects of preferences as constructions such as 
cognitive language, idiomatic phrases, and live shifts between positions; for instance, from “I 
don’t think” to “out of the question”. Other extracts will show similar productions 
and devices but also various other actions and resources.  
 
Extract 4.2 (recording 10) 
PAT:     yeah (.) erm .hhh he’s told me that I can have treatment (.) 1 
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         which is err radiotherapy (0.8) and err removal 2 
CNS:     mk[ay] 3 
PAT:       [th]ere was another one but I can’t remember what that was 4 
         (0.2) it was three= 5 
CNS:     =err hormone th↑erapy treatment maybe 6 
PAT:     possibly I don’t know 7 
CNS:     °no: ok° 8 
PAT:     erm I have opted for the removal  9 
CNS:     >mm hmm<  10 
PAT:     to get rid of it all together >and that< (.) he’s told me  11 
         about the consequences [and] side effects= 12 
CNS:                            [yep]              =ok= 13 
PAT:     °so°= 14 
CNS:     =and I’m >just gonna< elaborate on that a bit further then .h 15 
 
In analysing the above extract, I will show how the patient constructs an ostensibly legitimate 
informed preference at the beginning of their appointment. This extract comes early in the 
encounter and the patient’s first turn is a response to the CNS checking the patient’s 
understanding of their prior encounter with another clinician. In response (lines 1-2), the 
patient produces a piece of reported speech (Holt, 1996) where the doctor categorised them as 
fit for treatment and provided two treatment options to choose between. This report implies 
that the patient was presented with a binary choice, but in line 4 the patient remarks that there 
was a third option, which might provide inoculation against either traducing the other 
clinician or ignoring them. Per classic early discursive work (Edwards & Potter, 1992) 
remembering is a discursive act and there are several potential resources that might be 
ascribed explanatory coherence. In this case, however, it appears plausible that the patient 
simply does not remember given the lack of gaps and pauses. A small insertion sequence 
follows as the CNS offers a candidate third option, but the patient maintains they cannot 
recall this information. Indeed, the patient claims not to know and therefore positions 
themselves as occupying the less knowledgeable end of an epistemic gradient (Heritage, 
2012a, 2012b). In turn, the patient positions themselves as insufficiently knowledgeable to 
affirm the CNS’s candidate third option. 
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In response to the patient’s “possibly I don’t know” (line 7) the CNS effectively 
collaborates to close the expansion. By proffering an acknowledgement token “no” and “ok” 
as receipt the CNS indicates no further topical treatment option talk. It is possible that this 
response demonstrates the CNS’s treatment of “possibly I don’t know” as closing the 
discussion of treatment options. It is in the subsequent turn that the patient voices their 
preference “to get rid of it all together” (line 11), one that has clear hearable 
implications for surgery with the removal of the prostate central to a prostatectomy. In 
putting the decision-implicative choice first and then accounting for this via the dimension of 
preference, there is a link between deliberation and decision (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010). 
In being “rid of it all together” the patient formulates a clear preference to both excise 
the disease and everything related to the disease in an intensified production. The patient 
having constructed their preference, then goes on to account for their choice by providing an 
upshot formulation (Heritage & Watson, 1979) of their previous appointment. In addition, the 
patient’s account reports that side effects and consequences were discussed, which suggests 
that the patient is voicing an informed preference in line with contemporary SDM thinking 
(Elwyn et al., 2017; Joseph-Williams et al., 2019) possibly and warding off the CNS pointing 
this out. 
 
This extract is distinct from the first in that a decision has purportedly been made, and the 
accounting for that decision constructs the preference. Furthermore, unlike the previous 
extract, the patient is responding to more traditional elicitation questions about their prior 
encounters. Here, then, we can see both a position in the appointment, the very beginning, 
and a sequential context that differs substantially, which speaks to the variability of the 
construction of preference. In the next extract we can see a similarly firm preference 
formulation but with another distinct focus. The next extract, then, features a greater focus on 
the legitimisation of the choice behind the patient’s preference, illustrates the use of SDM 
terms, and demonstrates a characterisation of progress through the structural organization of 
the conversation.   
 
Extract 4.3 (recording 18) 
PAT:     they’ve explained that: ((lips smack)) erm I have erm ess- 1 
         -entially erm cancer (0.5) erm: (      ) erm at an inter- 2 
         -mediate level[ whi]ch is four plus three= 3 
CNS:                   [yeah]                      =mm hm= 4 
 146 
PAT:     =and (.) ma (0.2) prostate= 5 
CNS:     =mm hm 6 
PAT:     erm (0.2) I was given choices about what (.) options I  7 
         [can:] (0.2) do .hh and my option is to have thee surgery  8 
CNS:     [yeah]  9 
PAT:     (.) and to remove it [(.) er]m .hh and they were just going 10 
CNS:                          [°yeah°] 11 
PAT:     through (0.2) er:m (.) some of the (0.2) pre-op (0.3) err  12 
         (options) post-[op] 13 
CNS:                    [ye]ah  14 
PAT:     aspects that I need to be aware of  15 
CNS:     yeah °ok° 16 
 
Again, above, we have an example of a straightforward preference being voiced early in the 
appointment, but this time coming without a traditional elicitation question. The CNS has 
asked the first substantive question of the encounter, which is to check the patient’s 
understanding of their previous appointment. Once the patient has produced an upshot 
formulation (Heritage & Watson, 1979) of their diagnostic information they segue, 
unprompted, into reporting the stage of the appointment we might call option talk (Elwyn et 
al., 2017). In this report, the other clinician is presented as performing the necessary steps for 
SDM of offering choice and providing relevant options (e.g., Charles et al., 1999; Elwyn et 
al., 2017), reporting the treatment options as “options I [Can:] (0.2) do” (lines 7-8). As 
such, the patient can be seen as articulating in service of legitimising the choice for surgery. 
By moving through an articulation of the conditions of SDM the patient also suggests that 
they have accrued sufficient information. In turn, despite coming early in the appointment, 
the preference is presented as an informed rather than initial one (Elwyn et al., 2017).  
 
In characterising the previous appointment, the patient also refers to aspects they “need to 
be aware of” (line 9), which implies that procedural aspects beyond performing surgery 
were provided, and a potential choice or preference might have been voiced in the previous 
appointment. The production of this preference is marked by the patient’s footing (Goffman, 
1981) as they claim, “and my option” (line 8), with ownership over the choice and by 
extension deontic rights (Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2012) to the decision-making implication. 
Despite reaching what might be heard as a transition relevance place (Sacks et al., 1974), the 
patient continues their turn by developing their preference in line 10. Indeed, while surgery is 
the preferred treatment, the preference is “to remove it”, and therefore something only 
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achievable through surgery. As such, the preference makes clear that there is one treatment 
appropriate for the decision. Moreover, the preference being cast as an informed preference 
therefore glosses it as decision implicative (Elwyn et al., 2017) in lines 6 and 9 where the 
patient reports on a decision relevant information exchange. The patient therefore constructs 
a firm preference from a clear upshot of their previous appointment and makes known that 
this preference is decision implicative. 
 
This first analytic section has provided examples of patients constructing firm preferences 
that both clearly endorse an option and pertain to decision-making. Extracts 4.2 and 4.3 were 
clearly oriented to a decision as having been made or awaiting ratification. As such, these 
preferences were stated outright and formulated as being informed preferences that follow 
appointments reported as being consistent with SDM. In extract 4.1, there was a similarly 
bold preference statement, but one that ruled out non-curative treatment. Indeed, extract 4.1 
began with a question about waiting prior to deciding and therefore showed an orientation to 
decision-making as something to follow. We can see then that there are patterns that unify 
projects of constructing preferences, but also variability in how their construction and 
orientation appear in the appointments.  
 
Although the three extracts above appeared to be from the respective patients’ first post-
diagnostic appointments, there will be cases in the analysis where the decision-making 
context may shift because of positioning in the trajectory. That said, even these simple 
constructions offer points of entry for parties to the interaction and can be explored further in 
service of a mutually agreed upon informed preference. Of course, this straightforward 
preference construction project is not the whole story. In the next section, the analysis will 
investigate more complex cases of patient preference construction. I note that this research 
was badged as discursive psychology, but the first analytic section has been largely 
conversation analysis inflected. The reason for this more sequential focus on displayed 
orientations and conversational resources is that it often reflected the firm preferences 
patients would account for. Beginning with a focus on emotional states and cognitive 
processes, the next two analytic sections more obviously evoke discursive psychology.  
 
4.3 Constructing preferences: Cognitions, emotions, and mental states  
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In this section the analysis progresses to consider some of the more complex cases of patients 
constructing preferences. While the first section demonstrated patients’ projects of 
constructing a preference, this section begins to focus more fully on the discursive and 
psychological resources involved in construction. To be specific, these preferences are ones 
that turn on the use of emotion categories, cognitive invocations, and mental states. Two of 
the extracts come from appointments where the patient had chosen a preferred treatment, 
while the third concerns information about one possible treatment option. Therefore, two of 
the extracts present a sequential context of an incipient decision while the other is more 
distant from decision-making. With these two sequential contexts, we can investigate the 
construction of preferences across the appointment.  
 
Extract 4.4 (recording 11) 
CNS:     any questions prior to ya leaving 1 
         (0.5) 2 
PAT:     nah I thin[k]  e[rm] 3 
CNS:                [n]o [(u]nclear) 4 
PAT:     I think I’m good I think I’m good at the moment thanks= 5 
COM:     =↑yeah I think you feel relieved cos you’ve made the de[cisi] 6 
PAT:                                                            [yeah] 7 
COM:     -on 8 
PAT:     [yeah] I’ve made my deci[sion] now and erm= 9 
CNS      [yeah]                  [yeah]             =(unclear)= 10 
PAT:     =obv[ious]ly you you you want it gone [as simple as th]at 11 
CNS:         [yeah] 12 
 
One thing that will become apparent with this extract is that it comes at the end of an 
appointment and appears less obviously concerned with preference construction. Indeed, the 
patient had stated their preferred treatment option earlier in the appointment, and as such my 
analysis will focus not just on the formulation of a preference, but the importance of the work 
that builds up to the preference. Indeed, the work of constructing a preference, from the 
sequential context that leads into it to the stated preferred treatment are all part of the 
preference as a unique interactive construction. Towards the end of the consultation the CNS 
poses a yes/no interrogative (Raymond, 2003) to elicit any potentially unaddressed concerns. 
Notably, they use the less successful “any” rather than some, which might not perform the 
elicitation (Heritage et al., 2007). In turn, the patient declines the CNS’s offer to field further 
questions with a loosely type-conforming rejection “nah” (Raymond, 2003), and then begins 
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to account for the declination. Accounting for the declination, as a potentially dispreferred 
action (Pomerantz, 1984), involves two pieces of discursive work.  
 
For one, the patient relays a cognitive and temporal formulation that indicates they have 
reached a particular juncture and are satisfied at this time (Button, 1990). Notably, the 
temporal formulation comes in the second reformulation (line 5) and upgrades the initial turn 
to render the intelligibility of the declination as localised to this late stage of the appointment 
(Button, 1990). Relatedly, the temporal formulation softens the potentially dispreferred action 
of declining further specialist information; the patient simply reaches a point of satisfaction 
near the end of the appointment. The patient’s companion proceeds to affirm the patient’s 
account and expand it with the same cognitive notion of inner workings. Here we see the 
second discursive act as the companion makes use of an emotion category (Edwards, 1997) 
and ascribes a sense of relief to the patient. In ascribing relief to the patient, the companion 
makes relevant an emotional reaction rather than a cognitive one (Edwards, 1997), such as 
claiming to know everything necessary for undertaking surgery for instance. Both the 
emotion category work and the temporal formulation are consonant with each other in 
inoculating the patient from anything other than reaching an understandable state of relief and 
satisfaction near the end of their appointment.  
 
The patient affirms the attribution and upshot offered by their companion by stating that they 
have made a treatment decision (line 9). Again, the patient offers a temporal formulation to 
take the turn beyond a minimally acceptable affirmation and localise the actions; the need for 
further questions does not exist in this space (Button, 1990). The construction has come close 
to its conclusion (line 5), the patient is ascribed a primarily emotional response and 
subsequent state (line 6), and the immediate environment is one that has a decision requiring 
no further questions (line 9). Having declined the CNS’s initial offer and accounted for this 
action, the patient provides their preference in line 10. The patient begins their turn with 
“obviously”, which has rhetorical value in implying that the following utterance is 
something that nobody would reasonably quibble with. With the grounds having been laid, 
the patient remarks that they “want it gone”, which might read as deceptively simple 
considering the clarity of expression and almost stock sounding nature of the preference. 
However, the preference cannot be divorced from the work that has gone into laying and 
constructing the foundations. The desire to get “it gone” follows from the lack of necessity 
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for further questions, the emotional state of relief rather than, say, inquisitiveness, and the 
sequential location of close to the end of the appointment. Not to speak of the rhetorical 
flourishes of “obviously” (line 11) to begin the preference and “as simple as that” (line 
11) to close it out as something near enough self-evident.  
 
This analysis has shown the importance of considering patients’ preferences as more than a 
named treatment option or generic response to an elicitation question. It is necessary to 
understand parties talking about decision-making or decisions, not simply the decision 
negotiation process. The reason for understanding talking about the decision is that this is 
part of the decision-making process and can serve as local interactional context for preference 
work such as in this extract. Indeed, the discursive work that goes into the decision process 
talk is necessary for laying the groundwork of a clear preference formulation. Talking about 
the decision here is necessary also because the decision might not have been ratified and the 
patient referred, so the talk is valuable in firming up the preference and presupposing a 
commitment. 
 
Extract 4.5 (recording 1) 
CNS:     do you have any questions around that because I know she’s p- 1 
         -robably gone through a bit of it with you and I don’t want to 2 
         go over too much of the ground if you’ve- 3 
PAT:     no no er:m she explained erm quite a lot= 4 
CNS:     =yeah= 5 
PAT:     =about the (.) about well about both= 6 
CNS:     =yeah= 7 
PAT:     =so yeah ye[ah] 8 
CNS:                [mm] 9 
PAT:     mm mm mm I think I’m pretty much kn:ow= 10 
CNS:     =know a bit mo[re] 11 
PAT:                   [wh]at 12 
CNS:     ye:ah 13 
PAT:     erm each one involve[s] 14 
CNS:                         [e]eah 15 
PAT:     a::nd (0.2) and I’m already thinking (.) along one 16 
         track= 17 
CNS:     =right= 18 
PAT:     =y’know to go down 19 
CNS:     °ok° right so on- with the surgery though erm it is 20 
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         an overnight stay >roughly< we try and get you home following  21 
         day .h most patients seem to go home after the following day  22 
         .h and as that’s home with a catheter  23 
 
The previous extract demonstrated a patient’s firm preference formulation “want it gone”, 
and the use of an emotion category (Edwards, 1997) as accounting for this preference. In the 
above extract, the focus again shifts as the patient builds up a preference through the 
construction of a mental state and does so in a markedly distinct way. This extract begins 
with the CNS asking after the information that another clinician gave to the patient, 
ostensibly to avoid repetition. Although the question solicitation sequence was grammatically 
a yes/no interrogative (Raymond, 2003), the patient goes further in response and 
characterises an appointment in which they were well informed about their two possible 
treatment options. Between lines 6-9, the patient and CNS produce a sequence of possible 
completion and speaker transition (Sacks et al., 1974), both abstaining from claiming 
speakership rights beyond these short utterances. Perhaps orienting to the CNS abstaining 
from self-selection (Sacks et al., 1974), the patient proceeds to offer a hedged entitlement to 
knowledge about the treatment options.  
 
We can track the development of a claim to sufficient understanding across the patient’s 
sequence from lines 4 to 14, at which point the patient has constructed a working 
understanding that stands to preclude the necessity of asking further questions. In the first 
instance, the patient reports in lines 4 and 6 that the other clinician provided substantial 
explanation. As such, the patient has been subject to much expertise, and the clinician’s 
category entitlement to specific knowledge (Potter, 1996, p. 114). That is, the patient reports 
on substantial information exchange delivered by one who is treated as entitled to have such 
knowledge (Potter, 1996, p. 114). Indeed, this knowledge might colloquially be termed 
medical knowledge due to the entitlement to ownership of that knowledge that clinicians 
have (Sharrock, 1974). From this start point the patient proceeds to make it known that there 
are two treatment options, which is useful for building their entitlement. Two options limit 
the extent of specialist knowledge necessary to develop an informed preference and 
minimises the notion that the patient might not be sufficiently informed.  
 
There is an interesting exchange between lines 10-11 where there appears to be a mismatch 
between the patient’s formulation of their epistemic position and the CNS’s reformulation. 
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While the patient appears to be working up a firm claim of knowledge “pretty much know”, 
it is notable that the CNS reformulates the patient’s claim as qualified in latched speech as “a 
bit mo[re]”. Here, then, the patient appears to be positioning themselves as higher up the 
epistemic gradient K+ (Heritage, 2012a, 2012b) and therefore closer to the CNS. By contrast, 
the CNS appears to be positioning the patient on a shallower K- epistemic gradient (Heritage, 
2012a, 2012b). On the face of it, this reformulation and mismatch is potentially troublesome, 
but it does not appear to provoke trouble as the sequence progresses. We can see the patient 
continue their unfolding sequence as the CNS responded with receipt and acknowledgement 
tokens (lines 15 & 18). 
 
Sequentially, the patient moves from the report of the expert informing, and almost category 
entitlement by proxy (Potter, 1996), to a claim of knowledge with the invocations of thinking 
and knowledge in line 10. Plausible candidate explanations for the non-definitive nature of 
the formulation are the early position in the appointment and the delicate nature of an 
entitlement constructed out of information exchange. Line 14 clarifies the patient’s project 
further, as they make clear that they have reached a working level of sufficiency for treatment 
information exchange. It is in line 16, after the earlier work, that we see the more obvious 
preference statement. A preference statement would necessarily have to come at this later 
point to successfully accomplish a sequential project of building an epistemic entitlement. 
Indeed, the patient starts this turn with a stretched “a::nd” (line 16) to link the upcoming 
production to the preceding project, while also projecting an upcoming utterance and 
therefore claiming speakership rights (Sacks et al., 1974).  
 
In formulating the preference statement, the patient produces a pre-announcement of the 
preference (Terasaki, 2004). Here the patient refrains from declaring a preference outright but 
does imply an incipient preference with the utterance “I’m already thinking” (line 16). 
The construction of a mental state via this cognitive phrasing is also interesting coming off 
the back of the public working up of information exchange. We can see from the CNS’s next 
turn that they acknowledge the incipient preference for surgery and go on to inform the 
patient further on the procedure. Therefore, the CNS does not treat the preference as hedged 
but rather an actionable choice. There are two features of this formulation worthy of 
comment. For one, the pre-announcement coupled with the track metaphor allows a non-
committal position. Institutional mechanisms, such as the multidisciplinary team, can provide 
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barriers that preferences cannot circumvent, or the need for further referrals or appointments. 
As such, a move like the patient makes can sound out any potential barriers while also 
making known that an incipient preference is taking shape. There is, therefore, a bidirectional 
set of possible responses to pursue depending on the expected response to the utterance.  
 
This analysis is insightful because it reveals another way that patients can construct 
preferences. That is, the construction of a preference as something hinted at rather than 
named outright. Through the production of cognitive language and constructions of mental 
states the patient can build an ostensibly intelligible, per the CNS’s demonstrable uptake, 
picture of a preferred treatment. Awareness of such a construction project is noteworthy 
because it suggests the potential of an almost unspoken preference that certainly is not 
commensurable with elicitation style preferences. Furthermore, this style of construction is in 
stark contrast with the following extract, which has a firm preference that the patient does 
much to make overwhelmingly clear to the clinician.  
 
Extract 4.6 (recording 6) 
CNS:     sorry it’s probably me[ (unclear)]   1 
PAT:                           [no it’s no]t that I just can’t do  2 
         needles (.) I ah I I g ((sighing)) I faint over at needles= 3 
CNS:     =h(h)uoh= 4 
PAT:     =blood tests and the whole lot I’m= 5 
CNS:     =OH DO [YA] 6 
PAT:            [ph]obia I take after me mum bless her= 7 
CNS:     AWW:::= 8 
PAT:     =I’ve took after her all the time I (0.2) when I had my 9 
COM:     (he’s well aware of the [erm)] [(unclear)]   10 
PAT:                             [biop]s[y I I wen]t I went and 11 
         had it in me hand= 12 
CNS:     =aww did ya bless [you] 13 
PAT:                       [and] I just don’t do needles 14 
… 16 lines omitted  
CNS:     WELL Y’KNOW= 15 
PAT:     =I know= 16 
CNS:     =>WITH THEM< WE’RE JUST TALKing about the options anyway you  17 
         don’t have to think about anything yet or decide a-  18 
         an[ythi]ng at this point these are just me .hhh being very 19 
PAT:       [yeah] 20 
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Up to this point the patient has been asking about hormone therapy treatment and the line of 
questioning has led the CNS to orient to a breakdown in shared understanding (line 1). 
Despite the CNS apologising for a perceived loss of intersubjectivity the patient disaffirms 
this candidate understanding in overlap, closing off the project prior to any further sequential 
work. In this space, the patient puts forward their reason for the question and begins their 
preference construction work. The patient’s utterance is glossed as something accepted and 
unspectacular through their minimisation “just can’t” (line 2), which gives a matter-of-fact 
air to the admission. In the next line there is marked disfluency coupled with an affective 
display, sighing, that suggests trouble in formulating the production. Such displays might be 
understood as adding to the factual quality of the production (Potter, 1996). Having made the 
trouble associated with needles visible, the patient goes on to intensify their response with an 
extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986). This extreme case formulation is considered 
possible, as we have no means of verifying whether the patient does “faint over at 
needles” (line 3). The CNS receives this information with laughter particles that might be 
heard, it is not entirely clear, as containing a change of state token (Heritage, 1984, 1998), 
and therefore suggesting that the information provided is novel (line 4).  
 
These laughter particles might show that the CNS orients to the extreme case formulation as 
non-literal (Edwards, 2000) and the turn as less than entirely serious (Holt, 2013). The patient 
continues along this minimisation project by providing a routine, and therefore mundane, 
example of scenarios involving needles in “blood tests” (line 5). Having performed this 
foundational construction work, the patient rounds off their production with a generic “the 
whole lot” (line 5) that might be hearable as the final item in a three-part list (Jefferson, 
1990). With the CNS latching their speech in lines 4 and 6 it might be the case that the CNS 
orients to the patient’s list as weak, and thereby not providing the emphatic completion that a 
three-part list would otherwise provide (Jefferson, 1990). The CNS produces a clearer change 
of state token (Heritage, 1984, 1998) but this time in the grammatical form of a yes/no 
interrogative, albeit possibly hearable as rhetorical, and with increased volume more clearly 
indicative of surprise. As the CNS’s speech was latched, and it was not clear that the patient 
had reached a transition relevance place (Sacks et al., 1974), the patient continues their 
truncated turn in line 7.  
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The patient reports that they have a phobia, presumably of needles, and this provides a 
psychopathological explanation for the earlier extreme case formulation of fainting at needles 
(line 3). Adding something psychological, indeed an anxiety disorder, escalates the patient’s 
stance from merely dispreferred to an outright barrier. In the same turn the patient remarks 
that they take after their mother and this report is rhetorically useful for invoking the 
immutability of heritable traits. That is to say, the patient mobilises a barrier to getting over 
the phobia that is glossed as particularly resistant to more generic or dispassionate appeals 
from the CNS and companion. Indeed, coupled with the reference to phobia, the patient 
essentially attempts to close off the entire issue as out of the question. The CNS has already 
produced two change of state tokens in response to disclosures about needles, which suggests 
they may have been unaware of this information. At that moment there would be no 
immediately available resource for checking the patient’s claims, which positions the CNS 
lower down on a shallower epistemic gradient (K-; Heritage 2012a, 2012b).  
 
The patient then compounds this by reporting on something that the CNS has no way of 
verifying, and which is so firmly in the patient’s lifeworld domain (Mishler, 1984) that it 
might not even be considered their place to seek such verification. Rhetorically, then, the 
patient is mobilising resources available to them in such a way as to construct a position of 
authority over the CNS from which they can frame their preference as something constructed 
across contextual specifics and broadly inaccessible to the CNS’s influence. We see this work 
borne out successfully after a further sixteen lines, at the end of the extract, at which point the 
CNS pushes to move away from decision-making implications and reiterates that this is 
simply a discussion of options. In essence, then, the patient has constructed a preference that 
is more complex than simply refusing the hormone treatment without explanation and in 
doing so has made the preference more robust. 
 
Something immediately apparent from this section is, again, the variability of the forms that 
preference construction can take. Indeed, extract 4.4 concerned a strikingly simple 
preference, but one constructed through a mixture of specific temporal formulations and 
explanatory emotion categories and ascriptions. By contrast, the second extract does not 
voice the preferred treatment, and instead builds on entitlements to knowledge and the 
reported speech of clinicians’ category entitlements to prepare the ground prior to 
announcing their preferred treatment. Perhaps most complex is the third extract, which works 
on establishing the severity of an adverse reaction to an aspect of hormone therapy treatment. 
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While this reaction, encompassing claims to a phobia, would be sufficiently complicated for a 
CNS to navigate the patient goes further. The phobia is presented as being associated with the 
patient’s mother and mundane experiences of medical procedures requiring needles. As such, 
the CNS ultimately finds themself in the position of halting the sequence and restating that 
this is merely a discussion rather than anything decision implicative.  
 
This section has built on the previous one by expanding our frame of reference, and 
providing examples, of another distinct way that patients can construct their preferences. As 
such, it continues to work towards addressing the research aim of identifying what patients’ 
preference might look like as constructions. Relatedly, although the sections do differ in the 
way that they showcase construction, they share in that unifying pattern, that these are 
preferences that come to be constructed. I wish to note that by constructed preference I mean 
a project of construction that potentially takes in several discursive acts and elaborate 
conversational resources that can be distributed across long stretches of talk. For example, in 
the extract that begins section 4.4 the patient produces emotion categories (Edwards, 1997), 
remembering as a discursive act (Lynch & Bogen, 2005), and epistemic entitlement by appeal 
to prior medical experience among other acts. Having moved from projects of construction 
centred around accounting for firm preferences to preferences that turn on cognitive and 
emotional invocations and formulations, the final section will consider the role of prior 
experience in constructing patients’ preferences.  
 
4.4 Constructing preferences: The invocation of prior experiences 
 
Having examined emotional and cognitive states and invocations in the previous section, this 
section will focus on the role of prior experience. As such, the focus remains on discursive 
and psychological resources available to patients in appointments. Furthermore, it also 
continues to develop the characterisation of patients’ preferences as unique interactive 
constructions that this chapter is concerned with. Although the extracts in this section are 
typically longer, especially the first one, the focus is squarely on preference construction that 
turns on prior experiences. To be specific, the production of longer multi-turn extended 
construction sequences that take time to invoke prior experiences. Extract 4.7 draws on a 
surgical complication that is mobilised comparably to the dispreferred option of surgery. By 
contrast, the second extract turns on an experience from the patient’s prostate cancer biopsy 
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that they will potentially experience again if they undergo surgery. The third extract shows 
discussion of prior experience at a different sequential position, which has implications for 
the discursive action it performs. We can see already, then, that both the sequential context 
and invocations of experiences themselves can be consequential. Furthermore, that this 
approach can show the variability that can make patient’s preferences a challenge for 
clinicians not just to identify but to render consequential and influential for decision-making 
and, crucially, a shared decision.  
 
Extract 4.7 (recording 1) 
CNS:     I’ve seen that she’s put down oncology and I’m not- I don’t 1 
         think- the decision for oncology is that because of you’re  2 
         sort of leaning towards oncology- oncology is where they do 3 
         the radiotherapy  4 
PAT:     yes I am (.) le:aning to[ward]s the: radiotherapy treatm- 5 
CNS:                             [yeah] 6 
PAT:     [-ent] rather [than surgery] 7 
CNS:     [yeah]        [is there any] reason why  8 
PAT:     erm (.) I’m a bit nervo[us abo]ut having (0.2) erm surg- 9 
CNS:                            [mm mm] 10 
PAT:     -ery down in that area I don’t like the sound of y’know po- 11 
         -ssibility of cutting through .h erm ne:[rv]es  12 
CNS:                                             [mm] 13 
PAT:     in that area roun- the y[’kno]w going round the prostate  14 
CNS:                              [yeah] 15 
PAT:         y[’kno]w so they I get y’know I don’t get the sensation- 16 
CNS:          [yeah]    17 
PAT:     -s not having an orgasm things like th[at] I mean that that  18 
CNS:                                           [mm] 19 
PAT:     wo:rries me 20 
CNS:     yeah 21 
PAT:     going forward (0.8) erm I: e: it’s a long time ago but I had  22 
         a: (.) vasectomy and I know it[’s] different area I was one  23 
CNS:                                   [mm] 24 
PAT:     (.) of erm (0.2) one in about fifty thousand whose vasectomy 25 
         went very very wrong  26 
CNS:     right  27 
PAT:     (alright) I bled internally  28 
CNS:     ye::ah 29 
PAT:     I was off work for ten week[s i]n massive amount of pain 30 
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CNS:                                [m m] 31 
         right 32 
PAT:     right I’ll never forget that  33 
CNS:     no  34 
PAT:     right that’s  35 
         (1.0) 36 
PAT:     up here  37 
CNS:     right 38 
PAT:     and I do not want (0.8) anything like that happening  39 
CNS:     no 40 
PAT:     I kno:w y’kno[w ]technology impro:ves y’know and >that< et   41 
CNS:                  [mm] 42 
PAT:     cetera .hh but y’know basically you try telling my head that  43 
CNS:     yeah [yeah] ok 44 
PAT:          [it’s] it’s har- it’s a hard one to get round that is  45 
CNS:     I know  46 
PAT:     (and and/erm erm) I don’t like the: risks of the surgery  47 
CNS:     right  48 
PAT:     I’d rather go for something (.) a lot less invas[ive] 49 
CNS:                                                     [inv]a- 50 
         -sive yeah  51 
PAT:     and as the lady was saying y’know these days with the advanc- 52 
         -es in radiotherapy  53 
CNS:     mm mm 54 
PAT:     right there’s an equal chance= 55 
CNS:     =mm mm= 56 
PAT:     that the t- both (.) treatments are about equal chance of  57 
         success 58 
CNS:     they are right 59 
PAT:     so I’d rather not put myself through the invasive surgery  60 
CNS:     ok (.) so I see both sides so I know aha for me= 61 
PAT:     =mm= 62 
CNS:     =the surgery works really well yes 63 
PAT:     yes 64 
CNS:     erm and erm yes you do lose things like your erections but t- 65 
         hey do work towards sparing nerves .h to enable spontaneous  66 
         erections if they’re able to 67 
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Patients can voice preferences that appear fully formed, and capable of being captured in a 
single turn or sentence. The issue, however, is that while the preferred treatment may be 
captured in a single turn, the actual constructed preference can often take a far longer form 
and follow the initial snapshot of a response to an elicitation question. Part of what 
distinguishes preferences as constructions (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010) is that they are more 
than an endorsement for a treatment option. Rather, a constructed preference is the total of 
the interactive work and discursive devices that go into ultimately endorsing a treatment 
option. As such, it is important to demonstrate the scope for and potential scale of interactive 
work that can, and does, go into the work of constructing a preference and rendering a 
preference as constructed. In this extract, the patient works up a specific example that has 
drawn on entitlements through past experiences, discursive and communicative resources, 
and emotion categories in service of a strong dispreference for surgery. The first four lines 
here showcase the CNS checking a candidate patient preference. In line one the CNS can be 
seen as doing a noticing and thereby reporting on the actions of a junior doctor who saw the 
patient for a diagnostic discussion and preliminary treatment discussion prior to this 
appointment.  
 
This noticing affords the CNS a way into checking the purported preference and provides a 
basis for the patient to respond. Furthermore, the CNS uses the phrase “decision for 
oncology” (line 2), which implies that the patient has come to the point of, at least 
preliminarily, agreeing a decision for radiotherapy treatment. The CNS then offers a 
candidate account for this decision which is that the patient might be “leaning towards 
oncology” (line 5) positing that it might rather be an incipient preference beginning to take 
shape. Despite implying both that the patient has a developing preference, and might have 
decided, they cut themselves off to provide a characterisation of oncology. The CNS’s 
question takes a longer form but can be recognised as a yes/no interrogative at its root, which 
projects a yes to affirm the request for confirmation embedded in the question (Raymond, 
2003). A type-conforming yes affirms the CNS’s preference-implicative “leaning towards” 
(line 5). However, the patient begins to formulate a contrastive preference by way of tagging 




With the checking question answered the CNS asks a follow-up question that functions to 
elicit a reason for this “leaning” and, by extension, a preference underpinning or accounting 
for this leaning. A preferred treatment on record, the patient provides the reason for their 
expressed preference for radiotherapy over surgery. In so doing, the patient invokes an 
emotion category (Edwards, 1997) of being “a bit nervous” (line 9). The emotion category 
is thereby given explanatory power (Edwards, 1997, p. 191) in the account and sets up an 
unfavourable or dispreferred account of the prospect of surgery. There is also a future tense 
attached to the prospect of surgery, which suggests that the prospect alone of surgery is 
worrisome. As such, the patient begins to firm up the preference and this is rhetorically useful 
for implying the possibility that surgery in the future would cause worry.  
 
Continuing this construction project, the patient refers euphemistically to surgery “down in 
that area” (line 11), which is a scenario that radiotherapy avoids. Therefore, radiotherapy 
also avoids the emotion category ascribed to surgery, and in turn the cause for being “a bit 
nervous” (Edwards, 1997). Beyond the emotion category ascription, the patient uses the 
language of risk and contingency when formulating a specific issue “possibility of 
cutting through .h erm ne:[rv]es” (lines 11-12). This formulation is notable because it 
is a risk specific to robot-assisted radical or laparoscopic prostatectomy, and therefore is a 
category-bound activity of a surgeon and their patient (Jayussi, 1984; Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 
40-41). This boundedness of the activity means that, again, it cannot be encountered during 
radiotherapy. As the CNS elicited this preference, they orient to the necessary suspension of 
typical turn-taking conventions to allow the patient to continue their telling (Sacks et al., 
1974).  
 
Within this extended telling the patient is continuing to weave together the flexible emotion 
category, and the bounded activities and consequences of surgery in one package, as 
ostensibly inseparable for useful rhetorical grounds. In lines 16 and 18 the patient continues 
to work up a specificity, going from the fuzzier experiential notion of losing “the 
sensation” (line 16) to “not having an orgasm” (line 18), which adds detail to the 
concern previously expressed. The patient’s account becomes firmer and increasingly stable 
as a particular version, or preference (Potter, 1996). That is to say, the patient adds detail and 
specificity to their previous euphemistic formulations and build towards a clearer picture of 
an aspect of surgery relevant to preference. All the while the patient is maintaining the 
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interweaving of the emotional and the practical, with the embodied notions of lost sensation 
(lines 16 and 18) described as something “that wo:rries me” (lines 18 & 20).  
 
Worry being an emotional state that can be linked to being nervous. Both emotional 
productions, then, are consonant with each other and therefore provide a coherence and 
reliability to the account in process. As such, the patient is working towards an objection to 
surgery on emotional grounds, but an objection that is beyond challenge. The interweaving of 
the practical embodied fear of “not having an orgasm” (line 18) and the personal 
emotional state of worry ground and support each other. By this point, then, the patient has 
been building their preference on the grounds of, and interplay between, emotion categories 
and emotional states (Edwards, 1997) and specific aspects and potential risks of surgery. 
Going forward, the patient develops their preference further by appealing to a prior medical 
experience, thereby raising a lifeworld contribution, and mobilising remembering as a 
discursive act (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Lynch & Bogen, 2005), a pattern we saw earlier in 
section 4.2.  
 
Although the patient leaves a point eight of a second pause in line 22, which might be heard 
as a spot for speaker transition (Sacks et al., 1974) they go on to begin a new turn. In so 
doing, the patient projects an upcoming story formulation with the temporal formulation “a 
long time ago” (line 22). Revealing that this projected telling occurred in the past indicates 
lasting relevance as opposed to being fresh in the patient’s recent history (Button, 1990). The 
second function of this temporal formulation is that the distance afforded by it is a resource 
itself, and the patient can be seen both as sufficiently distanced from the event to deny 
recency bias, and by making the concession to the passage of time the patient closes this 
avenue of rebuttal to the CNS. With a “but” immediately after the temporal formulation the 
patient begins to further work up the relevance of the telling.  
 
The first act is to reveal that they “had a: vasectomy” (lines 22 and 23), which establishes a 
previous experience of surgery. In turn, the patient establishes a base for surgery as a possible 
source of worry or nervousness. As with the concession to the procedure being “a long 
time ago” (line 22) the patient also acknowledges that the procedure was a “different 
area” (line 23). Once more the patient acknowledges a possible point of contention and 
possibly gets ahead of the CNS while also offering inoculation through casting them as 
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someone aware of potential weak points in their argument (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 154). 
At this juncture the CNS continues to sanction the suspension of turn-taking conventions, 
offering minimal acknowledgement tokens to allow the patient to continue. Immediately after 
the concession, the patient makes a statistical invocation that uses the numerical value to 
appeal to the unlikelihood of the misfortune they outline in the following line.  
 
While the statistical likelihood is striking for its appeal to unlikelihood, it also has something 
of an upshot in that the patient might be considered unlucky, which is hard to challenge or 
undermine due to its subjectivity. Additionally, the patient provides repeat intensification to 
emphasise the severity of the misfortune. As with the earlier progression from the 
euphemistic “in that area” to “going round the prostate” (lines 11 and 14), the 
patient again moves from a more general to specific issue, adding detail as they go. In line 28 
the patient proffers an understanding-checking “alright” before revealing that their 
misfortune was internal bleeding. Another temporal formulation (Button, 1990) follows to 
make known that the patient had to miss ten weeks of work following the vasectomy (line 
30). The intelligibility of this formulation is that the typical annual leave allowance in the UK 
does not exceed an average of 5.6 weeks for full-time workers (Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2020). This complication, the intensifiers preceding its 
announcement, and the noteworthy timescale all cohere in this multi-turn sequence to provide 
an interlocked candidate reason to be nervous about surgery. Moreover, the introduction of a 
lifeworld concern in taking extended time off from work allows for the “voice of the patient” 
(Mishler, 1984) to become visible and material for the decision-making discussion.  
 
The relevancy of this experience, this lifeworld concern, is compounded in the declaration 
that the patient will “never forget that” (line 33). Of course, this ties together the 
previous implication that the long time that has since passed is no barrier to the significance 
and impact of this experience. The declaration that the patient will “never forget” (line 33) 
is noteworthy because forgetfulness is a common excuse in response to having failed to do 
something. Indeed, “Cognitive actions like remembering and forgetting are of a piece with 
other communicative actions like answering questions, telling stories and demanding 
explanations for problematic conduct.” (Lynch & Bogen, 2005, p. 239). To claim then that 
one will never forget something is striking because it mobilises the discursive notion of 
remembering as practice rather than process (Edwards & Potter, 1992) to preclude the 
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possibility that this experience, and therefore dispreference for surgery, would ever slip their 
mind. Going further, the patient remarks that the internal bleeding is “up here” (line 37), 
which is not immediately clear because of the audio-only nature of the data. One plausible 
candidate for “up here” (line 37) however, is that the patient gestures to their head thereby 
implying that the memory is locked in. Such an explanation would follow the preceding 
declaration that the experience will never be forgotten. In this case, the patient would be 
mobilising both the discursive resources of remembering as communicative and the 
inaccessibility to others of something so entrenched as to have a place in the patient’s mind 
away from the externalities of the interaction.  
 
The patient thereafter begins a transition to a broader message that they “do not want 
(0.8) anything like that happening” (line 39). Despite the preceding work building on 
a vasectomy experience the patient is now making clear that any surgical mishap or 
complication would be dispreferred. This broadening of the focus allows for the patient to 
ward off any projects that might seize on the specificity of the experience to hold the surgery 
here as sufficiently distinct. As in line 40, the CNS acknowledges this turn with a “no” that 
suggests a display of understanding beyond simple recipiency, perhaps responsive to the 
patient’s checking-implicative “right” repeated on lines 33, 35, and 37. 
 
When working up the story formulation the patient offered some concessions, in lines 22 and 
23, that functioned to close off counter claims that either too much time had elapsed or that 
the surgery would be markedly distinct. This restatement is relevant because the patient again 
begins an inoculation project as they concede that there have been improvements in 
technology since the time of their vasectomy (Potter, 1996). In so doing they are working to 
dismiss any possible counter claim of wilful ignorance about or acting uncharitably to 
developments in surgery and the efficacy and benefits associated with this advancement. The 
concession is made in general terms and rounded out with a generic “et cetera” that 
therefore stands in contrast to the discursive work that follows. After a sustained inbreath the 
turn pivots on a “but y’know” that proceeds to the patient situating their preference as 
inaccessible.  
 
The patient does this by drawing a mind/body distinction (Descartes, 1998) in a way, as the 
head is presented as an arbiter held distinct from the body. Although the body might be 
 164 
convinced, the head, and by extension all its cognitive processes and inner workings, remain 
to be convinced. A rhetorical move is apparent too, as the “you try” ascribes an 
accountability for sufficiently selling the surgery treatment in a manner amenable to the 
patient’s head. Naturally, this is glossed as rhetorically difficult in response to the working up 
of the internal bleeding as an unforgettable experience (line 33). In response, the CNS 
produces a longer turn but the patient treats their own turn as incomplete and overlaps the 
CNS by their second utterance, rendering the turn a glorified acknowledgement token. That 
said, the acknowledgement tokens might be a mirror to the developing intensity of the 
patient’s extended telling and case against surgery.  
 
In overlapping and cutting off the CNS it is the patient’s project to outright give voice to the 
inferable difficulty at getting past the stated reasons for being nervous about surgery and the 
associated risks. The patient, in essence, offers an upshot of the entire construction sequence, 
which has built this preference as something difficult to surmount or disregard. Once more 
the CNS offers an acknowledgement of understanding, which is not cut off at this occasion. 
From this upshot, the patient explicitly names the risks of the surgery as dispreferred, which 
is a clear statement of preference. Moreover, the production is hearably similar to “I don’t 
like the sound of y’know possibility of cutting through .h erm ne:[rv]es” 
(lines 11-12). Risk is a relevant production also for the fact that the earlier statistical 
likelihood invocation might imply that the patient is in some way an unlucky person.  
 
Responsively, the CNS offers a continuer “right” that demonstrates attentiveness without 
staking a claim to speakership rights. Building on the preference statement, the patient 
follows with another, clearer statement of preference in line 49. Indeed, rather is a word that 
is familiar to formulations of preferential choice. Notably, there is both a subject for the 
preference, in being invasive, and a preference for the subject to be “a lot less 
invasive”. The rhetorical organization of this turn has two-layers then, and this guards 
against modulated counters or competing versions of the preference that might undermine the 
patient’s position. We see the patient’s argument being constructed to preclude any soft 
alternatives that scale back, but do not remove, the issues of invasiveness. Here the CNS 
displays understanding by attempting entry into the patient’s turn space to provide a 
collaborative turn completion sequence (Lerner, 1996, 2004) and to acknowledge this 
preference with the affirmative “yeah”.  
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At this point, the patient has produced a vast body of construction work and the preference is 
sufficiently clear that the CNS could successfully perform a collaborative turn sequence. 
Despite all this, however, the patient launches into a piece of reported speech (Holt, 1996), 
“the lady” is likely to be the doctor that the patient saw prior to this appointment. In turn, 
the patient is reporting medical information that can carry with it a category entitlement by 
proxy (Potter, 1996, p. 132). By reporting this speech, and making the other clinician’s 
category entitlement available, the patient is recruiting another person to corroborate their 
preference (Wooffitt, 1992). As a result, the preference can be treated as routed in the broader 
medical domain of knowledge rather than just the experiential domain (Landmark et al., 
2015). In line with this move, the reported speech switches the focus from the dispreferred 
aspects of surgery to the upside of radiotherapy. Radiotherapy “these days”, has hearable 
implications that surgery might once have been superior, but radiotherapy has had time to 
catch up. This inference is made explicit in the next turn, where the patient posits that the 
treatments offer “an equal chance”, a piece of information that is correct. Curative 
treatments for non-metastatic prostate cancer have an equivalent success rate (Xiong et al., 
2014). The patient then continues in latched speech to restate the likelihood equivalence but 
this time weaving the reported fact together with the binary of “both (.) treatments” and 
therefore foregrounding the decision-making implications.  
 
In response, the CNS affirms this report to verify the factual quality of what the patient 
reported, and by extension the information exchanged by the other clinician. At this point, 
then, the patient has invoked the quality about prostate cancer that makes it such a 
preference-sensitive treatment (Shirk et al., 2017) and mobilised it as a resource for the 
construction of their preference. In what might appear as accounting after the fact, the patient 
restates, albeit reformulated, their preference to avoid “the invasive surgery”. This 
formulation ties together both strands of the developing preference, the dispreferred surgery 
and the dispreferred invasiveness of this class of treatment. Unpacking the construction at 
this point involves first the problematisation of invasiveness following the botched 
vasectomy and the spectre of risk associated with this experience. Furthermore, the reported 
and subsequently corroborated equivalence of treatment success rates flattens the efficacy 
advantages, which allows the patient to restate their preference as responsive to this 
archetypal preference-sensitive juncture.  
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Before proceeding to the next analysis, it is worth remarking on the length of this extract and 
analysis, and its significance for the argument I am making. While notably longer than others, 
this extract is an instructive example of the elaborate and highly distributed form that 
patients’ preferences can take in decision-making conversations. The sheer length of the 
extract is significant because the sequence is essentially one for checking an indicative 
preference for radiotherapy, which in no way presupposes the complexity of the extract 
analysed. As for the elaborate nature of the preference, we can see this in the variety of 
sophisticated discursive acts that that the patient produced when in constructing their 
preference. For one, the interplay between remembering as a discursive act (Lynch & Bogen, 
2005), presenting emotion categories as explanatory (Edwards, 1997), and claiming epistemic 
entitlement through appeals to prior medical experience (Heritage, 2012a, 2012b) is dense 
with discursive acts and entailed much interactive work. Although not all the preference work 
in this section was as long and dense as this extract, they do all demonstrate the highly 
elaborate, distributed nature of preferences and their construction in situ. 
 
Analysis of the next extract will provide more insight as to how patients can draw on prior 
medical experiences and remembering as discursive acts for constructing preferences. Of 
note will be the work the patient performs to strengthen their epistemic entitlement based on 
prior experiences and familial connections. Again, the following extract is a substantial 
length, and this reflects the interactional space that some of these more complex projects of 
constructing a preference require.  
 
Extract 4.8 (recording 6)
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CNS:     (0.2) sorry hh hah I know many people think about that and  1 
         they’re like <oh no> the catheter but we i it it is it is  2 
         obviously important [to know what it] 3 
PAT:                         [I know what the] pain is from when I had 4 
         my biopsy and I had a catheter [and I come round] 5 
CNS:                                    [oh did you (.) o]k 6 
PAT:     and as soon as I started to try and wee (1.1) i’ve never felt pain  7 
         like it in me life= 8 
CNS:     =oh really= 9 
PAT:     =but me dad bless him (0.4) he had bowel cancer and he had to  10 
         have (0.2) eventually he had to have a catheter and the nurs- 11 
         -es used to come out to the ho[use to him] and I know now wh- 12 
CNS:                                   [yeah ye:ah] 13 
PAT:     -at pain he went thr[ough] when when it had to be changed  14 
CNS:                         [yes:]  15 
PAT:     every fo:?ur days becuz it solidifies [a at] the end so and  16 
CNS:                                           [yeah] 17 
PAT:     oh a:h jesus christ (unclear)=  18 
CNS:     =I mean what hopefully I [mean you ]may have a different  19 
PAT:                              [(unclear)]  20 
CNS:     experience this time hopefully with it because sometimes we 21 
         use different catheters different sizes sometimes erm you  22 
         know your body may not just like that that particular  23 
         catheter at that instance an on other occasions you may you 24 
         may you may be fine (.) so to speak on a different occasion  25 
         of having a cath[eter]26 
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We join this extract as the CNS is discussing the procedural aspects of having a catheter after 
surgery. Although the CNS produces a piece of rhetorically generalised reported speech 
(Holt, 1996) to make a point about an important contrast (line 3), the patient overlaps and 
cuts off their turn. The patient’s overlap begins an epistemic claim of entitlement (Raymond 
& Heritage, 2006; Heritage, 2012a, 2012b) to knowledge of an embodied phenomenon and 
lifeworld experience (Landmark et al., 2015). In launching the entitlement, the patient reports 
that they have experience with a catheter from their biopsy (lines 4 and 5). The revelation is 
met with a change of state token and tag question that displays the disclosure as novel 
information (Heritage, 1984, 1998). Despite the CNS speaking up, the patient talks through 
their response and produces an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) “as soon as I 
started” (line 7) that also includes a temporal formulation to indicate immediacy and 
intensity to the experience (Button, 1990). Another extreme case formulation follows to 
present the embodied experience of wearing the catheter as outside of tangible comparison 
“never felt pain like it in me life” (lines 7-8). Here, again, the temporal 
formulation is important for the work of situating the severity of the experience as spanning a 
lifetime (Button, 1990). In latched speech the CNS produces another change of state token 
and tag question combination (Heritage, 1984, 1998), which might suggest that catheters are 
not typically reported as provoking such intense reactions. Perhaps due to the latched nature 
of the speech, the patient does not orient to the CNS’s contribution and continues with their 
turn.  
 
The patient pivots from their formulation, with a “but” to mention their father, and 
introduces this familial invocation with a display of sympathy “bless him” (line 10). After a 
short pause the patient reports that their father had bowel cancer. Moreover, that beyond the 
similarity of having had cancer, the father also had a catheter (line 11), and the patient builds 
the relevance of this telling across these similarities. From this relevance the patient moves 
into another epistemic entitlement claim, this time that they know the pain their father 
experienced (lines 12 and 14). By remarking that they “know now what pain he went 
thr[ough]”, the patient mobilises the discursive resources of a relevant temporal formulation 
and a comparative epistemic claim. For one, the patient only claims to know the pain that 
their father experienced now, after wearing a catheter (Button, 1990). In addition, the 
knowledge claimed is that of their father’s experience, and therefore the movement on an 
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epistemic gradient is to bring the patient closer to the father’s K+ position rather than outright 
challenge the CNS (Heritage, 2012a, 2012b).  
 
By recounting further detail about the frequency with which the catheter was changed, and 
the reason for changing the catheter, the patient further builds their epistemic entitlement. 
This exchange echoes other extracts in this chapter as the epistemic entitlement is based on 
remembering and experience. In the cases of experience and remembering, the two are 
present as psychological states and acts respectively, and we see them produced and 
accomplished interactively, as discursive acts in these exchanges. Over the course of this 
extract, the patient has drawn on a claim to knowledge inaccessible to the other parties, due 
to the familial relation and embodied experience. In localising the claim to their father and 
their biopsy experience the patient constructs a preference that leaves the CNS with limited 
options. We see the constraints on the CNS borne out in the turns that follow where they 
produce a series of hopeful and probabilistic formulations that do little to incorporate or 
avoid the dispreference for a catheter.  
 
This analysis has examined one of the ways that patients can draw on prior experiences, as a 
discursive act, to construct their preference. While the patient built up entitlement through 
their own embodied experience, they developed that entitlement further by weaving together 
their experience with that of their father, who experienced cancer and catheters. Therefore, 
the preference becomes something inaccessible to the CNS and deeply woven together with 
the patient and their experiences. In the next extract I will analyse an extended project of 
constructing a preference to avoid side effects associated with radiotherapy. The analytic 
focus will be on the way that the patient uses the discursive act of remembering and prior 
medical experience to construct a preference.  
 
Extract 4.9 (recording 17) 
CNS:     d’you have any questions cos I talk a lot: 1 
         (1.3) 2 
PAT:     well basically mister (0.2) doctor what d’ya call it says 3 
         about when you have the (unclear) radiotherapy= 4 
CNS:     =yeah 5 
PAT:     or (y’know) there are those .hh it’s possible sometimes 6 
         y’know bleeds and stuff like that 7 
         (0.5) 8 
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CNS:     err: bleedi:ng (0.2) where 9 
PAT:     [well] 10 
CNS:     [blee]d 11 
PAT:     ee said (>well out<) your back passage  [(  )] 12 
CNS:                                             [from]: (.) 13 
         ((stammering)) does he me:an >in regards to< the side effects: 14 
PAT:     side effects yeah= 15 
CNS:     =so there are some side effects of radiotherapy treatment 16 
         (0.4) th:e bleeding is not one that I’m: (.) particularly 17 
         [familiar with] 18 
PAT:     [it won’t it w]on’t affect me warfarin will it 19 
CNS:     hmm: no it shouldn’t do no cos 20 
PAT:     no I’m sort of asking because 21 
CNS:     oh is this [what you mean I ]thought you meant as in visible 22 
PAT:                [(              )] 23 
CNS:     no n[o no ]you should be able to  24 
PAT:         [no no]                      no like I mean like if I 25 
         take warfarin becuz it 26 
CNS:     oh your eye and are and things like [tha]t no: it shouldn’t 27 
PAT:                                         [yes] 28 
CNS:     do [no] 29 
PAT:        [oh] cuz b- becuz it sort of like (0.2) thins the blood 30 
         out 31 
CNS:     yeah 32 
PAT:     I mean it’s not gonna (0.4) cause (0.9) a bhu [larger] 33 
CNS:                                                    [( ) n]ormally 34 
         do NO [no no] 35 
PAT:           [not a] lot of bleed[in] 36 
CNS:                               [it] shouldn’t do 37 
PAT:     a normal 38 
CNS:     WEll (.) >to be h[onest<]  39 
PAT:                      [if I d]id end it 40 
CNS:     the radiotherapy treatment is localised to the prostate 41 
         gland anyway (.) so (0.5) y:’know (0.5) we’re irradiating the 42 
         prostate  43 
 
For this extract above, the CNS has come to a juncture after an extended informing and offers 
to field any questions the patient might have. After a notably long pause the patient takes up 
the offer, therefore completing the adjacency pair (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) and produces a 
simplified upshot formulation (Heritage & Watson, 1979) of a piece of information given to 
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them by another clinician. The patient uses loose reported speech (Holt, 1996) to mention a 
candidate side effect of radiotherapy treatment “bleeds and stuff like that” (line 7). 
Perhaps due to the disfluency and general characterisation of the effect, the CNS treats the 
report as insufficiently informative and requests clarification (line 9). In response the patient 
hurries through another loose piece of reported speech (Holt, 1996), but the CNS again seeks 
clarification by offering a candidate context for the other clinician’s reported speech “>in 
regards to< the side effects:” (line 14).  
 
The patient affirms this candidate context and then the CNS goes on to state that they are not 
“particularly familiar with” (lines 16-17) bleeding as a side effect. This claim to 
limited epistemic access (Heritage 2012a, 2012b) is useful for minimising accountability 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992) especially considering the importance of side effects in evaluating 
otherwise broadly equivocal curative treatments (Shirk et al., 2017). On the patient’s side, 
although the formulations are loose and lay, they are reporting on information exchanged by 
another clinician. As such, the information carries with it the entitlement to knowledge that 
clinicians are commonly understood to have (Potter, 1996; Sharrock, 1974). Therefore, by 
repeatedly producing reported speech (Holt, 1996) throughout the sequence, the patient 
essentially plays this knowledge against the CNS, and their lack of familiarity (lines 17 and 
18) might display an orientation to the entitlements associated with the reported speech.  
 
Despite signs of intersubjectivity between lines 14-18 the patient asks another question, and 
this time introduces “me warfarin”, a blood-thinning agent. The patient’s question takes a 
yes/no interrogative format, and the CNS produces a type-conforming answer, affirming the 
patient’s projected request for disconfirmation (Raymond, 2003). Over the following five 
lines there is a breakdown in shared understanding, which we can see the patient orient to in 
line 25 “no like I mean like”. By line 27 the patient has received a further answer to their 
question, which is consistent with the CNS’s previous answer “no: it shouldn’t”. The 
patient, however, responds with a change of state token, which suggests that they might be 
receiving unexpected or novel information (Heritage, 1984, 1998), and then immediately 
moves into accounting for producing the change of state token. Despite the accounting, the 
CNS produces a straightforward acknowledgement token “yeah” and does not orient to the 




As such, the patient has received a consistent answer to their question on four occasions in 
the sequence, and the CNS goes on to change the sequential trajectory. Here, the complexity 
of the preference is not in the subject, as that becomes clear over the sequence as a preference 
to avoid side effects that complicate the patient’s existing medication. Rather, the preference 
is complex because it plays off the reported speech of another clinician. The preference, then, 
invokes a different kind of remembering and experience than that which featured in the first 
two extracts in this section. This distinction is key because the CNS has no access to the 
experience nor the remembering in question, but they do have biomedical knowledge of the 
topics that they cover. As such, the CNS offers modulated and contingent responses and there 
are multiple attempts to re-establish shared understanding. Further complexity comes with 
the lay and loose reports that the patient offers, which often led the CNS to request further 
clarity and information to respond appropriately.  
 
Despite the differing lengths of these three extracts, the distinct issues of treatment they 
cover, and ways they invoke experience, this last point unifies them. Patients’ productions of 
prior experiences suggest that patients treat them as possessing explanatory coherence and 
therefore as functional in constructing and accounting for their preferences. Notably, the 
invocation of prior experiences runs as a sort of parallel to patients’ preferences, in that the 
nominal simplicity belies the complex interactional character of the action. While it is easy to 
say that a patient suggested they wished to avoid surgery because of a prior experience, this 
does not capture the entire picture. Further to being constructions, patients’ preferences are 
discursive acts that feature epistemic claims as one aspect of their construction. The ways that 
patients accounted for epistemic claims included using acts of remembering and appeals to 
private mental experiences. Distinct discursive acts such as remembering and appealing to 
private mental experiences pose questions as to how clinicians respond to the associated 
preferences. It is, then, through the interactional work of construction, and the interweaving 
of potentially simple sounding but personally and uniquely complex experiences and other 





Having analysed preference construction projects that span a broad spectrum of complexity 
and length, preference construction was not a standardised process, and patients’ preferences 
were not a homogenous phenomenon. Patients’ preferences cannot easily be reduced to 
snapshots in the way that the institutionalised notion of SDM has historically suggested 
through its modelling. Perhaps the best conceptual model of SDM to-date is the TALK model 
(Elwyn et al., 2017), which has discrete components or phases but remains clear on the 
importance of interactive aspects of the decision-making process and patients’ preferences. 
Of course, there are cases where the patient puts forward something straightforward and 
immediately intelligible, but this is not overwhelmingly the pattern. Often the simplest 
preference formulations come later in the decision-making process and are decisions in all 
but name.  
 
In turn, the appointments become procedural informing exercises to ensure that the patient is 
aware of all the relevant information necessary to lock in an informed preference. Now, it 
remains important that preference construction could be identified in the dataset, for that was 
the primary aim of this research. Naturally, a stable and reproducible pattern of generic 
organizational features over fifty extracts would have been perfect, but that does not reflect 
the interactions captured and reported on for the project. Indeed, while I did not have much to 
say about the quantity of distinct preferences, I did capture some of the variability in both 
more complex and ostensibly fixed and firm preferences. Opening the topic up, however, is a 
valuable contribution, especially considering the desire for a model of SDM that reflects and 
facilitates the process (Elwyn et al., 2017). In this case, we have some initial findings for a 
model rooted in and reflective of patients’ preferences as they get constructed and discussed. 
 
One possible takeaway from this chapter, however, is support for the claim that that SDM is 
distributed and takes place across various settings and interlocutors (Rapley, 2008). For 
instance, the diagnostic appointment, the post-diagnostic appointments with CNSs, and 
different settings outside of the healthcare encounters. Indeed, the prevalence of talk about 
patients’ preferences in the dataset and analyses in this section, suggests that these 
appointments are only one snapshot of the decision-making process. As a result of these 
analyses, we perhaps find that people are not always orienting to preferences and SDM. That 
said, parties are always orienting to the fact that there is a decision to be made. This, then, 
might be a problem of framing how we consider, and approach SDM. One implication can be 
that we tend to think of SDM in one neat and tidy way. For instance, a clinician simply 
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stating the following “here are your options on the table, what do you think you would like”. 
However, SDM does not typically take that form, and it is not actually like that. Shared 
decision-making is deferred, takes place over time, and is infused with lots of discursive and 
critical communicative conduct. The work of SDM continues and develops across the 
decision-making process, not just being limited to decision-making conversations, but also 
the whole illness journey and experience.  
 
Further to not always orienting to preferences and SDM, it is possible also that patients do 
not orient to SDM formulaically. In fact, patients orient to the status of the decisions in 
different ways. For instance, as a decision still to be made, by themselves or with someone 
else, as something they have firmly decided on for various reasons, as something they are 
working through in relation to previous experience etc. The message might be that clinicians 
need to appreciate that SDM is not a box to tick but an iterative process that unfolds through 
different meetings in different ways; and perhaps that patients use it for different purposes. 
Indeed, as demonstrated in the last analytic section of the chapter, patients may pursue lots of 
projects when constructing a preference. When pursuing those projects, and constructing their 
preferences, patients are also engaged in many discursive and conversational acts that 
interweave and generate an elaborate and distributed preference. As it has become clear that 
there are many paths that patients can take to the construction of their preferences, it follows 
that clinicians might have to work hard to track preferences and make them consequential. In 
the next chapter, analysis of preference construction will look at the work of CNSs in 
rendering patients’ preferences visible and consequential for decision-making discussion. A 
further look at the work involved with patients’ preferences will encompass the subsequent 





Chapter 5: The receipt and subsequent handling of patients’ attempts 
at constructing their preferences in situ  
 
Chapter Overview  
 
In the previous chapter I demonstrated that patients do indeed construct their preferences and 
provided examples of construction projects. My analysis revealed that preference 
construction was a heterogenous process, as patients drew upon different discursive devices 
and conversational acts in their constructions. As such, there was no sense of preferences as a 
systematic phenomenon. Having established that preference construction occurs, that 
construction was heterogenous, and preferences lacked systematicity there remained 
questions to be answered. Chiefly, what happens with preferences during and following 
construction? Although the final decisions were unavailable to me, it became clear 
throughout the dataset that preferences are not equivalent to decisions. Patients are not solely 
responsible for the influence of their preference on decision-making. In theory, patients’ 
preferences can be resisted if unfeasible, decisively influential for the decision if 
straightforward, or potentially contested if a preference complicates the encounter. As such, 
there is an element of decisional responsibility, and in the extreme gatekeeping, to the CNS 
role. Patients’ preferences do not exist in isolation and their construction, even their 
formulation, may often be insufficient to influence the decision made.  
 
To begin with, it is important to revisit the concept of patient’s preferences as they appear in 
the models and definitions of SDM. In the original model of SDM, the characterisation of 
patients’ preferences was that “both patient and physician share treatment preferences” 
(Charles et al., 1997, p. 683). Furthermore, that a shared decision cannot occur without the 
exchange of preferences. Preferences have clearly been key to SDM since the beginning, but 
they have not been well defined. Indeed, the term preferences has been used interchangeably 
with values, attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and reasons (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010). A 2012 
review offered a brief characterisation of preferences as “what patients want from their 
healthcare” (Street et al., 2012, p. 168). Despite these observations, however, a detailed 
definition of patients’ preferences comparable to SDM has not been attempted. It would be 
instructive to compare this characterisation of patients’ preferences with an example of a 
constructed preference taken from my previous chapter. This characterisation is not incorrect, 
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but it is also not insightful as it largely trades on the vernacular sense of something being 
preferred simply being something that a person would choose.  
 
A characterisation acting as a concise heuristic is not inherently problematic, but with 
problems of definition around patients’ preferences (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010; Street et 
al., 2012) there should be more insight and instruction about patients’ preferences. We saw in 
chapter 4 that while preferences can simply be what patients want, they can also be 
formulated through the lens of being least dispreferred, which is the first point worth making. 
Second, characterising preferences by reference to the forms that they can take and 
expressions they make would be more insightful. For instance, a preference may take the 
form of a list of items to avoid, a story of a previous medical experience, as well as 
straightforward statements of a preferred treatment. This list is necessarily not exhaustive 
given the heterogeneity seen in the sample. To give an empirical example, extract 4.6 
demonstrated a patient presenting needles as a dispreferred item to be avoided. First by 
introducing a physical effect of fainting, then by claiming similarity with their mother’s 
experiences, and lastly giving an example of prior experiences with needles. Preferences may 
be very brief or expressed as part of longer interactive sequences where patients apparently 
seek to account for their preferences.  
 
We might, then, consider preference construction itself as insufficient for accomplishing a 
preference-shaped shared decision. Successfully constructing a preference does not guarantee 
that it will be influential for the decision-making process. The reasons why preference 
construction itself appears insufficiently influential, however, is unclear. Although looking to 
the appointment as an interaction may prove revealing. For instance, while clinicians have 
been reported to elicit patient’s preferences by formulating hypothetical preferences and 
treatment proposals, these formulations were designed to encourage acceptance of clinicians’ 
preferred options (Landmark et al., 2017). Furthermore, paraphrasing patients’ treatment 
stances has similarly been used to elicit and check preferences, but these were sometimes 
paraphrased to appear less legitimate to undermine patients’ preferences (Landmark et al., 
2016). Therefore, while ostensible SDM behaviour has occurred, the interactional 
accomplishment may be highly significant to the preference that gets expressed and the 
decision that gets made. The processes of eliciting and checking preferences, then, are highly 
context dependent. The CNSs in these encounters might be engaged in more work than the 
steps of SDM suggest. Patients might have constructed a preference in such strong terms, and 
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with such a strong commitment, that they halt the progress of the decision-making business. 
Neither scenario discount the construction or elicitation of a preference, but they suggest 
reasons why looking closer than construction or elicitation is necessary.  
 
What we can see, then, is a contrast between what is theorised, modelled, and assumed about 
patients’ preferences and the ways they are treated in decision-making encounters. This 
contrast is akin to that between the notion of preferences as a stable phenomenon, or in some 
cases a cognitive construction, and the interactive construction of preference demonstrated in 
the previous analytic chapter. As such, there are grounds to investigate the role of patients’ 
preferences as they appear in treatment appointments. This chapter will build on the analysis 
of the previous one to examine how patients’ preferences are received and handled following 
their construction. The intention behind this analysis is to move beyond the generic treatment 
of patients’ preferences as essential, but loosely defined, and continue to illuminate their 
practical role. Analysis will be split into two parts, each dealing with the receipt and handling 
of patients’ preferences. The first will look at cases where a patient’s preference is treated 
unproblematically and incorporated into the business of the appointment. The second will 
explore instances of how preferences that prove more challenging to the business of the 
appointment are handled.   
 
5.1 Preferences on the record: Unproblematic receipts  
 
As stated in the introduction, the analysis presented will focus on the receipt and handling of 
patients’ preferences. In turn, extracts will include construction projects in progress, the 
aftermath of preference construction, and cases where outright preference statements are 
produced. This variety of extracts corresponds with the heterogeneity of preference 
construction projects reported in chapter four. Therefore, it is both representative of the 
snapshot of the decision-making process captured in the dataset, and the lack of systematicity 
I observed in preference construction. This analytic section primarily concerns instances 
where patients’ preferences are consonant with the clinical recommendation for surgery as 
first choice treatment for prostate cancer. One exception appears, in extract 5.4 where a 
patient presents with a reported initial preference and little knowledge of the treatment 
options beyond name, and this is treated by the CNS as unproblematic. Before the analysis 
begins, I wish to remark that this chapter will demonstrate a more conversation analysis 
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inflected analysis, and as such the focus is less obviously psychological. Instead, the focus is 
on the organization and management of sequences of talk, but not to the exclusion of 
psychological considerations.   
 
Extract 5.1 (recording 3) 
 
COM:     [mm mm] and he’s (.) talked about the consequences of 1 
         each o[ne]        what the results [(would)]  2 
CNS:           [ea]ch one                   [side ef]fects [yeah]   3 
COM:                                                       [yeah] yeah          4 
CNS:     and what do you think so far  5 
         (0.9) 6 
PAT:     well hh I was just saying to my name redacted here .h that  7 
         it’s a bit like ladies having vasectomies  8 
CNS:     hmm 9 
PAT:     whip the whole thing off  10 
CNS:     ok  11 
PAT:     erm= 12 
CNS:     =yeah= 13 
PAT:     =erm >y’know< (.) it’s erm a little bit (1.6) demasculating  14 
         in some ways= 15 
CNS:     =yeah= 16 
PAT:     =erm better to have it  17 
CNS:     hmm mm 18 
PAT:     as I say vasectomies again come into it [surg]ical 19 
CNS:                                             [yeah]    yeah 20 
         yeah  21 
PAT:     it’s a basic part of (0.2) masculinity (but on the other  22 
         hand) you’re safer  23 
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CNS:     yeah (.) yeah 24 
PAT:     rather than taking a chance  25 
CNS:     so you’re sort of leaning towa::rds surgery then= 26 
PAT:     =yes= 27 
CNS:     =is that what you’re saying (.) mkay  28 
         (1.5) 29 
PAT:     >yeah<  30 
CNS:     err do you have any questions about that or d’ya think- 31 
         has that been covered for ya  32 
         (1.4) 33 
PAT:     I think he’s covered most of it erm I’M SURE (.)34 
 
At the beginning of the extract, the companion characterises the diagnostic appointment. The 
companion reports that they were informed of the consequences of each treatment option, 
which suggests the clinician engaged in option talk (Elwyn et al., 2017). Despite the 
companion having a turn in progress the CNS overlaps and interrupts to mention side effects 
(line 3). After the companion confirms that they were informed about side effects, the CNS 
treats the account for claiming to have no questions as sufficient. Indeed, they then ask a 
question designed to elicit the patient’s thoughts on these options if not their outright 
preference. After a gap in line 6, the patient responds to the CNS with an intelligible temporal 
formulation (Button, 1990) “was just saying” that situates the upcoming information as 
contemporary. The patient follows with a simile making both surgery and the gendered 
notion of “ladies having” the procedure topical. Surgery, here a vasectomy, is 
characterised by the lay formulation “whip the whole thing off”, implying a gloss of 
surgical procedures as one and done. I note that while the patient may have meant 
hysterectomy, they consistently said vasectomy throughout. 
 
The possibility of trouble formulating follows as the patient repeats the non-lexical 
vocalisation “erm”, before introducing a gender identity concern. That is, the notion that 
having the surgery to “whip the whole thing off” might be seen as “a little bit 
(1.6) demasculating”, which opens the patient’s preferences up to lifeworld concerns 
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(Mishler, 1984) as well as medical ones. Interestingly, gender membership categorisation 
work was not necessarily as prominent in the data as one might expect. That is not to say that 
ostensibly gendered talk was not observed, but that the production of identity work, 
especially relevant to preference construction, was infrequent. In this extract, then, we have a 
notable case of gender membership categorisation work where the discursive work is key to 
the preference work. I remarked earlier that the “demasculating” line was notable for 
foregrounding a lifeworld concern, but it is also a piece of discursive identity work. The 
patient offers the “demasculating” function of the surgical procedure as a statement with 
explanatory coherence. Arguably, the hearable upshot of the characterisation of 
“demasculating” is that this outcome would be significant in terms of masculine identity. 
When we consider the principle of word selection, the patient could have chosen any number 
of alternatives, but went with one that can clearly be heard as gendered.  
  
Although unclear what exactly they refer to, the patient concedes that it might be “better to 
have it” and is observably weighing out the pros and cons of surgery. As such, the work of 
preference construction is not only visible and interactive but is a process that could be done 
internally, with the outcome simply reported afterwards. Since the CNS acknowledges the 
turn rather than seek clarification, and the patient returns to the vasectomy simile, they might 
be referring to a candidate male characteristic such as erectile function. This referent would 
be consistent with the masculinity concern and the side effects of surgery. More 
acknowledgement from the CNS follows in overlap with the patient’s introduction of surgery 
as explicitly being the option under discussion. The equivocation between issues continues, 
as the patient enacts a comparison between the pros and cons of surgery. As such, we see the 
patient weigh the balance between a more discursive lifeworld-oriented concern with 
masculinity (Mishler, 1984) and a clear concern with their medical safety and treatment 
efficacy. Despite formulating the con strongly, as “a basic part of (0.2) masculinity” 
the patient contrasts this with the safety of surgery. 
 
The balance might appear to swing over towards the pros of surgery as the patient uses both 
the lay preferential word rather and the language of risk in the formulation “taking a 
chance”. As such, the CNS moves into a more clearly elicitation-implicative turn and, in a 
softened, or less than decisive fashion, formulates the upshot (Heritage & Watson, 1979) “so 
you’re sort of leaning towards surgery then”. Perhaps orienting to the absence of a 
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clear preference formulation, the CNS’s question is qualified and does not imply a firm 
commitment. After a notable gap the patient quickly confirms the CNS’s upshot in line 30. 
Accepting the answer, the CNS proceeds to ask if the patient has any outstanding questions. 
The patient declines this offer, and, in text not included here, the sequence goes on to 
describe the clinician they saw previously in positive terms. Therefore the CNS helps render 
the patient’s preference as on the record and by extension potentially influential for the 
decision-making process.  
 
The preference is treated as unproblematic and the only response from the CNS is to offer to 
field further questions on this preference. There is no caveat or contest, and the preference is 
straightforwardly incorporated into the business of the appointment. Again, it might be 
relevant that the preference for surgery is consistent with the clinical recommendation for 
surgery as the first-choice treatment. This extract, and the interactional work it contains, is an 
exemplar of the phenomenon I focus on in this section. For one, we can see the patient 
publicly work through pros and cons of the decision, which glosses the preference as 
ostensibly being thought through. If we couple this public display of deliberation with the 
reported discussion between patient and companion (lines 7-8), then we see a preference that 
came to be constructed. Beyond this clear demonstration of construction, the unproblematic 
receipt of this preference and straightforward way it is incorporated into the encounter is 
instructive. This sequence of receipt and handling quickly gets the preference on the record 
and proceeds to checking. In turn, this sequence suggests that patients’ preferences need to be 
received by a CNS rather than merely stated. Indeed, without the CNS acknowledging the 
preference as on record and facilitating its integration and progression there is not an obvious 
path to influencing the treatment decision.  
 
Extract 5.2 (recording 12) 
 
CNS:       [mop] up [thos]e (.) [thos]e small surrounding ar[eas ]  1 
COM:                [yeah] 2 
PAT:                  [ok]      [yeah]                      [yeah] 3 
CNS:     that contain .h the disease still 4 
COM:     [I don]’t know but I think we’re edging towards that aren’t  5 
PAT:     [mm hm] 6 
COM:     we be[cuz of yo]ur age as well (0.3) y- y’know [it’s] 7 
PAT:          [e e: yeah]                               [yeah] wi  8 
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         we’ve sort of yeah I th[ink ]just just ta y’know ta (0.2) 9 
COM:                            [yeah]          10 
PAT:     a quick chat=  11 
CNS:     =[ye:a]h]   12 
COM:      [yeah]  13 
PAT:         [y’k]now [an- ]just  14 
CNS:                  [yeah]    d’yu want me to just elaborate a 15 
         little bit more on about the surg[ery]  16 
COM:                                      [yes]  17 
PAT:                                           ple[ase yes] 18 
COM:                                              [yes ple]ase 19 
CNS:     SO erm °>hold on° we’ll try not to explain too much<°  20 
         ([spie]l)=  21 
PAT:      [yeah] 22 
COM:     =ye[ah] 23 
CNS:       £[ok]£ but erm the operation is done upstairs  24 
 
In the above extract there is a far briefer construction project, which the patient’s companion 
undertakes in lines 5 and 7. For context, the CNS has been informing the patient and their 
companion about the procedure of having radiotherapy after surgery. In line 6 the patient 
produces an acknowledgement token to display understanding of the prior talk, while the 
companion begins a new project in overlap. Perhaps orienting to the relatively early point in 
the decision-making process, proximal to the diagnostic appointment, the companion begins 
their turn with the less certain “[I don]’t know” (line 5). More hedging follows as the 
companion formulates the lead-in to their preference as “but I think we’re edging 
towards that” (line 5). Immediately there is a contrast between the two cognitive 
invocations of first not knowing and second “just thinking”, as such the preference is 
incipient and probable rather than a preference proper. By being both undecided and “just 
thinking”, it follows that the statement of preference might follow a similarly softened 
form. Indeed, by formulating the preference as “edging towards that” the companion 
suggests a preference more than declares one. The verb, edging, implies a slow and subtle 
move in one direction rather than a firmer and perhaps more decision-implicative alternative.  
 
The companion recruits the patient to the project with the tag question “aren’t we” (line 7) 
to which the patient affirms in overlap (line 8). The preference, contingent as it is, becomes 
fleshed out in line 7 as the companion accounts for this “edging towards” with “be[cuz of 
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yo]ur age as well”. As there is no further exposition about the specific role of age here, 
the companion might be invoking age as self-explanatory resource. Indeed, after invoking the 
patient’s age, the companion leaves a short pause “be[cuz of yo]ur age as well (0.3) 
y’know” which appeals, rhetorically, to the intelligibility of the invocation of age as an 
explanatory resource while also projecting towards the extension of a turn beyond its current 
juncture. After the preference is formulated, the patient produces a line of talk that is marked 
by disfluency throughout. It might be a sign of trouble formulating, and the patient does 
produce a similar appeal to intelligibility and projection of turn extension with a “ta y’know 
ta” (line 9). It is only after a brief pause that the patient states a possible subject in “a quick 
chat” (line 11). Although not abundantly clear because of the disfluency, both CNS and 
companion acknowledge the patient’s formulation affirmatively in latched speech. In turn, 
demonstrating that they understood the patient’s formulation rather than, for example, 
requesting clarification in response.  
 
In this extract the patient’s preference is received and handled positively and there could be 
multiple options for this receipt. For one, the preference is not strongly formulated and 
therefore implies no strong commitment to a firm position. As such, the preference does not 
dismiss any treatment options out of hand. Second, the preference is for surgery and therefore 
consistent with the institutional clinical recommendation for surgery when patients are 
sufficiently fit to undergo surgery. Third, the preference accords with a key function of these 
appointments, which is to sufficiently inform patients that they then make shared decisions 
influenced by informed preferences (Elwyn et al., 2017). It is key to remark that while the 
first possibility is an interactive one visible in the data, the other two are extra-discursive and 
therefore considered more analytically speculative. This extract is distinct from the previous 
one in that while the preference is tentatively for surgery, the preference is clearly an initial 
rather than informed one (Elwyn et al., 2017) and the CNS treats it as such by offering to 
inform the patient further. With this framing of and orientation to the preference as initial the 
CNS puts the preference into the business of the appointment without a commitment to 
surgery being presupposed. 
 
This exchange is useful for its part in showing the variation in extent of preference 
construction, with such a brief project being produced by the companion rather than the 
patient. Moreover, in the importance of receipt and handling of preferences. That is to say, 
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the initial preference being received positively then requires integration and further action in 
the appointment. Once the preference has been received it can then be straightforwardly 
integrated into further information exchange that advances the appointment towards decision-
making. Unlike the previous extract there is no public display of pros and cons, although 
there is observable construction work, and as such the unproblematic receipt has distinct 
sequential implications. The patient and companion here both affirming the desire to know 
more about the procedure, as opposed to reporting a prior sufficient informing. In the next 
extract, there is another distinct construction project and again a different, albeit 
unproblematic, receipt as we consider further the variability and consequences of the 
handling of these constructed preferences. 
 
Extract 5.3 (recording 13) 
 
PAT:     at this present time (1.5) asked him if: (1.2) well 1 
         jus- >just< how quickly these cancers grow (0.5) because  2 
         my- my initial (1.3) reaction was (0.8) not to do anything 3 
         at all °and° just .h see (0.4) what’s happening (.) al- 4 
         -though (0.5) i don’t understand (0.5) what the risks are  5 
         (.) of doing that (.) with a (0.4) apart from (0.3) .hhh  6 
         being (.) proactive (0.7) i don’t know (0.6) it’s .hh the 7 
         whole thing it’s come as er (1.7) well no- not so much as a 8 
         shock becausee my eldest brother died from prostrate cancer  9 
         .hhh and that was the initial (1.3) reason why  was  10 
         investigated= 11 
CNS:     =ok= 12 
Eight lines omitted  
PAT:     and that’s how it all started  13 
CNS:     ok (1.0) d’YA want me ta (0.3) expand on (.) all the  14 
         treatment options so (.) active surveillance (0.6) ra- 15 
         -diotherapy I can talk about them all surgery as well  16 
 
While the extracts in this section are unified by their demonstrations of unproblematic receipt 
and handling of preferences, they are distinct in their interactional constitution. In this extract 
the patient takes a multi-turn extended sequence to furnish a story that reveals an initial 
preference not to pursue treatment. This extract is another instance where the CNS has asked 
the patient about their understanding of the previous appointment. We join the encounter 
right after the patient lists the options they were offered. To begin with, the patient introduces 
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a temporal formulation “at this present time”, which is intelligible as marking their 
reported actions as in the moment of that previous appointment (Button, 1990). In lines 3 and 
4 the patient states the preference that corresponds to that temporal formulation, active 
surveillance, and accounts for this preference with a question about the speed with which 
prostate cancer grows. Notably, the patient’s preference is a distinctly lay formulation “not 
to do anything at all” compared to the term active surveillance.  
 
Moreover, the “at all” in the preference intensifies the formulation beyond the other, 
curative, treatment options. Having reported their initial preference, the patient concedes that 
they “don’t understand (0.5) what the risks are (.) of doing that” and 
inoculates against any possible notion that they might be invested in resisting treatment 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992). This kind of inoculation work is notable because although there 
are other cases of patients inoculating their turns, these do not pertain to resisting treatment. 
Rather, the patients who perform inoculation tend to produce these around alternative options 
or potential overclaiming. Moreover, the fact that this preference is an initial one is 
interesting because it is complementary to the inoculation work but is not something broadly 
seen throughout the dataset. In turn, the patient makes clear that this is an initial rather than 
informed preference (Elwyn et al., 2017).  
 
In lines 7-9 the patient accounts for this initial preference by way of characterising their 
diagnosis as possibly surprising albeit “not so much a shock”. The inference of the 
patient’s characterisation being hearable as something short of shocking but sufficiently 
comparable to warrant denying an outright shock. The patient reports that their eldest brother 
died of prostate cancer and, in lines omitted, describes their appointment with a clinician that 
started their prostate cancer diagnosis trajectory. In response, the CNS acknowledges the 
patient’s contribution and a one second pause is left for self-selection (Sacks et al., 1974). 
Self-selecting, the CNS asks the patient if they would like more information on the treatment 
options available to them. The CNS produces a turn-initial “d’YA want me ta” which marks 
the question as taking a yes/no interrogative format (Raymond, 2003), with the remainder of 
the turn comprising the available options. The “d’YA” from the CNS is interesting because 
the one second pause following the turn-initial response makes available the possibility of 
self-selection, but the patient does not take this opportunity. Further interest here is that the 
CNS leaves that pause and does not produce their offer of further information earlier. Here 
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the CNS might be orienting to the lay formulation of active surveillance as doing nothing at 
all, and concession that they do not understand the associated risk (line 5).  
 
This initial preference (Elwyn et al., 2017) makes available the inference that the patient has 
not been sufficiently informed to the point required for SDM (Charles et al., 1999). As such, 
the CNS treats the preference as an appropriate departure point for further informing, 
indicated by the choice of “expand” rather than a generic alternative such as talk about. If we 
consider a model of SDM, such as the three talk model (Elwyn et al., 2017) then this would 
belong to the initial team talk stage where clinicians describe available choices and work to 
establish appointment goals. The patient’s preference appears to be treated unproblematically 
by the CNS’s orientation to its status as initial and related implication that it is neither fixed 
nor firm. Notably, the CNS does not challenge the preference, nor do they proceed 
immediately into the possible further informing.   
 
Rather, the CNS’s orientation treats the preference as a reflection of the patient’s position in 
an earlier stage of the decision-making process. An offer is made to the patient in lines 14-16 
that demonstrates an understanding of the preference as initial and therefore treats it as being 
potentially malleable in response to further information. I would suggest that the patient’s 
preference being intelligible as initial, and potentially malleable, marks it as amenable to 
straightforward sequential progress towards the next stage of decision-making. The patient in 
this extract also provides a clear example of construction in action and demonstrates what is 
distinct from a standardised notion of preference elicitation. This construction is notable 
because although it is an initial preference, it draws on the lack of information in its 
construction as initial. We have seen two initial preferences and one more informed 
preference so far, and all of these have been straightforwardly received as unproblematic. 
Beyond that receipt, they have all been handled seamlessly in quickly transitioning to further 
business in the appointment.  
 
In this extract, then, I have attempted to demonstrate how intricate the receipt of the patient’s 
preference is in the exchange, as opposed to a hypothetical elicitation and confirmation 
exchange. Furthermore, the patient’s tentative preference utterance elicits the offer of 




Extract 5.4 (recording 18) 
 
PAT:     erm (0.2) I was given choices about what (.) options I  1 
         [can:] (0.2) do .hh and my option is to have thee surgery  2 
CNS:     [yeah]  3 
PAT:     (.) and to remove it [(.) er]m .hh and they were just going 4 
CNS:                          [°yeah°] 5 
PAT:     through (0.2) er:m (.) some of the (0.2) pre-op (0.3) err  6 
         (options) post-[op] 7 
CNS:                    [ye]ah  8 
PAT:     aspects that I need to be aware of  9 
CNS:     yeah °ok° So are y↑ou familiar with what the (0.3) pocedures  10 
         called [erm d-        ] would you g[et it if (          )  11 
PAT:            [((lips smack))]            [err yEAh I I get it  12 
CNS:     (called)] 13 
PAT:      yeah I ] I read the booklet last night [I’]m sorry I can ne- 14 
CNS:                                             [ok]  15 
PAT:     -ver rememb[er the (         ) heading of it [(            ) 16 
CNS:                [↑t]ha:t’s alright                [hmm it’s a bit  17 
         of a mouthf[ul anyway robotic assisted r:adica]l laparoscopic 18 
PAT:                [yeah           radical pros   yeah] 19 
CNS:     prostatec[tomy] 20 
PAT:              [yeah]= 21 
COM:     =yeah 22 
CNS:     (h)mm yeah we- 23 
PAT:     so: I read through this booklet  24 
 
In the above extract we can see a somewhat different unfolding of the unproblematic receipt 
of a preference, in that there is repair work involved in reaching the unproblematic receipt 
status. While the CNS affirms the patient’s preference, they go on to check this preference 
with a perhaps unexpected question. This extract begins with the patient providing an upshot 
formulation (Heritage & Watson, 1979) of their previous appointment. In this upshot, the 
patient reports that the appointment was ostensibly consistent with SDM as they were offered 
the choice of available options. By line 2 the patient states their preferred treatment of “thee 
surgery” and broader preference “to remove it”, standing as it does as an account for the 
surgery. Indeed, the preference “to remove it” can only indicate surgery as that is the one 
treatment that removes the prostatic tissue from the body.  
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Therefore, the patient constructs their preference very briefly and moves on to resume their 
upshot formulation of the previous appointment. The upshot continues to characterise an 
appointment that sounds consistent with SDM to the extent that the clinician informed them 
about aspects surrounding the surgery. In turn, the patient has now reported being offered 
options, informed as to which options they are eligible for “options I [can:] (0.2) do”, 
and having received information about the surgical procedure. As such, the patient can be 
seen as legitimising their preference by framing it as arising out of the proper channels and 
being constructed in response to information exchange. This same pattern of epistemic claims 
on the patient’s side as discursive acts of preference construction was also observed in 
chapter 4 and my analysis of preference construction projects.  
 
In response, the CNS acknowledges and affirms the patient’s preference, but also asks if they 
know the name of the surgical procedure. This question might function to check the patient’s 
preference since they stated it outright in their earlier upshot. Moreover, as the patient 
claimed to have been informed about the surgery and presented this as part of the 
legitimisation of that preference, the CNS might be checking the extent of that informing. 
The patient produces the second pair part (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) by answering in the 
affirmative “yeah I ] I read the booklet last night” and goes on to address the 
hearable implication in the question that they provide the name. While it appears that the 
patient is going to name the procedure, on account of having read the booklet last night, the 
temporal formulation (Button, 1990) intelligible here for the proximity to the appointment, 
the patient instead claims to have forgotten. Indeed, the patient characterises the forgetfulness 
as persistent, they can never remember, which allows them to answer in the affirmative 
without naming the procedure.  
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this analysis, the CNS’s interrogative in lines 10-11 is 
unexpected. While a patient might be expected to recall the available options, that is not the 
case for the highly technical names of the procedures. Indeed, the CNS’s somewhat disfluent 
interrogative suggests that they might not expect the patient to know the answer. Despite this, 
the patient treats the interrogative as a request for them to confirm they have performed the 
informing that they reported. The patient, however, answers the question only to the extent of 
affirmation, as per a yes/no interrogative (Raymond, 2003). As such, the patient does not 
provide the propositional context that would indicate beyond doubt that they had indeed 
informed themselves. In so doing, the patient mobilises the discursive act of remembering 
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(Edwards & Potter, 1992) to claim that they can “never remember” (lines 14-16) and 
therefore avoid accusations of not having done the informing.  
 
The CNS responds by accepting the patient’s memory claim, corroborating the possibility of 
not remembering by deeming the name “a bit of a mouthful anyway” (lines 17-18) 
before then naming the procedure. This exchange here, then, is a departure from the 
unproblematic receipt of previous extracts as it is a repair sequence (Schegloff et al., 1977). 
In particular, the patient’s claim that they “can never remember” (lines 14-16) is a self-
repair attempt (Schegloff et al., 1977) to account for their earlier affirmative, but 
propositionally lacking, answer. We can see in the CNS’s response, as they offer acceptance 
“that’s alright” which would stand as the second part of an adjacency pair, they take no 
issue with this repair attempt. In addition, the CNS goes on to account for the patient’s 
ostensible difficulty remembering by characterising the name as “a bit of a mouthful 
anyway” (line 17-18). The CNS accepts the repair sequence relatively unobtrusively and the 
business of the appointment proceeds with the resumption of the patient’s project. All of this 
is handled sensitively and throughout the preference for surgery is treated unproblematically 
and is impactful for further sequential and institutional business towards the decision to be 
made.  
 
Although it is not possible to comment on the treatment decisions that these patients 
ultimately made, their preferences were straightforwardly integrated into their appointments. 
Three of the four preferences were for surgery, so it is possible that consistency with the 
clinical recommendation was a factor, although this is not something I can ascertain from the 
data. Besides this consistency, the preferences typically facilitated the decision-making 
business of the appointment, or the work of the CNS. For instance, they put a preference on 
the record so that they can take the appointment further in the direction of informing about 
the thus far preferred treatment. Although a preferred treatment might be the one the patient 
receives, the decision may be made later and there is time, then, to ensure the patient hears all 
relevant information. Alternatively, they implied an incipient preference and then accepted 
the offer of more information about this option. Therefore, it might also be important that 
these preferences had clear and stepwise sequential implications in addition to the 
consistency with a clinical recommendation.  
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Having clear and stepwise implications might be significant for the way that my previous 
chapter presented both decision-making and preferences as being oriented to in distinct ways 
at distinct times. Decision-making is not always oriented to as the immediate next action, 
although there is typically a consistent orientation to a decision as having to be made. 
Patients’ preferences that have clear and stepwise implications, then, appear to be both more 
amenable to, and oriented towards, deciding. In turn, clear and stepwise preferences may be 
better able to move treatment appointments towards a decision being the next or a more 
immediate act. That is, the time until deciding or ratifying a provisional decision becomes the 
next act might be understood as being reduced when a preference has clear and stepwise 
implications. By contrast, the next analytic section will investigate cases of patients’ 
preferences that appear to challenge the decision-making business or progress of the 
treatment appointment. The preferences being received as challenging to the treatment 
appointment entails that the CNSs also handle those preferences differently, and this will also 
be explored.   
 
5.2 Receiving and handling patients’ preferences that prove challenging to the 
business of the appointment 
 
Having now reported on instances where preferences were straightforwardly integrated into 
the encounter, this section turns to preferences that proved less easy to integrate. Here, less 
easy to integrate ranges from having to inform patients that their preferred treatment might be 
unavailable through to patients voicing a preference for avoiding an essential part of 
treatment. This section contains more extracts than the previous one, and that is simply a 
reflection of the appointments in the dataset. Although not every appointment featured 
extensive preference construction work, it was observed that preferences proved more 
difficult to integrate more often than they proved straightforward. Indeed, as mentioned 
previously 10 of the 21 appointments featured decisions that were either awaiting ratification 
or had been put into motion. This left the five firm preferences and six non-firm preferences 
to be received and handled. I would contend that five of these 11 preferences were received 
as challenging while two had non-committal treatment preference work that did not form part 
of the analysis. The first extract will demonstrate a preference that is less easy to integrate by 




Extract 5.5 (recording 2) 
 
CNS:     o:k it’s just to say you’ve had a diagnosis a::nd what we’ve 1 
         y’know what we’ve the plan is we’ve given you a decision= 2 
PAT:     =yep= 3 
CNS:     =to make and that y’know 4 
PAT:     h we’ve just been discussing (0.4) y’know t[he: th]- options 5 
CNS:                                                [ye:a:h] 6 
PAT:     as well= 7 
CNS:     =yeah 8 
PAT:     y’know a::nd .h the point that you made there was quite (.) 9 
         apt 10 
CNS:     mm 11 
PAT:     that if you have surgery then you get two bites of the cherry 12 
         on it 13 
CNS:     mm:: 14 
         (1.8) 15 
PAT:     y’know= 16 
CNS:     =°mm°= 17 
PAT:     so that’s (0.4) the other lady didn’t say that 18 
CNS:     ye:ah °I know° 19 
PAT:     so you know that’s worth thinking abou[t] [and it’s] 20 
CNS:                                           [i]t[ is wort]h 21 
         thinking about        22 
PAT:     and it’s now y’know sort of made me think (0.3) perhaps 23 
CNS:     yeah 24 
PAT:     y’know 25 
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CNS:     as i said it’s a (.) because we’ve not formally discussed it on 26 
         the MDT although she’s given it to you 27 
PAT:     yeah 28 
CNS:     the option may still end with radiotherapy for you d’ya get 29 
         me 30 
PAT:     ye:ah 31 
 
One reason a CNS might not receive a preference as something to straightforwardly influence 
decision-making is that it is not yet possible to confirm that option. This extract begins with 
the CNS providing an upshot (Heritage & Watson, 1979) of the diagnostic letter for the 
patient’s general practitioner. The CNS’s upshot ends with the invocation of the need to 
decide. Perhaps orienting to the conditional relevance (Schegloff, 1968) of decision-making, 
the patient begins to launch a project pertaining to treatment options. Here the footing 
(Goffman, 1981) is notable because the patient reports that “we’ve just been 
discussing” and the patient’s companion is therefore presented as being involved in 
decision-making relevant conversations. Although this interaction remains dyadic, the 
companion becomes an active contributor to a potentially preference-shaping discussion 
through their role in a stretch of option talk (Elwyn et al., 2017). As this discussion is 
reported to have “just” taken place, a temporal formulation (Button, 1990) provides a 
context of recency and relevance with the discussion being so close to this encounter. 
Moreover, as the relevance of this discussion has been established, it follows that 
implications for preference can be ascribed to something interactive and collaborative rather 
than internal cognitions and computations. 
 
When we examine the patient’s contributions in lines 9-13, we see that they ground their 
construction work in a piece of reported speech (Holt, 1996). This reported speech being 
something the CNS said, albeit not in the recording, and therefore the incipient preference 
comes into view on the back of the CNS’s contribution. By invoking the CNS’s contribution 
in this way, particularly through reported speech, which is often used to substantiate 
(Wooffitt, 1992, p. 159) and provide evidence (Holt, 1996) the patient brings the CNS into 
the construction process. In turn, the preference construction continues to exist in an 
interactive space, here being responsive to relevant information provided by the CNS. We 
can see this positioning of the CNS further in line 18 where the patient compares the CNS’s 
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contribution with that of the clinician, likely either a CNS or doctor, they previously saw. 
Rather than simply acknowledge the patient’s comparison with the “ye:ah”, the CNS affirms 
that they are aware of the fact the other clinician did not state this idiom. It is also noteworthy 
that the speech reported is an idiomatic or figurative phrase, which is rhetorically useful for 
glossing a generality (Drew & Holt, 1988) and a finality or sense of having the last word 
(Drew & Holt, 1998).  
  
The patient continues by characterising the idiom as “worth thinking about”, which the 
CNS affirms in overlap. In their next turn, however, the patient goes further and reports that 
the idiom has made them think a certain way. The patient does not announce what they 
thought, but instead appeals to intelligibility with a turn-final “y’know”, which the CNS 
orients to as being understandable. In response, the CNS orients to the patient’s contribution 
as implying a preference for surgery and begins to launch a project of explanation. As the 
option of surgery has not been “formally discussed” by the patient’s multidisciplinary 
team, the decision about whether the patient is suitable for surgery has not been made (lines 
26-29). Here the local sequential organization is notable because the CNS offers a candidate 
explanation for the possibility of surgery being unavailable before announcing that 
possibility. One reason for this might be that providing the explanation first might gloss the 
decision as procedural and soften the announcement. It could also, however, be the case that 
announcing the possibility of being unable to have surgery might be understood as a 
dispreferred response, and the CNS creates an interactional buffer between the preference 
implication and potential dispreferred response.  
 
While the patient’s preference is not contested, and the CNS does not attempt to steer the 
patient to another option, the preference cannot straightforwardly influence the decision-
making at this point. In this case, it is a procedural issue that complicates the possibility of 
the patient’s preference being incorporated into the appointment unproblematically. As such, 
the CNS does not work against the preference, but instead invokes the institutional machinery 
of decision-making. Although this does not change the fact that the patient’s preference is 
handled in a way that halts its potential for influence, the preference is not received as 
problematic or an outright challenge to the business at hand. Therefore, this case is 
significant for the preference according with the clinical recommendation for surgery but 
having to be halted due to institutional constraints. It is also notable that in the previous 
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chapter I demonstrated that preferences could look distinctly messy in practice. Furthermore, 
that patients’ preferences can be constructed haltingly, hinted at, and turn on the contributions 
of CNSs such as in this extract. 
 
Extract 5.6 (recording 1) 
 
PAT:     so I’d rather not put myself through the invasive surgery  1 
CNS:     ok (.) so I see both sides so I know aha for me= 2 
PAT:     =mm= 3 
CNS:     =the surgery works really well yes 4 
PAT:     yes 5 
CNS:     erm and erm yes you do lose things like your erections but t- 6 
         hey do work towards sparing nerves .h to enable spontaneous  7 
         erections if they’re able to 8 
PAT:     mm 9 
CNS:     radiotherapy can still have that effect on your erections an- 10 
         -yway it can still have an effect on your waterworks  11 
PAT:     mm 12 
CNS:     so you can still come out of radiotherapy as y’know with pr- 13 
         -oblems with your waterworks and you could still come out wi- 14 
         -th problems with your erections as well 15 
PAT:     ok= 16 
CNS:     =ok so:: erm but as I say each person is an individual  17 
PAT:     mm 18 
CNS:     and where some persons do really really well some people 19 
         y’know person don’t always do the same  20 
PAT:     mm 21 
 
In this extract, we join the encounter after an extended preference construction sequence at 
which point the patient produces a one-line preference statement. The choice of phrase 
“rather not” stands as a clear indication of preference while the specific component of the 
preference is tagged to the treatment it implies “invasive surgery”. In response, the CNS 
acknowledges the patient’s preference but then launches their own project. As the patient’s 
extended preference construction sequence, not included here but analysed in the extract 4.7, 
was a response to a checking question the CNS’s “so” might indicate that the patient’s 
contribution has been pending (Bolden, 2009). The CNS invokes their category entitlement 
(Potter, 1996) by virtue of seeing “both sides” and makes an epistemic claim (Heritage, 
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2012a, 2012b) to know “surgery works really well” (line 4). The invocation of “both 
sides” and proximity to the patient’s preference makes available the inference that the CNS 
might be preparing to challenge the patient’s preference. With the introductory “for me” and 
“both sides” the epistemic gradient positions have the CNS at K+ to the patient’s K- 
(Heritage 2012a, 2012b).  
 
In the extended turn that follows, the CNS concedes that surgery presents the side effect of 
erectile dysfunction but promptly minimises the issue by reporting that this might be 
avoidable (lines 6-8). Therefore, while the initial concession might suggest that the CNS was 
doing impartiality as per Sacks’ characterisation of the work speakers engage in to appear to 
be ordinary via “doing “being ordinary”” (Sacks, 1984, p. 414), the minimisation and 
subsequent description of the side effect probabilities of radiotherapy might undermine this. 
In line 6 the patient might be producing a script formulation, which is a description of an 
activity as typical and therefore not requiring an account (Edwards, 1994), with their appeal 
to “if you’re going out”. Script formulations are necessarily rhetorical acts and can be 
unsuccessful if the recipient counters the formulation.  
 
It is unclear how the CNS might have responded as their attempt to claim speakership failed 
and the patient proceeded to formulate another topical interrogative about incontinence 
permanence. The CNS, however, responds to this new interrogative in a hedged and 
probabilistic fashion that might be heard as a poor fit with the patient’s implication of the 
seriousness of incontinence as a side effect. The plausibility of this suggestion perhaps lies in 
the breakdown of intersubjectivity that the patient makes clear in line 5 “[no no I understa]nd 
that”. In the possible script formulation, made partially uncertain using the contingent if 
rather than the more definitive when, we can observe that the patient sets up “going out” as 
an action that can be scripted (Edwards, 1994) and therefore oppositional to the CNS’s 
probabilistic treatment of side effects 
 
In lines 10 and 11 the CNS presents two candidate side effects of radiotherapy close together. 
By phrasing the erectile dysfunction side effect as “problems with your erections as 
well” the CNS makes clear the possibility of two side effects for radiotherapy. The two 
effects contrast with the single one attributed to surgery in numerical terms but also the 
previously mentioned minimisation possibility of enabling “spontaneous erections” (lines 
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7-8). Moreover, the CNS continues to restate the candidate side effects but this time invokes 
the footing of the patient with the effects prefaced by “you can” and “you could”. As such, 
the CNS moves from the less personal “radiotherapy can” to the more personal “you 
can”, which ties the effect to the patient.  
 
Despite this focus on the side effects of radiotherapy, the CNS goes on to remark that “each 
person is an individual” (line 19) and returns to the task of doing impartiality. Taking 
this further, the CNS remarks that patients have unique responses to these treatments and 
their side effects. Based on the work produced throughout this sequence of extended turns the 
CNS appears to be contesting the patient’s preference. While notable for having no response 
to the preference for avoiding invasion, the CNS’s turns do undermine the option of 
radiotherapy relative to surgery. That said, the CNS’s entire project is couched in an appeal to 
doing impartiality with the undermining project bookended by notions of “both sides” and 
that “each person is an individual”. A lot of interactional work, then, goes into the 
handling of the patient’s preference, to both argue against it and avoid appearing insensitive 
or confrontational in so doing. The consequence of a receipt such as this, is that it advances 
progressivity along the CNS’s line rather than that of the patient. 
 
Particularly remarkable with this extract is the observation that it is driven overwhelmingly 
by the CNS from line 2 through to the end. As such, the patient spends the exchange 
producing minimal turns that do not go beyond displays of acknowledgement or recipiency. 
While the patient mirrors the CNS’s “yes” in line 5, the remainder of their turns are either the 
non-lexical “mm” or minimal “ok”, which lack positive or negative valence. The patient, then, 
also receives the CNS’s project of doing impartiality in non-committal minimal turns, which 
may reflect their relative tension with the clear preference formulation in line 1. Whether the 
patient is simply respecting speakership rights via minimal acknowledgements or letting their 
preference speak for itself is analytically unclear, but the CNS makes full use of the 
interactional space afforded to them. We can see, as a result, that a clearly formulated firm 
preference was not treated as being particularly influential or exempt from the possibility of 
being reversed or altered.  
 
Extract 5.7 (recording 16) 
 
PAT:                       [yeah] 1 
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         yeah I mean y- incontinence I find that intolerable  2 
CNS:     ((lip smack)) well they’re all possibilities (.) ok I can’t 3 
         definitively say [(              )] 4 
PAT:                      [no no I understa]nd that I don’t expect you  5 
         ta say I’m just telling ya that ma- (0.1) I mean that wouldn- 6 
         -‘t be very nice if you’re going out and stuff [like] that 7 
CNS:                                                    [WAIT] 8 
PAT:     is it temporary or would it be permanent  9 
CNS:     it’s difficult to say sometimes patients (0.2) do: (.) 10 
         sometimes as a result end up with erm (0.4) y’know (.) 11 
         <lifelong> effects from radiotherapy treatment .hhh there’s 12 
         all possibilities y’know not everyone has these y’know they 13 
         [(    )] 14 
PAT:     [no but] if you’re the one that does then that’s what  15 
         matters  16 
CNS:     unfortunately t[ha]t but it is a side effect of treatment  17 
PAT:                    [mm] 18 
CNS:     for prostate cancer= 19 
 
One potential problem with handling and managing patients’ preferences is that the 
preference might ultimately be unfeasible. A patient might want something that the clinician 
cannot do anything about. Preferences might be unfeasible because they increase risk, desire 
an unavailable treatment, or attempt to avoid a commonplace side or treatment effect. In this 
extract, the patient is discussing urinary incontinence as a post-radiotherapy treatment effect. 
The preference, then, also relates to radiotherapy since that is the option under discussion, 
and the CNS suggests the patient will be having radiotherapy. The production of an extreme 
case formulation marks a clear display of preference, or dispreference, and the extremity of 
the formulation glosses incontinence as a “legitimate complainable” (Whitehead, 2015, p. 
580). In turn, the CNS responds with a dispreferred turn marked by the smacking of their lips 
and turn-initial “well” (line 3; Pomerantz, 1984). 
 
Furthermore, the CNS remarks that all side effects including incontinence are “all 
possibilities” (line 3), therefore all side effects are similarly probabilistic. The CNS 
proceeds to state that they “can’t definitively say” (lines 3 and 4) whether the patient 
will experience any of these side effects. In turn, the CNS’s reformulation of incontinence as 
an incumbent of the category side effects positions incontinence as bundled together with 
treatment. That is, side effects are category-bound activities (Jayussi, 1984; Sacks, 1992, vol. 
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1, p. 40-41) for those who undergo prostate cancer treatment. I observed in the previous 
analysis that the CNS could be seen as doing impartiality after Sacks’ notion of “doing 
“being ordinary”” (Sacks, 1984, p. 414). Similar work can be found in this exchange, with 
the CNS formulating the likelihood of urinary incontinence as one among “all 
possibilities” (line 3). The CNS, then, is positioned as simply reporting on one possible 
treatment effect and doing so impartially or professionally. This CNS’s “all 
possibilities” remark has similarities to the CNS’s “each person is an individual” 
in the previous extract. While the patient acknowledges the CNS’s contribution and inability 
to offer a definitive answer, they also orient to the response as ill-fitted.  
 
The patient appears to orient to the CNS’s response as shifting from personal to impersonal. 
As such, the patient’s response suggests a breakdown in intersubjectivity, which is 
consequential for the business of the sequence. We can see this in the patient’s contributions 
from lines 5-6, which show the patient attempting to correct the CNS’s displayed 
understanding. The patient initially treats the CNS’s turn as inappropriate and possibly 
indicative of misunderstanding, as they respond in misalignment “no no I understand”. 
After which, they begin a project of re-stating that this initial statement was a telling rather 
than the interrogative that the CNS’s treatment suggested (line 6). The patient might be seen 
to orient to the CNS’s rhetorical work of categorising incontinence as one of various side 
effects. The patient does so by appealing to intelligibility with “I mean” before accounting for 
the stated dispreference for incontinence rather than the category side effects. In turn, the 
patient re-states their preference. An affective “wouldn’t be very nice” component and a 
temporal “if you’re going out” (lines 6-7) one gets produced that designate incontinence 
as a specific preference issue rather than a treatment contingency. The patient’s receipt of the 
doing impartiality in line 15 is also notable, here, as it suggests that the parties have not yet 
resolved the intersubjective breakdown. Indeed, the patient might be considered to have 
presented a sequential opportunity for further talk in the question about permanence (line 9) 
but the CNS’s return to doing impartiality receives a restatement of intersubjective trouble.  
 
For the patient, it is not a case of indirectly requesting information by reporting a 
complainable, or a biomedical question, it is a lifeworld statement about quality of life. 
Indeed, it is a question of the “voice of the patient” (Mishler, 1984) and it is at tension with 
the biomedical knowledge of the CNS (Landmark et al., 2015). The issue of incontinence is 
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formulated explicitly in the patient’s first turn and hearably relevant for preference 
construction. In response, however, the CNS produces another instance of doing impartiality 
in response to the patient rendering a lifeworld concern (Mishler, 1984). This exchange, then, 
is an awkward case for SDM. The aim of SDM is to bring patients’ and clinicians’ ideas 
together, albeit without the presupposition that SDM would become intuitively easier. 
Indeed, what occurs in this exchange is a mismatch between the patient’s lifeworld-oriented 
point of view and the biomedical role of the CNS. Perhaps the CNS is constrained by the 
institutional parameters of their role, but the response to the patient appeared disruptive and 
poorly fitted. 
 
Two takeaways are especially notable, and the first of these is the tension between the 
lifeworld and the biomedical not as theoretical or conceptual positions (Mishler, 1984) but as 
the contributions made and domains invoked by the respective parties. It appears to me from 
the patient’s contributions to this sequence that they are not divorcing the subjective 
experience of an effect from its biomedical likelihood. We would not necessarily expect this 
either, since a preference is “what patients want from their healthcare” (Street et al., 2012, p. 
168). As such, the preference need not prioritise the treatment of cancer over the subsequent 
health related quality of life; a domain that urinary incontinence would affect. Indeed, the 
patient gives voice to a subjective sounding complaint such as “not very nice” and offers a 
candidate example that is tethered less to the biomedical and more to subjective day-to-day 
issues (lines 5-7). While it is important not to reach beyond the data for the extra-discursive 
in language and social interaction research, the choice of candidate example and word 
selection indicate a more subjective side of preference rather than a purely biomedical 
concern with efficacy. If we were to conceptualise preferences solely as a preferred treatment 
option, then we might find issue with the question of the subjective. However, treatment 
options are not the sum of patients’ preferences as my previous analytic chapter spoke to by 
revealing the elaborate and highly distributed nature of patients’ preferences and their 
construction.  
 
It is important also to note that biomedical does not straightforwardly imply an extra-
discursive claim but is rather a vernacular descriptor for the domain of specialist knowledge 
that a CNS is entitled to by virtue of their categorical incumbency (Jayussi, 1984; Potter, 
1996; Sharrock, 1974). Furthermore, while the patient is not exclusively voicing efficacy or 
curative concerns they are still accounting for their preference and involved in preference 
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work. As such, the distinction between a subjective side of the treatment and primarily 
biomedical evaluations of efficacy is one introduced and made relevant by the patient. For the 
CNS there is this same tension visible, as they do not pursue the patient’s subjective 
perspective. Rather, the CNS pursues an ostensibly impartial or professional account of the 
biomedical perspective with a small sympathetic concession in the “unfortunately”. 
Excepting the “unfortunately”, however, the CNS does little to engage with the patient 
about their preference, and this is the second takeaway. The biomedical pursuit is doing 
impartiality by speaking more generally and probabilistically, but also closing off fruitful 
discussions of what might animate the patient’s dispreference. As such, there is no 
exploration of the preference or what might ameliorate the dispreference in the event of 
radiotherapy treatment. There are questions, then, to be asked about the possible constraints 
on the CNS, whether institutional role constraints or constraints around the unpredictability 
of treatment or side effects among individual patients. 
 
Extract 5.8 (recording 6) 
 
CNS:     weeks this is literally [jus-] 1 
PAT:                             [stil]l enough 2 
COM:     in your booteh= 3 
CNS:     =in your [bottom]  4 
PAT:              [still ] enough= 5 
COM:     =you won’t see it  6 
PAT:     still enough 7 
CNS:     b(h)less y(h)ou= 8 
CNS:     WELL Y’KNOW= 9 
PAT:     =i know= 10 
CNS:     =>WITH THEM< WE’RE JUST TALKing about the options anyway you  11 
         don’t have to think about anything yet or decide a-  12 
         an[ythi]ng at this point these are just me .hhh being very 13 
PAT:       [yeah] 14 
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CNS:     open and informative telling you everythink about all the 15 
         treatment options] 16 
COM:     [no we need to kn]ow everything= 17 
CNS:     =absolutely .hhh ok (0.3) so that’s hormone therapy treatment  18 
         .hhh erm (.) and then there is (.) erm (.) brachyth-  19 
 
As suggested by the heading of this section, the focus is on how patients’ preferences are 
received and subsequently handled by CNSs. These extracts therefore often begin during, or 
after, a patient’s construction project. For this case, the patient has constructed a strong 
preference to avoid the needles involved in hormone therapy treatment and we join the 
encounter in the aftermath. Please note that while this text is not included here, it was 
analysed in the previous chapter as part of extract 4.4. At this point in the encounter the CNS 
is attempting to minimise the significance of the hormone injections. Although the turn is 
aborted, it is probable that the CNS was appealing to how infrequent these injections are, 
once every three months, by launching an intensified characterisation “literally [jus-]”. 
The patient, however, ignores turn-taking conventions (Sacks et al., 1974) by interrupting the 
CNS to shut down their turn as insufficient before completion. In this response, “still 
enough”, the patient might be orienting to the CNS’s turn as a minimisation project, which 
could undermine the patient’s preference. As such, the patient rejects the CNS’s project out 
of hand, not allowing its completion.  
 
Notably, the patient’s companion is also involved in this minimisation project. In line 3, the 
companion produces a more lay characterisation of the injection as “in your booteh”. The 
companion’s formulation might be designed to soften the patient’s stance by juxtaposing the 
seriousness of the preference with the more familiar and less serious sounding “booteh”. In 
latched speech the CNS repeats the companion’s contribution but reformulates “booteh” into 
the less casual “bottom”, as an attempt at corroboration (Wooffitt, 1992). Again, however, 
the patient rejects the minimisation out of hand and repeats their initial response “[still] 
enough”. Moreover, the patient again treats the CNS’s turn as insufficient and interrupts them 
prior to completion. Despite the patient rejecting both the companion and CNS’s attempts, 
the companion continues to attempt the minimisation project. In line 6, the companion shifts 
from the appeal to infrequency to an appeal to the lack of a visual trigger. Here the 
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companion is essentially invoking a sense of being out of sight, out of mind and constructing 
a characterisation of the patient’s preference accordingly. A version of the preference to 
avoid needles that is sufficiently weak enough to accept needles if they are not seen.  
 
For a third time, however, the patient dismisses the attempt and repeats their initial “still 
enough” a second time. Having constructed a strong preference and gone as far as claiming a 
phobia of needles, the patient might be continuing to orient to the minimisation efforts. 
Accepting the appeals to infrequency or the ostensible invisibility of the needle would 
undermine the constructive work that went into their version of the preference and its 
established strength. Despite seemingly abandoning the minimisation project, the CNS shifts 
their focus to the sequence at large. The current sequence is characterised as “JUST-TALKing 
about the options”, and this rhetorically disarms the preceding talk by glossing it as just 
talk and therefore denies its action-orientation. Moreover, by “JUST TALKing about 
options” the sequence is framed as being concerned with option talk rather than preference 
talk (Elwyn et al., 2017), which again stands to minimise the patient’s contribution. This 
project continues as the CNS tells the patient that they do not “have to think at this 
point”, which the patient acknowledges in overlap (line 14). In lines 13 and 15 the CNS’s 
project goes further by ascribing deontic authority (Stevanovic, 2012) to themselves in a 
characterisation of this point as them “telling you everythink”. Producing a matter-of-
fact declarative in “telling you”, rather than a more inclusive alternative, such as 
discussing with you, does not presuppose an interactional spot for the patient to respond. As 
such, having found no success in minimising the patient’s specific preference, the CNS 
moves on to minimise the issue of preferences entirely at this point. 
 
At this point we have seen three or four examples of the receipt of patients’ preferences as 
challenging or problematic. There has been some variability in how the receipts have 
proceeded, and the interactive slots and possibilities that they offered. In extract 5.5 for 
instance, the preference was received as challenging because it projected a request for 
confirmation that could not be granted. While the preference was received as challenging, 
then, by virtue of the commitment it implied, the sequence was able to proceed without 
breakdown or conflict resolution. By contrast, we saw a case in extract 5.7 that presented an 
intersubjective breakdown that ultimately went unresolved. The CNS, again unable to 
provide the commitment to confirmation that the patient’s preference entailed, effectively 
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closed the exchange with a minimally sympathetic appeal to the matter-of-fact nature and 
occurrence of side effects. Although both preferences had similar implications and both 
projected difficult commitments, they produced distinct interactive work that subsequently 
had markedly different implications for how the receipt could proceed in the decision-making 
business of the appointment.  
 
Extract 5.9 (recording 11) 
 
CNS:                               [do] you want to talk to you about 1 
         that (0.2) briefly about that (.) what it is 2 
PAT:     well waell (0.6) (I’ll see how I’ll be/we do in the hand of) 3 
         name reda[cted] I’m sure he’s gonna make ( )s incisions[ all] 4 
CNS:              [yeah]                                        [yeah] 5 
PAT:     th time I think doh doh don’t >know< if there’s any point in 6 
         [that  ]cos all I want is this to be gone=      =so so no  7 
CNS:     [°yeah°]                                  =yeah= 8 
PAT:     that’s fine thank you= 9 
CNS:     =OHkay ohkay (.) so: (0.3) °dhuh° ok that’s fine the[n so]  10 
PAT:                                                         [yeah] 11 
CNS:     the- so part of erm (0.3) having s::- the (nerve spared one) 12 
         not having nerve[s sp]ared (.) erm is part of sometimes a  13 
PAT:                     [yeah]  14 
CNS:     side effects o[k which is WH]Y which is why you made them   15 
PAT:                   [s]ide effects]  16 
CNS:     erm get erectile dysfunction[n ok] .hhh so erm (0.5) 17 
PAT:                                [yeah] 18 
 
This extract comes during the CNS informing the patient about the side effects of surgery. 
More specifically, the CNS has asked if the patient wishes to know more about nerve-sparing 
versus non-nerve-sparing surgery. As the patient produces a turn-initial well, repeats it, and 
then leaves a notable pause this suggests that their turn will constitute a dispreferred response 
(Pomerantz, 1984). The CNS’s question presented as a yes/no interrogative (Raymond, 
2003), and the turn-initial “well” might suggest that they are not producing a projected 
yes/no answer. The patient not only declines the offer, but they also eschew the typical 
responses projected by the yes/no interrogative (Raymond, 2003). By way of accounting for 
the dispreferred response the patient produces an idiomatic formulation “in the hands of” 
that ascribes a sense of sufficiency and therefore finality (Drew & Holt, 1998) in leaving the 
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matter to the surgeon. Moreover, the patient produces an upshot (Heritage & Watson, 1979) 
of the surgery as making incisions (line 4) and moves from this upshot to question the 
necessity of further information. Here the simplistic upshot formulation is a rhetorical move 
that glosses the procedure as straightforward and therefore not requiring the assistance 
offered by the CNS.  
 
Despite closing off the CNS’s offer with idiom and upshot, the patient accounts for the 
declination further by stating their preference in line 7. Here the patient’s preference is 
formulated as “cos all I want is this to be gone” with the straightforwardness of the 
preference hearable as not necessitating further information. Indeed, the version of surgery 
the patient constructs as their preference is one that counters a more technical and thorough 
alternative by way of its lay formulation of an outcome, namely getting it gone. After latched 
acknowledgement from the CNS the patient proceeds to explicitly link the preference to the 
declination by stating “so so no that’s fine thank you” (lines 7-9). By this point, the 
patient has idiomatically put themselves “in the hands of” the surgeon and therefore 
beyond the stage of the informing, undermined the need for further information with a 
simplistic upshot, and positioned their preference as one that does not necessitate the CNS’s 
offer. In response, the CNS acknowledges the patient’s position but displays signs of 
disfluency throughout, possibly because of the dispreferred response and its extent.  
 
After the disfluency the CNS goes on to ratify the patent’s declination stating, “that’s 
fine”. That said, the CNS then ignores the implication of the patient’s declination in line 12 
by launching the project of informing that the patient declined. Although the CNS 
acknowledged the patient’s position, they might disregard it on the grounds of institutional 
obligations. Yes, the patient has stated a clear preference, but the patient is declining 
information that could be considered relevant for an informed preference (Elwyn et al., 2017) 
and sufficient information exchange (Charles et al., 1999). As such, this sequence might be a 
case of the contextual situation of the talk in an institution being prioritised ahead of its 
sequential one. The CNS, then, acknowledged the patient’s preference, both to skip the 
informing and as an account for skipping the informing, but ultimately oriented to the context 
of the treatment appointment. As a result, the patient’s preference is disregarded in order that 




5.3 Discussion  
 
This chapter investigated the receipt and handling of patients’ preferences to build on the 
analysis of preference construction in chapter four. Analysis revealed that patients’ 
preferences were typically received in two ways. The first of these ways was as 
unproblematic and straightforward to integrate into the appointment. This receipt was 
observed when patients’ preferences clearly indicated a decision had all but been agreed, 
were for surgery, or prompted further information exchange by the CNS. The other way was 
patients’ preferences being received as a challenge to the decision-making business of the 
encounter. In these cases, patients’ preferences often had more complicated implications for, 
or firmer commitments to, stances that might ultimately prove unable to influence treatment 
decisions. For instance, preferring to avoid urinary incontinence and voicing this preference 
in strong terms despite likely experiencing incontinence because of treatment. That said, the 
heterogeneity of preference construction revealed in chapter 4 was again observed in this 
analysis. For example, extract 5.5 demonstrated a patient working up a preference for 
surgery, which we might expect to be received and handled as unproblematic. The CNS, 
however, had to inform the patient that they might not be eligible for surgery. Therefore, the 
otherwise straightforward preference required the CNS to invoke the institutional machinery 
of decision-making in response.  
 
The most striking findings are of course those that demonstrate the receipt and handling of 
patients’ preferences as challenging or problematic. That said, it was no less remarkable that 
patients’ preferences were received positively when they were amenable to straightforward 
institutional and sequential progress. On the level of conversational organization, it fits with 
the established preference for progressivity and dichotomy of preferred and dispreferred 
responses (Pomerantz, 1984). That is, we would reasonably expect that a statement with 
straightforward sequential implications would be favourably received and sanction further 
progress. Of course, the opposite response being observed when the preferences entailed 
more complex implications suggests that this basic domain of preference organization, in the 
technical conversation analytic sense, remained operative and observable in this specialised 
institutional context. A preference for a curative treatment such as radiotherapy, then, could 
prompt a dispreferred response despite it being an acceptable treatment option. With regards 
to the institutional level, the findings are noteworthy because they speak to a set of real 
 
 206 
constraints on patients’ preferences. There were little to no constraints on patients 
constructing their preferences in the sense of entering or producing a project of construction. 
However, the distinct patterns of receiving and handling patients’ preferences enacted a 
constraint on which preferences were understood as feasible and therefore consequential.  
 
Patients’ preferences were consequential, in that they were influential, primarily when they 
accorded with the clinical recommendation for surgery. In turn, the interactive work of the 
CNS was straightforward because they simply had to affirm an incipient decision, informed 
preference or proceed to another relevant act such as information exchange. What is 
significant here is that the technical domain of preference organization superseded patients’ 
actual preferences in the exchanges. Rather than focusing on what can be done with the 
patients’ preference or seeking for a way that it might prove influential the CNS would 
instead undermine challenging treatment preferences or do impartiality in the face of 
preferences that would occasion dispreferred responses. Of course, CNSs face real 
institutional constraints, and some preferences are indeed straightforwardly unfeasible such 
as guaranteeing the absence of a particular treatment or side effect (extract 5.7). That said, 
with few exceptions (extract 5.4 for positive receipt) and (extract 5.9 for challenging receipt) 
the technical domain of preference organization was operative and preferences or preference-
implicative work that would not easily imply a dispreferred answer were received 
unproblematically compared to inverse examples. Perhaps the institutional constraints around 
what can be done with patients’ preferences are also important for the technical organization 
of preferred or dispreferred responses and the in situ receipt and handling of the patient’s 
preference.  
 
Both the unproblematic and challenging receipts of patients’ preferences revolve around 
similar poles. In each case, the technical domain of preference organization remains 
operative, and an unproblematic receipt is prompted in a similar way to a challenging receipt. 
Now, the difference in prompt sits between the local conversational organization and the 
propositional content of the patient’s preference. If a preference is for something that a CNS 
can provisionally affirm, such as an institutionally preferred treatment option, then receipt 
and handling will typically be unproblematic. Similarly, if a preference has clear stepwise 
sequential implications, for example sanctioning further information exchange, then it will be 
received unproblematically and treated as amenable to the business of the appointment. The 
inverse of this pattern holds true for the receipt of patients’ preferences as challenging, which 
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is significant for suggesting a generic or reproducible mechanism. The intersection of 
preference organization as a technical domain of local conversational organization and 
patients’ preferences having propositional content oriented to accomplishing actions therefore 
appears relevant to how patients’ preferences are received and handled. The scope for 
negotiation with preferences received as challenging is obviously limited and the parameters 
for avoiding this receipt are similarly narrow but this is also the case for unproblematic 
receipts. In turn, it would be useful to understand that patients’ preferences constructed in situ 
can be received in a comparable way to any formulation that might occasion either a 
preferred or dispreferred response. 
 
It became clear from the analysis in chapter four that preference construction alone might not 
be sufficient to influence the decision-making process towards the patient’s preferred 
treatment option. From this chapter’s analysis, questions began to arise about how influential 
patients’ preferences could be for their overall treatment decision. The literature reviewed in 
the introduction pointed to a suggestion that preferences might not exert influence in 
decision-making business for a range of reasons. One was that practitioners might prioritise 
medical grounds even if they eschew preferences (Sommers et al., 2008; Scherr et al., 2017). 
Another was that preference elicitation and checking looked very different to our theoretical 
definitions when conversation analysis was used to analyse the actual talk-in-interaction 
(Landmark et al., 2016, 2017). In some instances, preferences could only be influential in a 
very specific way, since they were bound to the elicitation tool used (Couët et al., 2015). 
While initially only prompts for this investigation, my analysis revealed findings that were 
supportive of these claims. Not exclusively, nor perfectly, but the evidence suggested that in 
reality patients’ preferences were substantially constrained in their opportunities for 
influence.  
 
In the extracts where patients’ preferences were received as challenging, the work of the CNS 
often involved footing (Goffman, 1981), institutionally preferred treatment, and identity work 
akin to doing impartiality. Patients’ preferences can be seen to throw CNSs into difficult 
positions with little room to manoeuvre. We can see in extract 5.9, for instance, how the 
patient’s declination of further talk about side effects was in fact followed by the side effect 
talk previously offered. When a patient constructs their preference in a way that cuts short the 
institutional role of the CNS, they may not be able to action that preference. For one, such a 
preference clashes with the requirement to inform patients about the risks of treatment, 
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although this is speculation rather than an empirical observation. When a patient formulates a 
clear preference to avoid needles as part of the hormone therapy treatment, the CNS is again 
in a tough position. To my knowledge, it is not possible to disregard the Dectapeptyl injection 
for hormone therapy treatment, and the patient’s preference is therefore simply not feasible.  
 
As such, we can observe that the CNS worked to gloss the exchange as “JUST TALKing 
about the options” (extract 5.8, line 11) rather than an exchange grounded in a firm 
preference. Here, then, the CNS moved to minimise the patient’s preference once it became 
clear that the tension between the strength of the patient’s position and the unfeasibility of its 
execution was halting progressivity. Even when the patient expressed a preference for the 
surgery, which was the clinical recommendation, in extract 5.5 the CNS was not able to 
guarantee the preference. Rather, the CNS revealed that the treatment decision might be made 
for the patient by the multidisciplinary team. Such a decision would reorient the patient’s 
decision-making process around a more limited set of options that excludes their preference. 
In this exchange the footing (Goffman, 1981) was notable because the CNS refers to the 
multidisciplinary team as “we”. As such, the CNS was positioned as part of the institutional 
machinery of decision-making but not decisive nor personally responsible for the patient’s 
treatment decision.  
 
All these cases are interesting, then, because they illustrate constraints on both parties that are 
relevant for patients’ preferences. Patients are most obviously constrained by the CNSs’ 
handling of their preferences, as CNSs have the institutional authority. Clinical nurse 
specialists put the preference on the record, or do not, and move the decision-making journey 
closer to ratifying a treatment decision. Clinical nurse specialists, however, are also 
constrained by the institutional role that they perform and the tensions that this makes 
relevant for appointments. For one, the uncertainty of a side effect constrains the CNSs’ 
extent that they can offer patients definitive answers to their questions, such as in the case of 
the urinary incontinence in extract 5.7. Another constraint on CNSs is that they are not the 
decisive figure in the decision-making process. Indeed, the patient and CNS collaborate on 
establishing a preferred treatment option but the institutional machinery of decision-making 
ultimately rules on this option. For instance, the multidisciplinary team, the options available 
at local NHS foundation trusts, and variables around the patient’s general health and fitness. 
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We see this constraint in extract 5.5, and the CNS acknowledges their role as one of many 
cogs in this decision-making apparatus. 
 
One possible important consideration for this project of doing impartiality is the fact that 
treatment decision-making often involves uncertainty in the forms of, for instance, treatment 
outcomes and side effects. If I was to characterise this uncertainty, I might term it raw 
uncertainty as it is very real and somewhat unpredictable rather than an imagined notion of a 
precise risk that CNSs might prefer to provide. Indeed, we can observe throughout these 
extracts that CNSs refrain from giving precise risk statistics or fixed pronouncements. As 
such, we might suppose that there was not a preferred format of risk to communicate to the 
patient. For example, the ability to tell patients that there is a 75% chance of incontinence but 
100% chance of fatigue that remains constant might facilitate clearer risk communication but 
is not seen in the exchanges. 
  
Rather than this precise risk communication, we instead observe that patients are told of a 
risk and that the CNS simply does not know or cannot guarantee whether a patient will 
encounter that side effect. Patients, then, must make decisions and choose between options 
that entail uncertain but very real risks of distinct side effects without a firm idea of whether 
they will experience these effects and with what severity. Unsurprisingly, this raw 
uncertainty around risk communication is observed when we consider preferences that are 
received as challenging. There is a tension between those patients’ preferences that seek to 
ascertain a more precise likelihood and or avoid a risk and the response of the CNSs that 
abstain from fulfilling the actions these preferences request or presuppose. Of course, the 
reason for CNS abstention might simply be the absence of firm or precise statistics, or it 
could be a wish to avoid prospective liability for potentially uncertain information. 
 
For the sake of my analysis, however, what remains interesting is the project of doing 
impartiality and how it effectively problematised patients’ preferences. A preference, then, is 
subject to further factors and considerations than simply “what patients want from their 
healthcare” (Street et al., 2012, p. 168) and these factors can impede both the handling and 
construction of a preference. For one, what a patient wants may be uncertain or unfeasible 
and as such the preference either does not get to be influential or becomes modified. 
Immediately, then, a preference no longer stands in as the initial function of what a patient 
wants but becomes something different that could be interpreted in two distinct ways. The 
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first is that the preference shifts from an initial preference that might have sounded nice to a 
patient but proved unfeasible to an informed preference where the patient makes an educated 
choice and wants what is best from what is available. Second, however, is that the patient in 
fact abandons their preference and follows the clinician towards the least dispreferred 
available option based on credible information.  
 
Now, there is nothing wrong with the second trajectory, but it is worth considering if it more 
accurately accounts for the process of coming to an informed preference or for negotiating a 
least dispreferred option. Again, negotiating a least dispreferred option is not necessarily a 
problem and can indeed be considered a form of preference, as one simply moves in a 
different direction. That direction being from preferred to least dispreferred rather than the 
inverse. That said, it might not be entirely accurate to characterise the process as moving 
from an initial to an informed preference. It is true that a patient moves from an initial 
preference, and that they are likely to have been further informed, but this does not entail that 
the subsequent choice is a preference in the same sense as the initial preference. Moreover, 
the constraints on patients’ preferences that we see with those received as challenging are 
consequential for preferences in a way that might not otherwise be clearly articulated in any 
definition of preference. We can speculate, then, that what occurs in these cases where a 
patients’ preference is received as challenging is an underemphasised aspect of preference 
construction in addition to a clear example of handling patients’ preferences. 
 
There might be a suggestion, then, that preference is a somewhat ill-fitted name for what 
occurs in real terms. While most extracts featured examples of preferences that were 
consistent with the characterisation of “what patients want from their healthcare” (Street et 
al., 2012, p. 168), that is perhaps an oversimplification. Certainly, the notion that patients’ 
preferences shape their treatment decision was not straightforwardly supported by the 
recordings in the dataset. By contrast, the literature that revealed patients’ preferences were 
sometimes being handled in ways that betrayed their ostensible consistency with SDM was 
supported (e.g., Landmark et al., 2016, 2017). There is no question of conduct here, that is 
not the aim of this work, but it does pose a question about how well the theoretical notion of 
preferences and expectations about their role in decision-making appointments fit. There are 
various possibilities that might be usefully considered in response to the poor fit between 
preferences as a theoretically important aspect of SDM and the interactive work of 




In turn, I will briefly consider two suggestions for helping to address this issue. The first, is a 
problem with how interactive work that might be considered disruptive of the decision-
making and preference rendering processes is conceived of in SDM models. That is, the work 
of receiving a preference and possibly negotiating its subsequent handling and scope for 
influence may be conceptualised as an unhelpful interruption or even unrelated to the 
elicitation and checking work. I argue that the interactive work of constructing, formulating, 
and accounting for preferences, no matter how unlikely or peculiar the form, is an integral 
part of the process of constructing a preference and by extension cannot be divorced from the 
ultimate preference. While I do not believe that promising models of SDM such as the three 
talk (Elwyn et al., 2017) or Implement-SDM (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019) models perform 
especially poorly in this regard, I do think work is required to improve our understanding of 
patients’ preferences. In turn, my second suggestion is to offer a candidate definition of 
preferences, in particular preferences as constructed (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010). I would 
suggest that we define preferences as constructions in the following terms or similar: 
Patients’ preferences are constructed phenomena that they render in their healthcare 
encounters responsive to their healthcare values, available treatment options, and information 
from their healthcare practitioner. Moreover, these constructions are comprised of such wide-
ranging discursive devices as appeals to prior medical experiences, characterisations of 
previous medical appointments, and invocations of emotional and cognitive states as 
explanatory components. 
 
In turn, the next analytic chapter will explore a less obvious site of preference work by 
investigating the presence and function of laughter in treatment appointments. A focus on the 
presence and function of laughter in treatment appointments also points to greater 
heterogeneity in preference conversations. As such, we would want to see more instances of 
the phenomena and patterns reported in this chapter, in a larger dataset, to corroborate and 
possibly confirm these findings.   
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Chapter 6: The production of laughter in treatment appointments and 




This chapter is the final analytic contribution to the thesis and focuses on perhaps an 
unexpected example of preference construction work. Throughout this chapter I will focus on 
the production of laughter in post-diagnostic prostate cancer treatment decision making 
appointments. A focus on the production and function of laughter in treatment appointments 
was not one I anticipated. Indeed, of all the analytic chapters this is the one that developed 
most in line with the concept of “unmotivated looking” (Psathas, 1995, p. 45). By 
unmotivated looking I mean that the idea of exploring laughter came from my increasing 
familiarity with the data. A process of analytical noticing occurred as I continued to observe 
instances of patient, clinician, and shared laughter in the recordings. These instances were 
collated, and I examined the collection for any possible patterns or analytically interesting 
conversational work. Both the prominence of shared laughter and prevalence of laughter from 
the CNSs caught my attention and I therefore decided to explore these cases. Upon further 
examination it became clear that there was a case for laughter’s place in an understanding of 
preference construction.   
 
While the preference construction functions that laughter performs might be more subtle than 
the construction projects reported in chapter 4, it is still insightful and wholly relevant to the 
focus of my research. As such, my analysis will focus on the actions that laughter can be seen 
to accomplish in these appointments. The broader analytic claim of this chapter is that 
laughter functions to sanction sequential progress. As a result, the analyses will track this 
phenomenon across a spectrum of the production and organization of laughter that spans 
degrees of complexity. To begin, analysis will consider cases where laughter 
straightforwardly sanctioned sequential progress and required little or no interactional work. 
The second analytic section investigates more complicated instances that would often involve 
extended sequences and distinct conversational acts. In the final analytic section, I examine 
the flexibility of seriousness as an interactive resource relevant for laughter and related 
sequential progress. Concurrent with this analytic claim is the claim that laughter stands in 
 
 213 
for and/or represents the subtlest form of patient’s preference construction in these 
appointments.  
 
6.1 Introduction to the study of laughter as social action in healthcare 
 
For laughter to serve a function in these appointments there needs to be a socially organized 
and interactional conception of laughter as a communicative resource. As Harvey Sacks and 
his students took conversation analysis from the lectures to the academic publishing world 
this interactional conception of laughter began to develop further. Although Sacks was 
already characterising the local organization of jokes in his lectures in the 1960s, as quite 
simply “You tell a joke, there’s a laugh” (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 15), owing to their status as 
ceremonials, the first conversation analysis publication on laughter came later. This 
publication, Schenkein’s (1972) study of laughter particles, observed that laughter which 
hearably referred to prior talk was often laughter at the talk immediately preceding its 
production. Sacks would subsequently develop Schenkein’s finding further, reporting that 
“(l)aughs are very locally responsive - if done on the completion of some utterance they 
affiliate to last utterance and if done within some utterance they affiliate to its current state of 
development” (Sacks, 1974, p. 348). There was, then, substantial development in a short time 
as work went from laughter as ceremonials to a responsive and locally organized 
phenomenon that was analytically tractable. Once empirical analysis began in earnest, a 
development from this ceremonial conception of laughter to one of laughter as a responsive 
and locally organized phenomenon became clearer (Schenkein, 1972; Sacks, 1974).   
 
We, therefore, have some basic foundation for the socially organized nature of laughter and 
its local organizational contexts of production. The next step is to relate this to the ways that 
interlocutors manage and engage with the local organization of laughter. Building on this 
insight, Gail Jefferson began to develop a characterisation of the interactional organization of 
invitations to laugh. One of the techniques for inviting laughter is for the current speaker to 
produce a “post-utterance completion laughter particle”, where they follow their utterance 
with laughter either immediately or after a pause (Jefferson, 1979, p. 80). These particles can 
be met with reciprocal laughter to show acceptance of the invitation, or the absence of 
laughter such as silence. When an utterance is understood as a laughable, there is an 
“invitation/acceptance sequence” (Jefferson, 1979, p. 80). This sequence is crucial because an 
alternative trajectory of recipient laughter is a recipient volunteering laughter. Volunteered 
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laughter typically comes at what has been termed a recognition point; a precise or expectable 
position in the interaction for a response such as laughter (Jefferson, 1974). With speaker-
produced laughter, the producer orients to the projected appropriateness of laughter as the 
relevant next act. Speakers may also invite laughter through interpolated laughter within an 
unfolding utterance, which a recipient might treat as a recognition point (Jefferson, 1974) and 
thereafter take the invitation to laugh.  
 
Of course, invitations to laugh are not obligations to laugh and can be declined. Silence, 
however, is not sufficient for declination, and the initial speaker may pursue laughter as a 
response to their laughter or laughable (Jefferson, 1979). Indeed, recipients must produce a 
verbal alternative to laughter, such as extending the topical talk, to decline an invitation to 
laugh. As such, recipients can shut off the relevance of laughter as the next act, whether in 
overlap, a possible completion point, or immediately post-completion (Jefferson, 1979). A 
recipient must, however, decline the invitation to laugh if they wish to shut down laughter’s 
relevance and subsequently terminate the pursuit (Jefferson, 1979, p. 93). An example of 
successfully declining laughter is seen in response to laughter produced by speakers who also 
perform troubles-telling (Jefferson, 1984). Jefferson found that a speaker who told a trouble 
would also laugh, but the recipient would instead offer a serious response to the trouble. 
Troubles-tellers who produce laughter are said to exhibit troubles-resistance and to be 
handling their situation well, while the recipient demonstrates troubles-receptiveness by 
treating the trouble as serious (Jefferson, 1984, p. 351). While the troubles-teller might laugh, 
they are not necessarily inviting the recipient to laugh.  
 
Troubles-tellings are a particular sequential context, and in that regard are relevant for the 
present research, which is both a particular context and one where we might expect to find 
troubles-tellings. Particularly relevant for this research is what Jefferson found on the 
occasions that troubles-teller and recipient both laughed. Instances where both parties 
laughed were associated with a buffer topic, broadly a “time-out for pleasantries” from the 
sequential project at hand (Jefferson, 1984, p. 351.). Buffer topics are interesting because 
they can remain topical or be unrelated, although they typically take the form of an anecdote 
or a joke. Beyond this, buffer topics hold consistent with the other features of laughter in 
troubles-tellings in that they are not normative but rather interactionally accomplished. That 
is, their invitation is typically the troubles-teller’s business, and the troubles recipient may not 
immediately laugh; rather requiring more interactional work to reach that acceptance point. In 
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sum, buffer topics are a way for speakers to detach from the sequential context of a troubles-
telling so that they can engage in laughter even if the topical talk of the troubles-telling 
continues (Jefferson, 1984).    
 
Alongside Gail Jefferson, one of the researchers who has contributed the most to the 
development of the study of laughter as an interactional resource is Elizabeth Holt. Especially 
relevant to this chapter is the finding that shared laughter is relevant for topic termination as 
non-lexical pre-closings that suggest exhaustion of the topic at hand (Holt, 2010). Perhaps 
most crucial to this chapter, however, is Holt’s work on seriousness/non-seriousness and how 
interlocutors can produce or abstain from producing laughter to treat turns as serious, non-
serious, or a combination of both (Holt, 2013). As such, interlocutors can weave together 
laughter and topical talk plus seriousness and non-seriousness to ease sequential work or 
facilitate sequential progress by softening otherwise hearable delicate actions (Holt, 2013). It 
is worth noting that Holt’s work, like Jefferson’s, primarily concerned everyday non-
institutional talk, sometimes also dealing with telephone data. As such, the earlier research on 
laughter tended towards more generic and reproducible findings in non-specific contexts. In 
the following sections of this chapter, I will overview the inroads that language and social 
interaction research has made into laughter in healthcare interactions.  
 
Having characterised some of the fundamental work that shapes our understanding of the 
socially organized nature of laughter, it is worth providing some context-specific detail. 
Despite the early ties between institutional encounters and both ethnomethodology and 
conversation analysis, as discussed in the second chapter (Turner, 1972; Coulter, 1973; 
Wootton, 1977; Sacks, 1992) it took some time for the study of laughter in institutional 
interactions to come to the fore. The study of laughter in healthcare encounters has largely 
stemmed from the seminal Routine Complications (West, 1984), and a distribution pattern of 
laughter that became clearer with subsequent research (Haakana, 2001, 2002; Beach and 
Prickett, 2017). Laughter was not necessarily as uncommon as we might expect, but the 
manifestations were distinct. For one, unilateral laughter was overwhelmingly more common 
than shared or reciprocal laughter. Practitioners were observed to laugh less than patients, and 
to take up invitations to laugh from patients less frequently than patients would take up 
practitioners’ invitations (1984, p. 125-127). Beyond these numerical findings, much of 
West’s work in Routine Complications focuses on “salutations, and the mutual exchange of 
names” (1984, p. 120) and this stands in as the truly conversation analytic thrust of West’s 
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chapter. The numerical findings remain influential, however, as they reveal a distribution 
pattern that has been found again and again.  
 
For one, a study of various institutional interview contexts in Sweden, from job interviews to 
post-trial interviews, found that unilateral laughter was far more common than reciprocal 
laughter (Adelswärd, 1989). Similarly, a study of Finnish healthcare encounters almost 
twenty years after West’s work observed this same distribution pattern (Haakana, 2002). 
Haakana goes on, however, to argue that the numerical analysis alone is insufficient, and that 
conversation analysts need to engage in the fine-grained microanalysis that typifies their 
discipline. Furthermore, Haakana remarks that the institutional incumbency might be 
characterised by a professional or neutral quality. Therefore, laughter may be heard as 
potentially unprofessional, whereas smiling might be deemed an appropriate affective 
alternative (Haakana, 2002, p. 228). Smiling in these instances typically referred to the 
production of utterances in a smiley voice. Indeed, much like Jefferson’s troubles-telling 
findings (1984), patients’ laughter was not routinely considered to invite laughter but to index 
“delicate interactional slots” (Haakana, 2002, p. 226). Patients were seen to routinely laugh 
when they performed a potentially delicate action such as challenging a practitioner’s 
understanding (Haakana, 2001). In turn, Haakana (2001) suggested that smiling might serve 
as an appropriately affective response to laughter that doesn’t invite reciprocation, such as 
around potential delicate actions or moments. 
 
What became immediately apparent from the current dataset was that the distribution pattern 
of laughter evidenced above was not observed. Indeed, here were CNSs who laughed more 
frequently than their patients. By the time that I felt confident laughter would make an 
analytic topic I had observed in a collection that CNSs laughed on sixty-eight occasions 
compared to patients’ fifty-four. Perhaps understandably, patients did initiate laughter and 
formulate laughable utterances more than clinicians, although not by as clear a margin as in 
West’s (1984) or Haakana’s (2002) studies. That said, the distribution of laughter is clearly 
distinct to the pattern identified in the literature to date but for one notable exception. A study 
of gynaecological appointments, although not focused on the numerical data, observed 
recurrent reciprocal laughter in service of verbal play between patient and practitioner 
(Ragan, 1990). One explanation for this similarity might be the nature of the content of these 
encounters. For Ragan’s (1990) study the patients were engaged in an intimate physical 
examination and for this study the appointments spend a significant amount of time 
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discussing urinary and sexual function in addition to the invasiveness of the pre-diagnostic 
prostate cancer screening tests. As such, the role of laughter in appointments that require 
discussions of sexual implications and intimate examination may perhaps be mobilised to a 
sociable goal.  
 
Of course, the finding that patients produce laughter as a marker of a delicate action, or in 
service of problem resolution (Haakana, 2001) is relevant for this current project. As are 
other observations that help illustrate the form and function of laughter in healthcare 
encounters. For example, the potential delicateness of gynaecological exams was seen to be 
headed off by the parties engaging in a side sequence (Jefferson, 1972) wherein they 
produced verbal play (Ragan, 1990). By producing verbal play together, patient and 
practitioner were able to not just achieve task-oriented goals but also social goals that helped 
minimise threats to face (Goffman, 1967; Brown & Levinson, 1978) and bring the parties 
together in delicate moments (Ragan, 1990). Unlike much of the other research (West, 1984; 
Adelswärd, 1989; Haakana, 2002) the parties engaged in reciprocal laughter throughout these 
encounters to produce the verbal play (Ragan, 1990). Focusing more closely on my specific 
area of study, we find that a recent study of oncology consultations once again found the 
familiar laughter distribution pattern (Beach & Prickett, 2017). Most relevant, however, was 
that they reported patients produced laughter around the troubles or challenges that were 
raised throughout the interaction. Again, practitioners were not typically invited to laugh, did 
not often reciprocate laughter, and functionally laughter was used to manage delicate 
moments in the consultation (Beach & Prickett, 2017). 
 
Having reviewed some of the now well-established research on laughter in healthcare 
encounters, albeit briefly, the chapter shall proceed with the analysis. Analyses are divided 
into three sections that correspond to various degrees of interactional work and sequential 
complexity. The first section reports on instances where laughter effectively performs the 
function of a receipt token, and straightforwardly sanctions progress through an affective 
display of understanding. Increasing in complexity, the analysis then explores extended 
sequences and the production of buffer topics for allowing an interactional intermission from 
potentially delicate moments. The analysis concludes with an investigation of the production 
of laughter and the interplay between designing and treating turns as serious, to soften 
otherwise delicate business and moments. As such, I draw on the work of Gail Jefferson and 
her work on inviting laughter (1979) and laughter in troubles-tellings (1984). Prominent also 
 
 218 
in these analyses is the work of Elizabeth Holt, particularly her research on laughter and 
seriousness (2013) and laughter and topic termination (2010). These findings are especially 
useful for explicating the function of laughter in the extracts reported on below. 
 
6.2 Laughter and straightforwardly sanctioning sequential progressivity  
 
This analysis will focus on instances where laughter is produced in positions that we might 
otherwise expect to see straightforward acknowledgement. These instances were notable 
because laughter would sanction sequential progress via standing in for acknowledgement 
tokens or softening potential delicate actions. While perhaps lower stakes, laughter could 
stand in for preference construction and patient involvement. The link to SDM here is in 
sanctioning progress, and the relation to preference construction is in the patient’s tacit 
approval. Functionally, from a healthcare ethics perspective, we want patients to tick a box 
saying I have no objection to the business at hand. This can be considered positive 
preference, but practically it is in tension with the actual mess of working out preference 
through the interaction.  
 
There is a tension between an explicit list of patients’ preferences that must be brought to 
bear on the interaction and the more tacit work of construction and formulation we see 
operating from various levels of straightforwardness that span laughter to outright protest. 
Taking this tension forward, it follows that the most tacit, and therefore least disruptive way 
to sanction sequential progress, at least where a receipt token is in some way treated as 
insufficient, may be laughter. In terms of decision-making, the production of laughter both 
allows progress of institutional business and therefore progress towards a decision and 
demonstrates that the patient does not take the current business as a threat to “what patients 
want from their healthcare” (Street et al., 2012, p. 168) and therefore their preference.   
 
Extract 6.1 (Recording 1)  
 
PAT:     it’s not nothing’s like that (0.2) because the test- 1 
         -osterene you’re just stopping the testosterone  2 
CNS:     yes 3 
         (1.0) 4 
PAT:     yeah (0.9) so I might I might not have to shave so often then 5 
CNS:     ahahahaha well I can’t guarantee you that 6 
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PAT:     a hua ha ha aha ha  7 
COM:     what drug is it that stops the testosterone8 
 
At this point, the patient has reached the end of a story formulation that built up their 
entitlement to knowledge on female hormones through prior employment history. 
Throughout this story formulation the patient proffered candidate side effects and asks about 
these in a tag question at the end of his extended telling. A short affirmation from the CNS 
might be expected considering the design of the tag question as one that projects an 
affirmative answer (Raymond, 2003). Once the CNS provides the projected answer, the 
sequence reaches a point of recognisable completion and a transition relevance point, which 
is evident from the notable pause before the next turn. The patient acknowledges the CNS’s 
answer and after another notable pause formulates a follow-up question. As previously 
mentioned, one of the concerns with decision-making is that progress might stall, or a 
delicate moment might cause a problem.  
 
The exchange above is an example of a potential delicate moment, as the patient asks about a 
side effect; one that was the subject of an experiential story formulation. The question having 
been answered, the patient then softens the sequence with the production of laughter and a 
turn that they mark as non-serious via that laughter (Holt, 2013). As the CNS responds with 
laughter particles (line 6) they appear to treat the patient’s turn as non-serious (Holt, 2013). 
Interestingly, the patient reciprocates the laughter despite the CNS’s laughter not falling in a 
post-utterance completion point (Jefferson, 1979). In turn, the patient appears to treat the 
CNS’s response as either at least partially non-serious (Holt, 2013) or a recognition point for 
laughter (Jefferson, 1974). Whichever response the patient performed, the laughter in this 
extract not only sanctioned sequential progress but also performed preference construction 
work by means of indicating that concerns have been satisfied. The patient was able to ask a 
potentially delicate question, receive an expected and therefore preferred response 
(Raymond, 2003), and could indicate, subsequently, that there was no problem to “what 
patients want from their healthcare” (Street et al., 2012, p. 168) at that point.  
 
Extract 6.2 (recording 7) 
  
CNS:     Sometimes patients can feel quite lethargic and quite fati- 1 
         -gued with it (0.6) .hhh erm hot flushes night sweats sudden  2 
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         flashes and an an an (0.2)[ sweats coming on]  3 
PAT:                               [I get all that no]w] 4 
COM:                                               [get] that  5 
CNS:     hmm bless ya  6 
PAT:     °a ha ha° 7 
CNS:     bless you .hhh erm and <moo::d> can be effe<cted> ok so 8 
         sometimes your mood can fluctuate a bit so you can (.) be a  9 
         little bit ..h emotional10 
11 
12 
This extract sticks with the notion of lower stakes but also begins to demonstrate variability 
in how laughter can sanction sequential progress. For example, the patient alone produces 
laughter in a hushed voice, which does not get treated as an invitation to laugh by the CNS. 
In the sequence, the patient produces an utterance that threatens progressivity because of its 
status as a potential complainable. As the CNS outlines side effects for hormone therapy the 
patient begins speaking in overlap. Although the CNS has not finished, the patient might 
orient to the three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) as projecting possible completion and therefore a 
transition relevance place. The patient orients to the list of effects to voice what is hearable as 
a complainable by reporting that they already experience the side effects. The companion’s 
turn is cut off, but in using two of the words from the patient’s turn, might be understood as a 
corroborative effort (Wooffitt, 1992). Although the CNS responds minimally with their turn, 
they use it to produce a sympathetic demonstration alongside their receipt token. Notably, the 
patient does not expand on the potential complainable nor engage directly with the 
sympathetic demonstration.  
 
Instead, the patient produces a short string of laughter particles in hushed voice, which may 
be to manage the subjective side of their potential complainable. By subjective side, I refer to 
what Edwards termed “the way that a complaint may index the speaker/complainer” 
(Edwards, 2005, p. 5). That is, a speaker might interpolate, or subsequently produce, laughter 
to indicate that they are not belabouring their complaint (Edwards, 2005). In turn, although 
the format of the initial utterance may be heard as projecting a complainable, the affective 
stance is marked as distinct from a whinger with an intractable complaint. Laughter, then, 
manages the potential delicacy of a poignant moment (Beach & Prickett, 2017), as the patient 
reports experiencing side effects prior to treatment. As such, the patient can get an ostensible 
complainable related to treatment preferences the on record without the turn being 
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understood as a complaint, thanks to the indication that they are not whinging (Edwards, 
2005). This delicate management affords an opportunity for the CNS to orient to the report as 
less than entirely serious (Holt, 2013) and possibly topic terminal (Holt, 2010). In turn, it is 
the production of laughter that lays the ground for sequential progress and enables the CNS to 
continue with institutional business. The sequence is not disrupted beyond this short 
insertion, or side, sequence (Jefferson, 1972), as the CNS continues to outline the side effects 
afterwards in text not shown.  
 
Extract 6.3 (recording 16)  
 
CNS:     =it VARies it VAries erm: (0.2) some (.) patients (.) y’know 1 
         feel (0.2) completely exhausted hh and some feel a little bit 2 
         more tired than usual but it does vary it doesn’t mean that  3 
         you’re going to get things straight away (.) it may (0.1) be  4 
         subsequent injections (0.1) so (.) on (.) going inject[io]ns  5 
PAT:                                                           [mm] 6 
CNS:     >are< where you might start to feel the side effects which 7 
         I’ll talk about in a moment= 8 
PAT:     =yeah can you still drink your glass of wine and that with  9 
         this stuff [(up ya)] 10 
CNS:                [yes you] can still drink when you’ve had medi- 11 
         -cation  12 
PAT:     ah huh huh 13 
CNS:     ok .hh so fatigued (0.2) ERM feeling (0.2) hot flushes hot  14 
         sweats sudden hot flashes that can occur >be< one of the side 15 
         effects .hhh (.) 16 
 
In the exchange above we have perhaps an even simpler example of laughter functioning to 
sanction sequential progress. The patient responds to the CNS’s turn in latched speech to ask 
about drinking alcohol while taking medication. The patient words their propositional content 
euphemistically and uses a yes/no interrogative format to project a positive answer 
(Raymond, 2003). Although the CNS translated the euphemistic content into the 
straightforward “can still drink”, the yes/no interrogative format receives its preferred 
response in line 11. Therefore, the sequence is complete in organizational terms as the 
interrogative was answered appropriately in the preferred format. In turn, the patient 
volunteers three laughter particles in line 13, with no clear invitation to laughter or marked 
laughable in the preceding sequential context. Here, then, the laughter particles effectively 
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stand in for an acknowledgement token, such as the similarly non-verbal “mm”, as a 
standalone display of recipiency. With this display of recipiency, the patient chose laughter of 
all viable alternatives and laughter might therefore have a particular function in this position.  
 
Shared laughter has been linked to topic termination (Holt, 2010), perhaps due to indexing a 
juncture (Button, 1991) in the topic that indicates the exhaustion of the sequence at hand and 
subsequent closing relevance. The patient, having had their question answered, may have 
subsequently invited laughter through their post-utterance completion laughter particles 
(Jefferson, 1979) as a potential closing-implicative act (Holt, 2010). As shared laughter needs 
to be interactively accomplished rather than normatively presumed, the CNS continues with 
the topicality they introduced between lines 7-8. In turn, while the CNS does not orient to the 
patient’s laughter as a prompt for shared laughter and topic termination (Holt, 2010), they do 
orient to it as an indication of acknowledgement, no problem, and a sanction for sequential 
progress. Indeed, while shared laughter might have exhausted topicality and therefore moved 
away from conversational business (Holt, 2010), the patient-side laughter simply allowed 
topical progress to continue unimpeded. We see, then, that while one possible function of 
laughter was not brought to bear on the interaction, laughter was able to perform preference 
construction work and demonstrate that the appointment could continue relatively seamlessly.  
 
We can see then that those delicate moments in the interaction might be managed through 
laughter production. Whether it be through a buffer topic that allows for interactants to 
produce levity in the interactional space, or through inviting laughter around a delicate topic 
or turn. Whichever form these productions took, they ultimately sanctioned sequential 
progress. Whether they softened an action that might otherwise be disruptive or received 
something possibly disruptive or delicate with laughter. Moreover, laughter might treat some 
utterances as sufficiently serious for the propositional content and its topical implications but 
also non-serious enough to facilitate progress despite the delicate topicality or action. At its 
simplest however, laughter can just indicate that although a receipt token might be treated as 
insufficient or inappropriate, the sequential business at hand can proceed.  
 
Extract 6.4 (recording 15)  
 
CNS:     =and it may well (0.2) be affected as well (0.3) with you 1 
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         having the production of testosterone stopped (.) so with  2 
         this drugs- (.) stopping the production of testosterone  3 
         >testosterone< gives you your sex drive .hh libido will be 4 
         reduced (.) when you have this drug= 5 
PAT:     =couldn’t be more reduced could it  6 
CNS:     eh he he he he he .h(hh)hh (0.4) so: erm yeah (.) so going on 7 
         to the side effects of the injection then so because we stop  8 
         that production of testosterone .hh you can experience some 9 
         side effects ok= 10 
 
In this extract, the CNS is outlining the effects of hormone therapy treatment where they 
concern sexual function. Considering the accepted cultural knowledge that sexual 
dysfunction and reproductive organs are largely private matters, it stands to follow that this 
discussion might be understood as delicate. In turn, the CNS builds a softened and 
probabilistic account of the effect characterised by repetition and stops and starts that indicate 
disfluency. Reduced libido and sex drive can be heard as potentially undesirable occurrences 
by their belonging to the category of treatment effects. Crucially, however, the patient has 
previously reported low libido and poor sexual function. In latched speech the patient 
produces a rhetorical question that suggests they orient to low libido already and that this 
might not be an especially significant effect. The rhetorical question is formatted to project 
agreement as the preferred response, grammatically speaking, through its yes/no interrogative 
format (Raymond, 2003).  
 
In line 6, the “could it” hints at two possibilities; one being the shared knowledge of low 
libido as previously reported and the other a potential indicator of a laughable moment. In 
response, we see the CNS treat the rhetorical question as a recognition point to volunteer 
laughter (Jefferson, 1974) thereby treating the patient’s turn as indicating a laughable 
moment. By laughing as the singular response to the patient’s turn the CNS might be helping 
the interaction transition to topic termination. Holt (2010) observed that laughter can be 
understood as a pre-closing contribution as a non-lexical response. Couple the CNS’s non-
lexical response with the patient’s figurative expression, looking back as it does to a prior 
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admission, and this pair of turns appears to indicate topic termination (Holt, 2010). An 
understanding of this action would appear to be borne out by the CNS marking the upcoming 
talk as progressing from the issue of libido to the broader topic of side effects.  
 
Extract 6.5 (recording 17)  
 
CNS:     facial hair can sometimes become less coz obviously men have 1 
         (0.2) test(h)osterone .h uh huh huh £she says as he strokes  2 
         his beard£ uh huh hu:  3 
PAT:     huh heh  4 
CNS:     ER it can sometimes become a little bit less you don’t have 5 
         to shave as frequently 6 
 
One of the functions of laughter for managing delicate moments we have discussed was 
getting an action on record in a sufficiently soft manner as not to disrupt progress. Naturally, 
we would have a keen interest in patients’ use of this resource, but laughter is a generic non-
lexical resource for all interlocutors. In turn, this extract provides an example of the CNS 
mobilising this resource to perform the same function that patients have, such as in extract 
6.1 with the post-completion laughter particle. Informing patients about side effects is a 
fundamentally delicate action because they are typically undesirable and particularly delicate 
in preference-sensitive decision-making contexts as they could be claimed as the reason for 
one choice over another. In interaction terms, side effects are possible prompts for rejection, 
for protracted sequences, or for ostensible rash decisions.  
 
The CNS produces an interpolated laughter particle (line 5), which is immediately followed 
by a longer string of laughter particles and an account for the laughter given in smiley voice. 
Here the CNS designs their turn to couch the action between two strings of laughter particles 
further to the smiley voice. As such, laughter is a pivot between a straightforward informing, 
an informing-relevant noticing, and once more a straightforward informing. By remarking on 
the patient’s embodied conduct, the CNS can pre-emptively offer a candidate complainable 
that the patient might produce in response to the initial informing. It does not, however, take 
away the interactional slot or space for the patient to formulate a complainable or for instance 
a disprefered response. Indeed, giving voice to the patient’s embodied conduct ensures that 
not only facial hair, but the patient’s beard specifically is made conditionally relevant 




Furthermore, the smiley voice was followed by laughter, which might suggest that both the 
turn is designed for non-serious affective conduct and sequential progress (Holt, 2013), and 
that the CNS is leaving the interactional space for the patient to orient to the laughter rather 
than projecting the expectation such as with a joke (Sacks, 1992; Haakana, 2010). Beyond a 
preference for shared laughter and affiliation then, the patient has the speaker’s rights to 
formulate their turn however they wish. Despite there being relatively few constraints on the 
patient’s next turn, they respond minimally and choose to reciprocate the laughter projected 
by the CNS (Jefferson, 1979; Haakana, 2010). As such, the CNS has given voice to a 
candidate complainable, responsively to a patient’s embodied conduct, successfully invited 
reciprocal laughter, and accomplished getting the patient to sanction sequential progressivity. 
Here then, the CNS has demonstrated that the function of laughter as softening actions to get 
them on record without halting progressivity is available also to clinicians. In the extract to 
follow, I will examine a case where not only does laughter not straightforwardly sanction 
sequential progress but prompts the CNS to account for their turn .  
 
Extract 6.6 (recording 5)   
  
CNS:     ((lips pursing)) u::h er i i if you- when you see name redac- 1 
         -ted cos he would be the one who’s going to do it .h erm he 2 
         would outline all the risks uh in- every single risk >SO< at 3 
         it’s most basic (.) he chops there he chops there he cuts it 4 
         all out .h but [we]            [do the surgery] 5 
PAT:                    [PH]UH huhuhuhuh[uhuhuhu aha ha] ha ha ha ha 6 
         ha 7 
CNS:     yeah that’s at its most basic but uh we use eh do it 8 
         robotically so it’s key hole surgery uhn- a little and a step 9 
         beyond that so they use very fine instruments= 10 
PAT:     =<yeah>= 11 
CNS:     =a::nd erm it’s done (0.5) uh::: h::h via:: we- they’re all 12 
         planted in the abdomen the the tubes for it to work through 13 
         .h and name redacted sits next to you and does his tour via 14 
         (1.1) his fingers= 15 
 
The following extract is distinct from the others in this section, as the production of laughter 
is treated as unexpected by the CNS. It is a deviant case in a way, as while the production of 
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patient-side laughter not being taken up is not uncommon, the treatment and its impact on the 
sequential trajectory are noteworthy. This extract demonstrates that laughter is not simply 
tethered to delicacy nor progressivity but is a resource that requires interactional work. 
Indeed, as with the patient’s laughter changing the sequential implications of the talk, the 
CNS appears to treat the patient’s turn as ascribing accountability. The treatment of the 
production as unexpected is also interesting, as the numerical data in the dataset suggests 
CNSs are not averse to sharing laughter or treating laugher as an appropriate act. 
 
Although the notion of laughter straightforwardly sanctioning sequential progress seems 
unproblematic, as akin to a more affiliative receipt token, there is no guarantee of its success. 
Here, the CNS is outlining the surgical procedure in broad strokes. Being an outline, the CNS 
marks the upcoming formulation as a gloss or an upshot (Heritage and Watson, 1979), as 
being “at its most basic”. The upshot is delivered through a three-part list (Jefferson, 
1990) that trades on lay notions of chopping and cutting, which is far removed from 
professional alternatives such as incision. Despite projecting that they have more to say, the 
patient produces an emphatic breathy laugh particle and subsequently continues to laugh until 
the CNS abandons her projected turn. In the absence of any cues such as smiley voice, a post-
utterance completion laughter particle (Jefferson, 1979), or a clearly formulated joke (Sacks, 
1992, vol. 1, p. 15) it might appear that the CNS designed the upshot as a serious, if informal, 
utterance. With such an extended sequence of laughter particles the patient appeared to treat 
the upshot as non-serious, and as such changed the sequential implications of the turn (Holt, 
2013). We see this in the CNS’s decision to restate their pre-upshot marker “at its most 
basic” before then re-attempting the turn previously cut off in line 5.  
 
Therefore, without formulating a challenge, complainable, or request the patient’s turn 
prompts the CNS to account for their turn design after the fact. Based on other extracts 
examined, it appears plausible that a straightforward receipt token or similar display of 
understanding would avoid the CNS’s repetition. Indeed, that a simple yeah would indicate 
that there are no current problems with the sequential or institutional business. We can see 
this in line 12, when the CNS’s previously abandoned turn has been met by a straightforward 
yes and sequential progress continues unimpeded. Therefore, in the treatment of an ostensibly 
serious turn as non-serious (Holt, 2013), there was a disjuncture that problematised the 
progressivity project. The laughter, by problematising progressivity, steers the appointment 
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back into re-treading old ground even if only briefly. In this case, laughter was not treated as 
nor did it act as an emotive alternative to an acknowledgement token, but perhaps instead as 
non-serious treatment of a colloquial but ostensibly serious turn (lines 4-5). As such, this is a 
reminder of the interactional accomplishment of laughter as sanction for sequential progress 
rather than taking it for granted. Moreover, it is an example of a deviant case in the function 
of laughter within prostate cancer treatment appointments 
 
I mentioned at the beginning of this section that there is a tension between the healthcare 
ethics perspective of preferences and preferences as constructed by patients. For the former, 
preference is essentially outright stating that one has no objection to the business at hand, 
while the latter involves the mess of putting together and working out a preference over the 
encounter. With the function of straightforwardly sanctioning sequential progressivity, it is 
possible that laughter might be a useful resource here. When patients could produce an 
acknowledgement token or display of understanding, they instead produced laughter as an 
affiliative alternative. By producing laughter, the patient displays that there is no threat to 
“what patients want from their healthcare” (Street et al., 2012, p. 168), which is a working 
characterisation of preference. As such, there is a way for patients to provide or approximate 
the positive preference that healthcare institutions are looking for within the interaction. 
Furthermore, patients can engage in prosocial work in a way that might be beneficial for 
decision-making business as I will discuss in the next analytic section.  
 
As I am concluding this section it is important to make a clarification and a distinction. The 
clarification is an obvious one, but needs stating, and that is that other more typical 
acknowledgement tokens, such as mm or ok, of course sanctioned sequential progress. The 
distinction, however, is that these acknowledgement tokens are produced for the express 
purpose of sanctioning sequential progress by virtue of displaying listenership and being 
minimally intrusive. Laughter, by contrast, is not and poses a higher risk of immediately 
halting sequential progress through inviting reciprocal laughter (Jefferson, 1979). 
Furthermore, if laughter is understood by a speaker as inappropriate, then there is another risk 
to halting sequential progress. Taken together, then, it is even more noteworthy that laughter 
was not only able to sanction sequential progress but did so around side effect talk (extracts 
6.1 & 6.4). Indeed, the production of laughter largely avoided disturbances to progress and 
intersubjective breakdowns while also engaging in prosocial or affective work. A generic 
acknowledgment token would have likely gone unremarked upon and would not necessarily 
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be understood as prosocial in a similar way to laughter. In the next section I will move on to 
examine longer sequences and the use of buffer topics (Jefferson, 1984) as a form of 
produced laughter.  
 
6.3 Extended sequences and buffer topics  
 
In this section, the focus moves from cases of laughter straightforwardly sanctioning progress 
to longer instances of, typically shared, laughter. Particularly pertinent to this section is the 
buffer topic (Jefferson, 1984) that was reported when troubles-tellers and troubles-recipients 
shared laughter. These buffer topics typically involved troubles-tellers telling a joke or 
anecdote as a “time out for pleasantries” (Jefferson, 1984, p. 351). For the following extracts 
the interest remains on both sanctioning progressivity and managing potential delicate or 
sensitive moments. Typically, these delicate moments concern personal topics such as 
sexuality and health-related quality of life and have the potential for halting progress. 
Moreover, it could also be possible that these delicate moments pose a risk to speakers’ face 
(Goffman, 1967). In turn, there were often extended sequences occasioned by the production 
of some potentially delicate utterance, which when aligned with laughter prompted a buffer 
topic. Often the buffer topic would be extended to allow that “time out for pleasantries” 
(Jefferson, 1984, p. 351) which afforded affective prosocial work and facilitated resumption 
of progress.  
 
Extract 6.7 (recording 3)   
 
CNS:     =and our role then is to: (0.2) just make sure you’re doing 1 
         well .h check on your waterworks make sure they’re improving 2 
         check in on you  3 
COM:     °mm° 4 
CNS:     erect↑ions↓ >much< not physically [but just to (b]e sure) 5 
PAT:                                         [M HA HA HA HA]        .h  6 
COM:                                             [ha ha] 7 
PAT:     [ah ha: ha:]   8 
COM:     [ha:: ha:: ]<Ha:: Ha:: Ha::>  9 
PAT:     calm down [eh]  10 
CNS:               [Ju]st to be sU:RE  11 
COM:     you’ve got me [job then] 12 
CNS:                [A [ha]        A HA HA HA HA HA HA HA hua ha 13 
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PAT:                   [A HA HA ]HA  14 
COM:     yes no yes no  15 
CNS:     °aah ha ha°  A HA HA 16 
PAT:     oo::h yes  17 
CNS:     check if you’re achieving what you wa[nt from y]’know  18 
COM:                                          [A HUA HUA] 19 
CNS:     with the exercise make sure you’re using the pump correctly  20 
         .h y’know just make sure things are (0.2) y’know you’re happy  21 
         [with ]how things are g[oing]  22 
COM:     [yeah]                 [yeah] and do ya get checks annual ch- 23 
         -ecks after that to make s[ure] 24 
 
Here the CNS is outlining the procedural steps involved in managing the effects of treatment 
on urinary and erectile function. Possibly aware of a sexualised interpretation, the CNS 
clarifies their remark about checking erections (line 5), which the patient and companion treat 
as laughable. In turn, both patient and companion volunteer laughter at what they understand 
as a recognition point (Jefferson, 1974). In line 19, we see the CNS reattempt their earlier 
turn, which they abandoned in the face of sustained shared laughter. Both patient and 
companion produce potentially playful and humorous utterances either side of this attempt, 
however, and the CNS abandons the project to reciprocate laughter. Eventually the CNS can 
restart their informing, but this comes much later, and after what we might consider a buffer 
topic (Jefferson, 1984). Buffer topics can be topical or non-topical and can comprise 
anecdotes or jokes for instance, but effectively function to allow “time out for pleasantries” 
(Jefferson, 1984, p. 351).  
 
The companion’s turn at line 20 might be understood as a joke, as per Sacks (1992, p. 15) 
jokes are a ceremonial such that, “you tell a joke, there’s a laugh”. I note that while the 
patient and companion treat their turns as offering laughables, the CNS shows no such 
orientation and perseveres with topical talk. As such, it appears that the parties understand the 
delicacy of the topic being discussed and work to buffer the serious talk until initial 
sequential progress can be resumed. This exchange is somewhat typical of the form and 
function of buffer topics in this dataset. That is, a potentially delicate issue for the patient is 
transformed into an interactional space for laughter that often produces prosocial work from 
the parties. One exception is that this is the only extract of the 4 in this section where the 
laughter is first produced by the patient and companion rather than the CNS. In the next 
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extract we will consider an example where the CNS invites laughter in response to the 
patient’s turn, which instigates the buffer topic. 
 
Extract 6.8 (recording 5)  
 
CNS:     =absolutely it’s not as though you’re one of these erm  1 
         uhh y‘know one of these gym bodies that are (.) uh sticking it in  2 
         for >other< reasons you had it [f]           an and you  3 
PAT:                                    [T]hat’s right  4 
CNS:     nee::d testoste<rone> (0.6) as a man (.) for everything else 5 
         ((stammering but ultimately producing no utterance)) y’know 6 
         just to function really haven’t you= 7 
PAT:     =have to start buying some dresses=  8 
CNS:     u(h)hu(h)= 9 
PAT:     =a ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha  10 
CNS:     [(      )] 11 
COM:     [he might] be quite happy with that 12 
PAT:     HA HA [HA HA HA HA] HA HA 13 
COM:           [HA HA HA HA] 14 
CNS:     SO (.) BUT we’ll but (.) I’ll still refer you to uhm see name 15 
         redacted our >erectile< function specialist have you ever  16 
         met him before (0.2) no= 17 
PAT:     =no=18 
 
Here the CNS is affirming in strong terms the patient’s good patient narrative, which is a 
characterisation I suggest and interactive project which I subsequently discuss again in 
extract 6.12. To do so, the CNS invokes an alternative category to favourably compare the 
patient against. The patient is someone who took testosterone for erectile dysfunction, which 
is a valid medical reason. By contrast, the other group of “gym bodies” are marked by their 
misuse of testosterone, emphasised by the distinctly non-medical characterisation of 
“sticking it in”. As the CNS works up corroboration (Wooffitt, 1992) of the good patient 
narrative, we see the patient affirm the upshot in lime 4. The CNS continues to work up 
corroboration (Wooffitt, 1992) and ties testosterone in with healthy masculine function, as a 
legitimising device for otherwise potentially problematic behaviour. In so doing, the CNS 
produces an utterance somewhere between minimisation and an extreme case formulation 
(Pomerantz, 1986). The initial “just” and final “really” both imply minimisation work, as 
they downplay further any notions of medical misuse of testosterone. However, the “to 
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function” may be hearable not just as an extreme case formulation, but also a possible face 
threatening act (Brown and Levinson, 1987). The potential for a face-threatening act is in the 
turn combining the category work of invoking successful incumbency of the “man” category 
with the hearable implication that the patient may not meet membership incumbency criteria 
(Jayussi, 1984; Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 40-41).  
 
In latched speech the patient orients to the hearable implication and offers a hypothetical 
consequence trading on this category membership criteria and an alternative category-bound 
activity (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 40-41). As they do not fit the male category, they would be 
incumbent in the female category, and the category-bound activity here would be buying and 
subsequently wearing dresses, which is hearable as markedly not male. The CNS responds by 
volunteering laughter, albeit through interpolated particles, which the patient reciprocates in a 
full string of laughter particles. The patient’s post-utterance completion laughter particles in 
line 10 mark their turn as an invitation to laughter (Jefferson, 1979), and as such non-serious 
(Holt, 2013). In turn, this treats the CNS’s extreme case formulation as nonliteral, and 
perhaps instead indexing a positive stance towards the patient and their good patient 
narrative. From this laughter the companion produces another hypothetical that revolves 
around the existing category work.  
 
Both the patient and the companion laugh, which marks the companion’s turn as being 
understood as a joke. In turn, the extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) was 
transformed into the departure point for a buffer topic (Jefferson, 1984), which softened the 
delicate category implications of this extreme case formulation and laid the grounds for 
sequential progress. The CNS does then progress the interaction with their next turn marked 
by a turn-initial “so” (line 15) that proceeds to outline further procedural business. The 
exchange above concerned the patient’s prior medical history and the potential for a delicate 
moment in the treatment appointment. As such, this extract is somewhat distinct, as the other 
three concern side effects that the patient could face in the future. There is a link, however, as 
both extracts feature category work around the patient that is key to the buffer topic and 
laughter within, in this case male identity and age in the extract below.  
 
Extract 6.9 (recording 9)  
 
CNS:     .hhh you can get hot flushes you can feel a bit letha::rgic 1 
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         certain w- at first (.) erm but (.) most of the chaps seem 2 
         to say it’s the sort of lethargy that when you sit down 3 
         (0.2) you know if you sit down after a meal or sit 4 
         down (.) in the evening you nod off (.) more easily [than ]  5 
PAT:                                                         [mm mm] 6 
CNS:     perhaps you norma[lly  do]  7 
PAT:                      [than than] normal=  8 
CNS:     =A H[UH HU HAH] HHEH .hhh[ HHE]    [if I] 9 
PAT:         [a huh huh]          [alth]ough[ at ]£age redacted I  10 
         think ah that’s happening [now uh huh huh huh hu hu hu] 11 
CNS:                               [yheah h    normally if I pu]t  12 
         wives in the room or partners I think they look at them  13 
         because you can see them go ((no sound – visual)) 14 
PAT:     yeah he’s doing it now [already A HUA  HU HA] HA HA HA   15 
CNS:                            [ah ha ha ha ha ha ha]           16 
         well I’ve never had anyone say they’ve fallen asleep on the  17 
         driving or anything .hhh18 
 
As with all these extracts, the CNS is outlining the effects associated with hormone therapy 
treatment, and the focus here is on fatigue. The fatigue effect is packaged in probabilistic 
terms before a self-repair (Schegloff et al., 1977), which steps down from the firm “certain” 
to softer substitute “at first”. A softening project continues as the CNS offers a 
generalised piece of reported speech (Holt, 1996), with “the chaps” appealing to a lay non-
medical audience characterising the effect in relatable terms. Indeed, the CNS pursues this 
project further with a simile, the projected relatability of which is demonstrated in the 
patient’s uptake and collaborative sequence completion (Lerner, 2004). Further to the 
demonstration of intersubjectivity, there is a display of shared laughter as the CNS latches 
their laughter and the patient reciprocates in overlap. Both patient and CNS attempt new turns 
closer together, and as the CNS cedes the floor, the patient produces a stretch of talk in 
smiley voice (line 10). This turn reports on the patient exhibiting the behaviour previously 
discussed in the sequence, as well as making relevant the patient’s advanced age as a possible 
category-bound activity (Jayussi, 1984; Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 40-41). Moreover, this turn is 
marked by the post-utterance completion laughter particle (Jefferson, 1979), which does not 
receive the invited laughter. The move from smiley voice to laughter does not receive 
laughter either, despite this move leaving open interactional space for the recipient to orient 
to the projected laughter (Haakana, 2010). Instead of reciprocating laughter, in line 9, the 
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CNS re-attempts their initial project by recycling the “if I”, which was cut off when they 
abdicated speaker’s rights in line 6.  
 
The CNS continues with their project and culminates with a visual act, that the recording 
could not capture, but is hearable as either implying or mimicking the act of dozing off. The 
patient orients to this act, affirms it as a viable candidate, and expands it to offer a candidate 
response to the act, which the CNS recognises as laughable (Jefferson, 1974) and the patient 
volunteers their own laughter to mark the turn as one to invite laughter (Jefferson, 1979). As 
the patient reports on what might be considered a trouble, by way of its similarity to the 
treatment effect, it might be seen that both the talk following and comprising this turn 
function as a buffer topic (Jefferson, 1984). We might make this argument as the patient 
demonstrates troubles resistance while the CNS shows troubles receptiveness (Jefferson, 
1984, p. 351) in their initial response.  
 
However, the CNS then goes on to produce a turn (lines 12-14) that the patient treats as non-
serious (Holt, 2013) and goes on to expand this into a laughable and each party shares in 
reciprocal laughter, as seen in buffer topics where troubles-telling utterances feature 
(Jefferson, 1984). Once the shared laughter has finished the sequence continues with a 
resumption of the earlier propositional content, which is about the specifics of the fatigue and 
its severity. As such, shared laughter was not associated with topic termination in this case 
(Holt, 2010), but rather as the ratification of “time out for pleasantries” (Jefferson, 1984, p. 
351). The potentially delicate moment of discussing this side effect (lines 5-8) was 
sufficiently softened by laughter to not impede sequential progress. Moreover, the patient 
demonstrates unproblematic treatment of a possible troubles-telling (lines 10-11) through a 
buffer topic, which again avoided the potential for halting sequential progress while engaging 
in prosocial work.  
 
In the below extract, the focus on progress is slightly different, as it is the patient who 
introduces the potential source for a delicate moment. As such, the companion and CNS 
initiate and drive the buffer topic as recognisably being a space for laughter prior to further 
sequential progress.   
 




PAT:       [yeah on o]n the prostectomy one it s[ays] (0.2) you can s-  1 
CNS:                                            [yes] 2 
PAT:     you can start jogging (1.2) but that’d be a mir[acle] 3 
COM:                                                    [inde]- 4 
         -pendently hhh (0.2) w(h)ow  5 
CNS:     A HEE HEE HEE HEH  6 
COM:     he says i couldn’t jog before  7 
PAT:     i’ve ad me hips replaced [i’m not allowed to]  8 
CNS:                              [A HAH HAH HAH HAH ] HAH HAH HA 9 
COM:                              [a hah hah ha] 10 
PAT:     so how does that work  11 
CNS:     hah hah hah hah hah hah ha 12 
COM:     heehe £like a dog£ a huuu huh .hhh hh 13 
         ((coughing))  14 
CNS:     HHH ((lips smack)) £↑well£ you’d be surprised some many- (.) 15 
         many patients err (.) y’know (0.1) w:e always say six weeks  16 
         anyway WE’RE ALL (.) wor we WE ARE very (0.2) erm encouraging  17 
         in regards to physical activity can (.) y’know overall help  18 
         your (0.2) ((lips smack)) your health and wellbeing .hhh19 
 
This extract begins part-way into a sequence where the patient reports information they read 
in one of the information booklets they were provided previously. At the start it appears that 
the patient is formulating an interrogative, and the CNS demonstrates attentiveness with the 
acknowledgment token “yeah”. The patient leaves a notable pause but goes on to produce an 
extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) “that’d be a mir[acle]” in line 3 instead. 
Here, then, the patient contrasts their stated opinion with the claim of the surgical information 
booklet, which is potentially hearable as challenging or undermining the booklet. As the 
companion begins speaking prior to the patient’s completion and offers an affected “w(h)ow” 
(line 5) through an interpolated laughter particle, they can be seen as marking this 
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contribution as non-serious and inviting laughter (Holt, 2013; Jefferson, 1979). The CNS 
orients to the prior turn as a laughable and takes up the invitation to laugh as a standalone 
response, not engaging with the propositional content of any preceding turns. With the 
topicality not having changed, and the floor open for self-selection (Sacks et al., 1974) the 
companion picks up the patient’s sequence and expands it via reported speech (Holt, 1996), 
which the patient may be seen as collaboratively completing in their next turn (Lerner, 2004). 
Lerner demonstrated how an interlocutor can be complicit in the collaborative production of a 
turn while ensuring authority remains with the original speaker by pre-empting completion of 
a previous speaker’s turn. Both companion and CNS start laughing prior to the patient’s 
completion but treat the admission of hip replacement as a point to laugh.  
 
Although it is not clear beyond reasonable doubt that the patient designed their turns to 
produce a joke across the sequence, the contrastive work done in the reveal has a dramatic 
quality amenable to laughter. In follow-up, the patient tags an interrogative to their reveal, 
which is similarly met with two-party laughter and treated firstly in relation to its perceived 
affective tone. The companion offers a candidate response, in smiley voice, couched between 
two strings of laughter particles that marks their design as non-serious (Holt, 2013). 
Furthermore, this turn invites laughter through the companion’s post-utterance completion 
laughter particle (Jefferson, 1979). While the companion treated the patient’s turn as non-
serious, to the extent of volunteering laughter and then inviting further laughter, the CNS 
treated the turn as combination serious/non-serious (Holt, 2013). As such, the affective 
response is modified and scaled back from laughter, as with the companion, to smiley voice. 
This shift might mark the move from a more playful, less serious moment in the sequence to 
the more serious work of responding to the interrogative that was initially treated as a point to 
laugh. We might therefore see the sequence spanning lines 1-14 as a buffer topic, trading on 
first the hip replacement anecdote, so dramatically revealed, and the companion’s smiley 
voice “like a dog” approximation of a joke.  
 
With the CNS moving from standalone laughter particles in line 12 to smiley voice in line 15, 
this may speak to the shift in relative seriousness in the sequential environment. This is 
because smiling after laughter in medical contexts has been seen as a resource for clinicians 
to acknowledge an affective contribution while demonstrating understanding of a prior 
utterance as delicate (Haakana, 2010). In this case, the patient’s tag question, formulated as 
oppositional to a trusted resource is understood as delicate while the affective and less serious 
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work around its production also gets acknowledged. Furthermore, the CNS’s smiley voice 
production is a response to the patient’s interrogative, which then transitions into a series of 
topical extended turns for the CNS. We see here, then, not just a buffer topic (Jefferson, 
1984) but also interplay between it and the design and treatment of turns as serious, non-
serious, and a combination thereof (Holt, 2013). Through this interplay of relative treatment 
of seriousness, the topical implications of the patient’s contribution were sufficiently softened 
prior to sequential progressivity. Any potential delicacy that might be heard in the patient’s 
challenge via extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) is therefore made more amenable 
to straightforward progress.  
 
As it may not appear obvious, the link between progress and preference construction should 
be made clear. One key aspect of these appointments, I argue, is that patients’ preferences are 
constructed (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010). To be specific, patients’ preferences are 
constructed across a series of moments where alternative sequential opportunities present 
themselves. We saw in the previous analytic section how the production of laughter can 
function as an approximation of positive preference instead of alternatives such as 
acknowledgement tokens. Patients would have the opportunity to respond with mm or ok for 
instance, but instead produced standalone laughter. By producing laughter instead of a 
generic display of acknowledgement, the affiliative nature of the production demonstrates 
that there is no threat to “what patients want from their healthcare” (Street et al., 2012, p. 
168). The analysis in this section demonstrated how laughter and humour, since we saw the 
production of jokes met with responsive laughter, were important resources for carefully 
treading between these alternative sequential possibilities until the parties negotiate one. In 
particular, the production of laughter was observed to soften potential delicate moments in 
the interactions, particularly when parties engaged in buffer topics to facilitate otherwise 
delicate sequential work (Jefferson, 1984). 
 
It is also possible to consider a further, albeit more speculative, point, which is that the 
institutional ordering of the appointment is in the direction of assent. When there is a 
potential breakdown in progressivity, such as a complainable, they get raised and either 
managed or negotiated. Once any potential or actual breakdown has been handled this 
contributes progress towards agreement to the preference currently in play or on the record. 
By institutional ordering towards assent I mean that we might consider there to be a parallel 
or mirror between the interactive work in service of sequential progress and the way that 
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CNSs move the appointments towards completion and closer to a decision. Of course, an 
orientation to progress is not uncommon in healthcare interactions and does not presuppose 
an interactive ordering towards assent. For instance, the three talk model (Elwyn et al., 2017) 
could be characterised as being oriented towards progress because it seeks to move patients 
from initial to informed preferences by way of progress from team talk to decision talk.  
 
Again, this is a speculative suggestion, particularly because I cannot speak to the final 
treatment decisions that the patients made. However, the management or resolution of 
potential progressivity breakdowns, through extended sequences of laughter, is observable in 
these extracts and accompanying analysis. This matter is raised again in the discussion 
chapter where I consider what empirical work might be necessary to explore this possibility 
further. Returning to the present discussion, the buffer topics function to step aside from the 
commitments that decision-making preferences were presupposing to perform prosocial, 
sometimes face-saving, work. As such, the link to preference construction is in the procedural 
and sequential work that surrounds and shapes the process of construction. Negotiating and 
guiding the preference work as it builds towards a preferred treatment option and ultimately 
decision. In the final analytic section below, I shall consider the flexibility of seriousness as 
an interactional resource for both managing potential delicate moments and sanctioning 
sequential progress.  
 
6.4 The interactional negotiation of seriousness as a tool for sequential progressivity 
 
This section focuses on the interactive work involved in constructing or orienting to specific 
turns as serious, non-serious, or a combination of both. As such, this section draws heavily on 
the work of Elizabeth Holt (2013) and her research on the malleability of seriousness as an 
interactional construct around laughter. Furthermore, the function and consequences of either 
constructing or orienting to turns as, particularly, non-serious or a combination of serious and 
non-serious. Although examples of this interactional work have been seen in earlier extracts, 
this analysis will investigate these occurrences where they are most noticeable as the central 
interactional work of the extract. The relevance for SDM and patients’ preferences is the 
function of laughter as managing potential breakdowns in progressivity and softening turns or 




Extract 6.11 (recording 3)  
 
CNS:     so there is a problem with the bladder if you have .h drinks=  1 
PAT:     =right=  2 
CNS:     =or something so that more or less’ll stay the same .hh 3 
COM:     WE eh eh eh he’s not he’s he’s he sounds an £alcoholic£  4 
CNS:     £no no no I know what he means£  5 
COM:     no no i mean i[t happens if he wa]nts to go to the loo 6 
CNS:                   [AHh       HA HA HA]     7 
COM:     he’[s got to going ]to the loo= 8 
CNS:        [£i think that’s] 9 
CNS:     =£i think that’s [most] people t be honest [i don’t think th]ere’s 10 
COM:                      [yeah]                    [yeah but I don’t] 11 
CNS:     anything >y’know< brand new there really but what i- what we (0.3) 12 
         with the surgery we do refer you to the continence service  13 
         so we try and get you in befo:re surgery .h  14 
 
An intersubjective breakdown is a possible delicate moment for most interactions, but these 
could prove particularly problematic in decision-making appointments. Maintaining shared 
understanding is a generic concern across social interactions, but it might become particularly 
relevant for potential delicate moments in preference sensitive scenarios (Shirk et al., 2017). 
This extract begins with the CNS producing an upshot formulation (Watson and Heritage, 
1979) of a bladder issue that the patient and companion have asked about in text not shown 
here. Although the patient affirms the upshot, thereby sanctioning the CNS to proceed with 
their candidate response the companion voices an issue with the characterisation. There is 
marked disfluency in the companion’s turn with repeating productions and a self-repair 
(Schegloff et al., 1977) before they formulate their complainable. In smiley voice, the 
companion remarks that the CNS’s upshot hearably implies the undesirable category 
membership of “£alcoholic£”. This category membership might be heard to imply that the 
patient’s issue is a consequence of their category-bound activities (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 40-
41) and perhaps be glossed unfavourably. As such, the upshot formulation is treated as a 
face-threatening act (Brown and Levinson, 1987) by the companion, who formulates a 




In response the CNS both recognises the affective tone of the utterance and responds to the 
action it institutes by appealing to a shared understanding with the patient in smiley voice. 
Crucially, the CNS appeals to an alternative understanding, as they know “what he means”, a 
point borne out by the patient’s second line affirmation of the initial upshot. As such, the 
upshot can be retroactively glossed as a loose characterisation for the purpose of sequential 
progress and held distinct from the shared understanding. In turn, the CNS moves to avoid an 
intersubjective breakdown by an appeal to the patient’s intended meaning rather than the 
implication of the upshot. The companion proceeds to affirm that there have been issues with 
the bladder, suggesting that their issue indeed lay more with the categorial implication than 
any possible intersubjective breakdown. Here we see the only laughter particles of the 
extract, as the CNS volunteers them in overlap (line 7), possibly as an escalation of the 
smiley voice. There is no uptake or orientation to the laughter, perhaps because there is no 
clear interactional space due to its placement as overlapping a developing turn-in-progress. 
Instead, the companion concedes that the CNS was not necessarily unfair in their upshot 
formulation via a tautological admission.  
 
Despite the lack of reciprocation, the CNS continues to produce smiley voice while 
reformulating their abandoned turn and responding to the companion’s propositional content. 
In so doing, the CNS appeals to normality and generalisability to inoculate against further 
problematisation of categorical implications. Although the companion attempts another turn, 
they do cede the floor to the CNS and ultimately sanction sequential progress. Rather than 
laughter standing in for an action like protest, or softening on the patient’s side, the CNS uses 
laughter to soften potential open protest and attempt to re-establish intersubjectivity. Through 
repeated smiley voice and volunteered laughter, the CNS can mark their turns as less than 
entirely serious (Holt, 2013) even if the companion might not orient to this marking. As a 
result of these markings, and recurrent projections of laughter as something to orient to 
(Haakana, 2010), the CNS offers the possibility that they do not understand the current 
sequential environment as harbouring a problem. Although the companion did not affiliate to 
the CNS’s affective tone, they did align with their resolution effort and did not formulate 
further complainables. Nor did they expand their initial complainable sufficiently to affect 
progressivity or jeopardise the sequential project of informing.  
 
This preceding extract is interesting for the way that it demonstrates a distinct way of using 
the interactive flexibility of seriousness to manage a potential breakdown in progress and 
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intersubjectivity. We might expect that a breakdown in progress or intersubjectivity would be 
resolved through reciprocal laughter or an overt demonstration of resolution. Here in this 
extract, however, the CNS was alone in producing laughter and yet the sequence was 
satisfactorily brought to progress and the disruption was relatively minimal. In this way, the 
exchange analysed in this extract is atypical for the section and demonstrates that the 
conversational resources of laughter and seriousness/non-seriousness reported on are equally 
available to all participants. 
 
Extract 6.12 (recording 5)  
 
CNS:          [a]nd that’s that’s ya key (0.2) .hhh in terms of er-  1 
         your erectile function we used to do (everything) on the tes- 2 
         -tosterone so it’s (.) i would guess it’s not the best is it 3 
PAT:     no:=  [no n]o i mean since i ad this (.) pee ess ayy test=  4 
CNS:     =at th[e mo]                                       5 
         =yeah= 6 
PAT:     =i’ve stopped it anyw[ay]       [beca]use ((puckering))   7 
CNS:                          [ok] right [yeah] 8 
PAT:     they said they uh h erm (.) testosterone is the prostrate- 9 
         -‘s friend= 10 
CNS:     =ye[ah] 11 
PAT:        [hu] hua ha ha ha ha ha ha  12 
COM:     he’s just never had it= 13 
CNS:     =y(h)ea(h) hah ↑↑Why don’t you (.) yeah but it’s easy to say 14 
         that y’know we have me- you >happen to< have men that have  15 
         (.) have (.) had testosterone and we never see them you know= 16 
PAT:     =yeah=            [yeah] 17 
CNS:     =it’s just one of [thos]e thing[s]18 
 
Unlike the previous extract, this one demonstrates reciprocal laughter between patient and 
CNS; indeed, it is the only such case in this section. Furthermore, the work of softening a 
potential delicacy falls on the patient’s side, while the seriousness of the exchange is 
cooperatively negotiated. The CNS outlines post-treatment procedures associated with 
erectile function and suggests that testosterone use might prove problematic through a tag 
question predicated on the prior disclosure of testosterone use. The tag question is a yes/no 
interrogative, which makes a yes/no answer the relevant answer format, and projects an 
expectation of an affirmative answer as the default response (Raymond, 2003). As expected, 
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the patient affirms, but they also transform the answer into an extended telling despite the 
CNS orienting to the projected answer as marking the patient’s turn as hearably complete. 
Once the CNS cedes the floor, the patient formulates a timeframe of recency that projects a 
newsworthy telling (line 4; Button, 1990) as part of establishing speaker’s rights for the 
extended production. The CNS understands the ongoing sequence as an extended telling 
through the string of receipt tokens and does not attempt a new sequential project (Sacks et 
al., 1974; Sacks, 1992, vol. 2, p. 21). It becomes apparent throughout the patient’s turns that 
they are constructing a good patient narrative marked by their adherence to medical advice 
and responsiveness to pertinent information. By invoking this archetype of a good patient, an 
interactive project that I suggest, the patient can work to head off any incipient trouble that 
the historical testosterone use might occasion.  
 
In constructing the good patient archetype, the patient produces a piece of reported speech 
(Holt, 1996) from previous healthcare encounters, which is conditionally relevant (Schegloff, 
1968) and fitted to the possible problem at hand, as well as broader adherence to medical 
advice. Further to the work of this narrative, the patient laughs after completion of their initial 
utterance as an invitation to laughter (Jefferson, 1979). There is no uptake by the CNS despite 
the invitation, and instead the companion proffers an expansion on the hearably laughable 
prior turn. Notably the CNS produces interpolated laughter in response to the companion’s 
turn, which is interesting for two reasons. One is that laughter is embedded in a receipt token, 
excepting one particle, which suggests the possibility of treating the previous turn as 
conveying a laughable that indexed non-seriousness as well as conveying a combined 
sequential implication for advancing the project of heading off possible trouble around the 
historical testosterone use (Holt, 2013).  
 
The patient has therefore accomplished construction of an ideal good patient, while the 
collaborative work of laughable turns with the companion soften the potential problematic or 
delicate issue, as we see from the CNS’s uptake. The cooperative work of negotiating 
seriousness and non-seriousness accomplishes the sufficient softening of the potential 
delicacy around testosterone use, receives and acknowledges the good patient construction, 
and sanctions sequential progressivity towards further institutional business. As stated at the 
start of the analysis, this is the only example in this section where laughter is shared by the 
parties. While laughter in the extract to follow is one-sided, the non-serious nature of that 
exchange is similarly cooperatively negotiated. The next extract also concerns the issue of 
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blocking the production of testosterone, albeit as a possible prospective consequence for the 
patient.   
 
Extract 6.13 (recording 15)  
 
CNS:     >voice can< softens slightly cos men naturally have a  1 
         a deeper voic[e cuz ]testosterone so that can 2 
PAT:                  [mm hmm] 3 
CNS:     soften slightly= 4 
PAT:     =↑i’ll have to speak like this↑= 5 
CNS:     =ah heh heh heh heh hee heeh £many patients talk like that  6 
         sometimes£ AH hah hah hah ha ha: .hhh erm hhh sometimes you 7 
         get some hair thinning on the top won’t >necessarily<  8 
         fall out but can (0.1) thin slightly .hh erm (0.2) and erm 9 
(0.4) again sometimes you can get a loss of libido becuz  10 
testosterone being stopped= 11 
 
One possible function of laughter around these delicate moments is to get actions on record in 
a way that is sufficiently soft as to not halt progressivity. The possibility of halting 
progressivity is pertinent because this phase of the consultation is heavily CNS-led and 
comprised primarily of information exchange. Here the CNS not only outlines one of the side 
effects of hormone therapy but embeds the reasoning in the sequence perhaps in the interest 
of progressivity. First, the patient acknowledges the effect with a receipt token but when they 
self-select at a potentially hearably complete transition relevance place (Sacks et al., 1974) 
they use their turn to produce an exaggerated turn. The patient’s production is marked as 
exaggerated by the affected high pitch it is produced in, and exaggeration can be used to 




We can observe from the CNS’s volunteered laughter that they understood the turn as, 
minimally, a combination of serious and non-serious, if not entirely non-serious (Holt, 2013). 
The CNS’s observable understanding of the turn as less than entirely serious becomes clearer 
when their response is produced in smiley voice (Haakana, 2002, 2010). Importantly, the 
CNS does engage with the propositional content and action of the patient’s turn to offer an 
appeal to normality and therefore minimises the patient’s concern. The production is couched 
between two strings of laughter particles to soften the response and expand the non-
seriousness that they understood to be present in the patient’s initial turn. Despite the patient 
not laughing, they were able to accomplish voicing a possible hearable complainable, receive 
somewhat playful reassurance, and sanction progressivity by offering a laughable instead of a 
generic receipt token.  
 
Extract 6.14 (recording 17)  
 
CNS:     but >some o< the s:ymptoms and side effects that I’m ex:plaining  1 
         are very individualised so you mAY get some you may get none  2 
         you may get all of them .h you may not even get it during  3 
         your first injection (0.4) ok (0.2) .hh 4 
PAT:     i’ll have to change shops will a 5 
CNS:     pardon 6 
PAT:     .hh won’t av to stai- change[ shops will i] £like start  7 
CNS:                                 [a heh heh heh] 8 
PAT:     shopping at women’s (.)[ clothin- clothes and (     ) ] 9 
CNS:                            [ERR hopefully not no no eh heh] 10 
PAT:     unless i start buying that  11 
COM:             [(oh brother)] 12 
CNS:     £unless y(h)ou’ve got a burning desire to do that a heh heh  13 
         heh heh huh heh (.) .hh so erm yeah so that’s s:- some of the 14 
         side effects that tHAt can potentially occur ok=  15 
PAT:     =right16 
 
Here in recording 17 the CNS is once again characterising the side effects associated with 
hormone therapy treatment as contingent and probabilistic. In so doing, the CNS can both 
inform the patient about the effects to fulfil their institutional obligations while also ensuring 
that they not be held accountable for variability in onset and occurrence. The patient responds 
by formulating an interrogative, but the CNS treats this as insufficiently informative and 
therefore insufficiently actionable. In turn, the CNS requests clarification, and opens an 
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insertion sequence. Accordingly, the patient reformulates the interrogative, making a change 
in word selection from “will” to “won’t”, and the CNS orients to the new format as a 
laughable. The patient goes on to produce the subsequent speech in smiley voice, indexing 
either playfulness or minimally a degree of non-seriousness (Holt, 2013).  
 
Despite the CNS volunteering laughter at a recognition point (Jefferson, 1974), the patient 
does not treat their project as complete and proceeds to complete their turn. Within this turn 
the patient offers a categorical incumbency and category-bound activity (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, 
p. 40-41) that turns on the gendered implications of hormone therapy side effects. Again, the 
CNS overlaps the patient’s turn by engaging with the propositional content and then 
producing laughter to invite reciprocation. The patient continues to treat their project as 
incomplete and begins to expand on the original utterance, which the companion remarks on 
with a flippant idiom. Here the CNS recycles the patient’s initial word selection of “unless” 
and offers a candidate sequence alternative marked by interpolated and standalone laughter 
particles. Here the laughter prefigures an incumbency marker, “so” (Bolden, 2009), which 
suggests it is produced to close topicality and push on with new business, following as it does 
from laughter as a non-lexical pre-closing contribution (Holt, 2010).  
 
Throughout this exchange the patient produces an interrogative, with candidate example, 
concerning a potential consequence of a treatment effect they might encounter. As such, the 
act of asking the interrogative, and its subject, might be considered potentially delicate; 
especially considering the CNS’s contingent and probabilistic informing. The production of 
smiley voice, then, in line 7 and its hint at non-seriousness is key for indicating that there is 
possible uptake of the patient’s turn as not entirely serious (Holt, 2013). As the CNS laughs 
twice after line 7 it appears that they took the indication of non-seriousness. The laughter and 
non-seriousness are the tools that soften the patient’s interrogative and its subject so that it 
can be discussed in a less serious, but non-trivial, and unobtrusive way thereby avoiding the 
possibility of halting sequential progress. While the patient does not perform preference 
construction work, their laughter does not approximate positive progress quite like we saw in 
section 6.2, their willingness to allow the interaction to continue, and the CNS to suggest 
topical closing with their “so” (line 14) could be understood as a demonstration that there is 





Extract 6.15 (recording 16)  
 
CNS:     =erm facial hair production so (.) erm (0.1) beard facial ha- 1 
         -ir can become a little bit les[s because of that] 2 
PAT:                                    [i just bought a n]ew razor as  3 
         well so i need to know that heh heh heh heh heh:= 4 
CNS:     =well it MAY i- it- these are all depend[ent these are al]l  5 
PAT:                                             [yeah i know that] 6 
CNS:     possibilities= 7 
PAT:     =yeah 8 
 
In the extract above we have a deviant case where the production of laughter does not soften 
a potentially delicate moment but prompts a dispreferred response from the CNS. Indeed, this 
is the only extract in this section where the CNS produces no laughter particles, despite 
successful examples of ostensibly similar exchanges across this analytic section. The CNS is 
outlining the effects associated with hormone therapy treatment and explaining how stopping 
the testosterone production might inhibit facial hair growth. The patient begins speaking in 
overlap and produces what is hearable as a complainable, pertaining to a recent relevant 
purchase. However, the patient tags their ostensible complainable as an invitation to laugh via 
a post-utterance completion laughter particle (Jefferson, 1979), and as such also minimally a 
combination of serious and non-serious work (Holt, 2013). Despite these markings, the CNS 
provides no orientation to any hearable laughable and instead treats the turn purely as 
formulating a complainable.  
 
From a preference organization perspective, we see the CNS preface their response with a 
dispreference marker “well” (line 5; Pomerantz, 1984). Moreover, the attempts at vocal 
productions are cut off abruptly with glottal stops before the initial production under attempt 
is abandoned and the CNS returns to the probabilistic and contingent characterisations of the 
side effects; engaging with the topicality and propositional content of the patient’s action but 
not the affective tone. The patient follows up to affirm that they knew the content of the 
CNS’s turn, and therefore imply that the turn was not designed for the function that the CNS 
understood it to perform. From this case we might see that laughter can also fail to manage a 
delicate moment or soften a delicate action if the local environment is not well managed. For 
instance, we might suppose that producing a hearable complainable in overlap displays an 
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insensitivity to the sequential environment. Indeed, it might indicate an urgency in production 
because of the violation to the turn-taking allocational system that it requires (Sacks et al., 
1974).  
 
In this final analytic section, we can again see the production of laughter as a resource for 
managing potential delicate moments. Of particular interest was extract 6.11, which showed 
the CNS producing laughter to resolve an intersubjective and progressive breakdown. 
Although neither patient nor companion reciprocated laughter, they ultimately allowed 
sequential progress to continue after the resolution attempt. An attempt that turned on CNS-
side laughter and smiley voice, the latter of which was sometimes shared with the companion 
as some sign of affective work (Haakana, 2002). This extract is interesting because it is not 
an outlier in this section, rather these delicate interactional moments tended to produce CNS-
side laughter with only one case of reciprocal laughter and one deviant case of patient-side 
only laughter. In these cases, then, the malleability of seriousness as something interactional 
that can soften the sequential location is successful for potential delicate or poignant 
moments. With the successful accomplishment of managing these possible delicate or 
poignant moments, the parties can avoid breakdowns in sequential progressivity or swiftly 
address them. As such, decision-making business can largely continue unimpeded, and 
patients get to raise points that might otherwise halt progress. Doing so allows for the 
sufficiently softened points to be received, and typically acknowledged, while also suggesting 
that these points are not a threat to “what patients want from their healthcare” (Street et al., 
2012, p. 168), and by extension not problematic for patients’ preferences. Notable, also, was 
the deviant case in the last extract of this section that demonstrated how laughter remains a 
resource rather than a given force or axiom of managing delicate or poignant moments.  
 
6.5 Discussion  
 
The focus of this chapter has been on the role and function of laughter in post-diagnostic 
prostate cancer treatment appointments. In particular, the various ways that patients, their 
companions, and clinicians can use laughter both to manage or soften potential delicate 
moments and sanction sequential progress; sometimes simultaneously. For one, patient-side 
laughter was seen to function as a standalone response to a turn, and subsequently indicate 
that there was no threat to “what patients want from their healthcare” (Street et al., 2012, p. 
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168) and therefore also no potential barriers to preference nor sequential progress. In these 
instances, it might also be found that parties share in reciprocal laughter, which similarly 
indicates that the sequence is marked for progress beyond its current juncture. Ostensibly, 
laughter in these cases functions similarly to a receipt token; it is a simple display of 
acknowledgement and understanding that is distinct in being more overtly affiliative. With a 
generic piece of information, a receipt token would overwhelmingly suffice across occasions, 
but with the potential delicacy of, for example, a treatment effect informing, there may be 
more possibilities for preference-based issues to arise and sequential progress to become 
halted.  
 
As laughter can approximate a positive preference and indicate that there are no present 
problems, it can also aid more complex interactional work where the sequence is less 
straightforward. In the second analytic section the focus fell on ways that laughter could 
soften or manage a potentially delicate moment. One resource that parties often drew on was 
a buffer topic, which is an extended sequence that can feature jokes or anecdotes and offers 
speakers “time out for pleasantries” (Jefferson, 1984, p. 351). As such, the buffer topic 
allowed further interactional space before the sequence progresses that speakers could use to 
perform prosocial and affiliative work. Typically, these exchanges represented the link 
between laughables and laughter more clearly. That is, anecdotes that turned on the 
formulation of a laughable and invitation to laugh, as well as jokes were more frequent. 
Shared and reciprocal laughter were common across these extracts, and they often turned on 
the affiliative or prosocial function of laughter. As such, they could bring together patient and 
CNS and soften the delicate moment via the exchange of affective responses. This affective 
exchange functioned also to sanction sequential progress, as we saw in section 6.3, since the 
potential delicate issue was typically avoided due to the production, and often reciprocation, 
of laughter. As such, laughter was again relevant for decision-making in the way that it was 
able to allow potential sources of delicate moments or actions to unfold in a softened 
sequential environment of prosocial and affiliative work.  
 
In section 6.4, I observed that the notion of seriousness and non-seriousness as a flexible 
interactional resource was present in exchanges where softening or managing delicate 
moments was a concern. As with humour or laughables (Jefferson, 1979), there is no 
normative relationship between non-seriousness and laughter (Holt, 2013). That said, the 
ability to gloss one’s own turn as non-serious with smiley voice or laughter or treat another’s 
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turn as non-serious through the same vocal productions was significant for the business of 
these exchanges. In extract 6.11 the CNS was able to ultimately soften a potentially 
problematic implication of their upshot by continued affective productions that indicated non-
seriousness. Similarly, patients were able to perform this softening function through these 
same indications of non-seriousness in extracts 6.8 and 6.13. As with standalone laughter and 
sequential progress, however, indications of non-seriousness were not always sufficient as 
seen in extract 6.15 and its deviant case. Altogether, however, laughter proved to be relevant 
to and functional for patients’ preferences and decision-making in a subtle but useful way of 
keeping the appointment progressing and helping avoid delicate or problematic moments. 
The findings of this chapter will be discussed further alongside the previous empirical 





























Over the six preceding chapters I have attempted to first make the case for a fine-grained 
discursive psychological analysis of patients’ preferences in situ and second provide the first 
example of this research. Chapters 1 and 2 established the background for the research by 
demonstrating the importance of patients’ preferences to SDM and the notable absence of 
language and social interaction research on the framing and construction of preferences. The 
methodological and analytic frameworks of discursive psychology and its antecedent 
conversation analysis and ethnomethodology were detailed and linked to the case for 
preference research in chapter 3. Finally, I conducted a series of detailed and rigorous 
analyses across chapters 4-6 with three distinct foci on patients’ preferences. First, the 
identification and characterisation of patients’ preferences as constructions; second, the 
distinct ways that CNSs handled patients’ preferences; and third, the function of laughter for 
patients’ preferences and SDM. This final chapter, then, will consider the work collected in 
the previous chapters of the thesis with the aims of this thesis, the analysis, and findings 
being summarised. Implications for research and practice will be discussed alongside 
suggestions for applications in each domain. Findings will be evaluated by comparison with 
the extant literature, appraisal of perceived limitations of the research, and possibilities 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
7.1 Summary of the thesis 
 
7.1.1 Summary of rationale  
At the beginning of this thesis, I introduced a host of models and definitions of SDM. These 
models and definitions overlapped with each other and shared a unified philosophy of 
collaboratively agreeing a preference-shaped decision. Indeed, patients’ preferences was the 
essential element most observed across models of SDM (Makoul and Clayman, 2006). 
Furthermore, moving from an initial preference to an informed one, through a step of 
preference talk, was deemed a key goal of SDM (Elwyn et al., 2017). As such, patients’ 
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preferences were clearly significant for SDM, and SDM had become an ethical imperative 
(Coulter et al., 2017). All this said, patients’ preferences were inconsistently defined (Street 
et al., 2012), treated as stable and transitive beliefs or opinions rather than unique 
constructions (Elwyn and Miron-Shatz, 2010), and not consistently brought to bear on 
patients’ treatment decisions (Sommers et al., 2008; Couët et al., 2015; Scherr et al., 2017). 
Therefore, while it was clear that patients’ preferences were crucial to SDM, it was unclear 
what exactly authors meant by preferences, what preferences looked like, and if preferences 
could indeed be consequential for SDM. 
Further to the lack of clarity on what patients’ preferences look like there was also a scarcity 
of empirical research into what preferences look like in the wild. Extant research had not 
focused on providing examples or characterisations of patients’ preferences in situ. Such an 
absence is significant because if we accept that patients’ preferences are constructions 
(Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010), then it is not sufficient to treat preferences as non-specific 
endorsements for treatment. Moreover, not understanding preferences as in situ constructions 
limits both our understanding of the forms that preferences take, plus the work that entails, 
and the scope for working practically with preferences in appointments. One study by 
Landmark and colleagues (2016) did investigate the ways that practitioners attempted to elicit 
patients’ preferences through hypothetical formulations of patients’ treatment stances. This 
study was instructive and insightful for bringing the empirical observational approach of 
conversation analysis to patients’ preferences, but its focus was on practitioner-side 
elicitation.  
The specific value of using conversation analysis was that the actions accomplished in situ 
would otherwise be reported in a way that obscured the actual form that the conduct took. 
That is, a non-language and social interaction and less granular approach might have 
unproblematically reported that clinicians attempted to elicit patients’ preferences. It was by 
using conversation analysis that the finding of the disparity between the ostensible SDM 
compliant action and the interactive work of seeking institutionally aligned preferences 
(Landmark et al., 2017) was revealed. Despite this significant revelation, there remains no 
conversation analysis or discursive psychology research, to my knowledge, focused on the 
interactive work of patients constructing a preference (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010), and the 
production and management of discursive devices and acts that construction can entail in 
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treatment appointments in situ. Of course, this scarcity is itself notable but is increasingly 
noteworthy when we consider the disappointing results of SDM implementation research.  
Indeed, we might suggest that the absence of any substantive work into what patients’ 
preferences look like informs the poor implementation attempts. To provide one example, a 
study measured the concepts of anxiety about cancer, initial preferred treatment, and interest 
in sexual activity in a conventional manner; but the researchers were unsuccessful when they 
tried to use them to predict the outcome of the interactions (Scherr et al., 2017). Another 
potential piece of support for the significance of the absence of empirical observational 
research on preferences in situ comes from broad discrepancies between practitioner 
perceptions and behavioural reports. For example, practitioners have reported a belief that 
they were effectively already engaged in SDM (Joseph-Williams et al., 2017), despite 
research showing poor attempts at engaging patients about their preferences (Coüet et al., 
2015) and involving preferences in treatment (Sommers et al., 2008). In these cases, it is 
entirely possible that practitioners were proceeding on the assumption that the elicitation of a 
preferred treatment prior to ratifying a decision accurately suffices as SDM. In turn, the 
absence of empirical observational research that provides clear examples of patients’ 
preferences as something they construct, and examples of the constructive process, was a 
clear gap awaiting an insightful contribution. 
7.1.2 Summary of aims 
The primary aim of my research was to investigate the presence and role of patients’ 
preferences in post-diagnostic prostate cancer treatment appointments and explore the 
implications for SDM. As such, my research question was: How do patients’ preferences 
shape treatment discussions in decision-making appointments? I aimed to explore how, if at 
all, the ways that patients and clinicians talked about patients’ preferences might be 
consequential for treatment decision-making conversations. To achieve this aim, I broke 
down the research into smaller aims. As such, my specific aims were as follows:  
1) To identify where, and how, talk about patients’ preferences occurred in the appointments   
2) To investigate how patients interactively constructed their preferences 
3) How talk about preferences got organized as part of the appointments 
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4) How preferences were consequential for the decision-making business of the appointments  
These aims might sound generic enough to generalise across interactions, so it is necessary to 
contextualise and highlight the specificity of my research. I note also that these aims make no 
mention of laughter, as while this became a research question it was one that developed 
within the existing framework of aims. I was interested in where, and how, talk about 
patients’ preferences occurred in prostate cancer treatment appointments. As such, the 
medical context was of an illness with equivocal treatment efficacy and no gold standard 
treatment (Zeliadt, 2006; Xiong et al., 2014) and the institutional context was one of making 
a highly preference-sensitive decision (Shirk et al., 2017). The research was designed to 
collect audio recordings of prostate cancer treatment appointments and subsequently analyse 
these recordings with discursive psychology, which has not, to my knowledge, previously 
appeared in the published literature. As such, I aimed to make contributions to the healthcare 
interaction and SDM literature by revealing the interactive work and discursive devices and 
actions that constituted and were entailed by discussing and the construction and handling of 
patients’ preferences. An additional consideration is that the clinicians in these appointments 
were CNSs, who are an understudied population in decision-making and language and social 
interaction research.  
Identifying where talk about patients’ preferences occurred was a consistent aim throughout 
the chapters but was explored most clearly in chapter 4, which concerned the act of 
constructing patients’ preferences. There was also a concurrent focus on the investigation of 
how patients interactively construct recognisable preferences in chapter 4. In chapter 5 the 
focus fell more squarely on how talk about preferences got organized as part of the 
appointments by considering the way that CNSs received patients’ preferences. The 
consequences of patients’ preferences were also at the forefront of chapter 5 since it focused 
also on the way that patients’ preferences were handled after receipt. Chapter 6 focused less 
obviously on patients’ preferences because the analysis concerned the production and 
function of laughter in these treatment appointments. Laughter was not a topic I had 
previously identified for a research question, and as such emerged from a process of 
responding to recurring phenomena in the data called unmotivated looking (Psathas, 1995, p. 
45). Patients’ preferences were key to chapter 6 however, as analysis explored the possibility 
of laughter performing a tacit kind of preference construction work in addition to a resource 
for sanctioning sequential progress. 
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Unmotivated looking (Psathas, 1995, p. 45) is the practice of approaching data without 
prespecified aims and noticing the phenomena that recurs. For instance, while I investigated a 
series of post-diagnostic prostate cancer appointments, I identified a surprising quantity of 
laughter across the dataset. Laughter was an unexpected topic that I came to without a prior 
interest or objective. Recurrent phenomena subsequently lead researchers to a collection of 
instances, which give direction to the development of the research question. As I cannot 
claim to have approached the data with no hint of an existing interest in patients’ preferences, 
it is worth contending that true unmotivated looking is not typically attainable in research on 
a specific institutional context such as healthcare interactions. Instead, I would assert that 
while my broader interest in this data preceded its collection, the specific research questions 
truly developed and were shaped by the data. Chapter 6 and the investigation of the 
production and function of laughter in appointments was a topic entirely responsive to 
recurrent instances in the dataset. Once an uncommon pattern of laughter distribution was 
observed, and a collection of interesting recurrent cases were gathered, the chapter became an 
investigation of how laughter was relevant for patients’ preferences and SDM. 
To achieve these aims I adopted the “package of topic, method, and theory” (Edwards, 2012, 
p. 427) of discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992). A discursive psychological 
approach was chosen for two reasons. For one, conversation analytic research had begun to 
show that ostensible SDM and preference behaviours could look different in practice. 
Namely, that eliciting or checking a patients’ preference could involve undermining or 
arguing against the patient via rhetorical moves (Landmark et al., 2016, 2017), and non-
language and social interaction approaches had missed this revelation. While the 
conversation analytic work was instructive, it did leave a clear space for a discursive 
psychological contribution to explore preferences as a psychological constructed 
phenomenon. The second reason was that the focus on both the constructive power and 
action-orientation of talk-in-interaction in discursive psychology (Wiggins, 2016, p. 9) made 
it a clear choice for the psychological phenomenon of patients’ preferences. There is a track 
record of discursive psychology having been used to good effect on similar topics such as 
attitudes and opinions (Puchta & Potter, 2002). Constructs such as these have been shown as 
interactively produced and subject to local conversational organization rather than 
straightforwardly existing out there as standardised absolutes.  
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7.1.3 Summary of analytic findings by chapter  
I argue that among the observations made about the data and appointments there are three 
particularly worthy of emphasis. The first key takeaway is that patients’ preferences were 
indeed often constructed, whether these were extended projects or short cases of accounting 
for a simple preference. Second among takeaways was that patients’ preferences were 
received and handled in two distinct ways by CNSs seemingly responsive to the complexity 
of the implications of the preference. Third was that decisions and decision-making were 
oriented to variously depending on the placement in the interaction and encounter. As such, I 
could observe a temporal story whereby preference construction would occur within and 
across a sequence of appointments and parties’ orientations to decision-making took distinct 
forms. One form was acknowledging a decision needed to be made or orienting to a decision 
previously made in principle. The other orientation was to turn-by-turn articulating a 
preference and negotiating an outcome. 
Considering a central driver of my rationale was disparities between conceptual notions and 
actual observable preferences, the first analytical chapter investigated the construction of 
preferences. This chapter explored the ways that patients were observably constructing 
preferences and the organization of and forms that patients’ construction projects took. It 
became clear, then, that patients’ preferences could not be reduced to simple notions like 
stable opinions or positive evaluations of one treatment option over others. This analysis 
found three distinct patterns of preference construction. The first was closest to that 
anticipated by SDM models. Patients expressed a firm preference such as “you want it 
gone [as simple as th]at” (extract 4.4, line 11), about surgery as the preferred 
treatment, and the interactive work of construction primarily revolved around accounting for 
and legitimising the preference. For example, a patient would provide an upshot (Heritage & 
Watson, 1979) of a previous appointment that characterised it as having appropriately 
informed them to the extent that they were presenting an informed preference (Elwyn et al., 
2017). The second pattern of preference construction saw patients engaged in complex 
interactive work involving distinct discursive devices and conversational acts. Emotion 
categories and emotional states (Edwards, 1997) or mental states and cognitive processes in 




As such, patients might hint at a preferred option by, for instance, suggesting that they were 
thinking of a treatment option without naming it (extract 4.5) or prefer to avoid a treatment 
due to fearing a core aspect of a treatment procedure (extract 4.6). The third distinct pattern 
was when patients would appeal to prior medical experiences as a means of working up 
epistemic entitlement to a preference as part of its construction. In this pattern, one patient 
referred to a surgical complication that they reportedly could never forget as a key driver in 
their preference for radiotherapy rather than surgery (extract 4.7). Another patient wove 
together a memory of their previous experiences with catheters and their father’s comparable 
experiences to firmly indicate that catheters would be dispreferred (extract 4.8). As such, 
there was clear variability in the ways that patients constructed preferences, and in the 
discursive devices and acts used, but these preferences were ultimately unified by the 
observation that they were indeed all interactively constructed.  
 
Although there was not an abundance of cases, and I am therefore mindful not to overclaim, I 
do wish to spotlight some of the discursive stake and accountability work observed in 
patients’ constructions. Patients were seen to engage in inoculation projects that either 
mitigated the possible claim of being invested in refusing a particular treatment option 
(extract 4.7 and surgery) or in accounting for a firm bur clear preference as something that 
merely brings relief (extract 4.2). In fact, the stake work largely appeared relevant to pre-
emptively avoiding a possibility that patients might be resisting a given treatment or in some 
way treatment-relevant information. There were also examples of accountability as 
something interactively ascribed (Potter, 2000, 2005), as the CNS claimed not to be 
particularly familiar with bleeding as a side effect in extract 4.9 and sought to minimise 
prospective possible accountability. We might consider, perhaps speculatively, that the stake 
and accountability work suggest various orientations in situ. One orientation to the 
responsibility for decision-making and another to CNSs as institutionally obliged to inform 
patients sufficiently. Furthermore, an orientation to an expectation that patients are to 
collaborate with clinicians to make a decision both parties can endorse and is ideally shaped 
by an informed preference (Charles et al., 1999; Elwyn et al., 2017). Both parties, then, might 
occasionally display sensitivity to the possibilities of accountability and responsibility but 





I observed in my second analytic chapter that patients’ preferences were broadly received by 
CNSs in two distinct ways. For one, preferences were received as unproblematic and treated 
as straightforwardly amenable to decision-making business and sequential progress. There 
was one arguably deviant case, as a misunderstanding was resolved by successful patient-side 
self-repair (extract 5.4; Schegloff et al., 1977), but otherwise patients’ preferences were 
received as straightforward or unproblematic. Being received as straightforward meant 
preferences were integrated into the appointments without issue or were put on the record 
unproblematically. The suggestion made for the receipt of preferences as straightforward was 
that these preferences had clear and stepwise sequential and practical implications, which 
might align with the institutional ordering of the interactions towards assent and ultimately a 
decision. It is crucial to clarify, however, that sophisticated interactive work went into the 
receipt and handling of even the most ostensibly straightforward or unproblematic 
preferences. Rendering a patient's preference as on the record, in extract 5.3 for example, 
included ascertaining whether it was initial or informed, orienting to the relative firmness of 
the preference, and performing subsequent business that reflected an orientation to decision-
making as an act for later. As with the construction of a clear but seemingly straightforward 
preference in chapter 4, receiving and handling a preference unproblematically entailed 
substantial interactive work.  
 
One thing to note is that preferences were received as challenging more often than they were 
treated as straightforward. Although it is hard to point to something specific in the data as 
explanatory, it may be interesting to consider whether the stage of decision-making trajectory 
was significant. That is, as decision-making is understood within NHS England as a 
distributed process, the sequential and medical contexts may not have been appropriate for 
ratifying a decision or preference; something typically done fairly immediately prior to 
treatment. One notable piece of language and social interaction research into decision-making 
work is worth remarking upon here, as it concerns this understanding of distributed decision-
making. Rapley (2008) argues that the decision-making process is one that shifts and 
develops across a series of appointments and encounters and is therefore distributed. 
Moreover, the decision is also distributed over the people involved in the decision-making 
process, it is not a singular, cognitive decision in the mind of the patient. Rapley’s (2008) 
argument draws on a series of research he has been involved in and makes a convincing case, 
albeit perhaps limited in scope. As such, my finding that decision-making might be oriented 




The second pattern observed was receiving and handling patients’ preferences as challenging 
and therefore not easy, or even possible, to integrate with the decision-making business of the 
appointment. Patients’ preferences were received as challenging when, for instance, they 
indicated a treatment option that was only a possibility rather than confirmed as available 
(extract 5.5). In this case of a preference for a conditional treatment option, the CNS invoked 
the institutional decision-making machinery of the multidisciplinary team to account for the 
possibility that the preferred treatment option might ultimately not be feasible. As such, the 
CNS had to work not to be heard to undermine or contest the patient’s preference while also 
making clear that this preference cannot be guaranteed to influence the overall treatment. One 
particularly interesting discursive act was something I referred to as doing impartiality after 
Sacks’ notion of “Doing “being ordinary”” (Sacks, 1984, p. 414).  
 
In cases where I considered CNSs to be doing impartiality, they engaged in glossing specific 
side effects as one among various possibilities (extract 5.7) or idiomatic responses such as a 
non-specific appeal that “each person is an individual”  (extract 5.6, line 17). In turn, 
receiving and handling patients’ preferences as challenging might be understood as a 
potentially delicate act, and as such it is notable that CNSs both worked to avoid implications 
of undermining preferences and merely providing all the information. The findings from this 
chapter also hinted at the possibility that the notion of preference-shaped decisions might be 
an oversimplification. That is, in addition to institutional constraints that cast preferences as 
impossible, CNSs engaged in discursive work around doing impartiality that restricted 
engagement with challenging preferences beyond their status as challenging. A point worth 
noting here is that historically a decision was considered shared irrespective of whether a 
treatment option was mutually preferred (Charles et al., 1997). As such, patients’ preferences 
have the interesting position of potentially being the single influential preference in a 
treatment decision or having no formal influence depending on which option is ultimately 
endorsed. A shared decision or decision-making sequence could involve a project that 
appears to push back against a patient’s preference or even rules it to be unfeasible despite 
the outward appearance of what might be considered paternalistic or exclusionary behaviour.  
 
Having investigated the construction of preferences and begun to reveal some of the ways 
that preferences were handled, my final analytic chapter explored the role of laughter in 
SDM. It is important to restate that I was not simply taking my existing research questions 
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into the data, and I came to the topic of laughter due to its surprising prevalence, especially 
on the side of the CNSs. Indeed, not only did I observe that both parties shared in reciprocal 
laughter, but that CNSs both took up invitations to laugh and invited patients to laugh. 
Essentially, the laughter produced in those cases approximated a positive preference by 
demonstrating the absence of issues and moving the interaction forward with an affective 
marker. The function of laughter was seen to be sanctioning progressivity either 
straightforwardly or through softening a potentially delicate moment over several turns.  
 
In straightforward cases, laughter functioned similarly to a receipt token by indicating that 
the business at hand was both understood and posed no threat to what the patient wants. With 
more complicated cases, the production of laughter was consistent with previous 
conversation analytic research into healthcare communication. That is, laughter was often 
produced to manage potentially delicate or poignant moments (Beach & Pricket, 2017). Often 
this production would include a buffer topic that would allow the sequential transformation 
from potentially delicate or sensitive to a “time out for pleasantries” (Jefferson, 1984, p. 351). 
Therefore, laughter could either sanction sequential progress when there were no threats to 
what the patient wanted, or it could allow interlocutors to take developing talk into a different 
interactional space. Once in this space, interlocutors could work through potential trouble and 
manage or avoid possible threats to decision-making business or patients’ preferences.  
 
7.2 Limitations of the research  
Before proceeding to the contributions that my findings make to research and practice, it is 
important to address possible limitations of my research. When applying for ethical approval, 
I stipulated an upper limit of 35 audio recordings for the research dataset. A total of 22 
recordings were made of 22 individual post-diagnostic prostate cancer treatment 
appointments in the same ambulatory outpatient setting. The dataset, then, was less than 
originally aimed for in terms of number of recordings and these recordings varied 
significantly in terms of length with a range of 10 to 90 minutes. Data collection proved 
difficult to achieve in a busy clinic, especially considering the professional responsibilities of 
participating CNSs that take priority over their voluntary data collection role. Indeed, 
although ethical approval was in place and a digital recorder provided by early October 2018 
the first recording was not taken until January 2019. Furthermore, data collection was unable 
to continue beyond March 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic and there was therefore not 
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scope to add to the dataset. That said, the data I did collect was a type that is extremely 
difficult to get and rarely collected, so each recording has novelty and value in this regard. 
Beyond novelty and difficulty, there was enough data to substantiate some of my analytic 
claims but not all of them.  
It is unclear, however, whether my initial upper limit would have been sufficient to 
substantiate all my analytic claims for the following three reasons. The first is that while 
these recordings were of post-diagnostic treatment appointments there was no guarantee that 
the conversation would feature preference talk. Appointments varied in tone and content from 
long sequences of information exchange to brief discussions about managing cancer or 
reiterating a decision awaiting ratification. Indeed, as mentioned throughout the thesis, 
decision-making in NHS England is understood as being distributed across both time and 
appointments. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to anticipate whether an appointment would 
contain any substantial preference or even treatment decision talk. Second, and related, was 
the variability in recording and appointment length with some recordings lasting between 10-
20 minutes and others between 60-90 minutes. Recording more appointments, then, could 
have produced a batch of recordings comprised of brief restatements of decisions-in-principal 
or extensive sequences of information exchange. As previously mentioned, neither of these 
scenarios guarantee preference talk. Being a distinct approach to the study of the social 
world, discursive psychology does not have fixed numerical criteria for dataset sufficiency. 
Rather, the process of attaining sufficiency might be considered more fluid and involve 
pragmatic sufficiency for substantiating analytic claims.  
While novelty and difficulty are relevant criteria for assessing a dataset, the fact remains that 
sufficiency for substantiating analytic claims remains the most important metric for judging 
the relative success of data collection. There are two considerations worth entertaining when 
we examine the dataset I collected. The first is that my chapter on laughter can be seen as 
having performed best on the metric of numerical sufficiency, as laughter was the most 
prevalent analytic foci throughout the data set. By contrast, preference construction and the 
handling of patients’ preferences were less frequent, but these phenomena are less 
commonplace in the vernacular than laughter and this raises a crucial point. The observation 
that patients’ preferences were indeed constructed was significant because it is something 
argued to occur in healthcare encounters (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010) that we have very 
little, if any, fine-grained observational evidence for. By contrast, the prominence of laughter 
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is significant because it runs counter to the research on laughter in healthcare encounters 
(West, 1984; Haakana, 2002; Beach & Prickett, 2017). The second is that other language and 
social interaction theses have reported datasets between 5.5 (Shaw, 2012; Flinkfeldt, 2016) to 
12.5 hours (Hofstetter, 2016). As such, my dataset of 9.65 hours falls within a historically 
acceptable range of dataset size for thesis submission.  
For preference construction, then, our first metric for significance and sufficiency is arguably 
weighted less towards numerical sufficiency because there are a finite number of 
opportunities to construct a preference. Moreover, the question of patients’ preferences as 
constructions concerns what these constructed preferences look like and how they come to be 
constructed. Laughter, however, is interesting in the first instance because research tells us 
we should not expect to find such prominence of laughter especially from CNSs. The 
preference construction analysis, then, needs to establish instances and a characterisation of a 
constructed preference or the construction process before I can entertain concerns about 
numerical sufficiency. With laughter, however, there needs to be sufficient numerical cases to 
be noticeable and then interesting relative to the historical patterns of prominence and 
distribution. Once this interest has been established, and the material is a candidate for further 
analytic interest, it can then be investigated in a similar way to the preference construction 
data. Indeed, the way that I became interested in laughter as part of this research was through 
its surprising prominence in the dataset; and only subsequently did I uncover its functionality 
for preference work.  
I will not pretend that numerical sufficiency is unimportant, but I would contend that my 
dataset was sufficient to substantiate some if not all my analytic claims. Indeed, the 
consideration most worth discussing is the strength of the dataset in answering the research 
questions and addressing the aims of the research. My position is that this dataset was 
sufficient to settle some key questions but not others and that such a position does not 
undermine the analytic work or claims made. For instance, this dataset shows that preferences 
are indeed something that patients interactively construct in situ (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 
2010). Furthermore, my analysis demonstrated that discursive psychological processes such 
as stake inoculation (Potter, 1996) and category entitlement (Edwards and Potter, 1992) 
affect the construction of patients’ preferences. The sequences wherein patients worked to 
construct their preferences were heterogeneous however, and I was unable to establish a 
taxonomy of preference construction. A larger data set may be required to establish a 
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taxonomy of preference construction, such as Schegloff’s (1996) suggestion of 50 or more 
cases for establishing an action as generic and reproducible. Similarly, while I was able to 
establish that the way clinicians receive and subsequently handle patients’ preferences was 
consequential for decision-making business, there may well be more to say with a larger 
collection. Again, it is necessary to restate that these numerical limitations in no way 
invalidate the analytic work or claims made, but rather emphasise that caution is taken when 
advancing these claims. 
Perhaps more relevant to discursive psychologists and conversation analysts is the decision to 
make audio recordings rather than video. There are scholars who might strongly favour the 
provision of video data, especially conversation analysts, to analyse the embodied behaviour 
of interlocutors. Now, this is of course a valid point and especially in contexts where one 
might presume to find substantial embodied behaviour or be particularly interested in 
multimodal analysis. For my research, however, there were factors that mitigated any desire 
to provide video recordings. For one, a sensitivity to the patients who were volunteering their 
participation in the research. Cancer treatment discussions are sensitive moments, which 
patients often share with companions such as spouses or relatives and can prove to be 
emotional encounters. Moreover, since research with the NHS is required to demonstrate 
public patient involvement, I was keen that this involvement shape and influence the research 
where possible. Making this influence possible entailed attempts to put patients’ concerns, 
suggestions, and privacy first which involved minimising the extent that patients were 
exposed or put out there.  
An additional practical consideration was the difficulty of relying on healthcare staff to set up 
recording equipment in a busy outpatient clinic setting. Audio recordings were easier to 
implement into the appointments and less disruptive since they simply required placing a 
digital recorder on the desk and pressing record. As such, it was decided that video 
recordings carried the risks of being unnecessarily invasive and requiring more extensive set 
up preparations. Indeed, while there might have been interesting considerations of embodied 
behaviour this was not judged to provide sufficient grounds to relax the delicate handling of 
sensitive moments. Again, the impact of the limitation here is primarily related to the broader 
implications of my findings. Although I have a suspicion that patients’ preferences both look 
like and are handled like they are in my analysis, this account cannot consider in detail any 
potential role or function of embodied behaviour. 
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The following is not strictly a limitation, and indeed follows from the conversation analytic 
tradition of unmotivated looking (Psathas, 1995, p. 45), but must be made restated before 
discussing the results further. That is, the recordings did not always yield talk about patients’ 
preferences. One possible reason for this was that the study recorded post-diagnostic prostate 
cancer treatment appointments. The issue here is that there can be considerable variability 
between appointments depending on their position in the decision-making trajectory. Patients 
do not have the same diagnostic journey nor the same readiness to discuss decisions at that 
appointment. It is likely that all appointments took place in the same diagnostic clinic, 
however. Even though the quantity of preference talk was variable, the research makes a 
strong novel contribution to the SDM and patients’ preferences literature. The analysis shows 
how complicated and messy decision-making is in situ; how preferences can take various 
forms distinct from the idea of eliciting preferred treatment. Indeed, even where the 
psychometric approach of survey batteries has been employed it has not been able to tame the 
messiness and complexity of SDM.  
An institutionalised care pathway, such as moving through appointments and clinician-led 
information exchange, does not change the fact that decision-making is messy and 
complicated. As such, there was no guarantee that appointments would contain substantial 
preference talk. I could have, for instance, written an interview schedule and asked former 
and current prostate cancer patients about their decision-making experiences and preferences. 
This approach would increase the likelihood that my data contained sustained talk about 
patients’ preferences, but it would not help answer questions about the interactive 
construction of patients’ preferences in situ. The dataset consists of conversations with one 
group of CNSs in one hospital in the UK. Moreover, these conversations are all with men, 
and we know from discursive psychology research that healthcare conversations are gendered 
(Seymour-Smith et al., 2002; Jeffries & Grogan, 2012). In the future it might be instructive to 
see how these conversations proceed with different clinicians, different stages of cancer, and 
in different places. For instance, prostate cancer, is not always appropriate for curative 
treatment, as when the cancer metastasises and spreads then the discussion of options 
becomes one about managing and living with cancer. Both treatment discussions and talk 
about preferences have scope to vary substantially even within the broader context of cancer 
care, then, which is to say nothing of the distinction between inpatient, outpatient, and 
palliative care interactions. 
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Finally, there are of course limitations to discursive psychology, as with all approaches to 
social sciences research. One of the main limitations is the way that discursive psychology 
approaches research questions that are more typical of mainstream psychology. That is, I 
would not expect to effectively answer questions about any predictive relationships between 
the type of interactive conduct captured in my analysis and the quality of SDM thereafter 
(Wiggins, 2016). As such, if I wished to investigate the effect of a training intervention 
centred around affective displays of laughter in decision-making appointments, I would not 
attempt to do so with discursive psychology. Instead, I would require an interaction systems 
approach, ideally the Roter interaction analysis system (Roter & Larson, 2002) to coherently 
address this question. Indeed, there is space for an interested researcher to conduct this exact 
research if they wished to pursue the findings from my third analytic chapter. Furthermore, 
my focus on the action-orientation of talk ahead of its propositional content also means that 
my findings are highly specific. As such, while I could broadly discuss the propositional 
content among my analyses, I could not answer questions about, for instance, the type of 
preference talk that took place. I would therefore look for researchers in broader qualitative 
traditions so that we might supplement each other’s work in furnishing a full and detailed 
picture of patients’ preferences in situ.  
Being an approach to the study of language and social interaction that largely avoids 
questions of theory and ideology means that the focus of discursive psychology falls squarely 
on the empirical observation of interactive and discursive practices and acts. Now, this is a 
particular strength for my specific research, but is restrictive in a broader sense. Even 
researchers within language and social interaction traditions take broader positions and wish 
to address “issues of ideology and power in psychology” (Parker, 2002, p. 1). I also remarked 
earlier that discursive psychology typically avoids research interviews, so if researchers were 
interested in the propositional content of interviews or focus groups with patients about their 
experience of treatment decision-making appointments, they would be better suited to an 
alternative approach such as thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
 
7.3 Contributions to research and practice 
 




My analysis revealed empirical examples of the disparity between the theorised notions and 
practical realities of patients’ preferences and SDM that the extant literature suggests. For 
one, patients’ preferences were indeed often interactively constructed in situ (Elwyn and 
Miron-Shatz, 2010) and patients did mobilise distinct discursive devices for construction 
projects (Wiggins, 2016, p. 146). These observations, then, deviate from the simplistic notion 
of preference elicitation in SDM models, which is a disparity that Landmark et al. (2016) had 
already revealed could involve unfavourable paraphrases of patients’ stances to occasion on-
the-record preferences. Patients’ preferences were seen to be responsive to past medical 
experiences, new information in situ, and claims of entitlement to knowledge (Potter, 1996; 
Heritage, 2012a, 2012b). As such, preferences were heterogeneous and did not present as a 
stable phenomenon that could be easily substituted for opinions or attitudes (Elwyn and 
Miron-Shatz, 2010) or mapped onto a decision-aid (Joseph-Williams et al., 2017).  
 
Together, this analysis contributes both to the SDM and patients’ preferences literature and 
the language and social interaction literature. To the latter it contributes the first discursive 
psychological study of patients’ preferences in situ, bringing a psychological focus to a topic 
with sustained conversation analytic interest (Land et al., 2017). For the former, the 
contribution is the first examples of what a constructed preference can look like in practice, 
and characterisation of some of the ways that preference construction can occur. In so doing, 
the research extends the work on preferences as constructions by showing how construction 
gets done publicly, moment-by-moment, through talk-in-interaction. Furthermore, how 
preferences can look messy or hinted at, especially when construction is an extended or 
halting process. The unexpected focus on laughter in chapter 6 provided a particularly 
insightful contribution. For one, the laughter analysis contributed to research into SDM and 
patients’ preferences with the findings about positive preferences and sanctioning progress. 
Beyond this contribution, the findings are also insightful for both institutional conversation 
analytic research and research on laughter as a social action. 
 
While SDM literature often treated patients’ preferences as stable phenomena rather than 
constructions (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010), it did also suggest that preference shaped shared 
decisions should be made where possible (Elwyn et al., 2012, 2017). Findings from chapter 5, 
however, revealed that even preference sensitive choices such as prostate cancer treatment 
decisions (Shirk et al., 2017) did not presuppose simple preference involvement. Rather, 
patients’ preferences were subject to distinct forms of receipt and handling depending on the 
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commitments they entailed. For instance, preferences that suggested a decision-in-principle 
or were consistent with the clinical recommendation for surgery were often handled as 
straightforwardly amenable to decision-making business. By contrast, preferences that 
implied a commitment to avoiding specific side effects or invasive treatment procedures were 
handled as a challenge or barrier to the decision-making business. Therefore, whether in-
between the stages of initial and informed preferences (Elwyn et al., 2017) or in the pursuit of 
a preference shaped shared decision there might be an underreported negotiation of patients’ 
preferences.  
 
This finding again adds to the work of Landmark and colleagues (2017) by demonstrating 
that patients’ preferences were not simply received into the decision-making process but 
could be contested if inconsistent with clinical recommendations. While Landmark and 
colleagues’ (2017) findings suggested that terms such as eliciting and checking were 
insufficient, my results suggest that the notion of preference-shaped may be an 
oversimplification. A preference being constructed was not straightforwardly treated as 
sufficient to influence decision-making. Rather, preferences came up against institutional 
constraints, and when understood as challenging, preferences were precluded from shaping 
the decision towards “what patients want from their healthcare” (Street et al., 2012, p. 168). 
Clinical nurse specialists would inoculate themselves, and perhaps move to resist or preclude 
claims of responsibility for constraints or impediments to preferences, by claiming an 
inability to guarantee a preference or that individual variability was too high or rule out 
preferences via medical knowledge when unfeasible. 
 
With the findings from chapter five, there is another possible contribution worth considering, 
which is that SDM did not consistently follow the path one might expect. In particular, the 
observation of handling sequences for patients’ preferences defied expectations for SDM. 
These handling sequences often put patients in the position of either choosing between 
dispreferred options or between available curative treatments and monitoring the cancer. 
Now, these decisions could technically be considered preference shaped, as patients might 
prefer curative treatment to monitoring or managing their cancer. However, the position of 
the patient is functionally one of assenting to the least disprefered treatment option, foregoing 
curative treatment, or relinquishing deontic authority entirely. The extent of any work 
concerning preference construction or engagement with a constructed preference was 
typically a discussion about why it is unlikely, unfeasible, or uncertain. In turn, the notion of 
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a truly preference shaped shared decision comes under question or could at least be 
considered worthy of further scrutiny. The caveat, of course, is that a decision is considered 
shared if each party agrees to the course of action, irrespective of whether it is mutually 
preferred (Charles et al., 1997).  
 
The constraints on the patient were not the only noteworthy disparity between expectation 
and observation, however, as CNSs were also constrained in the receipt and handling of 
patients’ preferences. When patients expressed a preference to avoid urinary incontinence, or 
avoid injections in hormone therapy, there was little to nothing that CNSs could do with that 
preference. On a sequential level, there is an obligation to provide an appropriate response, 
such as a second-pair part (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) irrespective of the feasibility of the 
preference. While on institutional grounds there is an imperative to prevent or minimise risk 
and ensure that patients make informed decisions. In turn, ruling out unfeasible preferences 
or making patients aware that they may need to prepare for a different treatment is good 
institutional practice. Fundamentally, CNSs were unable to bring these preferences to bear on 
treatment decisions because they were not actionable possibilities. These CNSs, then, were 
caught between SDM in name and SDM in practice, which came into tension with each other. 
This tension is likely uncomfortable because it often entailed dispreffered sequential 
responses pertaining to patients’ requests in the form of preference statements.  
 
In terms of the hallmarks of SDM, then, both patients and CNSs were constrained in the 
aspects that they could perform. The actual work and interactions that occurred were limited 
and the roles and contributions each party could make was functionally restricted. Obviously, 
an impossible preference presents an opportunity for intersubjective and sequential 
breakdown, and there is a need for a device or strategy that allows relatively straightforward 
exit from such a conversational impasse. In my analysis I observed that while not seamless, 
CNSs typically appealed to a presentation of doing impartiality, that glossed a discussion of 
an impossible preference as, for instance, “just talking about options” (extract 5.8, line 
11). Patients typically were not the ones seeking exit from these impasses, which might 
reflect either the firmness of their preference or an orientation to the institutional expectation 
that CNSs lead the interaction. When combined with the tension between sequential and 
institutional obligations, the CNSs are recurrently put into uncomfortable positions at the 




It is worth discussing the phenomenon of patients’ impossible preferences and the related act 
of doing impartiality further. The reason for further discussion is that I wish to suggest 
patients’ impossible preferences posed the issue for decision-making that I expected clinical 
equipoise to pose. Clinical equipoise is often invoked to mark prostate cancer treatment 
decisions as being particularly preference sensitive (Shirk et al., 2017). This equipoise exists 
because there is equivalent effectiveness across curative prostate cancer treatments (Zeliadt et 
al., 2006; Xiong et al., 2014). An expectation for prostate cancer treatment decisions, then, is 
that equipoise will present a problem for patients who wish to receive the best treatment. The 
finding that there were few orientations to clinical equipoise across the decision-making 
conversations that I analysed was therefore striking. Where equipoise might have presented a 
problem for CNSs, such as having to explain the absence of a gold standard treatment, the 
problem was instead often patients’ impossible preferences. Indeed, there was evidence of a 
clinical recommendation for surgery, which was both oriented to and communicated 
informally by the CNSs. This clinical recommendation therefore helped avoid the potential 
problem of equipoise by way of providing a point to which both parties could orient and 
make sense of the suggestion. I must note, however, that CNSs did have to resist giving 
decision-implicative advice when patients asked which treatment they should get, although 
this only happened in one recording.  
 
What I instead observed was patients producing impossible preferences that CNSs could 
neither guarantee the influence of nor sanction for decision-making. In turn, CNSs went on to 
do impartiality to manage the difficulty of being caught between the sequential obligation to 
produce a second-pair part response and the institutional obligation to rule out unfeasible 
options. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, I wish to suggest both that patients' 
impossible preferences might be a, if not the, primary problem of prostate cancer treatment 
decision-making and that this is a novel contribution to research. Such a claim is predicated 
on the belief that, to my knowledge, the issue of impossible preferences is neither prominent 
in models of SDM nor the SDM literature. While there might be an implicit understanding of 
impossible preferences, this is something that ought to be clear and central in any SDM 
discussion. Furthermore, I would also suggest that there is no reason in principle to suppose 
that impossible preferences and doing impartiality might not transfer to other tumour sites. 
 
For one, the reduced prominence of clinical equipoise, and evidence for a clinical 
recommendation brings my findings closer to other cancers that are marked less by 
 
 268 
preference sensitivity. Second, it is reasonable to suggest that clinicians both wish, and 
attempt, to make the best decisions for patients. Decisions that reflect and are shaped by what 
patients want. However, when patients voice an impossible preference, this presents a real 
problem for clinicians who can do little to nothing with the preference and are constrained in 
how to respond. Not only is it difficult to make the decision in concert with the patient’s 
preference, but it is also difficult to respond in a way that satisfies the sequential and 
institutional obligations that are in tension with each other. It is not, then, a leap to imagine 
that other cancers might present similar scenarios when clinicians attempt to face down 
impossible preferences while facilitating preference shaped shared decisions. 
 
A striking and very interesting point here is that treatment decision-making, in many 
instances, includes the weighing of uncertainty. I previously referred to this uncertainty as 
raw uncertainty, which differs from the imaginary notion of precise risk that clinicians might 
wish that they could give to patients. For instance, a 50% risk of incontinence but a 90% 
chance of cure. Indeed, to remain with the example of incontinence in extract 5.7 the patient 
was simply told that there is a risk of incontinence and that the CNS could not be more 
specific. As with impossible preferences, uncertainty was met with doing impartiality since 
CNSs were constrained in their possible responses to patients’ requests. As such, the degree 
of risk was not a frequent topic in the decision-making conversations that I analysed. This 
absence is notable because it is a factor that might influence the construction and subsequent 
role of patients’ preferences in the treatment appointments. In models of SDM risk is 
typically associated with options and subsequently information about risk tends to get 
communicated at those points of the appointment. The three talk model, for instance, located 
risk communication in the section of option talk dedicated to describing patients’ options 
(Elwyn et al., 2012, p. 1364). Patients can probably access information on risk outside of 
appointments, but this does not change the fact that the understanding of risk in the 
conversations was imprecise. 
  
Crucially, the authors remarked that they “lack a measure to assess proficiency in risk 
communication” (Elwyn et al., 2012, p. 1366). Risk communication was therefore deemed an 
area that might improve with more specific and refined instruments. The issue of assessment 
is one that I am mindful to engage with on its own terms and I will therefore not suggest a 
particular standardised tool. Rather, while measurement assessments might be practicable 
tools for clinicians, it is worth recalling that standardised pathways to decision-making have 
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not proved particularly fruitful, especially regarding patients’ preferences. Clinicians, then, 
might simply need to be encouraged to do their best when communicating the risks to 
patients and attempt to soften this raw uncertainty by discussing the practical reality and 
consequences further with patients. Indeed, perhaps being especially responsive to the points 
that patients react or respond to, to tailor the communication to the points that patients make 
relevant and important. A possibly critical consideration, however, is that clinicians might not 
wish to be held accountable for negative side effects, especially when they cannot speak with 
statistical certainty. Shared decision-making, then, might be a means to ensure that the 
responsibility of the outcome rests with the patient. Indeed, the findings from chapter 5 
revealed much in the way of appeals to doing impartiality as a device that CNSs used to 
present side effects as consequences that they might not be held accountable for. 
 
I have written previously about clinicians possibly engaging more with patients about aspects 
such as uncertainty and the options here are indeed limited. My earlier suggestion was to 
attempt further discussions of the hopes, fears, and uncertainties that patients bring to the 
appointment. In turn, clinicians could go beyond some of the more limited or contingent 
explanatory talk about, for example, side effect likelihoods and try to get to the heart of what 
animates a preference towards a treatment or effect. This discussion might look something 
like extract 4.7 where the patient details their adverse experience with invasive surgery. 
Although the sequence is not occasioned by talk about risks, the patient uses the interactional 
space afforded to them to provide rich detail about their preference to avoid surgery and 
receive radiotherapy. By contrast, the extract 5.7 discussion of incontinence is an example of 
an opportunity for clinicians to get to the heart of the issue. Indeed, to possibly come upon a 
point of insight that is particularly instructive, reassuring, or convincing for the patient. While 
such a discussion would not lead to perfect risk communication nor guarantee a preference-
shaped decision, it would increase patient involvement, offer more opportunities to provide 
tailored risk communication, and foreground the issues important to the patient. 
  
7.3.2 Contributions to the study of laughter in healthcare interaction 
 
Laughter might have been a surprising subject for my final analytic chapter, but the findings 
contribute to both the conversation analytic and the SDM and patients’ preferences literature. 
First, the distribution pattern of laughter production was distinct from the typical one 
established in West’s influential monograph on healthcare communication Routine 
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Complications (1984). That is, unlike in West’s and subsequent authors’ work, I observed 
that CNSs would both actively invite and reciprocate laughter rather than rarely take up 
invitations. This finding is noteworthy because previous research suggests that healthcare 
professionals treat invitations to laugh as inappropriate and typically decline them (Haakana, 
2001, 2002). One explanation offered for this declination was that the institutional role might 
be characterised as possessing a professional quality that renders laughter hearable as 
unprofessional (Haakana, 2002). Indeed, Haakana reported in that same study that 
practitioners instead produced smiley voice as an emotive alternative. In cancer consultations 
also practitioners were not routinely seen to treat invitations to laugh as appropriate nor did 
they typically reciprocate laughter (Beach & Prickett, 2017).   
 
One potential parallel for my findings, however, is a study of gynaecological appointments, 
where the author observed reciprocal laughter and verbal play between patient and 
practitioners as resources for the prosocial function of face-saving work and the 
accomplishment of the appointment goals (Ragan, 1990). There might be a similarity, then, 
when one considers the intimacy of anatomy involved with prostate cancer and 
gynaecological appointments. In turn, there might be similar scope for laughter to serve 
prosocial and face-saving functions in prostate cancer treatment appointments. Perhaps most 
notable in my findings, however, is simply that CNSs did not typically orient to laughter as 
inappropriate or unprofessional. Indeed, not only did CNSs initiate and reciprocate laughter, 
but they engaged in buffer topics (Jefferson, 1984) to soften potential delicate moments 
thereby using laughter as an interactional resource for decision-making business. Crucially 
patients did not typically orient to CNSs’ laughter as inappropriate or unprofessional either, 
which suggests that there may be cases or moments where laughter can straightforwardly 
serve a decision-making purpose. 
 
Another contribution to research on laughter in healthcare interactions that is consequential 
also for SDM is the possible preference work of laughter. That is, the analysis in chapter 6 
suggested that patients’ laughter could approximate a positive preference in its function of 
sanctioning sequential progress. I found that in sequential positions where an 
acknowledgement token or alternative display of affirmative recipiency was expected, the 
patient could instead laugh. At these junctures, the functional requirement from a healthcare 
institution perspective would be a clear affirmation that there is no problem with the business 
at hand. While a clinician could attempt to prompt this affirmation via a question, this is not 
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necessarily straightforward considering the heterogeneous and ongoing construction of 
preference. Therefore, the production of laughter could serve as a display that there is no 
trouble and no threat to “what patients want from their healthcare” (Street et al., 2012, p. 
168). In turn, an unobtrusive way of sanctioning progressivity might also be relevant for 
checking or re-establishing the current state of developing preference work. Furthermore, as 
the idea of preferences as unfolding constructions might sound challenging, having this 
approximate positive preference could be a useful guide for clinicians. Although this insight 
is a snapshot of preference work it does contribute to filling out the idea of preferences as 




Patients drew on various resources to construct their preferences that ranged from prior 
lifeworld experiences to new information in situ. Further to these resources, patients also 
used distinct discursive devices such as category entitlements (Edwards & Potter, 1992), 
reported speech (Holt, 1996), and emotion categories (Edwards, 1997). As such, preferences 
were heterogeneous and did not take the same shape across patients despite the recognisable 
similarity of arising in situ from an interactive construction process. Crucial, also, is that I do 
not have enough cases to confidently assert that there are successful and unsuccessful 
patterns of preference construction. If replicated, these findings suggest that while patients’ 
preferences can draw on previous experiences, including previous medical experiences, they 
ultimately become constructed, and recognisable as preferences in situ. In turn, while we 
might suggest that encouraging patients to formulate their preferences as clearly as possible 
might be a useful solution, we can neither take this for granted nor presume effectiveness.  
 
For one, patients produced preferences at different points in the appointments, some only 
being formulated in response to new information. Indeed, the core of the argument that 
preferences are constructed is that these preferences develop over time and are responsive to 
new options and information (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010). Therefore, while it might be 
instructive if patients were able to provide clear preference formulations, it might not always 
be advantageous. For one, I demonstrated that patients’ preferences received as challenging 
were often handled in a way that precluded their influence on the treatment decision in 
chapter five. We would also need, then, what might be referred to as reflexive interviewing 
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on the part of CNSs that allows for both sustained active listening and continued engagement 
with the opportunities for preference talk and formulations that indicate preference 
construction. Therefore, the notion of preference elicitation might not be understood as 
singularly conducive to getting a preference from a patient. Rather, the preference would be 
attended to over the appointment, and perhaps into other appointments, in its incipiency and 
various shapes. 
  
Of course, this might not be simple in practice, as asking CNSs to be more reflexive 
interviewers might sound nebulous. Indeed, it is necessary to clarify that by reflexive 
interviewing, I mean being attuned to the ongoing interactive work of construction that 
patients are engaged in throughout the appointment and being responsive in tailoring the 
information that patients receive in response. Therefore, I would also recommend providing 
examples of, and a guide to, the ostensibly messy and halting ways that patients construct 
preferences. Being able to see the pieces of talk-in-interaction, and discursive resources, that 
comprise the construction of preferences could be crucial for making this claim intelligible 
and the recommendation actionable. In being a more reflexive interviewer there is also space 
to draw on the findings of my final analytic chapter. That being, the production of laughter as 
sanctioning progressivity by approximating positive preference and managing potentially 
delicate or sensitive moments.  
 
I observed that laughter was not routinely treated as inappropriate by CNSs but rather 
understood by the parties as useful for the business at hand. Indeed, the finding that CNSs 
participated in buffer topics and utilised the “time out for pleasantries” (Jefferson, 1984, p. 
351) they afford is a positive one. As Ragan (1990) reported in her study of gynaecological 
appointments the production and reciprocation of laughter can serve prosocial and face-
saving functions. When one considers that prominent side effects of prostate cancer include 
erectile dysfunction and urinary incontinence, there might be recourse to consider laughter as 
a resource to serve similar functions. The suggestion is not that laughter ought to be used to 
deflect or be inappropriately produced without relevant sequential or institutional 
occasioning. Rather, the use of buffer topics (Jefferson, 1984) in the appointments and 
laughter as a resource for managing potential delicate moments imply that laughter could be 





Within conversation analysis there is a form of training called the Conversation Analytic 
Roleplaying Method (Stokoe, 2014) that uses real examples of institutional interactions as 
educational materials. The benefit of that approach is, of course, that it moves away from 
simulated talk to observations of what observably occurs in these encounters and what they 
look like in practice. With patients’ preferences having little in the way of empirical 
observation there would be a clear benefit in providing examples of and insights about the 
construction of preferences and their subsequent shape in situ. This exposure to observations 
and examples might help establish familiarity with the notion of preferences as constructed 
and awareness of the forms that construction and preferences can take. Without providing 
examples the idea of construction may continue to sound vague or difficult to visualise. 
Similarly, simply showing examples without exposition does little more than suggest proof of 
concept. It is the combination of examples from practice and an intelligible characterisation 
of the interactive work and consequences in situ that might prove useful. As with any 
recommendation rooted in language and social interaction, however, it is worth remembering 
that there is no conversational magic bullet to fix issues definitively (Pilnick & Dingwall, 
2011). Indeed, there would remain much to do if the desire was to improve the quality of 
patient preference involvement in decision-making and accomplish routine SDM. 
  
I now wish to discuss the appropriateness of the term patients’ preferences and the main 
reason for this is that patients were not always able to have what they wanted. In turn, it was 
unlikely that they could make a truly preference-shaped shared decision regardless of any 
collaborative work that might follow. One of the striking findings of my research was that 
patients’ preferences were received and handled differently depending on the commitments 
they entailed and their sequential implications. The result of this receipt and handling pattern 
was that patients with ostensibly complex or challenging preferences were told their 
preferences were unfeasible and unable to influence treatment decision-making. Preferences 
received as challenging entailed a sequence, often extended, to account for the receipt of this 
preference as difficult or unfeasible. One tentative suggestion would be to attempt more 
engagement with patients about their preferences and alternatives when they are more 
complicated or a challenge for the encounter. This, of course, would be in the context of 
providing an alternative to or going further than the interactive work of explaining why the 




Going beyond explanations of why a preference is challenging and discussing the reality of 
the situation with the patient and their concerns and questions. For instance, if patients 
display, or state outright, a dispreference towards incontinence, such as in extract 5.7, then 
attempt to discuss this issue further with the patient. Of course, the patient may not wish to go 
into detail, but I would consider an attempt at further preference-specific discussion more 
proactive than attempts at impartiality and matter-of-fact glossing of something as sensitive 
as side effects. Of course, I accept that a preference to avoid incontinence is an impossible 
preference and as such there are very real constraints on what can practically be 
accomplished. Furthermore, the fact that CNSs do inform patients that they may or may not 
experience specific side effects is clearly valuable information relevant for any preference-
shaped decision that might incorporate patients’ preferences. That said, when we return to 
extract 5.7, we see a breakdown in intersubjectivity tied to the misalignment between the 
patient’s firm preference and the CNS’s attempts at doing impartiality (lines 10-14). Indeed, 
the breakdown is only restored by the CNS’s discursive act of packaging incontinence as one 
of the category-bound activities side effects of the category prostate cancer (Sacks, 1992, vol. 
1, p. 248-251); remarking that it is unfortunate, but side effects are bound up with prostate 
cancer.  
 
Of course, it is crucial to explain to patients why their preference might be unworkable or 
unattainable. That said, an explanation for why a preference is unfeasible does little to bring 
patients closer to a preference-shaped decision. Patients might, then, still report 
disappointment with their choice, or even decisional conflict in having to choose between 
two dispreferred options. Therefore, when a patient voices their strong dispreference towards 
incontinence, for instance, one could go beyond explaining why this might be unfortunately 
unavoidable. For example, ask the patient if they wish to discuss the preference further or to 
expand on what they consider to be its potential impact. Patients might not always take up the 
offer but providing this opportunity for outreach might be valuable for increasing patient 
involvement as a counterpoint to the limited influence of their stated preference. Engaging 
further with patients about the reality of their decision-making preferences may provide an 
opportunity to reduce decisional conflict or increase a sense that their preference has shaped 
or contributed to the decision-making encounter. That is, shifting the dynamics of the 
conversation by moving away from the felt preferences to objective knowledge in the hope 
that this is ultimately useful or meaningful for engaging with the patient’s preference. 
Examples might include leaving a patient feeling particularly well informed or engaging in 
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dialogue that answers hitherto unspoken questions about the impact of their probable 
treatment option. 
 
If we accept the claim that concepts such as preference elicitation have insufficiencies and 
that there are institutional constraints on patients’ preferences, then we must address what 
that means for modelling and implementing SDM. I have argued that preferences are crucial 
to SDM partly because of their prevalence in models and definitions (Makoul & Clayman, 
2006) and partly because there are many occasions where the choice is broader than 
treatment or no treatment. Now, if we accept that patients’ preferences are indeed constructed 
in situ, and do not take the form that clinicians might imagine, then this creates an issue for 
modelling and attempting SDM. In particular, the issue is that the handling of patients’ 
preferences can reasonably be expected to follow from the conceptualisation and modelling 
of the concept. This, then, means that patients’ preferences need to be clearly defined as 
constructions in models of SDM and characterised accordingly. That is, to provide an 
explanation of what the term constructed means in relation to patients’ preferences and the 
context of treatment decision-making. Additional information such as the heterogeneity of 
both construction projects and preference formulations, pending further empirical evidence, 
would make further insightful additions.  
 
Indeed, in chapter 5 I proposed a candidate definition of patients’ preferences that was 
specifically responsive to the assertion that they are constructions (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 
2010), and I will restate that candidate definition here. Patients’ preferences are constructed 
phenomena that they render visible in their healthcare encounters responsive to their 
healthcare values, available treatment options, and information from their clinician. 
Moreover, these constructions are comprised of such wide-ranging discursive devices as 
appeals to prior medical experiences, characterisations of previous medical appointments, 
and invocations of emotional and cognitive states as explanatory components. Being a 
provisional definition based on a single dataset, albeit supplemented by extant theoretical and 
empirical literature, this definition might mutate before it ever, if it ever, gains traction. There 
is, then, substantial space for refinement and development both in terms of specificity and 
lucidity but also responsiveness to and grounding in further empirical observational research 




Without clinicians acting as institutional gatekeepers, patients’ preferences simply exist in the 
abstract awaiting rulings as to any possible influence on final treatment decisions. In this 
regard, we are fortunate that a contemporary model, the Implement-SDM model (Joseph-
Williams et al., 2019) is perhaps the best placed to adopt this usage and transition 
successfully. For one, the Implement-SDM model subsumed a simple but practicable guide to 
SDM as entailing intuitive stages of talk originally proposed in the three talk model (Elwyn et 
al., 2017). As such, the insertion of a definition of patients’ preferences as constructions in 
the decision talk section, being focused on preferences, would be sensible and unintrusive. 
Secondly, the acknowledgement of deliberation as being a key process for the evaluation of 
the pros and cons of treatment options is helpful here. Again, this characterization can be 
expanded to include patients’ preferences as a key aspect of this deliberation process and 
linked closely to the pros and cons of treatment options. The use of an empirical 
observational approach, albeit at a less granular level of detail, also lends the Implement-
SDM model (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019) readiness to adopt this usage.  
 
In largely taking on and developing the three talk model (Elwyn et al., 2017), the Implement-
SDM model also makes use of initial and informed preferences. This conception of patients’ 
preferences is also amenable to my observation that preferences were indeed constructed in 
situ and would not require substantial change. Of course, my finding that preferences can be 
constructed haltingly or even hinted at is hard to account for in any standardised fashion. On 
this point I would suggest that this characterisation of patients’ preferences as potentially 
haltingly or even obliquely constructed is included in models of SDM. Furthermore, that 
clinicians are encouraged to be alert to these forms of preferences and processes of 
construction where possible. I also believe that it would be instructive to provide illustrative 
examples of the ways that patients accounted for preferences and indicative decisions. For 
instance, it might be easier to understand that a patient characterised a previous appointment 
in a particular way to indicate that they have an informed preference if this is possibility is 
suggested in SDM materials.  
 
One of the advantages that the three talk model had was an acknowledged that SDM entails a 
“complex dynamic interpersonal communication process” (Elwyn et al., 2012, p. 6) and “a 
fluid transition between different kinds of talk” (p. 6). In extending the three talk model, the 
Implement-SDM model (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019) continues to hold these 
communication processes as central and therefore retains this advantage. Of course, neither 
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model is a language and social interaction model of SDM despite the commendable 
acknowledgement of complex communicative practices and processes in SDM. Indeed, while 
I expressed support for these models in chapter 1 and have made frequent reference to them 
throughout the thesis, I did not endorse them unequivocally and without critique. Chief 
among these critiques was the absence of an empirical grounding in the observable 
interactive conduct of parties to a decision from real examples of treatment appointments in 
the three talk model. The Implement-SDM model began to address this concern with the use 
of empirical qualitative analysis, but the incorporation of language and social interaction 
research has been slow. As such, there is both encouragement and apprehension as my 
contributions might be well received but join other largely unheeded language and social 
interaction insights. As the authors suggested that the Implement-SDM model might 
subsequently form the basis for training and implementing SDM I wish to discuss it further.  
 
The first point is that the expansions of the conduct and stages of talk in the three talk model 
(Elwyn et al., 2017) observed by the authors (Joseph-Williams et al., 2019) are instructive for 
better understanding SDM as a distributed process occurring across phases. This distribution 
of decision-making fits with Rapley’s (2008) argument that decision-making is distributed 
and my observations of distinct orientations to decision-making as a process, act, or 
requirement. Furthermore, I commend the authors for focusing on attempts to accomplish 
SDM in situ rather than presuming SDM occurs and attempting an operationalised quality 
assessment. This approach to the research is admirable for prioritising empirical 
observational evidence ahead of theoretical conceptualisations, which I suggest is 
underutilised in SDM models. Joseph-Williams and colleagues (2019), then, make an 
insightful contribution to studying and understanding SDM while also encouraging continued 
engagement with an empirical observational focus on in situ conduct. In demonstrating 
support for the three talk model (Elwyn et al., 2017) and also highlighting the additive value 
of in situ empirical observation, the work makes a promising contribution. In turn, I wish to 
see further empirical insights built into the overwhelmingly theoretical area of SDM models 
and subsequent models grounded in empirical analysis.  
 
Given the ultra-empirical focus of my research, I wish to see continued engagement with 
SDM through an empirical observational lens but with increased granularity and specificity. 
A clear focus on the actual talk produced during the stages of talk observed and interrogation 
of the link between that talk and the actions accomplished. I believe that most interested 
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parties are aware of the general philosophical principle of collaboratively agreeing an, 
ideally, preference-shaped decision underpinning SDM (Charles et al., 1997). By contrast, I 
suggest fewer might be able to speak confidently on the interactive conduct consequential for 
involving patients’ preferences in treatment decisions and potentially facilitating or impeding 
SDM. Absent detailed knowledge of the interactive machinery of SDM and construction of 
patients’ preferences in situ, we risk relying on non-empirical conceptualisations of conduct. 
To reiterate, I commend the qualitative work performed and simply wish for further 
engagement and increasingly fine-grained detail. I consider a fine-grained focus on 
interactive detail key for empirically interrogating actual SDM attempts, as they occur, away 
from the expectations of theory. For instance, this approach revealed the distinct patterns of 
receipt and handling for patients’ preferences per their sequential and institutional 
implications in chapter 5.  
 
That said, there is space both for an encouraging response to my suggestions and for a clear 
reminder that the talk assigned to these three distinct stages of talk can and do occur 
throughout the entire appointment. Indeed, in my dataset, patients that presented firm 
preferences often did so at the beginning of the appointment and constructed them as 
informed rather than initial preferences (Elwyn et al., 2017). Across these considerations and 
suggestions, it is worth recalling that decisions are considered shared if each party agrees to 
the course of action, regardless of whether the option is mutually preferred (Charles et al., 
1997). As such, the concept of SDM might be understood as varying between the illnesses, 
conditions, and clinical settings. Indeed, variations between pre-dialysis and breast cancer 
decision-making conversations were reported in the Implement-SDM model (Joseph-
Williams et al., 2019). For example, we would expect to see extensive engagement with and 
involvement of patients’ preferences in preference sensitive decisions such as prostate cancer 
(Sommers et al., 2007). By contrast, preferences might figure less in decisions between 
treatments with equivalent effectiveness. The goal of SDM would be shared across these 
conversations but the extent of preference involvement might differ.   
 
On the topic of clinical equipoise, this remains a key point when we consider decision-
making for prostate cancer treatment. I expected clinical equipoise to pose a problem for 
decision-making, but I instead observed that trouble occurred when patients produced an 
impossible preference that constrained the CNS’s options. In turn, CNSs responded by doing 
impartiality, which fulfilled the sequential obligation to respond and the institutional 
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obligation not to sanction unfeasible preferences. Of course, the trouble is between what that 
patient wants, but is unfeasible or impossible, and that CNS’s inability to give the patient 
what they want while being obliged to respond. By contrast, I observed evidence of a clinical 
recommendation for surgery as the initial treatment, which might reduce the problem of 
equipoise. I note, however, that while a clinical recommendation for surgery was observed, 
CNSs resisted patients’ attempts to solicit a best treatment. In my dataset, a plausible 
alternative to the problem of equipoise might be the problem of patients’ impossible 
preferences. To expand, when a patient prefers to avoid needles (extract 4.6) or states that 
incontinence is intolerable (extract 5.7), there is no answer for this impossibility comparable 
to the clinical recommendation.  
 
Clinical nurse specialists can do little with impossible preferences and this might be a factor 
in their doing impartiality. Patients, then, are constrained in the extent to which their 
preference can influence their ultimate treatment, and CNSs are similarly constrained in 
means of involving patients’ preference. I have suggested previously that CNSs might 
attempt further engagement with patients about preferences they find impossible. I would 
suggest that it could be valuable if patients were given interactional slots and spaces to tell 
their stories and prompted to give accounts even if these slots are not taken. My reasoning is 
that even if a shared decision cannot fully incorporate the patient’s preference, because of 
impossibility, the stories and accounts around the preference can involve the preference 
meaningfully and give a sense of involvement to the patient. For example, we saw 
storytelling in extract 4.7 used to give voice to concerns, experiences, and the practicalities of 
post-treatment life. In turn, it might help reduce decisional regret and leave patients less 
likely to feel that they were insufficiently involved in the decision-making process. The 
decision is therefore made more fully in the spirit of SDM as an ethical and admirable idea 
rather than procedural box-ticking. 
 
7.5 Future directions  
The findings that I report provide novel contributions to both the SDM and language and 
social interaction literatures. That said, these findings cannot and do not stand as a 
comprehensive statement on patients’ preferences. I would argue that a comprehensive 
statement is unfeasible because of the scope of encounters where patients’ preferences are 
relevant. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of preferences and preference construction projects 
 
 280 
observed suggest there is a wealth of possibilities. As it stands, then, my research stands as 
the first discursive psychological study of patient preference construction, and one of the few 
studies of in situ patient preference work. There remains much to investigate to attempt a 
comprehensive answer to the question of how patients’ preferences influence treatment 
decision-making. Indeed, despite the insight my findings provide, there are also further 
questions that they prompt. There are questions about SDM at large which merit further 
consideration and future research, which I will consider later. To begin this section, however, 
I will propose some suggestions for further research into patients’ preferences.  
To extend the research agenda that I have staked out, I believe it is necessary to continue with 
language and social interaction research. For one, the notion that patients’ preferences are 
constructed has a solid basis (Elwyn & Miron-Shatz, 2010) and I provide context-specific 
examples of constructed preferences and construction projects. Therefore, one particularly 
important avenue for future research is the interactive construction of patients’ preferences. 
Building on my research into prostate cancer, preference-sensitive treatment decisions would 
be an ideal area to pursue due to a reasonable expectation of preference talk. If we were to 
observe the interactive construction of preferences, then we would begin to know more about 
the robustness of preferences as constructed in situ and their forms. This means ascertaining 
just how generic and reproducible the phenomenon of preference construction is in situ and 
across contexts. Of course, there might also be insight as to whether the machinery of 
construction itself has stable and reproducible features, beyond its unified outcome of 
constructing a preference.  
While preference-sensitive diseases might be the most pertinent contexts for understanding 
preference construction, preferences remain a core essential element of SDM more generally. 
As such, the follow-up research would necessarily broaden out to other contexts where 
options and choice exists, and by extension the possibility of making a preference-shaped 
shared decision. An interesting, and perhaps stubborn, impediment to this machinery of 
preference might exist in treatment discussions for less preference-sensitive diseases. For 
instance, when a treatment decision needs to be made and the impossible preference must be 
addressed before a decision is endorsed. The context of decision-making and orientations to 
patients’ impossible preferences might be markedly different in non-preference-sensitive 
diseases. This difference could be that while patients’ impossible preferences might impede 
decision-making progress; patients’ preferences might also be more tightly constrained by the 
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presence of a gold standard treatment. The issue of clinical equipoise did not come out 
prominently in my findings, but this does not entail that reduced preference sensitivity in 
other decision-making contexts wouldn’t prove influential for decision-making.  
Although this next point is not strictly an empirical one, it is a hope I have for the future of 
SDM and patients’ preferences. That is, that further discussion can be had about the merits 
and appropriateness of the term preferences in the context of SDM. It is hopefully clear from 
the rationale and aims for my research that I believe there needs to be a far more central role 
for language and social interaction research and findings in SDM. Both as part of the research 
agenda that drives the development of SDM and as the components and related 
characterisation that makes SDM intelligible and actionable. While this is a belief that I made 
clear from the beginning, the need for a discussion about the term preferences arose from my 
data and subsequent analysis. Obviously, the findings of my study would require replication 
across other preference-sensitive decision-making contexts before making any bold claims. 
When one considers that the literature shows inconsistent definitions (Street et al., 2012), 
poor and infrequent attempts to incorporate patients’ preferences (Couët et al., 2015), and 
little relationship between preferences and treatment decisions (Sommers et al., 2008; Scherr 
et al., 2017) then the case grows stronger. Moreover, when one adds the conversation analytic 
work that reveals how patients’ preferences can be undermined during elicitation (Landmark 
et al., 2016) there is certainly grounds for further discussion. 
Due to the scale of SDM as a research topic and the healthcare aim, there is significant scope 
for future research. Further to the directions already outlined, there is also the potential to 
explore the handling of dispreference and uncertainty. My research began to hint at both 
notions, particularly around the aspect of side effects, and they appear viable research topics. 
However, a full investigation would require its own substantial work to do justice to those 
topics. It would, of course, be instructive to characterise the ways that expressions of 
dispreference were handled, since these are intimately linked to preferences and perform 
similar pragmatic functions. Uncertainty would form a proximal topic to preferences based 
on my observations from this dataset but would be relevant to and useful for SDM. For 
instance, fellow researchers might ask what role uncertainty has in constructions or 
formulations of preference. Furthermore, what impact does the handling of uncertainty have 
on patients’ preferences and the decision-making business of the appointment. Naturally, the 
handling of dispreference could receive similar treatment and questions of this nature be just 
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as easily applied to that investigation. In any case, both topics and sets of questions would be 
excellent directions for future research. Moreover, both directions could make useful 
contributions to the study of SDM as it happens in situ. In turn, expanding and enriching our 
understanding of SDM with their potential consequences being practical implementable 
strategies for clinicians. 
Additional scope exists for research into laughter, particularly in healthcare settings and 
specifically cancer care appointments. Wayne Beach has been influential in the study of 
cancer care from the conversation analytic perspective (Beach, 2003, 2004) and has recently 
investigated the role of laughter. While I echoed Beach and Prickett (2017) in observing that 
laughter often functioned to soften a delicate or poignant moment, the pattern of laughter 
distribution I observed was notably different. Indeed, the prevalence and function of CNS 
laughter was closest to Ragan’s (1990) work on gynaecological appointments in being 
prosocial, potentially face-saving, and often a shared action. As such, not only would it be 
insightful to further investigate the role of laughter in cancer appointments to check my 
findings, but to explore laughter in personally sensitive treatment appointments. By 
personally sensitive, I mean illnesses or issues that relate to intimate anatomy or effects such 
as the cervix and vagina or prostate and penis. This additional sensitivity factor would be 
interesting for an explanation of how exactly laughter serves a function, and how that 
function can be responsive to the institutional situatedness of the appointments. Naturally, 
research into laughter and its function can be expanded for other professions. Perhaps some 
promising candidates might include mediation or legal counsel, as examples of serious 
encounters where one might expect to observe delicate or poignant moments. 
My final suggestion for future research directions focuses squarely on practical application 
and clinical implementation. This direction is research into training clinicians, in this case 
CNSs, in the handling of patients’ preferences and approach to SDM. I have previously 
mentioned the Conversation Analytic Roleplaying Method (Stokoe, 2014), with fair grounds 
for caution about communication training as a universal fix (Pilnick & Dingwall, 2011), and 
discussed interaction analysis systems at length in chapter 2 (Roter, 1977). The suggestion, 
then, is to engage in a programme of intervention research that draws on and marries the 
respective strengths of these instructive approaches. Despite their methodological differences, 
the Roter interaction analysis system (Roter & Larson, 2002) and the Conversation Analytic 
Roleplaying Method (Stokoe, 2014) are both well-established programmes with 
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demonstrable track records of empirical contributions. In turn, my suggestion would pull 
together these unique strengths and scopes into a collaborative and multifaceted intervention 
research programme fixed on the feasibility and utility of the insights generated and 
subsequently tested. There are two ways of running this programme and it could be tried in 
either order depending on whether prioritising academic or practical evidence.  
The first order is to generate an insight such as the finding from chapter 6 that laughter was 
relevant for both preference construction and SDM and prepare a suitable proposal for an 
intervention study. For example, per Roter’s (1977) classic study, developing an intervention 
for patients and clinicians that provides information about and encourages appropriate 
laughter. The intervention can then be subjected to random trialling and if results are positive 
then there are two distinct but complementary evidential bodies plus preliminary practical 
support. An approach like this has been advocated for by researchers interested in language 
and social interaction and experimental psychology (de Ruiter & Albert, 2017; Albert & de 
Ruiter, 2018). The reasoning behind this advocacy being that the experimental approach 
often disregards the context of a discovery while, for instance, conversation analysis builds 
this context into its findings (de Ruiter & Albert, 2017). Taken together, then, a theory or 
intervention developed out of a combination of the two would be robust, significant, and both 
grounded in and close to the ways that the phenomena function in everyday life. In terms of 
academic rigour this approach might be the best choice as the collaborative evidential body 
may be significant in convincing relevant stakeholders.  
In terms of clinical priority, I would suggest that the reflexive interviewing mentioned in 
section 7.5 would be an intervention to prioritise. Again, it would be quite possible to 
combine an intervention for increasing the presence or quantity of reflexive interviewing with 
the naturalistic study of the conversations that implement the intervention. Such an 
intervention, be it a script or tool for use in the appointment, could outline operationalised 
instance of phenomena or practices considered to demonstrate or typify reflexive 
interviewing and subsequently be measured and assessed by both quantitative and language 
and social interaction benchmarks. A similar combined approach would certainly be 
advantageous for attempts to improve the treatment decision-making process for prostate 
cancer patients, while I continue to advocate strongly for more language and social 
interaction research to build a characterisation of patients’ preferences as empirical 
analytically tractable phenomena.  
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That said, there is a more straightforward way of focusing directly on application and that is 
to feed into clinicians directly by tailoring the insights from an empirical observational study 
such as this one. There would be a clear pipeline, then, between the insights generated from 
the findings and the clinicians and their work implementing them to attempt SDM. Again, 
there are two ways that this application work could be attempted. One is to characterise the 
insights and provide examples of the forms and consequences of the interactive actions to 
give interested clinicians. This approach is likely closer to the idea of communication training 
that could be delivered in a short institutionally run training event. A more reflective 
alternative would be to provide clinicians with audio or video data examples of the 
interactive behaviour and insights that would be characterised by a language and social 
interaction study. In a similar fashion to how clinicians would take video recordings home 
with them to make notes and study, they could do this with the insights and interventions 
being suggested for SDM practice.  
In either case the focus would be on familiarising clinicians with the insights and suggestions 
for how to implement them in clinical practice. Observation of subsequent appointments with 
clinicians who received the insights could then be undertaken and the interactions 
investigated in a similarly fine-grained microanalytic manner. This would also represent a 
logical extension of the work that the Implement-SDM model performed when it analysed 
consultations with practitioners trained in SDM skills derived from the three talk model 
(Joseph-Williams et al., 2019). Of course, the judgement on effectiveness would differ 
markedly from the other approach previously proposed and would need to be made 
abundantly clear. A combined approach could be taken later but the primary focus would be 
on empirical observation rather than statistical significance. As such, we would be looking to 
direct observation of appointments for outcomes and again be detaching from more 
operational measures of SDM and some of their issues, which I discussed in chapter 1. The 
two approaches exist in proximity, however, because I believe that both orders of approach 
are similarly feasible and hold potential for additive contributions differing simply in their 
primary focus being either immediately academic or practical. 
As may have become apparent throughout this thesis, it is not particularly easy to reduce the 
discursive constructive work into a neat road map. Moreover, there remains much work to be 
done before we have reliable additive SDM tools. Although, there are promising signs with 
preference assessments (Shirk et al., 2017) that might be bolstered by language and social 
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interaction research. While this research is not presupposing any specific knowledge of 
healthcare communication or implementation training, the language and social interaction 
research can be combined with numerical coding or quantitative aspects of study design. For 
instance, Stivers (2015) makes the case that conversation analysis already performs a kind of 
coding where the distributional evidence of phenomena occurs in building collections of 
phenomena. There is also evidence of successful interweaving of coding and conversation 
analysis studies such as Heritage and colleagues’ (2007) study of using some versus any in 
addressing patients’ additional concerns. Moreover, conversation analysis and multivariate 
analyses have been successfully combined to reveal that inappropriate prescribing in 
paediatric encounters occurred more frequently when clinicians believed parents expected 
antibiotics (Mangione-Smith et al., 2006). As such, there is clear scope to take this 
programme forward and demonstrations that such an approach can generate robust instructive 
findings. All of which is promising and should be seized upon in service of advancing our 
understanding of patients’ preferences and SDM in ways facilitative of routine 
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Jefferson Transcription Conventions 
 
The following are based on and taken from Jefferson (2004) except for the final convention 
which is my own 
 
(0.2) Numbers in parentheses indicate time gaps in tenths of seconds 
 
(.) A full stop in brackets denotes a pause smaller than two tenths of a second 
 
[Words] Square brackets represent concurrent speech with the left bracket indicating onset 
and the right bracket the end of overlapping talk 
 
= Equals signs indicate contiguity between utterances, such that speech is latched and there 
are no pauses between interlocutors 
 
> < More than and less signs are markers of notable changes in the pace of speech. When 
pointed >inwards< utterances are produced quicker and when pointed <outwards> the 
production is notably slower 
 
£ A pound sign is used for representing smiley voice, which means that the interlocutor is 
smiling while speaking 
 
: Colons indicate that an utterance is being prolonged with more colons meaning greater 
prolongation  
 
.h A full stop preceding a lower case “h” indicates an audible inbreath and the more “h”s 
there are the longer the inbreath 
 
h A “h” with no full stop preceding represents an audible outbreath and the more “h”s there 
are the longer the outbreath  
 




(h) A “h” within brackets indicates either breathiness within the utterance or laughter 
particles interpolated with the utterance  
 
Words Underlining a word indicates that it is being emphasised  
 
↑ ↓ Up or downwards pointing arrows indicate marked shifts in the pitch of a production  
 
( ) Empty brackets indicate inaudible productions that could not be transcribed 
 
(Words) Words within brackets indicate a best guess at uncertain productions that could not 
be transcribed confidently  
 
((Words)) Words within double brackets are descriptions of non-verbal context such as 
background noises   
 
° ° Words enclosed within degree signs indicate notably quieter productions than the 
surrounding speech  
 
WORDS Capital letters indicate that a production was produced at a notably higher volume 
and can be used for either individual letters or entire words  
 
. A full stop marks falling intonation at the end of an utterance 
 
, A comma indicates slight rising intonation at the end of an utterance 
 
? A question mark represents sharp rising intonation at the end of an utterance rather than a 
question 
 
Word Italicised words represent information that has been redacted to deidentify the 
interlocutor and mark these words as distinct from other material presented 
